Posted on 05/08/2011 9:36:55 AM PDT by annalex
A LIBERTARIAN CASE FOR MONARCHY
Clear thought and discussion suffer when all sorts of good things, like liberty, equality, fraternity, rights, majority rule, and general welfare–some in tension with others–are marketed together under the portmanteau label “democracy”. Democracy’s core meaning is a particular method of choosing, replacing, and influencing government officials (Schumpeter 1950/1962). It is not a doctrine of what government should and should not do. Nor is it the same thing as personal freedom or a free society or an egalitarian social ethos. True enough, some classical liberals, like Thomas Paine (1791-1792/1989) and Ludwig von Mises (1919/1983), did scorn hereditary monarchy and did express touching faith that representative democracy would choose excellent leaders and adopt policies truly serving the common interest. Experience has taught us better, as the American Founders already knew when constructing a government of separated and limited powers and of only filtered democracy.
As an exercise, and without claiming that my arguments are decisive, I’ll contend that constitutional monarchy can better preserve people’s freedom and opportunities than democracy as it has turned out in practice.1 My case holds only for countries where maintaining or restoring (or conceivably installing) monarchy is a live option.2 We Americans have sounder hope of reviving respect for the philosophy of our Founders. Our traditions could serve some of the functions of monarchy in other countries.
An unelected absolute ruler could conceivably be a thoroughgoing classical liberal. Although a wise, benevolent, and liberal-minded dictatorship would not be a contradiction in terms, no way is actually available to assure such a regime and its continuity, including frictionless succession.
Some element of democracy is therefore necessary; totally replacing it would be dangerous. Democracy allows people some influence on who their rulers are and what policies they pursue. Elections, if not subverted, can oust bad rulers peacefully. Citizens who care about such things can enjoy a sense of participation in public affairs.
Anyone who believes in limiting government power for the sake of personal freedom should value also having some nondemocratic element of government besides courts respectful of their own narrow authority. While some monarchists are reactionaries or mystics, others (like Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn and Sean Gabb, cited below) do come across as a genuine classical liberals.
Democracy has glaring defects.3 As various paradoxes of voting illustrate, there is no such thing as any coherent “will of the people”. Government itself is more likely to supply the content of any supposed general will (Constant 1814-15/1988, p. 179). Winston Churchill reputedly said: “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter” (BrainyQuote and several similar sources on the Internet). The ordinary voter knows that his vote will not be decisive and has little reason to waste time and effort becoming well informed anyway.
This “rational ignorance”, so called in the public-choice literature, leaves corresponding influence to other-than-ordinary voters (Campbell 1999). Politics becomes a squabble among rival special interests. Coalitions form to gain special privileges. Legislators engage in logrolling and enact omnibus spending bills. Politics itself becomes the chief weapon in a Hobbesian war of all against all (Gray 1993, pp. 211-212). The diffusion of costs while benefits are concentrated reinforces apathy among ordinary voters.
Politicians themselves count among the special-interest groups. People who drift into politics tend to have relatively slighter qualifications for other work. They are entrepreneurs pursuing the advantages of office. These are not material advantages alone, for some politicians seek power to do good as they understand it. Gratifying their need to act and to feel important, legislators multiply laws to deal with discovered or contrived problems–and fears. Being able to raise vast sums by taxes and borrowing enhances their sense of power, and moral responsibility wanes (as Benjamin Constant, pp. 194-196, 271-272, already recognized almost two centuries ago).
Democratic politicians have notoriously short time horizons. (Hoppe (2001) blames not just politicians in particular but democracy in general for high time preference–indifference to the long run–which contributes to crime, wasted lives, and a general decline of morality and culture.) Why worry if popular policies will cause crises only when one is no longer running for reelection? Evidence of fiscal irresponsibility in the United States includes chronic budget deficits, the explicit national debt, and the still huger excesses of future liabilities over future revenues on account of Medicare and Social Security. Yet politicians continue offering new plums. Conflict of interest like this far overshadows the petty kinds that nevertheless arouse more outrage.
Responsibility is diffused in democracy not only over time but also among participants. Voters can think that they are only exercising their right to mark their ballots, politicians that they are only responding to the wishes of their constituents. The individual legislator bears only a small share of responsibility fragmented among his colleagues and other government officials.
