But according to Calvin, God didn't just arrange the situation and do nothing to interfere with the sin of Adam and Eve, merely foreseeing, that is, taking a permissive role and seeing ahead of time what man, in his own moral authority, freely chose to do, but actively willed that it take place and, because he had willed that they should sin, they did sin.
Yes, it was God's will. He accomplished that particular will by Divinely choosing to not protect them against the sin He knew they would commit without His protection. They are still responsible for their sins since God had no duty to protect them. God willing it to happen does not mean that He "injected" them with sin to cause it to happen. There was no need. Adam and Eve as created were already capable of sin.
Man's action in sinning, therefore, was not conditional but determined. That is, there was nothing in man having to do with unconditioned volition that was the cause of sin for which he bore the moral responsibility.
No, it was determined by God AND volitional by man. God did not MAKE Adam or Eve sin. As the Potter, He created them as He did, capable of sin, and then allowed them to sin. God could have prevented them from sinning, but He chose not to here. Since He had no duty, God's hands are clean. It is no coincidence that God let the serpent into the Garden at the same time He was going to be unavailable to counsel Eve. However, it was still Eve, and then Adam, who did what they did. That's not on God, unless you can show me a duty.
Man's sin, therefore, was the expression or outworking of the will of God.
I would never say it that way because it invites false connotations of obedience, which has nothing to do with this. It was certainly God's will that Judas betray Jesus, but Judas was not in obedience to God when he did so.
Man's sin was as caused as his nature as man was caused and, according to Calvin, the cause of both, the responsible agent of both, was God. The reason? "...because the Lord saw good."
No, none of the quotes from Calvin you have given lead me anywhere near this idea. In Reformed theology, the concepts of "cause" and "responsible" are complicated and have to be worked through. I think you are jumping to conclusions in blaming God here.
With that viewpoint, one wonders what one must make of the Bible reporting that God said, "Let us make man in our image, in our likeness."
Why? That concept obviously means some things, BUT NOT others. Further reading and understanding of the scriptures is necessary to know what those things are.
“I confess it is a horrible decree; yet no one can deny but God foreknew Adam’s fall, and therefore foreknew it, because he had ordained it so by his own decree.”
(Calv. Inst., b. 3, c. 23, sec. 7.)
“God of his own good pleasure ordains that many should be born, who are from the womb devoted to inevitable damnation. If any man pretend that God’s foreknowledge lays them under no necessity of being damned, but rather that he decreed their damnation because he foreknew their wickedness, I grant that God’s foreknowledge alone lays no necessity on the creature; but eternal life and death depend on the will rather than the foreknowledge of God. If God only foreknew all things that relate to all men, and did not decree and ordain them also, then it might be inquired whether or no his foreknowledge necessitates the thing foreknown. But seeing he therefore foreknows all things that will come to pass, because he has decreed they shall come to pass, it is vain to contend about foreknowledge, since it so plain all things come to pass by God’s positive decree.”
(Ibid., c. 23, s. 6.)
“The devil and wicked men are so held in on every side with the hand of God, that they cannot conceive, or contrive, or execute any mischief, any farther than God himself doth not permit only, but command. Nor are they only held in fetters, but compelled also, as with a bridle, to perform obedience to those commands.”
(Calv. Inst., b. 1, c. 17, s. 11.)
Once one accepts Calvin's logic, which one is by no means constrained to do, one must find innumerable ways to make plainly stated scriptural passages mean something radically different than what they plainly state--simply to make them become somewhat consistent with the extra-Biblical logic of a human conceptual scheme. One must also devise various ways to reinterpret common human experience to fit the logic even though it contradicts what we know; such as this: God has his secret will by which he has decreed that someone will be doomed to hell. Because that person has been, by the decree of God, reprobate, he is impelled to sin. But the revealed will of God says that man should choose to follow righteousness and not sin. From the human's point of view he finds himself violating that revealed will of God, and that violation is sin and, from the standpoint of the revealed will of God, God is spared the charge of having compelled the sin which, according to the hidden will of God, was the way he had laid out throughout all eternity for that human to act regardless of what that person happened to believe (for that matter, all his thoughts as well as actions are preordained as well). The human's final perdition is not because he sinned, but because God had ordained, in a way independent of foreknowledge, that he would be. The sin was, for the final state, merely an attendant circumstance, though one decreed and brought to pass by the hidden will of God*.
Thus, the living word of God is either stretched or chopped back to fit on the Procrustean bed of systematic theology.
*"Nor, nevertheless, does it follow that God unjustly complains of men when they sin, though they do nothing but what God wishes to be done by them. For, first, that distinction is to be kept in mind between God's secret will (called voluntas beneplacti) which is always done, and his revealed will (called voluntus signi) which is to us the rule of life and action. And, secondly, it is to be remarked, that the sins of men are to be judged, not by the secret, but by the revealed will of God. Therefore, though man, when he sins, does only what God by his secret and most just will has ordained, nevertheless he cannot be excused, because he acts in opposition to the revealed will of God, which he knows to be the rule of duty" (Thesis 7 de Reprobationa)., p. 571).