PREDESTINATION; LIVE BY GRACE; NOT BY WORKS (WEEK 8)

why I am not an Arminian

I am a calvinist in the tradition of Arminius. This arminianism people keep describing sounds horrid. Throwing justice to the win, having God make no sense....why...it sounds worse than Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam combined.

Good think I'm a Calvinist in the tradition of Arminius.

The Calvinists here on Free Republic keep describing a kind of hypothetical Arminian and what these hypothetical Arminians are alleged to believe is nothing close to what you or I believe, yet they continue to try to link us up with this boogeyman description of Arminians.

Clearly neither of us falls into their definition, and neither did Arminius. Thus we are more accurately called Calvinists in the Tradition of Arminius. Most of those who describe the Arminian boogeyman are likely Calvinists in the tradition of the Dort Council or Calvinists in the tradition of Beza.

Thank you so very much for all of your insights!

Indeed, logic like so many other conceptualizations come back to the "observer problem" and, as you say, for many among us, a "second reality" as well.

What are you "Observing" while vacationing on this planet?...

LOL! Great title for whoever wishes to write the initial article.

Thank you so very much for your outstanding essay and analysis!

We should add a caveat. The concept that you call bivalence is itself the product of logical analysis. This means that while we may easily posit the concept bivalence, this act does not reveal the depth of the synaptic relation between the associated elements. More care is needed to understand it. Plus, the association varies when a third or more element becomes involved. Given that the world is a multitudinous plurality of things, we can become shortsighted by simplifying the relation into a nondescript dualism.

Exactly! Dualism is an "easy" position that often does not comport with reality - as in this case, the principle of bivalence in logic and the debate of predestination v free will.

Another note. The idea of nonclassical logic is not that profound, but easily overlooked. For any system to work, we have to agree on first principles. The most important of these is one of scope (which is often presupposed, and thus often not considered a first principle). The observer phenomena is one that designates scope.

So very true!

It seems that many wish to ignore scope altogether and apply an observation which can only be made with reference to a system to any thing or event which may exist beyond that system. It is a common error especially related to second realities.

A simple example is that one cannot say a thing is random in the system if he doesn't know what the system "is." For instance, a string of numbers extracted from the extension of pi would appear random when they are in fact highly determined.

Likewise in mathematics the concept of infinity is a useful construct which does not translate well to physics because infinity is boundarylessness whereas physical reality (the geometry of space and time) has boundaries. Moreover, neither mathematics nor physics translate to spacelessness and/or timelessness - both of which are properties of the "void" from which there was a beginning in all cosmologies. IOW, timelessness and spacelessness apply to the Creator not the Creation.

And more to the point of this sidebar, laws such as logic or physical laws which apply to us as observers in physical reality cannot be projected "beyond" our boundaries "in" Creation to apply to the Creator as well.

In this regard, we can say that the law of non-contradiction also applies for nontraditional logical analysis. Again, this bears out the fact that the concept of non-contradiction does little to reveal the scope of the system. But the law does require limit. There is no principle of noncontradiction apart from limit.

Precisely! Well said.

(For some reason this reminds me of Porphory's Isagoge and the classification terms genus and species.)

Fascinating, cornelis! I would love to see a comparison of Porphory's Isagoge and Plato's Metaxy and Jewish mysticism wrt neshama, ruach and nephesh.

For Lurkers:

Porphyry

Porphyry wrote a commentary on Aristotle's Categories that is extant and another longer one that is lost except for some fragments. And he wrote the Isagoge, which is an introduction to Aristotle's logical works in general. Through these logical writings Porphyry established himself as an important figure in the history of logic. The Isagoge in particular served as a standard introductory text in Byzantium, the Arabic world and in the Latin West through Boethius' translation and commentary. These texts served as a basic introductory texts in philosophy for at least 1000 years.