Democracy and liberty coexist in tension. Nowadays the United States government restricts political speech. The professed purpose of campaign-finance reform is to limit the power of interest groups and of money in politics, but increased influence of the mass media and increased security of incumbent politicians are likelier results. A broader kind of tension is that popular majorities can lend an air of legitimacy to highly illiberal measures. “Bv the sheer weight of numbers and by its ubiquity the rule of 99 per cent is more ‘hermetic’ and more oppressive than the rule of 1 per cent” (Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1952, p. 88). When majority rule is thought good in its own right and the fiction prevails that “we”ordinary citizens are the government, an elected legislature and executive can get away with impositions that monarchs of the past would scarcely have ventured. Louis XIV of France, autocrat though he was, would hardly have dared prohibit alcoholic beverages, conscript soldiers, and levy an income tax (Kuehnelt-Leddihn, pp. 280-281)–or, we might add, wage war on drugs. Not only constitutional limitations on a king’s powers but also his4 not having an electoral mandate is a restraint.
At its worst, the democratic dogma can abet totalitarianism. History records totalitarian democracies or democratically supported dictatorships. Countries oppressed by communist regimes included words like “democratic” or “popular” in their official names. Totalitarian parties have portrayed their leaders as personifying the common man and the whole nation. German National Socialism, as Kuehnelt-Leddihn reminds us, was neither a conservative nor a reactionary movement but a synthesis of revolutionary ideas tracing to before 1789 (pp. 131, 246-247, 268). He suggests that antimonarchical sentiments in the background of the French Revolution, the Spanish republic of 1931, and Germany’s Weimar Republic paved the way for Robespierre and Napoleon, for Negrin and Franco, and for Hitler (p. 90). Winston Churchill reportedly judged that had the Kaiser remained German Head of State, Hitler could not have gained power, or at least not have kept it (International Monarchist League). “[M]onarchists, conservatives, clerics and other ‘reactionaries’ were always in bad grace with the Nazis” (Kuehnelt-Leddihn, p. 248).
A nonelected part of government contributes to the separation of powers. By retaining certain constitutional powers or denying them to others, it can be a safeguard against abuses.5 This is perhaps the main modern justification of hereditary monarchy: to put some restraint on politicians rather than let them pursue their own special interests complacent in the thought that their winning elections demonstrates popular approval. When former president Theodore Roosevelt visited Emperor Franz Joseph in 1910 and asked him what he thought the role of monarchy was in the twentieth century, the emperor reportedly replied: “To protect my peoples from their governments” (quoted in both Thesen and Purcell 2003). Similarly, Lord Bernard Weatherill, former speaker of the House of Commons, said that the British monarchy exists not to exercise power but to keep other people from having the power; it is a great protection for our democracy (interview with Brian Lamb on C-Span, 26 November 1999).
The history of England shows progressive limitation of royal power in favor of parliament; but, in my view, a welcome trend went too far. Almost all power, limited only by traditions fortunately continuing as an unwritten constitution, came to be concentrated not only in parliament but even in the leader of the parliamentary majority. Democratization went rather too far, in my opinion, in the Continental monarchies also.
A monarch, not dependent on being elected and reelected, embodies continuity, as does the dynasty and the biological process. “Constitutional monarchy offers us ... that neutral power so indispensable for all regular liberty. In a free country the king is a being apart, superior to differences of opinion, having no other interest than the maintenance of order and liberty. He can never return to the common condition, and is consequently inaccessible to all the passions that such a condition generates, and to all those that the perspective of finding oneself once again within it, necessarily creates in those agents who are invested with temporary power.” It is a master stroke to create a neutral power that can terminate some political danger by constitutional means (Constant, pp. 186-187). In a settled monarchy–but no regime whatever can be guaranteed perpetual existence–the king need not worry about clinging to power. In a republic, “The very head of the state, having no title to his office save that which lies in the popular will, is forced to haggle and bargain like the lowliest office-seeker” (Mencken 1926, p. 181).
