Posted on 05/08/2011 9:36:55 AM PDT by annalex
A LIBERTARIAN CASE FOR MONARCHY
Clear thought and discussion suffer when all sorts of good things, like liberty, equality, fraternity, rights, majority rule, and general welfare–some in tension with others–are marketed together under the portmanteau label “democracy”. Democracy’s core meaning is a particular method of choosing, replacing, and influencing government officials (Schumpeter 1950/1962). It is not a doctrine of what government should and should not do. Nor is it the same thing as personal freedom or a free society or an egalitarian social ethos. True enough, some classical liberals, like Thomas Paine (1791-1792/1989) and Ludwig von Mises (1919/1983), did scorn hereditary monarchy and did express touching faith that representative democracy would choose excellent leaders and adopt policies truly serving the common interest. Experience has taught us better, as the American Founders already knew when constructing a government of separated and limited powers and of only filtered democracy.
As an exercise, and without claiming that my arguments are decisive, I’ll contend that constitutional monarchy can better preserve people’s freedom and opportunities than democracy as it has turned out in practice.1 My case holds only for countries where maintaining or restoring (or conceivably installing) monarchy is a live option.2 We Americans have sounder hope of reviving respect for the philosophy of our Founders. Our traditions could serve some of the functions of monarchy in other countries.
An unelected absolute ruler could conceivably be a thoroughgoing classical liberal. Although a wise, benevolent, and liberal-minded dictatorship would not be a contradiction in terms, no way is actually available to assure such a regime and its continuity, including frictionless succession.
Some element of democracy is therefore necessary; totally replacing it would be dangerous. Democracy allows people some influence on who their rulers are and what policies they pursue. Elections, if not subverted, can oust bad rulers peacefully. Citizens who care about such things can enjoy a sense of participation in public affairs.
Anyone who believes in limiting government power for the sake of personal freedom should value also having some nondemocratic element of government besides courts respectful of their own narrow authority. While some monarchists are reactionaries or mystics, others (like Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn and Sean Gabb, cited below) do come across as a genuine classical liberals.
Democracy has glaring defects.3 As various paradoxes of voting illustrate, there is no such thing as any coherent “will of the people”. Government itself is more likely to supply the content of any supposed general will (Constant 1814-15/1988, p. 179). Winston Churchill reputedly said: “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter” (BrainyQuote and several similar sources on the Internet). The ordinary voter knows that his vote will not be decisive and has little reason to waste time and effort becoming well informed anyway.
This “rational ignorance”, so called in the public-choice literature, leaves corresponding influence to other-than-ordinary voters (Campbell 1999). Politics becomes a squabble among rival special interests. Coalitions form to gain special privileges. Legislators engage in logrolling and enact omnibus spending bills. Politics itself becomes the chief weapon in a Hobbesian war of all against all (Gray 1993, pp. 211-212). The diffusion of costs while benefits are concentrated reinforces apathy among ordinary voters.
Politicians themselves count among the special-interest groups. People who drift into politics tend to have relatively slighter qualifications for other work. They are entrepreneurs pursuing the advantages of office. These are not material advantages alone, for some politicians seek power to do good as they understand it. Gratifying their need to act and to feel important, legislators multiply laws to deal with discovered or contrived problems–and fears. Being able to raise vast sums by taxes and borrowing enhances their sense of power, and moral responsibility wanes (as Benjamin Constant, pp. 194-196, 271-272, already recognized almost two centuries ago).
Democratic politicians have notoriously short time horizons. (Hoppe (2001) blames not just politicians in particular but democracy in general for high time preference–indifference to the long run–which contributes to crime, wasted lives, and a general decline of morality and culture.) Why worry if popular policies will cause crises only when one is no longer running for reelection? Evidence of fiscal irresponsibility in the United States includes chronic budget deficits, the explicit national debt, and the still huger excesses of future liabilities over future revenues on account of Medicare and Social Security. Yet politicians continue offering new plums. Conflict of interest like this far overshadows the petty kinds that nevertheless arouse more outrage.