Platonists before Plotinus differed in their attitude towards Aristotle. Porphyry belongs to those who believed that Plato and Aristotle were essentially in agreement, and he refers to Aristotle for support throughout his writings. Plotinus too showed such reconciliatory attitudes but Porphyry takes this trend even further. The question arises how such an attitude can be reconciled with those passages in Aristotle that seem to disagree with Plato, sometimes expressly. We do not know how Porphyry dealt with others of these, besides Aristotle's Categories, which appears to modern readers in many respects to be an anti-Platonic work. This is especially notable in its claim that particulars are prior to universals. Porphyry solves this dilemma by insisting that the so-called Aristotelian categories—substance, quality, quantity etc. dealt with in the work Categories are “significant expressions”. That is to say, the Categories is not a work in primary ontology but rather a work about the expressions used to signify the sensible things around us. The class of beings signified by a universal term of this sort is indeed prior to the universal term, e.g., the class of pale things to the universal term ‘pale’. As Strange 1987, 1992 notes, this, however, does not affect the basic ontology. So interpreted the Categories is innocuous from a Platonic point of view: The realm of Platonic intelligible Forms, which are universals of a different kind than the expressions involved in the Categories, can be kept intact.

The Isagoge does not claim originality but on the contrary Porphyry says in his introductory note that in it he will rehearse “what the ancient masters say” and avoid the deep questions. As an example of the latter, he mentions questions about the ontological status of genera and species—whether they exist or depend on thought; and if they exist, whether they are bodies or incorporeal; and if the latter, whether they are sensible items or exist separately from such. These questions Porphyry wishes to shun. Nevertheless, his formulations of them constitute the most influential part of his work, since it was these questions that formed the basis of medieval debates about the status of universals.

Thank you so much for sharing your insights, dear brother in Christ!

Predestination is God's way of humbling all of us. It humbles us when we try to logica our way through it, and it humbles us when we realize our insignificance.

Amen! Thank God that He chose to confound the wisdom of man.

There is no free will that itself isn't previewed and certified by God.

Hmmm... it makes me wonder if that tree of the knowledge of good and evil which was plainly visible to Adam (but he was commanded not to take in under pain of death death) --- wasn't a "type" of preview for Adam's sake as well.

Those are three quite different statements, HD. Spin those out a bit please. I'm curious as to what your thinking is.

Yes, I'm in a bit of a hurry with relatives running around.

No one suggests that Protestants do not listen to the early fathers of the church. It's simply that Protestants believe the scriptures to be the sole source of "inspired" writings. All other writings could be in error. To say Protestants just willy-nilly make up new denominations every time someone brings a bad meat loaf to a pot luck is not really being true to what sola scriptura is all about. For the most part, historical Protestants had clear reasoning and judgment prior to branching out. I will admit that failure to adhere to sound Protestant teachings have lead to a number of weird Protestant denominations. Of course failure to adhere to sound Catholic teachings have lead to a number of weird Catholics. (I'm not sure if there are any "weird" Orthodox.)

It is my understanding the Orthodox, while believing scripture to be inspired, also give the teaching of the Orthodox Church equal weight. These teachings are given through councils after careful deliberations. In a few cases the Orthodox believe that some of the teachings (like bishops and elders) in scripture have gone away. (Which-btw-is not unlike some Protestants when we talk about the "gifts".) If I'm not mistaken, the Orthodox feel free to modify council decisions from time to time although judiciously.

When I stated that tradition is simply picking and choosing what to believe, the Orthodox looks to the councils, makes some decisions and go with those decisions. This isn't much different to me than Protestants saying they look to the Bible, examine the teachings handed down, and make some decisions. The only difference, and this is a significant difference, is that in the Orthodox case there is a group of "decision makers". In the Protestants cases the decision making power resides with the believer and he is responsible to God.

The beef with sola scriptura isn't so much that it rejects the teachings of the Church. These teachings vary in a number of places. The real beef is in who gets to decise what is right and what is wrong. Sola scriptura is really a refusal to acknowledge that a few people have the authority to tell the rest what a person should believe about God.

"To say Protestants just willy-nilly make up new denominations every time someone brings a bad meat loaf to a pot luck is not really being true to what sola scriptura is all about. For the most part, historical Protestants had clear reasoning and judgment prior to branching out."

Something which, thanks to you and several others I have come to appreciate, even if I have disagreements with those early Divines. They did indeed have coherent theological systems.

"(I'm not sure if there are any "weird" Orthodox.)"

Trust me, we have them; individuals and groups. Some are real nut groups headed by Class A, Number One screwballs. Others are cultish individuals following guru like leaders. Thanks to God, however, these days they are few and far between however.

"It is my understanding the Orthodox, while believing scripture to be inspired, also give the teaching of the Orthodox Church equal weight."