Dynastic continuity parallels the rule of law. The king symbolizes a state of affairs in which profound political change, though eventually possible, cannot occur without ample time for considering it. The king stands in contrast with legislators and bureaucrats, who are inclined to think, by the very nature of their jobs, that diligent performance means multiplying laws and regulations. Continuity in the constitutional and legal regime provides a stable framework favorable to personal and business planning and investment and to innovation in science, technology, enterprise, and culture. Continuity is neither rigidity nor conservatism.
The heir to the throne typically has many years of preparation and is not dazzled by personal advancement when he finally inherits the office. Before and while holding office he accumulates a fund of experience both different from and greater than what politicians, who come and go, can ordinarily acquire. Even when the king comes to the throne as a youth or, at the other extreme, as an old man with only a few active years remaining, he has the counsel of experienced family members and advisors. If the king is very young (Louis XV, Alfonso XIII) or insane (the elderly George III, Otto of Bavaria), a close relative serves as regent.6 The regent will have had some of the opportunities to perform ceremonial functions and to accumulate experience that an heir or reigning monarch has.
Some arguments occasionally employed for monarchy are questionable. If the monarch or his heir may marry only a member of a princely family (as Kuehnelt-Leddihn seems to recommend), chances are that he or she will marry a foreigner, providing international connections and a cosmopolitan way of thinking. Another dubious argument (also used by Kuehnelt-Leddihn) is that the monarch will have the blessing of and perhaps be the head of the state religion. Some arguments are downright absurd, for example: “Monarchy fosters art and culture. Austria was culturally much richer around 1780 than today! Just think of Mozart!” (Thesen).
But neither all arguments for nor all objections to monarchy are fallacious. The same is true of democracy. In the choice of political institutions, as in many decisions of life, all one can do is weigh the pros and cons of the options and choose what seems best or least bad on balance.
Some objections to monarchy apply to democracy also or otherwise invite comments that, while not actual refutations, do strengthen the case in its favor. Monarchy is charged with being government-from-above (Kuehnelt-Leddihn, p. 276). But all governments, even popularly elected ones, except perhaps small direct democracies like ancient Athens, are rule by a minority. (Robert Michels and others recognized an “iron law of oligarchy”; Jenkin 1968, p. 282.) Although democracy allows the people some influence over the government, they do not and cannot actually run it. Constitutional monarchy combines some strengths of democracy and authoritarian monarchy while partially neutralizing the defects of those polar options.
Another objection condemns monarchy as a divisive symbol of inequality; it bars “an ideal society in which everyone will be equal in status, and in which everyone will have the right, if not the ability, to rise to the highest position” (Gabb 2002, who replies that attempts to create such a society have usually ended in attacks on the wealthy and even the well-off). Michael Prowse (2001), calling for periodic referendums on whether to keep the British monarchy, invokes what he considers the core idea of democracy: all persons equally deserve respect and consideration, and no one deserves to dominate others. The royal family and the aristocracy, with their titles, demeanor, and self-perpetuation, violate this democratic spirit. In a republican Britain, every child might aspire to every public position, even head of state.
So arguing, Prowse stretches the meaning of democracy from a particular method of choosing and influencing rulers to include an egalitarian social ethos. But monarchy need not obstruct easy relations among persons of different occupations and backgrounds; a suspicious egalitarianism is likelier to do that. In no society can all persons have the same status. A more realistic goal is that everyone have a chance to achieve distinction in some narrow niche important to him. Even in a republic, most people by far cannot realistically aspire to the highest position. No one need feel humbled or ashamed at not ascending to an office that simply was not available. A hereditary monarch can be like “the Alps”(Thesen), something just “there”. Perhaps it is the king’s good luck, perhaps his bad luck, to have inherited the privileges but also the limitations of his office; but any question of unfairness pales in comparison with advantages for the country.
Prowse complains of divisiveness. But what about an election? It produces losers as well as winners, disappointed voters as well as happy ones. A king, however, cannot symbolize defeat to supporters of other candidates, for there were none. “A monarch mounting the throne of his ancestors follows a path on which he has not embarked of his own will.” Unlike a usurper, he need not justify his elevation (Constant, p. 88). He has no further political opportunities or ambitions except to do his job well and maintain the good name of his dynasty. Standing neutral above party politics, he has a better chance than an elected leader of becoming the personified symbol of his country, a focus of patriotism and even of affection.
