Apparently the Allied assault on Normandy had achieved tactical surprise in spite of the enemy's awareness of an impending invasion. This success could be attributed in part to the fact that the enemy defense plan for the Atlantic Wall included basic miscalculations and in addition could never be fully put into effect because of German helplessness in the air and the steady attrition of German forces on two other major fronts. The German effort to build permanent coastal defenses had been handicapped throughout the winter both by the inability of the crowded and bombed railroads to carry sufficient building materials and by the higher priority for men and materials which was assigned to the V-Bomb sites. Those defenses which were completed were concentrated most heavily in the area between the Somme and Seine Rivers which the Commander in Chief West consistently estimated as the most likely spot for an Allied invasion attempt. This region presented the most direct way to the Ruhr and from its excellent port, Le Havre, a fine road net led to the interior. Moreover, some effort had also to be expended to meet Hitler's insistence on maximum defense of the Channel Islands. It was not until May 1944, when the imminence of a landing became obvious to all, that Hitler reportedly foresaw, by "intuition," the likelihood of an assault on the Cotentin Peninsula. At that time it was too late to improve the fixed defenses. But additional antiaircraft and antitank weapons were emplaced in the peninsula, one more division (the 91st) was moved there, and units were supplied with "extra weapons mainly of a type useful in combating airborne troops."
Though the landings in Normandy might have been foreseen. it was not considered likely that they would constitute the main Allied effort. For weeks after the Normandy invasion Hitler and his generals continued to expect a second major effort in the Somme area and kept the Fifteenth Army there to meet it.
The army high command also found it difficult to agree on the best method of dealing with the invasion once it struck. One faction of the high command wanted to retain the bulk of the armored reserves well inland for eventual employment in mass counterattack. Field Marshal Rommel, on the other hand, was adamant in his contention that all reserves should be moved in as close to the coast as possible. He thought that it would be impossible to throw back an invasion once it had gained a foothold and that Allied air power would make impracticable extended troop movements. His view, backed by prior experience in North Africa, prevailed and in May three of the four armored divisions in strategic reserve, the 21st Panzer Division, 12th SS-Panzer Division, and 2d Panzer Division, were moved into Normandy proper-one to the south of Caen and two to the Alencon-Evreux region. Henceforth the Germans were committed to the coastal areas as their main line of resistance with all the dangers inherent in such an extended linear defense.
If there were some doubts on the wisdom of the plan, there were none on what was at stake. The Germans recognized from the beginning that failure to repel the invasion at the outset would rapidly unbalance both their tactical and strategic positions. Given a foothold, the Americans and British could ultimately win the race for the build-up of men and supplies, and so make it impossible to dislodge the enemy forces. But if the landings could be pushed back into the sea at once, it as likely that invasion would not be attempted again in the near future and perhaps not at all. Germany would then have a large part of the sixty western divisions for use as reserves against the Russians.
Considering the importance attached to fast and total reaction to any attempt to crack the Atlantic Wall, it is notable that so little German air power was used against the beachheads. Apparently Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, considered at one time the possibility of committing the whole of his fighter force against the expected invasion, but was forced to abandon the idea. Allied bombings had hit hard at Luftwaffe ground installations in France, and by moving large numbers of fighters to France, months ahead of time, the Luftwaffe would have been inviting destructive fights with Allied planes which it could not afford. Moreover, Goering was reluctant for obvious political as well as military reasons to strip Germany of fighter protection.
Two 386th Bomb Group's planes over Utah Beach heading back to base after mission. Great aerial view of Utah Beach after invasion forces moved inland. Extremely accurate low level bombing just 5 minutes before first forces landed enabled an unheard of low total of casualties. Beach is littered with landing craft and bomb craters which created instant fox holes for our troops. The enemy was killed, wounded or so stunned they offered little or no resistance.