This is correct, but the teachings (especially including our liturgical and devotional praxis) of The Church are equal in weight to the scriptures only to the extent that they are in accordance with scripture and are an integral part of the life of the People of God. By that I mean that the teachings are for all intents and purposes definitional of Orthodox individuals so that these teachings, combined with scripture, quite literally transform the individual and hopefully the society around him or her. Obviously, we're still working on that societal transformation part. Orthodox societies are hardly Utopian. But if you ever have the chance to spend some time in a small Orthodox community, say a Greek village, you'd see that the people "walk Orthodox" as my wife says, in a way which Western Christians don't "walk Christian".

"When I stated that tradition is simply picking and choosing what to believe, the Orthodox looks to the councils, makes some decisions and go with those decisions. This isn't much different to me than Protestants saying they look to the Bible, examine the teachings handed down, and make some decisions."

And actually we make very few dogmatic decisions at all. By dogmatic decisions I mean articles of Faith which MUST be accepted if one wishes to be called Orthodox. And we really don't have anything like canon law in the Latin Church. Probably the highest expression of what we believe is found in the way we pray and what we say when we pray, but most of that isn't the subject of any conciliar decision or decisions but rather is a natural, and very, very slow evolution of the understanding of The Church of the meaning of scripture. I say very, very slow because the Liturgy I will attend this morning is virtually the same one my ancestors did 1700+ years ago.

"The only difference, and this is a significant difference, is that in the Orthodox case there is a group of "decision makers". In the Protestants cases the decision making power resides with the believer and he is responsible to God."

Sort of. While a council is generally composed of hierarchs and their fellow travelers, in the end it is The Church, which is mostly the laity, which decides what is True Faith and what is not. Unlike in the Latin Church, whether a pronouncement of a council, especially a dogmatic pronouncement, is correct depends on whether or not the people accept it and live it out in their lives. In effect, it is the action of the Holy Spirit among the people of God which we count on to keep things "Orthodox".

"If I'm not mistaken, the Orthodox feel free to modify council decisions from time to time although judiciously."

Councils can declare dogma or disciplinary canons. We cannot change dogma but we can and do change discipline. Times change and the needs of the people change. Disciplines are established as a help to theosis for Christians. Sometimes they are quite onerous but they are promulgated for our improvement. When a discipline ceases to be useful or in fact becomes destructive, it can be abrogated. Dogma can be refined or expanded upon as the Church's understanding of scripture increases through the power of the Holy Spirit. Now Orthodoxy hasn't done that since the Great Schism since without the Latin Church involved, The Church wouldn't be making the decisions; a huge chunk would be missing. What you see from the various Orthodox councils since the Great Schism have been conciliar explanations of dogma (sometimes accepted, sometimes not) and local or Pan Orthodox discipline matters. We do not claim that these sorts of decisions are in any way binding on non-Orthodox Christians.

"The real beef is in who gets to decide what is right and what is wrong. Sola scriptura is really a refusal to acknowledge that a few people have the authority to tell the rest what a person should believe about God."

Ultimately this is precisely what Orthodox teaches and always has. Perhaps the difference lies in the more "communal" mentality of Orthodoxy when compared with Protestantism's individualism. Certainly we believe that a single individual can discern more clearly the Truth of scripture than perhaps everyone else. Orthodox history is full of these people. But the only way to know that is if The Church, hierarchs, clergy and laity, come to accept and live out that Truth.

#604... Excellent stealth and stalk..
You sneaked up on us all and hit us right in the kisser with a Porphyry Pie..

Humiliated I am, but am licking all that remains on my face..
It is quite sweet and scrumcious.. BTW; I have no self respect..

No matter how many time you repeat this historical falsehood, it does not pass the sniff test.

Arminius was no Calvinist, and neither are you two. You are Christians in the tradition of Arminius (in both theology and method).

Arminius was no Calvinist, and neither are you two.

We have it on good authority that "Calvinists... come in a hundred varieties."

I am simply not of your (Council of Dort) variety. I am of the Jacob Arminian/Norman Geisler (Moderate) variety.

I am not so greedy with the term "Calvinist" that I would not include you in the definition - even though I believe you have taken Calvin's teachings too far particularly in regard to limited atonement.

But I am gracious enough to let you continue to call yourself a Calvinist. You should be gracious enough to let xzins and Geisler and I do the same.

Carry on.

"factored into His omnipotent knowledge of His own creation." -- The above is what you wrote, E.