The monarch and his family can assume ceremonial functions that elected rulers would otherwise perform as time permitted. Separating ceremonial functions from campaigning and policymaking siphons off glamor or adulation that would otherwise accrue to politicians and especially to demagogues. The occasional Hitler does arouse popular enthusiasm, and his opponents must prudently keep a low profile. A monarch, whose power is preservative rather than active (Constant, pp. 191-192), is safer for people’s freedom.
Prowse is irritated rather than impressed by the pomp and opulence surrounding the Queen. Clinging to outmoded forms and ascribing importance to unimportant things reeks of “collective bad faith” and “corrosive hypocrisy”. Yet a monarchy need not rest on pretense. On the contrary, my case for monarchy is a utilitarian one, not appealing to divine right or any such fiction. Not all ritual is to be scorned. Even republics have Fourth of July parades and their counterparts. Ceremonial trappings that may have become functionless or comical can evolve or be reformed. Not all monarchies, as Prowse recognizes, share with the British the particular trappings that irritate him.
A case, admittedly inconclusive, can be made for titles of nobility (especially for close royal relatives) and for an upper house of parliament of limited powers whose members, or some of them, hold their seats by inheritance or royal appointment (e.g., Constant, pp. 198-200). “The glory of a legitimate monarch is enhanced by the glory of those around him. ... He has no competition to fear. ... But where the monarch sees supporters, the usurper sees enemies.” (Constant, p. 91; on the precarious position of a nonhereditary autocrat, compare Tullock 1987). As long as the nobles are not exempt from the laws, they can serve as a kind of framework of the monarchy. They can be a further element of diversity in the social structure. They can provide an alternative to sheer wealth or notoriety as a source of distinction and so dilute the fawning over celebrities characteristic of modern democracies. Ordinary persons need no more feel humiliated by not being born into the nobility than by not being born heir to the throne. On balance, though, I am ambivalent about a nobility.
Michael Prowse’s complaint about the pretended importance of unimportant things suggests a further reason why the monarch’s role should go beyond the purely symbolic and ceremonial. The king should not be required (as the Queen of England is required at the opening of parliament) merely to read words written by the cabinet. At least he should have the three rights that Walter Bagehot identified in the British monarchy: “the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn. And a king of great sense and sagacity would want no others. He would find that his having no others would enable him to use these with singular effect” (Bagehot (1867/1872/1966, p. 111).
When Bagehot wrote, the Prime Minister was bound to keep the Queen well informed about the passing politics of the nation. “She has by rigid usage a right to complain if she does not know of every great act of her Ministry, not only before it is done, but while there is yet time to consider it – while it is still possible that it may not be done.”
A sagacious king could warn his prime minister with possibly great effect. “He might not always turn his course, but he would always trouble his mind.” During a long reign he would acquire experience that few of his ministers could match. He could remind the prime minister of bad results some years earlier of a policy like one currently proposed. “The king would indeed have the advantage which a permanent under-secretary has over his superior the Parliamentary secretary – that of having shared in the proceedings of the previous Parliamentary secretaries. ... A pompous man easily sweeps away the suggestions of those beneath him. But though a minister may so deal with his subordinate, he cannot so deal with his king” (Bagehot, pp. 111-112). A prime minister would be disciplined, in short, by having to explain the objective (not merely the political) merits of his policies to a neutral authority.
The three rights that Bagehot listed should be interpreted broadly, in my view, or extended. Constant (p. 301) recommends the right to grant pardons as a final protection of the innocent. The king should also have power: to make some appointments, especially of his own staff, not subject to veto by politicians; to consult with politicians of all parties to resolve an impasse over who might obtain the support or acquiescence of a parliamentary majority; and to dismiss and temporarily replace the cabinet or prime minister in extreme cases. (I assume a parliamentary system, which usually does accompany modern monarchy; but the executive could be elected separately from the legislators and even subject to recall by special election.) Even dissolving parliament and calling new elections in an exceptional case is no insult to the rights of the people. “On the contrary, when elections are free, it is an appeal made to their rights in favor of their interests” (Constant, p.197). The king should try to rally national support in a constitutional crisis (as when King Juan Carlos intervened to foil an attempted military coup in 1981).
