Did environmentalism bring down Columbia?

CATASTROPHE IN THE SKY Did environmentalism bring down Columbia? NASA probed exact same glitch of insulation striking tiles in 1997

More than six years ago, NASA investigated extensive thermal tile damage on the space shuttle Columbia as a result of the shedding of external tank insulation on launch – now a prime suspect in the Columbia's disastrous disintegration upon re-entry yesterday.

The problems began when the space agency switched to materials and parts that were considered more "environmentally friendly," according to a NASA report obtained by WorldNetDaily.

NASA investigators have quickly focused on the possibility that Columbia's thermal tiles were damaged far more seriously than the space agency realized during liftoff. Just a little over a minute into Columbia's launch Jan. 16, a chunk of insulating foam peeled away from the external fuel tank and smashed into the left wing, which like the rest of the shuttle is covered with tiles to protect the ship from the extreme heat of re-entry into the atmosphere. Yesterday, that same wing started exhibiting sensor failures and other problems 23 minutes before Columbia was scheduled to touch down. With just 16 minutes to go before landing, the shuttle disintegrated over Texas killing all seven in the crew.

In 1997, during the 87th space shuttle mission, similar tile damage was done during launch when the external tank foam crashed into them during the stress of takeoff. NASA knows that problem occurred again on this Columbia launch. However, the agency is not certain this was the cause of the disintegration of the craft upon re-entry.

"Immediately after the Columbia rolled to a stop, the inspection crews began the process of the post-flight inspection," wrote NASA's Greg Katnik in a review of the problems of that 1997 flight. "As soon as the orbiter was approached, light spots in the tiles were observed indicating that there had been significant damage to the tiles. The tiles do a fantastic job of repelling heat, however they are very fragile and susceptible to impact damage. Damage numbering up to forty tiles is considered normal on each mission due to ice dropping off of the external tank (ET) and plume re-circulation causing this debris to impact with the tiles. But the extent of damage at the conclusion of this mission was not 'normal.'"

The alarming report continued: "The pattern of hits did not follow aerodynamic expectations, and the number, size and severity of hits were abnormal. Three hundred and eight hits were counted during the inspection, one-hundred and thirty two (132) were greater than one inch. Some of the hits measured fifteen (15) inches long with depths measuring up to one and one-half (1 1/2) inches. Considering that the depth of the tile is two (2) inches, a 75% penetration depth had been reached. Over one hundred (100) tiles have been removed from the Columbia because they were irreparable. The inspection revealed the damage, now the 'detective process' began."

NASA investigators seven years ago noted that the damage followed changes in the methods of "foaming" the external tank – changes mandated by concerns about being "environmentally friendly."

"During the STS-87 mission, there was a change made on the external tank," said the report. "Because of NASA's goal to use environmentally friendly products, a new method of 'foaming' the external tank had been used for this mission and the STS-86 mission. It is suspected that large amounts of foam separated from the external tank and impacted the orbiter. This caused significant damage to the protective tiles of the orbiter."

NASA's report on that earlier Columbia flight concluded on a positive note, suggesting changes would be made in procedures to avoid such problems at launches in the future.

"As this investigation continues, I am very comfortable that the questions will be answered and the solutions applied," wrote Katnik. "In fact, some of the solutions are already in progress. At present the foam on the sides of the tank is being sanded down to the nominal minimum thickness. This removes the outer surface, which is tougher than the foam core, and lessens the amount of foam that can separate and hit the orbiter."

This 6-year-old problem is sure to raise new concerns about NASA's safety procedures. Already, new public concern is focusing on a former NASA engineer who pleaded last summer for a presidential order to halt all further shuttle flights until safety issues had been addressed.

In a letter to the White House, Don Nelson, who served with NASA for 36 years until he retired in 1999, wrote to President George W. Bush warning that his "intervention" was necessary to "prevent another catastrophic space shuttle accident."

During his last 11 years at NASA, Nelson served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was on the initial design team for the space shuttle. He participated in every shuttle upgrade until his retirement.