Thank you, x, for helping us all understand just how Arminius prevaricated and deflected, twisting the truth into lies by your example of quoting half my sentence, thus missing the point entirely.

I wrote: "Nothing precedes God's determining will. If He thought it at the moment of creation, then it's set in stone because even His hypothetical "change of mind" would be factored into His omnipotent knowledge of His own creation."

Until we get you to address this, it is impossible for me to move on. I consider this an issue of straightforwardness.

And I consider this an issue of honesty. You are Arminius' offspring.

But I am gracious enough to let you continue to call yourself a Calvinist. You should be gracious enough to let xzins and Geisler and I do the same.

LOL. Call yourself "Fido" for all I care. Men are known by their words and deeds. Your words are the words of the counter-Reformer, Jacob Arminius.

When you start to speak like a Calvinist, I'll be delighted to call you a Calvinist.

One day, God willing.

Until then, I'll call you a cab.

(And once again you forgot to ping someone who quoted in your post. tsk tsk.)

Where's Alex? Wasn't there a song, "Walk Like an Arminian" sung to the tune of the Bangles' "Walk Like an Egyptian"?

I doubt God calls Himself anything but God or some variation of "I AM," but do you think He "prefers" the beliefs of the Calvinist to the Arminian, considering your correct and Scripturally-sound assessment here?

And the Doctrines of Grace and Sovereignty of God are logically parallel with what is in the Bible in its entirety.

Arminianism throws justice to the wind, and that mean OT God just doesn't make sense! How dare God allow evil to exist? How dare God make me Christian? How dare God take away my ability to sin in heaven? Free will becomes the god, and a weak and worthless god at that. I get to say whether He saves me. Does that sound like a God of Glory, which we fall on our faces in abject submission to? An Eternal and Everlasting God? Does that sound like the King of Kings, waiting for us to choose? Is He waiting on His throne, like a girl waiting for a call asking for a date?

I cannot guess how anyone of that bent can explain the Prophets... Calvinism allows the OT and NT to click together like legos. They just click together and they make sense. Justice and Love are fully allowed to be in God's character, and allows the Author of History to write the story as He wills. God does not need to herd the wills of billions of people into the best possible scenario. Everything is as He wills, and we just get to react the way we do, which is also the way He wills.

Amen.

There is no free will that itself isn't previewed and certified by God.

No Calvinist would make this statement. An Arminian makes this statement.

You have free will as primary here, with God "certifying" that free will choice as good or bad, after the fact.. That's why you believe in salvation by God "looking down the tunnel of time" and reacting to men's "free will" choice to believe or not. You have God beholden to men. You have God reacting to men. You have God waiting on men. You have God a respecter of men. You have God subservient to men.

A Calvinist knows nothing precedes God's decree for His creation, most especially not someone's clever choice to believe in Christ.

Trinitarian faith is given by God alone. It is a sign of redemption; not a requirement for it. Men can do nothing to earn God's grace; it is an unmerited, merciful gift.

Where's Alex?

A while back, out of the blue, he requested that I never ping or post to him again.

"I get to say whether He saves me. Does that sound like a God of Glory, which we fall on our faces in abject submission to?"

If you look at these verses from Revelation it would appear that in the last days God is giving all people a chance to repent in the face of His progressive wrath (judgments). In Rev. 10:6 He says the time for repentance is running out. In Rev. 16:17 He says the time for repentance has run out and there is no more grace and mercy for the lost. Now, why waste time with these opportunities for repentance if they can't repent?

Rev. 9:20-21, " And the rest of the men which were not killed by these plagues yet repented not of the works of their hands, that they should not worship devils, and idols of gold, and silver, and brass, and stone, and of wood: which neither can see, nor hear, nor walk: Neither repented they of their murders, nor of their sorceries, nor of their fornication, nor of their thefts."

Rev. 10:6, "And sware by him that liveth for ever and ever, who created heaven, and the things that therein are, and the earth, and the things that therein are, and the sea, and the things which are therein, that there should be time no longer:"

Rev. 14:6, "And I saw another angel fly in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to preach unto them that dwell on the earth, and to every nation, and kindred, and tongue, and people,"

Rev. 16:9,11, "And men were scorched with great heat, and blasphemed the name of God, which hath power over these plagues: and they repented not to give him glory.

11 " And blasphemed the God of heaven because of their pains and their sores, and repented not of their deeds.."