Responsibility is diffused in democracy not only over time but also among participants. Voters can think that they are only exercising their right to mark their ballots, politicians that they are only responding to the wishes of their constituents. The individual legislator bears only a small share of responsibility fragmented among his colleagues and other government officials.
Democracy and liberty coexist in tension. Nowadays the United States government restricts political speech. The professed purpose of campaign-finance reform is to limit the power of interest groups and of money in politics, but increased influence of the mass media and increased security of incumbent politicians are likelier results. A broader kind of tension is that popular majorities can lend an air of legitimacy to highly illiberal measures. “Bv the sheer weight of numbers and by its ubiquity the rule of 99 per cent is more ‘hermetic’ and more oppressive than the rule of 1 per cent” (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1952, p. 88). When majority rule is thought good in its own right and the fiction prevails that “we”ordinary citizens are the government, an elected legislature and executive can get away with impositions that monarchs of the past would scarcely have ventured. Louis XIV of France, autocrat though he was, would hardly have dared prohibit alcoholic beverages, conscript soldiers, and levy an income tax (Kuehnelt-Leddihn, pp. 280-281)–or, we might add, wage war on drugs. Not only constitutional limitations on a king’s powers but also his4 not having an electoral mandate is a restraint.
At its worst, the democratic dogma can abet totalitarianism. History records totalitarian democracies or democratically supported dictatorships. Countries oppressed by communist regimes included words like “democratic” or “popular” in their official names. Totalitarian parties have portrayed their leaders as personifying the common man and the whole nation. German National Socialism, as Kuehnelt-Leddihn reminds us, was neither a conservative nor a reactionary movement but a synthesis of revolutionary ideas tracing to before 1789 (pp. 131, 246-247, 268). He suggests that antimonarchical sentiments in the background of the French Revolution, the Spanish republic of 1931, and Germany’s Weimar Republic paved the way for Robespierre and Napoleon, for Negrin and Franco, and for Hitler (p. 90). Winston Churchill reportedly judged that had the Kaiser remained German Head of State, Hitler could not have gained power, or at least not have kept it (International Monarchist League). “[M]onarchists, conservatives, clerics and other ‘reactionaries’ were always in bad grace with the Nazis” (Kuehnelt-Leddihn, p. 248).
A nonelected part of government contributes to the separation of powers. By retaining certain constitutional powers or denying them to others, it can be a safeguard against abuses.5 This is perhaps the main modern justification of hereditary monarchy: to put some restraint on politicians rather than let them pursue their own special interests complacent in the thought that their winning elections demonstrates popular approval. When former president Theodore Roosevelt visited Emperor Franz Joseph in 1910 and asked him what he thought the role of monarchy was in the twentieth century, the emperor reportedly replied: “To protect my peoples from their governments” (quoted in both Thesen and Purcell 2003). Similarly, Lord Bernard Weatherill, former speaker of the House of Commons, said that the British monarchy exists not to exercise power but to keep other people from having the power; it is a great protection for our democracy (interview with Brian Lamb on C-Span, 26 November 1999).
The history of England shows progressive limitation of royal power in favor of parliament; but, in my view, a welcome trend went too far. Almost all power, limited only by traditions fortunately continuing as an unwritten constitution, came to be concentrated not only in parliament but even in the leader of the parliamentary majority. Democratization went rather too far, in my opinion, in the Continental monarchies also.
A monarch, not dependent on being elected and reelected, embodies continuity, as does the dynasty and the biological process. “Constitutional monarchy offers us ... that neutral power so indispensable for all regular liberty. In a free country the king is a being apart, superior to differences of opinion, having no other interest than the maintenance of order and liberty. He can never return to the common condition, and is consequently inaccessible to all the passions that such a condition generates, and to all those that the perspective of finding oneself once again within it, necessarily creates in those agents who are invested with temporary power.” It is a master stroke to create a neutral power that can terminate some political danger by constitutional means (Constant, pp. 186-187). In a settled monarchy–but no regime whatever can be guaranteed perpetual existence–the king need not worry about clinging to power. In a republic, “The very head of the state, having no title to his office save that which lies in the popular will, is forced to haggle and bargain like the lowliest office-seeker” (Mencken 1926, p. 181).
