The Mystery of Iniquity

It has been called the Achilles’ heel of the Christian faith. Of course, I’m referring to the classical problem of the existence of evil. Philosophers such as John Stuart Mill have argued that the existence of evil demonstrates that God is either not omnipotent or not good and loving — the reasoning being that if evil exists apart from the sovereign power of God, then by resistless logic, God cannot be deemed omnipotent. On the other hand, if God does have the power to prevent evil but fails to do it, then this would reflect upon His character, indicating that He is neither good nor loving. Because of the persistence of this problem, the church has seen countless attempts at what is called theodicy. The term theodicy involves the combining of two Greek words: the word for God, theos, and the word for justification, dikaios. Hence, a theodicy is an attempt to justify God for the existence of evil (as seen, for instance, in John Milton’s Paradise Lost). Such theodicies have covered the gauntlet between a simple explanation that evil comes as a direct result of human free will or to more complex philosophical attempts such as that offered by the philosopher Leibniz. In his theodicy, which was satired by Voltaire’s Candide, Leibniz distinguished among three types of evil: natural evil, metaphysical evil, and moral evil. In this three-fold schema, Leibniz argued that moral evil is an inevitable and necessary consequence of finitude, which is a metaphysical lack of complete being. Because every creature falls short of infinite being, that shortfall must necessarily yield defects such as we see in moral evil. The problem with this theodicy is that it fails to take into account the biblical ideal of evil. If evil is a metaphysical necessity for creatures, then obviously Adam and Eve had to have been evil before the fall and would have to continue to be evil even after glorification in heaven.

To this date, I have yet to find a satisfying explanation for what theologians call the mystery of iniquity. Please don’t send me letters giving your explanations, usually focusing on some dimension of human free will. I’m afraid that many people fail to feel the serious weight of this burden of explanation. The simple presence of free will is not enough to explain the origin of evil, in as much as we still must ask how a good being would be inclined freely to choose evil. The inclination for the will to act in an immoral manner is already a signal of sin.

One of the most important approaches to the problem of evil is that set forth originally by Augustine and then later by Aquinas, in which they argued that evil has no independent being. Evil cannot be defined as a thing or as a substance or as some kind of being. Rather, evil is always defined as an action, an action that fails to meet a standard of goodness. In this regard, evil has been defined in terms of its being either a negation (negatio) of the good, or a privation (privatio) of the good. In both cases, the very definition of evil depends upon a prior understanding of the good. In this regard, as Augustine argued, evil is parasitic — that is, it depends upon the good for its very definition. We think of sin as something that is unrighteous, involving disobedience, immorality, and the like. All of these definitions depend upon the positive substance of the good for their very definition. Augustine argues that though Christians face the difficulty of explaining the presence of evil in the universe, the pagan has a problem that is twice as difficult. Before one can even have a problem of evil, one must first have an antecedent existence of the good. Those who complain about the problem of evil now also have the problem of defining the existence of the good. Without God there is no ultimate standard for the good.

In contemporary days, this problem has been resolved by simply denying both evil and good. Such a problem, however, faces enormous difficulties, particularly when one suffers at the hands of someone who inflicts evil upon them. It is easy for us to deny the existence of evil until we ourselves are victims of someone’s wicked action.

However, though we end our quest to answer the origin of evil, one thing is certain: since God is both omnipotent and good, we must conclude that in His omnipotence and goodness there must be a place for the existence of evil. We know that God Himself never does that which is evil. Nevertheless, He also ordains whatsoever comes to pass. Though He does not do evil and does not create evil, He does ordain that evil exists. If it does exist, and if God is sovereign, then obviously He must have been able to prevent its existence. If He allowed evil to enter into this universe, it could only be by His sovereign decision. Since His sovereign decisions always follow the perfection of His being, we must conclude that His decision to allow evil to exist is a good decision.