Rev. 16:17, "And the seventh angel poured out his vial into the air; and there came a great voice out of the temple of heaven, from the throne, saying, It is done."

Nope, I'm a Calvinist in the Tradition of Arminius.

It's obvious. Just read what arminianism is supposed to believe, and it's obvious that I don't believe that. Therefore, I'm a Calvinist in the Tradition of Arminius.

You are a calvinist in the tradition of Dort.

I'm a Calvinist in the Tradition of Arminius.

Thank you for your reply!

you: All statements presume the fundamental principle of logic, which has its foundation in metaphysics (i.e. the science of being as being). In isolation there can be no "illogical" statements (not to be confused with unintelligible statements). Only *combinations* of statements can be illogical, when the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

me: The above is a false generalization of “logic” insofar as it represents “formal logic” as “logic” ...

You: The "insofar as" makes your statement a bit of sophistry, since my statement does not at all "represent formal logic as logic". To refute my statement you would have to provide a statement that does not presume the fundamental principle of logic, or you would have to show an illogical statement that is not a combination of statements.

Following are a series of excerpts from an article I linked earlier, illustrating various types of logic and how “formal logic” is not the only type of “logic” (for hotlinks to the various subjects, click on the primary link repeated below:)

Logic

Logic, from Classical Greek (logos), originally meaning the word, or what is spoken, (but coming to mean thought or reason) is the study of criteria for the evaluation of arguments, although the exact definition of logic is a matter of controversy among philosophers. However the subject is grounded, the task of the logician is to advance an account of valid and fallacious inference, to allow one to distinguish logical from flawed arguments.

Traditionally, logic is studied as a branch of philosophy, one part of the classical trivium, which consisted of grammar, logic, and rhetoric. Since the mid-nineteenth century logic has also been commonly studied in mathematics and law. More recently logic has been applied to computer science. The parts that make up a computer chip are often called "logic gates".

As a formal science, logic investigates and classifies the structure of statements and arguments, both through the study of formal systems of inference and through the study of arguments in natural language. The scope of logic can therefore be very large, ranging from core topics such as the study of fallacies and paradoxes, to specialized analyses of reasoning such as probability, correct reasoning, and arguments involving causality. Logic is also commonly used today in argumentation theory.

…

The crucial concept of form is central to discussions of the nature of logic, and it complicates exposition that 'formal' in "formal logic" is commonly used in an ambiguous manner. Symbolic language is actually a species or class of formal logic, and should be distinguished from another class of formal logic in traditional Aristotelian syllogistic logic, which deals solely with categorical propositions. We shall start by giving definitions that we shall adhere to in the rest of this article:

* Informal logic is the study of natural language arguments. The study of fallacies is an especially important branch of informal logic. The dialogs of Plato are a major example of informal logic.

* Formal logic is the study of inference with purely formal content, where that content is made explicit. (An inference possesses a purely formal content if it can be expressed as a particular application of a wholly abstract rule, that is, a rule that is not about any particular thing or property. The first rules of formal logic that have come down to us were written by Aristotle. We will see later that in many definitions of logic, logical inference and inference with purely formal content are the same thing. This does not render the notion of informal logic vacuous, since one may wish to investigate logic without committing to a particular formal analysis.)

* Symbolic logic is the study of symbolic abstractions that capture the formal features of logical inference.

The ambiguity is that "formal logic" is very often used with the alternate meaning of symbolic logic as we have defined it, with informal logic meaning any logical investigation that does not involve symbolic abstraction; it is this sense of 'formal' that is parallel to the received usages coming from "formal languages" or "formal theory".

While formal logic is old, dating back more than two millennia, most of symbolic logic is comparatively new, and arises with the application of insights from mathematics to problems in logic. Generally, a symbolic logic is captured by a formal system, comprising a formal language including rules for creating expressions in the language, and a set of rules of derivation. The expressions will normally be intended to represent claims that we may be interested in, and likewise the rules of derivation represent inferences; such systems usually have an intended interpretation.

…

Rival conceptions of logic

Logic arose (see below) from a concern with correctness of argumentation. The conception of logic as the study of argument is historically fundamental, and was how the founders of distinct traditions of logic, namely Plato, Aristotle, Mozi and Aksapada Gautama, conceived of logic. Modern logicians usually wish to ensure that logic studies just those arguments that arise from appropriately general forms of inference; so for example the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says of logic that it does not, however, cover good reasoning as a whole. That is the job of the theory of rationality. Rather it deals with inferences whose validity can be traced back to the formal features of the representations that are involved in that inference, be they linguistic, mental, or other representations (Hofweber 2004).