Dynastic continuity parallels the rule of law. The king symbolizes a state of affairs in which profound political change, though eventually possible, cannot occur without ample time for considering it. The king stands in contrast with legislators and bureaucrats, who are inclined to think, by the very nature of their jobs, that diligent performance means multiplying laws and regulations. Continuity in the constitutional and legal regime provides a stable framework favorable to personal and business planning and investment and to innovation in science, technology, enterprise, and culture. Continuity is neither rigidity nor conservatism.
The heir to the throne typically has many years of preparation and is not dazzled by personal advancement when he finally inherits the office. Before and while holding office he accumulates a fund of experience both different from and greater than what politicians, who come and go, can ordinarily acquire. Even when the king comes to the throne as a youth or, at the other extreme, as an old man with only a few active years remaining, he has the counsel of experienced family members and advisors. If the king is very young (Louis XV, Alfonso XIII) or insane (the elderly George III, Otto of Bavaria), a close relative serves as regent.6 The regent will have had some of the opportunities to perform ceremonial functions and to accumulate experience that an heir or reigning monarch has.
Some arguments occasionally employed for monarchy are questionable. If the monarch or his heir may marry only a member of a princely family (as Kuehnelt-Leddihn seems to recommend), chances are that he or she will marry a foreigner, providing international connections and a cosmopolitan way of thinking. Another dubious argument (also used by Kuehnelt-Leddihn) is that the monarch will have the blessing of and perhaps be the head of the state religion. Some arguments are downright absurd, for example: “Monarchy fosters art and culture. Austria was culturally much richer around 1780 than today! Just think of Mozart!” (Thesen).
But neither all arguments for nor all objections to monarchy are fallacious. The same is true of democracy. In the choice of political institutions, as in many decisions of life, all one can do is weigh the pros and cons of the options and choose what seems best or least bad on balance.
Some objections to monarchy apply to democracy also or otherwise invite comments that, while not actual refutations, do strengthen the case in its favor. Monarchy is charged with being government-from-above (Kuehnelt-Leddihn, p. 276). But all governments, even popularly elected ones, except perhaps small direct democracies like ancient Athens, are rule by a minority. (Robert Michels and others recognized an “iron law of oligarchy”; Jenkin 1968, p. 282.) Although democracy allows the people some influence over the government, they do not and cannot actually run it. Constitutional monarchy combines some strengths of democracy and authoritarian monarchy while partially neutralizing the defects of those polar options.
Another objection condemns monarchy as a divisive symbol of inequality; it bars “an ideal society in which everyone will be equal in status, and in which everyone will have the right, if not the ability, to rise to the highest position” (Gabb 2002, who replies that attempts to create such a society have usually ended in attacks on the wealthy and even the well-off). Michael Prowse (2001), calling for periodic referendums on whether to keep the British monarchy, invokes what he considers the core idea of democracy: all persons equally deserve respect and consideration, and no one deserves to dominate others. The royal family and the aristocracy, with their titles, demeanor, and self-perpetuation, violate this democratic spirit. In a republican Britain, every child might aspire to every public position, even head of state.
So arguing, Prowse stretches the meaning of democracy from a particular method of choosing and influencing rulers to include an egalitarian social ethos. But monarchy need not obstruct easy relations among persons of different occupations and backgrounds; a suspicious egalitarianism is likelier to do that. In no society can all persons have the same status. A more realistic goal is that everyone have a chance to achieve distinction in some narrow niche important to him. Even in a republic, most people by far cannot realistically aspire to the highest position. No one need feel humbled or ashamed at not ascending to an office that simply was not available. A hereditary monarch can be like “the Alps”(Thesen), something just “there”. Perhaps it is the king’s good luck, perhaps his bad luck, to have inherited the privileges but also the limitations of his office; but any question of unfairness pales in comparison with advantages for the country.
