Posted on 01/14/2026 9:39:14 AM PST by ebb tide
The Extraordinary Consistory, convened by Pope Leo XIV on January 7 and 8, represented a very important and significant moment for understanding the direction that the life of the Church will take in the coming months or even years; yet its real meaning goes far beyond apparent institutional formality.
The event—first point to be underlined—coincided with the conclusion of the Jubilee of 2025 proclaimed by Pope Francis and therefore, according to numerous observers, it would have marked the concrete beginning of the pontificate of Prevost, a pope who, though formally “moderate,” today appears as the guarantor of cohesion among opposing currents within the Church, rather than as the primary custodian of the Catholic faith.
At the outset of the Consistory, it was rapidly decided to reduce the themes from four to two, by vote. The overwhelming majority of the cardinals chose to discuss synodality and mission in the modern world.
The convocation of cardinals from all over the world to Rome had been announced last November 2025 through a letter from Cardinal Re, which was promptly “leaked” and published in the Italian and then the American media already on December 16, 2025.
Officially, according to what transpired, the cardinals were to be called to discuss four major themes: a deeper examination of the Apostolic Constitution Praedicate Evangelium on the organization of the Roman Curia, particularly regarding the relationship of governance between the Holy See and the local Churches; the modalities of the Church’s “mission” in the modern world in light of Francis’s Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium; liturgical peace; and finally, the question of Synodality.
Attention: as journalist Nico Spuntoni specified to me at the time, with regard to liturgical peace, the issue would not have concerned exclusively and explicitly the restoration of the Traditional Mass and the overcoming of Traditionis Custodes, as some Vatican watchers had hoped, but, in a broader sense, the possible need to intervene in some way in the liturgy (let us not forget that Koch’s project of an “Hybrid Rite” is still in some Vatican drawer, ready to be exhumed).
However, during the Consistory, it was then rapidly decided to reduce the themes from four to two, by vote. The overwhelming majority of the cardinals chose to discuss synodality and mission in the modern world.
The cardinals who had prepared to intervene on liturgy or on relations with the local Churches were placed in evident difficulty and embarrassment, while those who had prepared in advance on the themes of synodality and “mission” prevailed.
Thus, we are forced to note a first peculiar development of this first Extraordinary Consistory of Pope Leo: the cardinals who had prepared to intervene on liturgy or on relations with the local Churches were placed in evident difficulty and embarrassment, while those who had prepared in advance on the themes of synodality and “mission” prevailed. These, evidently, are those most aligned with progressive and Bergoglian thinking, hostile with or even unconcerned about the ongoing liturgical disputes.
The choice of moderators for the three sessions, all progressive figures—Radcliffe, Tolentino, and Tagle—is certainly not accidental, but indicative of this tendency: control of the discourse and of the agenda was strategically entrusted to those who represent the most active Bergoglian legacy. Even the inversion of the conventional organization had a very practical effect. Whereas, in the past, the plenary sessions of Synods and Consistories with the free interventions of cardinals preceded the work and the votes, on this occasion the opposite occurred: first the votes, then the interventions.
In this way, as is easy to intuit, any “critical” cardinals could do nothing other than express, once everything had already been decided, their dissent or doubts, and nothing more, as in the best Western democratic traditions.
No less worrying, at least from the point of view of symbolic evocation and imagery, was the use of round tables according to the already tested synodal logic, which divided the cardinals by linguistic criterion and in fact led to the isolation of certain categories—in particular the older and non-electors. This operation is not merely organizational, let it be well understood: it is a clear instrument of control and marginalization of dissent (see here what was declared by the heroic Cardinal Joseph Zen).
In fact, in the days following the Extraordinary Consistory, several cardinals admitted their discontent to the Italian blog Messainlatino, without however having the courage to put their faces to it.
The “Bergoglian Terror” (which, in the past, had led to the denial of the cardinal’s stipend to Raymond Leo Burke or to the drafting of a programmatic letter, anonymous for fear of retaliation, published in February 2024) is still present, and is demonstrated by the manifest reluctance of several “dissatisfied” cardinals to expose themselves openly.
In fact, in the days following the Extraordinary Consistory, several cardinals admitted their discontent to the Italian blog Messainlatino, without however having the courage to put their faces to it. This widespread sense of fear within the College partly explains the silence of many high prelates in the face of choices and acts of Leo XIV clearly in contrast with the doctrine and perennial Catholic practice (first among all, highly questionable episcopal appointments).