By contrast Immanuel Kant introduced an alternative idea as to what logic is. He argued that logic should be conceived as the science of judgement, an idea taken up in Gottlob Frege's logical and philosophical work, where thought (German: Gedanke) is substituted for judgement (German: Urteil). On this conception, the valid inferences of logic follow from the structural features of judgements or thoughts.

A third view of logic arises from the idea that logic is more fundamental than reason, and so that logic is the science of states of affairs (German: Sachverhalt) in general. Barry Smith locates Franz Brentano as the source for this idea, an idea he claims reaches its fullest development in the work of Adolf Reinach (Smith 1989). This view of logic appears radically distinct from the first: on this conception logic has no essential connection with argument, and the study of fallacies and paradoxes no longer appears essential to the discipline.

Occasionally one encounters a fourth view as to what logic is about: it is a purely formal manipulation of symbols according to some prescribed rules. This conception can be criticized on the grounds that the manipulation of just any formal system is usually not regarded as logic. Such accounts normally omit an explanation of what it is about certain formal systems that makes them systems of logic.

…

The logics discussed above are all "bivalent" or "two-valued"; that is, they are most naturally understood as dividing propositions into the true and the false propositions. Systems which reject bivalence are known as non-classical logics.

In 1910 Nicolai A. Vasiliev rejected the law of excluded middle and the law of contradiction and proposed the law of excluded fourth and logic tolerant to contradiction. In the early 20th century Jan ?ukasiewicz investigated the extension of the traditional true/false values to include a third value, "possible", so inventing ternary logic, the first multi-valued logic.

Intuitionistic logic was proposed by L.E.J. Brouwer as the correct logic for reasoning about mathematics, based upon his rejection of the law of the excluded middle as part of his intuitionism. Brouwer rejected formalisation in mathematics, but his student Arend Heyting studied intuitionistic logic formally, as did Gerhard Gentzen. Intuitionistic logic has come to be of great interest to computer scientists, as it is a constructive logic, and is hence a logic of what computers can do.

Modal logic is not truth conditional, and so it has often been proposed as a non-classical logic. However, modal logic is normally formalised with the principle of the excluded middle, and its relational semantics is bivalent, so this inclusion is disputable. On the other hand, modal logic can be used to encode non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic logic.

Logics such as fuzzy logic have since been devised with an infinite number of "degrees of truth", represented by a real number between 0 and 1. Bayesian probability can be interpreted as a system of logic where probability is the subjective truth value.

…

What is the epistemological status of the laws of logic? What sort of arguments is appropriate for criticising purported principles of logic? In an influential paper entitled "Is logic empirical?" Hilary Putnam, building on a suggestion of W.V. Quine, argued that in general the facts of propositional logic have a similar epistemological status as facts about the physical universe, for example as the laws of mechanics or of general relativity, and in particular that what physicists have learned about quantum mechanics provides a compelling case for abandoning certain familiar principles of classical logic: if we want to be realists about the physical phenomena described by quantum theory, then we should abandon the principle of distributivity, substituting for classical logic the quantum logic proposed by Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann.

Another paper by the same name by Sir Michael Dummett argues that Putnam's desire for realism mandates the law of distributivity. Distributivity of logic is essential for the realist's understanding of how propositions are true of the world in just the same way as he has argued the principle of bivalence is. In this way, the question, "Is logic empirical?" can be seen to lead naturally into the fundamental controversy in metaphysics on realism versus anti-realism.

Your protests concerning non-classical logic and informal logic are addressed in the above excerpt. And your questions concerning the observer problem are addressed by cornelis’ post and my reply to it at post 604.

You continued in a series of replies by stating in different words that one need give up nothing of (formal) logic to affirm or attest to various points I asserted. Therefore I challenge you to present the formal logic to affirm or attest to the following:

Predestination (prophesies) and free will (commandments) are not mutually exclusive.

Faith and reason are complementary but reason cannot substitute for faith.

God’s ways are higher than our ways and His thoughts are higher than our thoughts.

Some Miracles:

God became enfleshed and was born of a virgin, died for our sins on a cross, resurrected Himself and is now sitting at the right hand of God the Father in heaven.