Even though Allied control of the air and sea, together with bad weather, had curtailed German reconnaissance, enemy intelligence had secured a fairly accurate picture of Allied strength and estimated that the invasion would come as soon after 1 April as weather permitted. Yet the Germans had no knowledge of Allied plans for artificial ports and they under estimated the speed with which the build-up could take place across the beaches. Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl figured that the landing of about six American divisions across open beaches would require from five to six days and thought that within that time the German tactical reserves could be committed in a main counterattack. Actually the early build-up was much more rapid-within four days six and one-half divisions were ashore-and the movement of German troops took three or four times longer than expected. Despite the German command's estimate in May that an Allied invasion attempt was imminent, the actual landfall on 6 June took the enemy by surprise. Field Marshal Rommel was not present at the front, and the troops in the sector attacked had been taken out of their defense positions to construct additional fortifications.
Word of the Allied landings reached Hitler's headquarters about four hours after the first airborne troops came down in the peninsula, but it was not until several hours later that the landings were reported as part of a full-scale invasion and not until late in the day that even the Seventh Army realized that seaborne landings had taken place at Utah. The German high command released two of the four armored divisions in Seventh Army reserve for employment in Normandy; the expectation was that these reserves would arrive in the battle area by the end of D Day. The Sturm Battalion AOK 7 (Assault Battalion, Seventh Army) was ordered from Cherbourg into the beachhead sector. But generally the Seventh Army command was sure that the coastal forces could cope with the invaders. No other major troop shifts were ordered at the time. The German command still feared further landings elsewhere on the French coast, especially in the area between the Somme and Seine Rivers.
4th Division troops shelter behind a concrete wall while others advance off the beach
The disposition of the enemy forces in the Cotentin largely confirmed Allied estimates of the enemy Order of Battle prior to D Day. Manning the coastal defenses at Utah Beach was the 919th Regiment of the 709th Division. Other units of this division (729th and 739th Regiments) were identified as they reached the battle area from positions farther up the coast. It developed that there was no Georgian regiment in the 709th Division as believed in G-2 estimates prior to D Day, but the 729th Regiment had an 0st Battalion (the 649th), and the 739th Regiment a Georgian battalion (the 795th), the latter of which was encountered in the Ste. Mere-Eglise area. Both the 795th Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 919th Regiment (which was at Utah Beach), lost communications with higher headquarters early on D Day. Elements of the latter escaped over the Carentan Canal and joined other German units southeast of the Douve River.
Pre-D-Day intelligence had placed only the 716th Division southeast of Carentan, but elements of the 352d Division had also moved into this area. The 6th Parachute Regiment, located near Carentan, had not been listed separately in VII Corps' enemy Order of Battle, but had been mentioned in intelligence reports of higher headquarters as part of the 91st Division. The 1057th and 1058th Regiments, also part of this division, were identified along the Merderet as expected.
Covering the west coast of the Cotentin was the 243 Division, with about half its personnel manning beach fortifications and the remainder occupying higher ground a few kilometers inland, with the mission of breaking up any attempted airborne attack. This division was in the process of reorganization which would have upgraded it from its limited employment category and given it greater mobility. Its retraining and reequipment, however, had not been completed. Units of the division were ordered to regroup eastward early on D Day and were identified in the invasion area a few days later.
Unpreparedness of the enemy in ground and air defense, his indecision which tied up reserves, and his miscalculation of both his own and Allied capabilities played perhaps as important a part in allowing Allied forces to establish a foothold on the Continent on D Day as the efforts of the assaulting troops themselves. In the week that followed, the same enemy weaknesses, exploited in particular by overwhelming Allied air power which provided time for powerful build-up over the beaches, was to insure that Allied invasion forces had come to stay.
Additional Sources:
www.history.navy.mil
users.skynet.be
www.normandybattlefields.com
www.tuxjunction.net
www.bbc.co.uk
www.planetrainbowsix.com
www.jack-travel.com
search.eb.com
www.skylighters.org
pages.zdnet.com