Prowse complains of divisiveness. But what about an election? It produces losers as well as winners, disappointed voters as well as happy ones. A king, however, cannot symbolize defeat to supporters of other candidates, for there were none. “A monarch mounting the throne of his ancestors follows a path on which he has not embarked of his own will.” Unlike a usurper, he need not justify his elevation (Constant, p. 88). He has no further political opportunities or ambitions except to do his job well and maintain the good name of his dynasty. Standing neutral above party politics, he has a better chance than an elected leader of becoming the personified symbol of his country, a focus of patriotism and even of affection.
The monarch and his family can assume ceremonial functions that elected rulers would otherwise perform as time permitted. Separating ceremonial functions from campaigning and policymaking siphons off glamor or adulation that would otherwise accrue to politicians and especially to demagogues. The occasional Hitler does arouse popular enthusiasm, and his opponents must prudently keep a low profile. A monarch, whose power is preservative rather than active (Constant, pp. 191-192), is safer for people’s freedom.
Prowse is irritated rather than impressed by the pomp and opulence surrounding the Queen. Clinging to outmoded forms and ascribing importance to unimportant things reeks of “collective bad faith” and “corrosive hypocrisy”. Yet a monarchy need not rest on pretense. On the contrary, my case for monarchy is a utilitarian one, not appealing to divine right or any such fiction. Not all ritual is to be scorned. Even republics have Fourth of July parades and their counterparts. Ceremonial trappings that may have become functionless or comical can evolve or be reformed. Not all monarchies, as Prowse recognizes, share with the British the particular trappings that irritate him.
A case, admittedly inconclusive, can be made for titles of nobility (especially for close royal relatives) and for an upper house of parliament of limited powers whose members, or some of them, hold their seats by inheritance or royal appointment (e.g., Constant, pp. 198-200). “The glory of a legitimate monarch is enhanced by the glory of those around him. ... He has no competition to fear. ... But where the monarch sees supporters, the usurper sees enemies.” (Constant, p. 91; on the precarious position of a nonhereditary autocrat, compare Tullock 1987). As long as the nobles are not exempt from the laws, they can serve as a kind of framework of the monarchy. They can be a further element of diversity in the social structure. They can provide an alternative to sheer wealth or notoriety as a source of distinction and so dilute the fawning over celebrities characteristic of modern democracies. Ordinary persons need no more feel humiliated by not being born into the nobility than by not being born heir to the throne. On balance, though, I am ambivalent about a nobility.
Michael Prowse’s complaint about the pretended importance of unimportant things suggests a further reason why the monarch’s role should go beyond the purely symbolic and ceremonial. The king should not be required (as the Queen of England is required at the opening of parliament) merely to read words written by the cabinet. At least he should have the three rights that Walter Bagehot identified in the British monarchy: “the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn. And a king of great sense and sagacity would want no others. He would find that his having no others would enable him to use these with singular effect” (Bagehot (1867/1872/1966, p. 111).
When Bagehot wrote, the Prime Minister was bound to keep the Queen well informed about the passing politics of the nation. “She has by rigid usage a right to complain if she does not know of every great act of her Ministry, not only before it is done, but while there is yet time to consider it – while it is still possible that it may not be done.”
A sagacious king could warn his prime minister with possibly great effect. “He might not always turn his course, but he would always trouble his mind.” During a long reign he would acquire experience that few of his ministers could match. He could remind the prime minister of bad results some years earlier of a policy like one currently proposed. “The king would indeed have the advantage which a permanent under-secretary has over his superior the Parliamentary secretary – that of having shared in the proceedings of the previous Parliamentary secretaries. ... A pompous man easily sweeps away the suggestions of those beneath him. But though a minister may so deal with his subordinate, he cannot so deal with his king” (Bagehot, pp. 111-112). A prime minister would be disciplined, in short, by having to explain the objective (not merely the political) merits of his policies to a neutral authority.