Christ raised the dead, made the blind see, the lame walk, cast out demons and walked on water.

Creation took six days and occurred in the order given in Genesis 1.

Noah’s flood covered the whole earth destroying all in which there was the breath of life.

Jonah spent three days in the belly of a whale (or large fish.)

That a perfect God would make an imperfect Creation having both good and evil.

That laws discovered in an existence having boundaries apply to existence beyond those boundaries.

You continued:

A physical law is nothing other than a conceptual generalization of a physical disposition(s). It is not something God has to "override".

Physical laws must be true, “By definition, there have never been repeatable contradicting observations.” A Miracle is “striking interposition of divine intervention by God in the universe by which the ordinary course and operation of Nature is overruled, suspended, or modified.”

You continued with a challenge:

As far as God overriding a law of formal logic, name just one law of formal logic that God has overridden in the performance of a miracle.

The principle of identity is a law of formal logic. Stated simply, "a being is what it is" and in the negative “A being cannot both be and not be at the same time and under the same aspect."

And think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to [our] father: for I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham. – Matt 3:9

Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day. For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him. – John 6:53-56

Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am. – John 8:58

And Enoch walked with God: and he [was] not; for God took him. – Genesis 5:24

I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me. I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness [come] by the law, then Christ is dead in vain. – Gal 2:20-21

For ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God. – Col 3:3

And all that dwell upon the earth shall worship him, whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. – Rev 13:8

And of course there is the law of the excluded middle whereas God has spoken both prophesy (predestination) and commandments (free will.)

me: Moreover, I assert that many if not most all ad hominem arguments are not stated as a combination of statements, e.g. “The author is a liar” “You are an idiot” etc. The conclusion is not formally drawn, it is suggested.

You: Right, but those are still arguments, because they are enthymemes.

Enthymemes are more appropriately “rhetoric.”

Aristotle’s Rhetoric

For Aristotle, an enthymeme is what has the function of a proof or demonstration in the domain of public speech. Since a demonstration is a kind of sullogismos, and the enthymeme is said to be a sullogismos too. The word ‘enthymeme’ (from ‘enthumeisthai - to consider’) had already been coined by Aristotle's predecessors and originally designated clever sayings, bon mots and short arguments involving a paradox or contradiction. The concepts ‘proof’ (apodeixis) and ‘sullogismos’ play a crucial role in Aristotle's logical-dialectical theory. In applying them to a term of conventional rhetoric Aristotle appeals to a well known rhetorical technique, but, at the same time, restricts and codifies the original meaning of ‘enthymeme’: properly understood, what people call ‘enthymeme’ should have the form of a sullogismos, i.e. a deductive argument.

6.2 Formal Requirements

In general, Aristotle regards deductive arguments as a set of sentences in which some sentences are premises and one is the conclusion, and the inference from the premises to the conclusion is guaranteed by the premises alone. Since enthymemes in the proper sense are expected to be deductive arguments, the minimal requirement for the formulation of enthymemes is that they have to display the premise-conclusion-structure of deductive arguments. This is why enthymemes have to include a statement as well as a kind of reason for the given statement. Typically this reason is given in a conditional ‘if’-clause or a causal ‘since’- or ‘for’-clause. Examples of the former , conditional type are: “If not even the gods know everything, human beings can hardly do so.” “If the war is the cause of present evils, things should be set right by making peace.” Examples of the latter, causal type are: “One should not be educated, for one ought not be envied (and educated people are usually envied).” “She has given birth, for she has milk.” Aristotle stresses that the sentence “There is no man among us who is free” taken for itself is a maxim, but becomes an enthymeme as soon as it is used together with a reason such as “for all are slaves of money or of chance (and no slave of money or chance is free).” Sometimes the required reason may even be implicit, as e.g. in the sentence “As a mortal do not cherish immortal anger” the reason why one should not cherish mortal anger is implicitly given in the phrase “immortal,” which alludes to the rule that is not appropriate for mortal beings to have such an attitude.

6.3 Enthymemes as Dialectical Arguments

Aristotle calls the enthymeme the “body of persuasion,” implying that everything else is only an addition or accident to the core of the persuasive process. The reason why the enthymeme as the rhetorical kind of proof or demonstration should be regarded as central for the rhetorical process of persuasion is that we are most easily persuaded when we think that something has been demonstrated. Hence, the basic idea of a rhetorical demonstration seems to be this: In order to make a target group believe that q, the orator must first select a sentence p or some sentences p1 … pn that are already accepted by the target group, secondly she has to show that q can be derived from p or p1 … pn, using p or p1 … pn as premises. Given that the target persons form their beliefs in accordance with rational standards, they will accept q as soon as they understand that q can be demonstrated on the basis of their own opinions.