The Consistory confirmed the predominance of the Secretariat of the Synod in the organization of events. The images published by Vatican media, with the most progressive cardinals constantly behind Pope Leo XIV, reinforce the idea of a Pontiff engaged in mediating between opposing currents, out of love for internal power balances and under the influence of Francis’s heirs.
It was possible to note the constant presence of Tagle, Tolentino, Grech, Radcliffe (who paved the way with an interview to The Telegraph), Fernández, and other figures of the same line, a sign that the true engine of decisions remains the Bergoglian Party, determined to rapidly consolidate the “synodalization” of the Church and to make the neo-modernist drift irreversible.
It is therefore increasingly evident that the Synod on Synodality is nothing other than the attempt to propose a Third Vatican Council under false pretenses, with all the consequences this entails for the Catholic Church.
The fact that non-elector cardinals and even many curial cardinals were strategically excluded clearly shows what the priority is: to give voice and weight to the Bergoglian-synodal current, while other voices—not only those of conservatives, but even those of less “aligned” progressives—are marginalized.
The announcement that the extraordinary Consistory will become annual, that the Ecclesial Assembly has been confirmed for October 2028, and that this will serve as the culmination of the implementation of the Synod on synodality confirms the intention to proceed, with apparent prudence, toward the full implementation of reforms initiated by others.
As explained by Cardinal Grech in March 2025, the Ecclesial Assembly will not be a new synod, but the phase of implementation of the Final Document of the Synod on synodality, recognized by Francis as part of the ordinary magisterium (claimed to be infallible). It is therefore increasingly evident that the Synod on Synodality is nothing other than the attempt to propose a Third Vatican Council under false pretenses, with all the consequences this entails for the Catholic Church.
According to its promoters, such a Synod must in fact pass through three phases: listening (2022–2023), discernment (2024), and implementation (2025–2030). Now, we have entered the third and final phase.
The profile of Pope Leo XIV, confirmed by the Consistory, is once again that of a revolutionary of deceleration, but inclusive, favorable to maintaining unity among doctrinal, moral, and liturgical opposites. His conception of the Church and of the Papacy is strongly of a “Montinian” stamp: an almost parliamentary structure, one might say, in which the College of Cardinals and the Episcopal Conferences of the entire world assume roles analogous to those of an Upper House and a Lower House of a modern State.
This also explains why, recently, the Vatican has “dusted off” an old shelved project of Paul VI, that of drafting a Fundamental Law of the Church, that is, a sort of Constitution from which every canonical codification would derive. Curiously, this project has been presented by the Dicastery for Legislative Texts as “conciliar and synodal.” Ante litteram, one might say.
In light of all this, the Bergoglian Party still exercises a decisive function, although Francis is dead and Prevost himself does not belong—strictly speaking—to this progressive faction, today the majority.
A jus-positivist approach that betrays the inferiority complex that, for decades, certain high-ranking Catholics have had toward the institutionalized powers of modernity.
In light of all this, the Bergoglian Party still exercises a decisive function, although Francis is dead and Prevost himself does not belong—strictly speaking—to this progressive faction, today the majority. Nonetheless, as we have highlighted in other recent analyses, they largely dictate the Pope’s agenda and want to “keep accelerating” the process of synodalization initiated in the Church by Francis. After all, Prevost was voted for (also) by them and cannot fail to harbor toward them a feeling of “moral debt.”
The “Left of the College,” to use language borrowed from the modern political-parliamentary sphere, to which unfortunately the Church in its highest hierarchies seems to refer (although publicly it tends and will always tend to deny it), is not uniform, contrary to what one might commonly think.
The reformist tactics devised and carried out by progressive high prelates change depending on schools of thought and neo-modernist currents of belonging. In my view, we could divide the Left of the College into four major sections, as in the scheme below.
The largest section remains, as stated, what I have defined as the “Bergoglian Party,” that is, those who, like their progenitor, are revolutionaries of acceleration but exclusive, that is, they hope that the much-desired “reforms,” to be brought to completion as soon as possible, will cause or provoke the exit or at least the radical marginalization of all those fringes considered dangerous because reactionary, conservative, traditionalist, and little inclined toward worldliness.