Again, we must be careful here. We must never say that evil is good, or that good is evil. But that is not the same thing as saying, “It is good that there is evil.” Again, I repeat, it is good that there is evil, else evil could not exist. Even this theodicy does not explain the “how” of the entrance of evil into the world. It only reflects upon the “why” of the reality of evil. One thing we know for sure is that evil does exist. It exists, if nowhere else, in us and in our behavior. We know that the force of evil is extraordinary and brings great pain and suffering into the world. We also know that God is sovereign over it and in His sovereignty will not allow evil to have the last word. Evil always and ever serves the ultimate best interest of God Himself. It is God in His goodness and in His sovereignty who has ordained the final conquest over evil and its riddance from His universe. In this redemption we find our rest and our joy — and until that time, we live in a fallen world.

God could have,

1. made us (and angels) with no moral standard or sense or deprived us from the moral ability to respond to or choose good [morally insensible].

2. granted us free moral agency, but never have given us anything to choose between [negation of moral choices].

3. called man to make the Creator their ultimate object of spiritual affection and allegiance and source of security is what is right and what is best for man, versus finite created beings or things, and provided moral revelation and influences. But always have moved us to do good, and never have allowed us to choose evil (such as make believing in God and choosing good so utterly compelling — like God appearing daily and doing miracles on demand, and preventing any seeming evidence to the contrary so that no man could attempt excuses [effective negation of any freedom to choose].

4. allowed us to do evil, but immediately reversed any effects [negation of moral consequences].

5. allowed us to do bad, but restricted us to a place where it would harm no one but ourselves [restriction of moral consequences].

6. allowed us to choose between good and evil, and to affect others by it, but not ultimately reward or punish us accordingly [negation of eternal consequences, positive or negative].

7. given us the ability to choose, and alternatives to chose from, and to face and overcome evil or be overcome by it, with the ability to effect others and things by our choices, and to exercise some reward or punishment in this life for morality, and ultimately reward or punishment all accordingly [pure justice].

8. restrained evil to some degree, while making the evil that man does to work out for the good of those who want good, and who thus love God, who is good.

9. in accordance with 8, the Creator could have chose to manifest Himself in the flesh, and by Him to provide man a means of escaping the ultimate retribution of Divine justice, and instead receive unmerited eternal favor, at God’s own expense and credit, appropriated by a repentant obedient faith, in addition to the loss or gaining of certain rewards based on one’s quality of work as a child of God. And eternally punish, to varying degrees, those whose response to God’s revelation manifested they want evil, [justice maintained while mercy and grace given].

http://www.conservapedia.com/Theodicy

But presumably Jesus chose Judas to be one of his disciples because He foresaw from the beginning that Judas would choose to betray Him.

Then why not let Judas be a farmer in China rather than condemn him to Hell??

That is part of the mystery that Romans 9 teaches.

Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory, (Romans 9:21-23)

"The Lord hath made all things for himself: yea, even the wicked for the day of evil." (Proverbs 16:4)

However, this does not mean God made them evil, but that He gave them light to obey, and ability to obey light, (Gn. 4:7) but let them reject it to do what they wanted, while others were given more grace, or of a greater kind.

Because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, (Romans 1:21-22)

Turn you at my reproof: behold, I will pour out my spirit unto you, I will make known my words unto you. Because I have called, and ye refused; I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; But ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I also will laugh at your calamity; I will mock when your fear cometh; (Proverbs 1:23-26)

Thus Judas and all the lost go to Hell due to their own choices, while the redeemed are so because God drew and convicted them, opened their hearts, and granted them repentant faith, (Jn. 6:44; 12:32; 16:9; Acts 11:18; 16:14; Eph. 2:8,9) both enabling and motivating them. so that in conversion man does what he otherwise could not and would not do.

Which is not unjust, as God owes no one any grace, and as in the parable of the labourers, (Mt. 20:1-16) He is free to give more grace to some than others, while the damned have rejected light and grace given to them.

God could have even brought Sodom to repentance, while with more grace and blessings comes more accountability.

And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to hell: for if the mighty works, which have been done in thee, had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day. (Matthew 11:23)

..For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more. (Luke 12:48)

In such cases of giving more grace to impenitent souls, they would have been better off if they did not see so much grace.

Yet as the story of John Newton examples, great grace can be given to an opposer of God so that he repents and believes on the Lord Jesus unto salvation.

But it is all of grace, and the judgment of God is according to righteousness. (Rm. 2:2)

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.