The three rights that Bagehot listed should be interpreted broadly, in my view, or extended. Constant (p. 301) recommends the right to grant pardons as a final protection of the innocent. The king should also have power: to make some appointments, especially of his own staff, not subject to veto by politicians; to consult with politicians of all parties to resolve an impasse over who might obtain the support or acquiescence of a parliamentary majority; and to dismiss and temporarily replace the cabinet or prime minister in extreme cases. (I assume a parliamentary system, which usually does accompany modern monarchy; but the executive could be elected separately from the legislators and even subject to recall by special election.) Even dissolving parliament and calling new elections in an exceptional case is no insult to the rights of the people. “On the contrary, when elections are free, it is an appeal made to their rights in favor of their interests” (Constant, p.197). The king should try to rally national support in a constitutional crisis (as when King Juan Carlos intervened to foil an attempted military coup in 1981).
What if the hereditary monarch is a child or is incompetent? Then, as already mentioned, a regency is available. What if the royal family, like some of the Windsors, flaunts unedifying personal behavior? Both dangers are just as real in a modern republic. Politicians have a systematic tendency to be incompetent or worse.7 For a democratic politician, understanding economics is a handicap.8 He either must take unpopular (because misunderstood) stands on issues or else speak and act dishonestly. The economically ignorant politician has the advantage of being able to take vote-catching stands with a more nearly clear conscience. Particularly in these days of television and of fascination with celebrities, the personal characteristics necessary to win elections are quite different from those of a public-spirited statesman. History does record great statesmen in less democratized parliamentary regimes of the past. Nowadays a Gresham’s Law operates: “the inferior human currency drives the better one out of circulation” (Kuehnelt-Leddihn, pp.115, 120). Ideal democratic government simply is not an available option. Our best hope is to limit the activities of government, a purpose to which monarchy can contribute.
Although some contemporary politicians are honorable and economically literate, even simple honesty can worsens one’s electoral chances. H. L. Mencken wrote acidly and with characteristic exaggeration: “No educated man, stating plainly the elementary notions that every educated man holds about the matters that principally concern government, could be elected to office in a democratic state, save perhaps by a miracle. ... it has become a psychic impossibility for a gentleman to hold office under the Federal Union, save by a combination of miracles that must tax the resourcefulness even of God. ... the man of native integrity is either barred from the public service altogether, or subjected to almost irresistible temptations after he gets in” (Mencken 1926, pp. 103, 106, 110). Under monarchy, the courtier need not “abase himself before swine”, “pretend that he is a worse man than he really is.” His sovereign has a certain respect for honor. “The courtier’s sovereign ... is apt to be a man of honour himself” (Mencken, p. 118, mentioning that the King of Prussia refused the German imperial crown offered him in 1849 by a mere popular parliament rather than by his fellow sovereign princes).
Mencken conceded that democracy has its charms: “The fraud of democracy ... is more amusing than any other–more amusing even, and by miles, than the fraud of religion. ... [The farce] greatly delights me. I enjoy democracy immensely. It is incomparably idiotic, and hence incomparably amusing” (pp. 209, 211). Conclusion
One argument against institutions with a venerable history is a mindless slogan betraying temporal provincialism, as if newer necessarily meant better: “Don’t turn back the clock.” Sounder advice is not to overthrow what exists because of abstract notions of what might seem logically or ideologically neater. In the vernacular, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” It is progress to learn from experience, including experience with inadequately filtered democracy. Where a monarchical element in government works well enough, the burden of proof lies against the republicans (cf. Gabb). Kuehnelt-Leddihn, writing in 1952 (p. 104), noted that “the royal, non-democratic alloy” has supported the relative success of several representative governments in Europe. Only a few nontotalitarian republics there and overseas have exhibited a record of stability, notably Switzerland, Finland, and the United States.9
Constitutional monarchy cannot solve all problems of government; nothing can. But it can help. Besides lesser arguments, two main ones recommend it. First, its very existence is a reminder that democracy is not the sort of thing of which more is necessarily better; it can help promote balanced thinking. Second, by contributing continuity, diluting democracy while supporting a healthy element of it, and furthering the separation of government powers, monarchy can help protect personal liberty.