What if the hereditary monarch is a child or is incompetent? Then, as already mentioned, a regency is available. What if the royal family, like some of the Windsors, flaunts unedifying personal behavior? Both dangers are just as real in a modern republic. Politicians have a systematic tendency to be incompetent or worse.7 For a democratic politician, understanding economics is a handicap.8 He either must take unpopular (because misunderstood) stands on issues or else speak and act dishonestly. The economically ignorant politician has the advantage of being able to take vote-catching stands with a more nearly clear conscience. Particularly in these days of television and of fascination with celebrities, the personal characteristics necessary to win elections are quite different from those of a public-spirited statesman. History does record great statesmen in less democratized parliamentary regimes of the past. Nowadays a Gresham’s Law operates: “the inferior human currency drives the better one out of circulation” (Kuehnelt-Leddihn, pp.115, 120). Ideal democratic government simply is not an available option. Our best hope is to limit the activities of government, a purpose to which monarchy can contribute.
Although some contemporary politicians are honorable and economically literate, even simple honesty can worsens one’s electoral chances. H. L. Mencken wrote acidly and with characteristic exaggeration: “No educated man, stating plainly the elementary notions that every educated man holds about the matters that principally concern government, could be elected to office in a democratic state, save perhaps by a miracle. ... it has become a psychic impossibility for a gentleman to hold office under the Federal Union, save by a combination of miracles that must tax the resourcefulness even of God. ... the man of native integrity is either barred from the public service altogether, or subjected to almost irresistible temptations after he gets in” (Mencken 1926, pp. 103, 106, 110). Under monarchy, the courtier need not “abase himself before swine”, “pretend that he is a worse man than he really is.” His sovereign has a certain respect for honor. “The courtier’s sovereign ... is apt to be a man of honour himself” (Mencken, p. 118, mentioning that the King of Prussia refused the German imperial crown offered him in 1849 by a mere popular parliament rather than by his fellow sovereign princes).
Mencken conceded that democracy has its charms: “The fraud of democracy ... is more amusing than any other–more amusing even, and by miles, than the fraud of religion. ... [The farce] greatly delights me. I enjoy democracy immensely. It is incomparably idiotic, and hence incomparably amusing” (pp. 209, 211). Conclusion
One argument against institutions with a venerable history is a mindless slogan betraying temporal provincialism, as if newer necessarily meant better: “Don’t turn back the clock.” Sounder advice is not to overthrow what exists because of abstract notions of what might seem logically or ideologically neater. In the vernacular, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” It is progress to learn from experience, including experience with inadequately filtered democracy. Where a monarchical element in government works well enough, the burden of proof lies against the republicans (cf. Gabb). Kuehnelt-Leddihn, writing in 1952 (p. 104), noted that “the royal, non-democratic alloy” has supported the relative success of several representative governments in Europe. Only a few nontotalitarian republics there and overseas have exhibited a record of stability, notably Switzerland, Finland, and the United States.9
Constitutional monarchy cannot solve all problems of government; nothing can. But it can help. Besides lesser arguments, two main ones recommend it. First, its very existence is a reminder that democracy is not the sort of thing of which more is necessarily better; it can help promote balanced thinking. Second, by contributing continuity, diluting democracy while supporting a healthy element of it, and furthering the separation of government powers, monarchy can help protect personal liberty.
"Monarchy: Friend of Liberty", Liberty 18, January 2004, pp. 37-42
Not necessarily. The Romanovs had excellent Tsars all along, even if you argue about Nicholas II. Charlemagne produced a very successful dynasty that lasted centuries. So were the Spanish kings and queens. Some dynasties produced failures, like Louis XIV and everyone remembers those.
Just because the politicians revolve better and are not related doesn't make them any less hit-or-miss affair.
All this being said, let us not lose sight of my central proposition: that the office of a king makes for a good ruler just thanks to the pressures of the office. The elected office makes for a bad ruler, again naturally. It is easier to be a good king than a good president.