Consequently, the construction of enthymemes is primarily a matter of deducing from accepted opinions (endoxa). Of course, it is also possible to use premises which are not commonly accepted by themselves, but can be derived from commonly accepted opinions; other premises are only accepted since the speaker is held to be credible; still other enthymemes are built from signs: see §6.5. That a deduction is made from accepted opinions—as opposed to deductions from first and true sentences or principles—is the defining feature of dialectical argumentation in the Aristotelian sense. Thus, the formulation of enthymemes is a matter of dialectic, and the dialectician has the competence that is needed for the construction of enthymemes. If enthymemes are a subclass of dialectical arguments then, it is natural to expect a specific difference by which one can tell enthymemes apart from all other kinds of dialectical arguments (traditionally, commentators regarded logical incompleteness as such a difference; for some objections against the traditional view see §6.4). Nevertheless, this expectation is somehow misled: The enthymeme is different from other kinds of dialectical arguments, insofar as it is used in the rhetorical context of public speech (and rhetorical arguments are called ‘enthymemes’); thus, no further formal or qualitative differences are needed.

However, in the rhetorical context there are two factors that the dialectician has to keep in mind if she wants to become a rhetorician too, and if the dialectical argument is to become a successful enthymeme. Firstly, the typical subjects of public speech do not - as the subject of dialectic and theoretical philosophy - belong to the things that are necessarily the case, but are among those things which are the goal of practical deliberation and can also be otherwise. Secondly, as opposed to well trained dialecticians the audience of public speech is characterized by an intellectual insufficiency; above all, the member of a jury or assembly are not accustomed to follow a longer chain of inferences. Therefore enthymemes must not be as precise as a scientific demonstration and should be shorter than ordinary dialectical arguments. This, however, is not to say that the enthymeme is defined by incompleteness and brevity. Rather, it is a sign of a well executed enthymeme that the content and the number of its premises are adjusted to the intellectual capacities of the public audience; but even an enthymeme which failed to incorporate these qualities would still be enthymeme.

6.4 The Brevity of the Enthymeme

In a well known passage (Rhet. I.2, 1357a7-18; similar: Rhet. II.22, 1395b24-26) Aristotle says that the enthymeme often has few or even fewer premises than some other deductions, (sullogismoi). Since most interpreters refer the word ‘sullogismos’ to the syllogistic theory (see the entry on Aristotle's logic) according to which a proper deduction has exactly two premises, those lines have led to the wide spread understanding that Aristotle defines the enthymeme as a sullogismos in which one of two premises has been suppressed, i.e. as an abbreviated, incomplete syllogism. But certainly the mentioned passages do not attempt to give a definition of the enthymeme, nor does the word ‘sullogismos’ necessarily refer to deductions with exactly two premises. Properly understood, both passages are about the selection of appropriate premises, not about logical incompleteness. The remark that enthymemes often have few or less premises concludes the discussion of two possible mistakes the orator could make (Rhet. I.2, 1357a7-10): One can draw conclusions from things that have previously been deduced or from things that have not been deduced yet. The latter method is unpersuasive, for the premises are not accepted nor have they been introduced. The former method is problematic too: if the orator has to introduce the needed premises by another deduction, and the premises of this pre-deduction too, etc., one will end up with a long chain of deductions. Arguments with several deductive steps are common in dialectical practice, but one cannot expect the audience of a public speech to follow such long arguments. This is why Aristotle says that the enthymeme is and should be from fewer premises…

LOLOL!

I quoted your entire sentence in #574. We are now discussing the details of the statement itself. There is no need to continuously cite entire units when the pieces are being individually discussed.

The piece I was discussing actually does say that God can work anything into His plan.....which would be everything that is.

This does open the question if God knows everything because He is omniscient, or if He knows everything because He is omnipotent.

It has to be because He is omniscient in its own right. God does not NEED to direct every action that is.

In the taming of the frontier, the new American government discovered that they didn't need to control every inch of every river. They could do so by controlling the junctures of major rivers.

So with time and events. God knows the important junctures.