"Monarchy: Friend of Liberty", Liberty 18, January 2004, pp. 37-42
First, monarchs are not dictators. Second, maybe some monarchs are. Maybe it is not their job to be "efficient". For example, what do you actually know of the feasibility of an irrigation system using ancient Egypt's available technology? What do you know of whether the Egyptians even wanted an "efficient" irrigation system? From what we know, the Egyptians deified and loved the Nile with its floods and droughts, -- they moved in and out as the floodplain condition dictated and were quite happy doing that. That was "efficient" for them (*).
Further, you live in an age blinded with technology and so you measure everything by the use of technology. That is foolishness. To an Egyptian the procurement of the afterlife was infinitely more important than watering gardens, hence the pyramids. That is, by the way, the wisdom Moses got from them, and we got from Moses, -- well, from Jesus, really,-- and now we lost it. Desire for the life eternal is what produced our civilization. Don't side with the vandals who seek to destroy it.
(*) Journey Back to Eden: My Life and Times Among the Desert Fathers .
Funny you should mention that in the context of American political system, -- where, despite its short existence and the supposed benefit of getting rid of the presidents through the ballot box, we have an assassination in every generation, and we don't even know of the attempts that fail.
A typical taxation level in the modern industrial democracy runs about 50% (it is often masked by complex tax system). Yet we have bridges falling down, a pension plan that is going bankrupt so we fix it with a peasfule invasion of foreign guest-laborers, and we are not in any war we cannot get out of if we wanted to. Show me a similar predicament in any monarchy.
Thank you.
“If ye love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude than the animated contest of freedom — go home from us in peace. We ask not your counsels or arms. Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you. May your chains sit lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that you were our countrymen!” Samuel Adams
So it was with democracy or republicanism. And now it's the supporters of monarchy's turn to paint it in idealistic colors and argue that it's free of the usual corruptions of politics.
Monarchy now is a little like the direct election of senators. People promote it as a cure for what ails us. But society and people's thinking is already highly democratic.
A monarchy couldn't be put into place if it weren't, like Britain or Spain or the Scandinavian countries, essentially window dressing for a democratic or republican government. A king wouldn't last unless there was a representative government in place and in power beneath him, just as senators wouldn't have much real power if they weren't popularly elected. If a monarch really tried to act like the monarchs of pre-democratic eras he or she wouldn't last long.
Do kings and queens have a wider mental horizon? Sometimes. Some do think in terms of centuries, rather than 4 year election cycles. But in a hereditary system there are bound to be lemons. Sooner or later a Marcus Aurelius is succeeded by a Commodus. And there would be more lemons if monarchy were truly established: kings are so well behaved now because they realize how fragile their rule really is.
Are kings more attached to national values? Once upon a time, everybody was. Once upon a time you wouldn't have had rulers thinking that development in India or China could offset decline at home. But now you have people thinking that, and why would a king think any differently, especially when you consider that in their heyday kings and queens were accused of thinking more dynastically than nationally?
You read the article? Monarchy is not oppression, the system in Washington DC is today. That system, incidentally has much less in common with the Constitution than a monarchy would be.
You are correct that the constitutional order in the US indeed precludes a monarchy; but we are arguing in principle, are we not?
Monarchism is not any kind of a passing fad. For one thing, it was in existence for the bulk of recorded history. The republican systems are experiments and they are failing.