We don’t know what time is passed. Naturally we are not going to have a feudal society with subsistence agriculture, illiterate 90% of the population, etc. But we can have a society that is in principle feudal but takes advantage of the modern technological fluid society. For example, there is no techological reason I should not be able to hire for myself, for the argument’s sake, Pat Buchanan and be subject to policies he chooses rather than policies Bush chose ten years ago. That is new feudalism.
Likewise, I do not want to be responsible for abortion, euthanasia, and liberal miseducation system, yet my money will go for that in the republic. I do not want to patronize businesses that manufacture in China, but since foreign trade is federal law, I have no effective choice. However, if Missouri and Kansas were feudal states rather than federal states, we would have a true laboratory of freedom where the liberal regimes of New York and California have no effect on the suzerain in Kansas. his is by the way, an argument often made iapprovingly on the Free Republic, but people do not realize that it is essentially an argument for feudalism.
I would agree that feudalism is more compatible with the American spirit than absolute monarchy. But I do not argue for absolute monarchy.
I think all these medieval institutions will be reinvented for the technological age and they will thrive. I don’t have a ready answer for everything, and just like monarchies of the past, the new monarchies will differ greatly culture from culture. In a century or so, you would not recognize the West. It will be universally religious, nationalistic, open and fluid, with many forms of social organization, much greater local control, truly capitalistic and prosperous.
RIGHT ON TARGET,dear brother!
Do you believe America is too far gone to ever change?
I think prayer and fasting is the only way to drive out the core error that is behind this if that is what God wills.
Regardign nationalism, I would submit to you this. It is true that WWI was about nationalism. The worst kind of nationalism won in the West, and the worst kind of internationalism won in Russia. On the other hand, the truly organic multiethnic societies, where one nation lead others to some cooperative harmony, such as the German Empire, Austro-Hungary, and Russia all perished, whereas they were models of an ethnically diverse societies. Now all these countries are losers; the former colonies are unable to govern themselves (set your Google News on Africa and see how you like it), and the British, German and French runts are trying to re-galvanize the Holy Roman Empire, minus the holiness. Except they have no clue how.
In America we don’t understand what nationalism is supposed to mean. We fight foreign wars, for sure, but that does not make us a nation in the classical sense, it rather disunites us. The multicult and the immigration suicide show that America could use some serious doze of nationalism, just not the kind Rao falsely accuses us of having. What we need, and the time is running out, is cultural and economic nationalism, and Christian internationalism.
Libya is a democracy in its inevitalbe dictatorial stage. Bark, wrong tree.
I agree completely. I don't think I read anythiong from Dr. Rao on America that Pat Buchanan would not say, -- or is Pat banned too?
Hilarie Belloc was right about the end result when he wrote...
“It is inevitable there should appear in any Absolute State, not alone in States which still trust to the machinery of voting, but in all States, Monarchic or Democratic, Plutocratic or Communist, laws which no Catholic will obey. One or two tentative efforts have already been made at such laws. When those laws are presented to Catholics there will at once arise the situation which has arisen successively time and again for nearly two thousand years; the refusal on the part of Catholics, which refusal in the eyes of the State is rebellion.
There will follow upon that what the State calls the punishment of disobedience, and what Catholics have always called, and will once again call, persecution. It will be accompanied by considerable apostasy, but also considerable heroism; and in the upshot the Faith’s power to survive will lie in this: that devotion to the Faith is stronger, more rational, better founded, more tenacious, more lasting in substance, than that hatred which the Faith also, and naturally, arouses.” Belloc-The Catholic Church and the Modern State
http://www.catholicapologetics.info/modernproblems/americanism/modern.htm
Wasn't Mannerheim in the White Movement? Just asking.
I would agree that Russia had no busuness in the Germanic lands nor in Poland; even though Ostseean knights did not mind at all serving the Tsar. I wish there were more of them.
The worst that Finland suffered was from the USSR and not from the Russian monarchy. Ditto for Poland.
Neither do I like the federal system, but you dio not apparently understand it, because the Federal government is not a person, and no person owns anything in the national infrastructure. Hence it is neglected, and monarchy is needed to take ownership of it.
Yes, I agree. Their historical experience was such. But, I think, very little remains today of their work.