There are then those cardinals who, while sharing with the Bergoglians the necessity of overturning the Church in its nature and structure, nevertheless believe that the best strategy to achieve this objective is not the forced exclusion of complaining “nostalgics,” but their welcome. In other words, one should give the “enemies” a place in the New Church in order to keep them placated.
These are therefore called revolutionaries of acceleration, but inclusive (or liberal, if you will), and among their ranks we find cardinals who, in the time of Francis, obtained much influence and much power, such as the head of the Italian bishops Matteo Maria Zuppi or the Sant’Egidio member from Marseille, Jean-Marc Aveline.
We then find the area of belonging of Pope Leo XIV himself, that is, revolutionaries of deceleration (like Parolin) but inclusive (like Zuppi and Aveline). These want to keep the traditional ecclesial edifice standing in its external forms, while progressively transforming its doctrinal, moral, and juridical foundations, trusting that apparent continuity will defuse any real resistance.
However, during the reign of Leo XIV, these seem destined for scant fortune, although their vote—as was whispered in the days following the Conclave—indicated the desire to leave behind the totalitarianisms of the Jesuit Pope and the hope of receiving from the Augustinian of Chicago even greater recognition.
Moreover, we have the revolutionaries of deceleration, that is, those who want to apply in the Catholic Church the revolutionary strategy that, from a historical point of view, has always proven most successful, namely Fabianism or the “Overton window”: liturgical, doctrinal, and moral reforms must be very gradual, almost imperceptible, so as to persuade, if possible, even the most conservative Catholics of the goodness of their intentions.
Among these, some are exclusive, that is, they want to exclude from the outset the most conservative, especially those attached to Traditional liturgical forms: what has been laboriously “reformed” thus far with the boiled-frog technique cannot be undone. The prince of this party is certainly the Secretary of State, Pietro Parolin, not by chance considered by many laypeople and priests, especially in Italy, even a conservative figure of the Sacred College!
We then find the area of belonging of Pope Leo XIV himself, that is, revolutionaries of deceleration (like Parolin) but inclusive (like Zuppi and Aveline). These want to keep the traditional ecclesial edifice standing in its external forms, while progressively transforming its doctrinal, moral, and juridical foundations, trusting that apparent continuity will defuse any real resistance. For these, there is still room for dialogue and operativity, even for the most conservative and traditional.
In my view, the revolutionaries of acceleration are the most dangerous insofar as they provoke schisms and confusion among the laity (which, to date, remains largely conservative in the Catholic world) and among the clergy; the revolutionaries of deceleration, instead, appear more dangerous if we observe them from another perspective, namely from the fact that they do not present themselves and do not conceive of themselves as a phenomenon of rupture, but as “development”; not as revolution, but as “discernment.”
In this way, synodality no longer appears as an extraordinary event, but as the new constitutive principle of the Church, destined to relativize the Petrine Primacy, to dilute magisterial authority, and to subordinate revealed truth to the ecclesial consensus of the moment.
The extraordinary Consistory of January 2026 should not be read as a simple consultative moment, but as a decisive step in the attempt to refound the Church on procedural and parliamentary bases, foreign to its divine nature. Faced with this scenario, the problem is not so much to establish whether Leo XIV is progressive or moderate (as far as I am concerned, his position is clear), but whether he intends to exercise the munus of Saint Peter as custodian of the received Tradition or as arbiter of balances among opposing ideological forces.
For the Catholic faithful to the Church of all time, what is at stake is now clear: it is not a matter of liturgical preferences or pastoral sensitivities, but of the very survival of the Catholic form of the Church.
In times of institutionalized confusion, the only true reform remains that taught by the saints: the integral return to the faith, doctrine, morality, sacraments, and order willed by Our Lord Jesus Christ. Everything else, however skillfully disguised, is only ecclesiastical politics.
Ping
Pope Leo to fulfill Bergoglio’s goal to become Chaplain of the World Economic Forum as one of the equal world leaders of a Pan-Abrahamic religion while substituting an inoffensive sacramentally invalid pseudo-Eucharist for the True Bread of Life which alone is able to defeat Satan and save from hell.
[Catholic Caucus] Extraordinary Consistory: what is its true meaning? Wasn’t there a guy who got kicked out because he said some Italian word?
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