It is not a matter of painting monarcby is rosy colors either. You yourself admit that a king would have a longer horizon. That is the point, — I can readily admit that in the 2,000 of Christian world there have been bad monarchs. But monarchies recover from a bad monarch because, foremostly, a monarch is not asked to do anything. His job is purely reactive and conservational. A monarch disinterested in governance can simply have a good time and let the nation govern itself. Remember, a monarch is simply an owner of property, like you or I. Somehow we don’t get into a crisis because a road stays unpaved. He does not have to pull rabits out of a hat every 4 years. As someone with libertarian leanings I find that very attractive.
Definitely, in America, we are likely to get a diffuse, feudal system with a huge democratic component, rather than a absolute monarchy. That would be much in keeping with the American character. I don’t think an American monarch will ever monkey with the gold standard, or invent a Prohibition, or decide to fine-tune the demographics of Yugoslavia, or set up a national health care Ponzi scheme. But he would, given a brain the size of a pea, prevent the Congress from their excursions into foolishness.
Monarchy is by definition oppression. It has NOTHING to do with our Constitution - a document written by men who LOATHED Monarchy and the religious authorities that were so often their crutch.
“What influence, in fact, have ecclesiastical establishments had on society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of the civil authority; on many instances they have been seen upholding the thrones of political tyranny; in no instance have they been the guardians of the liberties of the people. Rulers who wish to subvert the public liberty may have found an established clergy convenient auxiliaries. A just government, instituted to secure and perpetuate it, needs them not.” Madison
The principle of freedom is what I am arguing.
No man can be free so long as he is a “subject” to a so called King.
You can call yourself free, and the house slave may think he is free also, but only free to be comfortable in your chains.
“Crouch down and lick the hands which feed you. May your chains sit lightly upon you, and may posterity forget that you were our countrymen!” Samuel Adams
The king does not oppress anyone. You are reacting with 18c. infantilism. The king owns roads, mint, mail, etc. and fights wars if they happen. No go list for yourself the things that Washington DC is busying itself with these days, and stop posting me two century old slogans.
Yes, according to legend, anyway... with King Codrus (sp?) being the last. His descendants ruled as hereditary archons (a kind of magistrate) for quite a while, until that was dissolved and archons were made elective, with a term of about a decade (IIRC). However, this is all distant past, and not a part of the Greek confederation of city-states which eventually evolved.
[roamer_1:] Character cannot be taught. It is learned by exposure, in trial and tribulation.
So is it taught by trial and tribulation at least? You seem to say two contradictory things.
Of course, trial and tribulation is a teacher. I am speaking of human teaching. I can pour my children full of myself... teach them in the way they should go - But that is no guarantee. What matters is when the rubber hits the road, when they are beyond all control - The choices they make right there, in that moment, define their character more than anything I can do.
The reality is that a kid from a noble family is taught that his future is in national service: he will have the obligation larger than his own family. He observes his father doing his work; his dad will take him to military campaigns and teach him to fight, -- he will learn the military craft, to endure pain, to face fear.
That is hardly the reality at all - the lion's share of privileged children are petulant and protected. How many fortunes built by the father have been squandered by his heirs? It is few indeed who are raised up in the way you describe. I will admit that THE heir is treated with a double dose of expectation and is given more tutelage in that regard - But that tutelage has hardly paid off historically.
Of course it can be learned. It can also be learned without the family, and so is the case with gained nobility; but the family helps. We actually have that in America as well: we have generations that go to West Point, or into politics.
There is no doubt that one can prepare the child - But no, the chances are that it won't be learned, as in order to learn, exposure is the key. And prolonged exposure at that. It is very seldom that a prince leads the charge. Quite normally, the prince (and the king, as well as his nobles) retire from the field to waiting tents and wagons at the rear of the field.
Nobility can also be lost. Cowardice, disloyalty are not crimes, but they are faults of character and the aristicratic system punishes them.
Hardly. Perhaps upon many and repeated actions so repulsive as to cause ultimate distress - And that only when the fault becomes deleterious in real terms to his direct peers... putting their own reign in jeopardy. But again, history is rife with notable examples of nobles and kings which were a scourge, and who were left to their own devices - Often suffering no effective measure against them at all.