A typical monarch is independently wealthy and does not need taxes to pay him salary. His well-being does, however, directly depend on maintaining the national treasure for his chidlren to inherit, which is a very good thing.
sorry to start form the beginning, but this reminds me of this joke:
-- Smoking is slow deathSeriously, the point is not about the character of a king, but of his assigned role. His office dictates that he leaves a better country to his son that what he inherited from his father. Nothing remotely similar can be said of an elected politician. So, a mediocre king still has the incentive to better his country in the long run, and an elected official -- only while he is in office.
-- I am not in a hurry
I agree that nobility should be earned as well as heritable, and in most feudal societies it was. Also, removal of nobility status was a common punishment for civic lapses.
“”how come “reviving respect for the philosophy of our Fathers” is not happening””
The core was not Holy to begin with.
From the words of Saint Hilary Of Poitiers in the 4th century..
“But nowadays, we have to do with a disguised persecutor, a smooth-tongued enemy, a Constantius who has put on Antichrist; who scourges us, not with lashes, but with caresses; who instead of robbing us, which would give us spiritual life, bribes us with riches, that he may lead us to eternal death; who thrusts us not into the liberty of a prison, but into the honors of his palace, that he may enslave us: who tears not our flesh, but our hearts; who beheads not with a sword, but kills the soul with his gold; who sentences not by a herald that we are to be burnt, but covertly enkindles the fire of Hell against us. He does not dispute with us, that he may conquer; but he flatters us, that so he may lord it over our souls. He confesses Christ, the better to deny Him; he tries to procure a unity which shall destroy peace; he puts down some few heretics, so that he may also crush the Christians; he honors Bishops, that they may cease to be Bishops; he builds up churches, that he may pull down the Faith…- Saint Hilary Of Poitiers
Again, I disagree. The point is always about character - else the democracies would not have been invented in the first place. It was an endeavor to create a better system, and was called for because of the excesses of kings and lords (I will stay in the English/feudal vernacular because it is easy - I do know there were democracies before the English, and other Euro-feudal systems).
Character breeds merit, and merit breeds character. Character cannot be taught. It is learned by exposure, in trial and tribulation. The American system was merit based in it's true sense (not what we have today). That really isn't the case for monarchy. The inevitable result of a caste-based system is a privileged class. and a privileged class, born to their station, has no real means of discovering character/merit, with the possible exception of a defensive war.
There are examples aplenty of lords and kings being so corrupt or inept that they left their children penniless upon their death (or even prior to), not to mention what they did to their charge (the people). So in that, your point cannot hold.
And I might add, as an aside (and another can of worms), that the establishment of one caste will naturally and invariably create another: So one need not try to envision a case where there are only kings and nobles atop an otherwise classless, upwardly mobile society. The establishment of the goodman/freeman castes in England were an aberration in monarchical terms - And that class (free land holders, merchants) is precisely the catalyst which caused liberty to begin to grow in the modern age - The middle-class was born in them. It can be inferred from this that a part of what the noble class must do is to keep the people down, and in subjection, as a measure of their own preservation. The middle class is the death of nobility - ergo, there can be no middle class... which means there will only be the lower class.
[...] Nothing remotely similar can be said of an elected politician.[...]
At this point, I would again draw a firm distinction between a politician and a statesman. Your conversation doesn't seem to do so, lumping all under the less savory term of politician. The statesman has the same sense of duty/honor/country as any fine noble you could mention, and is not a mere "salesman selling government". By the same token, statesmen are almost as rare as fine nobles are.
Virtually every vice found in our system can be found in a monarchical system: The Noble Court served the very same service as the American Lobby. There was every bit as much vice, bribery, greed, and corruption; the same sort of business deals, and old-boy networks, glad-handing, and favoritism. These are all symptomatic of any sort of power. And that brings me back to my original premise, that there is no recourse in the Monarchy: Power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts, absolutely.
I agree that nobility should be earned as well as heritable, and in most feudal societies it was. Also, removal of nobility status was a common punishment for civic lapses.
But still one must start in nobles - and further winnow the field to find an almost non-existent noble who has earned merit. Do you see how specious the argument is? What of the merchant who won his fortune fair and square, by good business practices and proper accounting? No matter how much wisdom he has gained, and merit he has earned; no matter how much more valuable his merit is than any lord; he can be of no value to governance (w/o the House of Commons) without nobility being conferred.