Yes. There is no question that John Adams, Lincoln, Reagan were statesmen. But our system breeds them not. The early American system, buoyed on Protestant spirituality did so more than ours.
I see that being primarily due to socialism - an infection which is not compatible with a federal republic, or with capitalism. We are not in trouble because there is some flaw (there is a flaw, but not the need of an earthly king) in the federal republic, but rather because it is a federal republic no more. The solution is not to call for a king - but rather to return to the root (and the Root) that preserves us. And that notion is exactly what true American Conservatism sets out to perform.
Holding two contradictory statements in your head at once. Hallmark of liberal thinking...
What is foolish is thinking a Monarch would be any less susceptible to greed, avarice, or corruption than anyone else.
No, not a guarantee, but between a family and school that teach a youngster to become a statesman and a family that does not (and perhaps teaches to become an engineer), you are likely to find a statistical difference: the former children will be better prepared to be statesmen and the latter, engineers.
I will admit that THE heir is treated with a double dose of expectation and is given more tutelage in that regard - But that tutelage has hardly paid off historically
First, every child has the expectations to be of noble character, not just the future king. It is simply a cultural expectation. A similar thing exists today in established families: children of academics are raised with the expectatin that they will grow up in academia, children of politicians, military, engineers, teachers, etc. are better prepared for the field their parents worked in. And such family has access to resources peculiar to their field, they know the right people, know how to best advance a particular kind of career. If the system is closed to incoming outsiders completely, that part is bad, -- we call it corruption or cronyism, but the system of heritable privilege is a natural thing and a good thing.
How do you know it hasn't paid off historically? You cannot merely point to some underperforming heir: you need to compare that country with a similar one run by commoners. I, on the other hand, can make a comparison between the West in 20c -- run largely by democratic governments, -- and the same West in any other century, run largely by monarchs. Any century compares favorable to the 20th. The wars were more brutal, the rules of war did not apply any more, freedoms people took for granted disappeared in the 20c., the social progress that was the norm up to 1914 all of a sudden reversed. History indicts democracy.
Quite normally, the prince (and the king, as well as his nobles) retire from the field to waiting tents and wagons at the rear of the field
You speak with conviction, as if you have any facts to back that up and compare, say, casualty rates among the commanders of aristocratically led armies and otherwise, under similar tactical conditions. I can start this project:
| List of monarchs of the British Isles by cause of death | |
|---|---|
| Died of natural causes | 54 |
| In battle | 15 |
| Murdered or executed | 16 |
| Unknown | 17 |
| Minor other categories | 5 |
| Total | 107 |
List of monarchs of the British Isles by cause of death
history is rife with notable examples of nobles and kings which were a scourge
Again, can you compare statistically to politicians?
that being primarily due to socialism - an infection which is not compatible with a federal republic, or with capitalism
... Or with monarchy. However, socialism is quite compatible with democracy, and a republic does not seem to have anything to fight off the infection. We have about 60% of population who want socialism in one form or another. How can you federal-republic your way out of that?
A monarch, susceptible as he is, has no interest in expanding the government, and an elected politician has such interest.
More assertions not backed up by reality. How many wars of expansion have various Kings fought over the course of human history?
You have your pet theory. Good for you. Everyone needs a hobby. Your zealotry is clashing with reality though, and that way lies madness.
Your basic philosophy is about as Anti-American as it can get.
It is loathsome regressive idiotic and putrid. Also absolutely futile.
Any fool who said he was my King would get no tribute from me but lead delivered at high velocity - he and his bootlicking followers.
I would expect nothing less from any American worthy of the name.
Let Them Eat Cake.
There’s been plenty of abusive taxation by monarchs. That’s just one shining example. And of course you’re changing the discussion, I just said there’s a long history of monarchs taxing to enlarge their coffers, you added the percentage and direction and horrid spelling of peaceful.
REAL defenders of AUTHENTIC freedom.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=wvs-QniMLxo
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3SyBGEjn8Q&NR=1
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