Here, a man can arrive a pauper, and by his own merit, attain wealth and go on to be of service (if elected). And many, many have done so. All of those people would not have any chance of being of real service in a monarchy. In fact, the chances are that he would remain a pauper, unable to break out of the caste he was born into, as that is the inevitable and historical state of monarchy.
Just by the statistical fact, more results come from a wider pool, and that is why democracies are so prosperous, inventive, intuitive, and quick. They allow the cream to rise to the top. Monarchy assumes the cream is already there.
You are a lunatic. Monarchs and dictators are inherently inefficient. Or have you skipped the last 10,000 years of human history?
For example, imagine if Khufu had used Egypts resources to build a more efficient canal/irrigation system instead of a big pile of rocks. Or if Qin Shi Huang had used his Countries resources on anything other than a stupid and ineffectual wall...
Do we even need to talk about modern light rail and high density housing initiatives?
We need to REDUCE public holdings to as near zero as we can get. What we don't need is to just consolidate ownership into one persons hands.
There was a belief that holiness would come to the seeker of it, while the government would remain secular. They believed that the novus ordo seclorum was what God would want. It was a mixture of Protestantism and the Lodge.
The interesting link between St. Hilary's remark and our age is this. Holiness comes from self denial. A political system like ours is based on self indulgence. It has a positive aspect: getting rich is a civic virtue and it has a negative aspect: borrow from your children whenever you can because they don't vote. Instead of robbing us, which would give us spiritual life, bribes us with riches, that he may lead us to eternal death.
This article concentrated on purely mechanical advantages of monarchy. Indeed from even basic government economics a monarch has a selfish interest to preserve the national treasure rather than to squander it. The truth is that without an orientation toward holiness a monarchy would not work either. However a monarch is blessed -- annointed -- by God; it is easier for a monarch to be holy at least because he knows that he personally did nothing to become a king; God shaped him in his mother's womb to be one. Like in a family, where religion comes from the father, so in a nation, a religious monarch would be a spiritual educator for the nation.
I KNOW enough remains of our founders work that the spirit of freedom and virtue burns brightly enough in the heart of American patriots - that any man who claimed to be our King and we his subjects would get a bullet to the skull - he and his knee bending boot licking lackeys.
It would be the very LEAST Jefferson and Washington and company would expect.
SIC SEMPER TYRANNUS!
Character cannot be taught. It is learned by exposure, in trial and tribulation.
So is it taught by trial and tribulation at least? You seem to say two contradictory things. The reality is that a kid from a noble family is taught that his future is in national service: he will have the obligation larger than his own family. He observes his father doing his work; his dad will take him to military campaigns and teach him to fight, -- he will learn the military craft, to endure pain, to face fear. A courtier would learn manners, sophistication, arts, basic science, diplomatic and bureaucratic skills. Of course it can be learned. It can also be learned without the family, and so is the case with gained nobility; but the family helps. We actually have that in America as well: we have generations that go to West Point, or into politics.
Nobility can also be lost. Cowardice, disloyalty are not crimes, but they are faults of character and the aristicratic system punishes them.
the establishment of one caste will naturally and invariably create another
That must be why the feudal system did not have castes.
I would again draw a firm distinction between a politician and a statesman.
Yes. There is no question that John Adams, Lincoln, Reagan were statesmen. But our system breeds them not. The early American system, buoyed on Protestant spirituality did so more than ours. Today, even if we have a president dedicated to serve the nation and blessed with the long vision, -- what made Reagan great was his vision of the victory in the Cold War, -- the system discourages that. Notably, Reagan's other agenda, reducing the scope of the government, failed.
That never stops the typical monarch from taxing the populace to give them more money. Once again your “theory” is 100% counter to actual historical fact. Kings tax, often quite a bit.
I'm thankful that you realize this.
The truth is that without an orientation toward holiness a monarchy would not work either. However a monarch is blessed -- annointed -- by God; it is easier for a monarch to be holy at least because he knows that he personally did nothing to become a king; God shaped him in his mother's womb to be one. Like in a family, where religion comes from the father, so in a nation, a religious monarch would be a spiritual educator for the nation.
We agree.You stated that so beautifully!
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