Listing a series of mishaps with shuttle missions since 1999, Nelson warned in his letter that NASA management and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel have failed to respond to the growing warning signs of another shuttle accident, reported the London Observer. Since 1999 the vehicle had experienced a number of potentially disastrous problems:

1999 – Columbia's launch was delayed by a hydrogen leak and Discovery was grounded with damaged wiring, contaminated engine and dented fuel line;

October 2000 – the 100th flight of the shuttle was delayed because of a misplaced safety pin and concerns with the external tank;

July 2002 – the inspector general reported that the shuttle safety programme was not properly managed;

August 2002 – the shuttle launch system was grounded after fuel line cracks were discovered. Yesterday, Nelson told the London Observer that he feared the Columbia disaster was the culmination of "disastrous mismanagement" by NASA's most senior officials and would inevitably lead to a moratorium on future flights. "I became concerned about safety issues in NASA after Challenger," he said. "I think what happened is that very slowly over the years NASA's culture of safety became eroded. But when I tried to raise my concerns with NASA's new administrator, I received two reprimands for not going through the proper channels, which discouraged other people from coming forward with their concerns. When it came to an argument between a middle-ranking engineer and the astronauts and administration, guess who won."

The original O-rings on Challenger were asbestos based and worked fine until NASA changed them in order to satisfy the Earth Worshippers.

No, they were always made of the same substance... the political problem of the O-rings is that they were there at all!

Senator Jake Garn (R) was chair of the Air and Space Committee of the Senate and a NASA supporter. Garn wanted his state, Utah, to get the major contract for the booster rocket system. If I recall correctly, two other companies with assembly plants in Georgia and Florida were also bidding for the project. Their designs matched the original one-piece design for the boosters and could be barged to Cape Kennedy. Morton/Thiokol, the Utah company championed by Garn, would have to ship the boosters by train which precluded the one piece design, so a modular booster was designed with the O-rings required for sealing the joints between modules. The modules were just the right size to be loaded sidways on flat cars and fit through the necessary railroad tunnels on the way from Utah to Florida.

Although the system was more expensive than the single piece units, the contract was awarded to Morton/Thiokol to please Jake Garn... political reasons. The rest is history.

Posted on Fri, Aug. 08, 2003

Families of Columbia crew await shuttle report and want it to make a difference
JUAN A. LOZANO
Associated Press

HOUSTON - Seeing the thing that brought down the space shuttle Columbia filled Jon Salton with sadness.

His sister, Laurel Clark, was one of the seven astronauts who died when the shuttle shattered on its return to Earth more than six months ago.

He viewed the video of the impact test in July that showed a chunk of foam insulation knocking a giant hole in shuttle wing parts.

"It's hard to watch that," he said. "It's utterly obvious now that type of impact could cause an orbiter to break apart.

"It didn't make me angry. It just made me sad."

NASA officials who didn't believe foam could do such damage "really missed the boat," Salton said in a telephone interview from Albuquerque, N.M., where he lives. The breakaway foam that slammed into the shuttle's left wing during Columbia's launch is being blamed for creating a hole that let in hot atmospheric gases that led to its destruction.

Once employed by a NASA contractor, Salton has been watching closely the work of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, which will issue its report on the shuttle disaster at the end of this month.

Part of him wants NASA to feel the sting of the report's criticism.

The other astronauts' families have been watching, too, not all as intensely as Salton, nor with such a critical eye. Some like Evelyn Husband, wife of Columbia commander Rick Husband, and Barbara Anderson, mother of astronaut Michael Anderson, are simply awaiting the final report.

"I'd like to wait until they finish the work of the investigation committee. Then I'll get a better picture," said Eliezer Wolferman, the 80-year-old father of Israel's first astronaut, Ilan Ramon.

"We have read (about the investigation) in the newspapers. I'd like to have something official," he said in a telephone interview from his home in the Israeli town of Omer.

Most family members who spoke with The Associated Press said they simply want the shuttle fixed and able to fly again more safely. Some said they appreciated the candor of the accident board. The family of astronaut David Brown could not be reached for comment.

Laurel Clark's husband, Jonathan, said he was grateful for the foam test because it confirms the cause of the accident.

"I felt it was great they were able to find a more definitive answer," he said. "I really don't look at it emotionally. I look at it analytically. I'm glad we found what did this."

Some peace of mind has come from the ongoing investigation and the 13 board members' work, said Clark, a NASA flight surgeon at Johnson Space Center.

"Talking to other family members, (we have) been very pleased with their thoroughness, their professionalism," he said. "They truly are an independent, free-thinking group. For that we're all very grateful."

Clark, 50, thinks the preliminary recommendations the board has already made, including finding ways to do in-orbit inspections and repairs and better preflight safety checks, are very prudent.

Still, he says, "It's one thing to say it but another to do it."

Both he and Salton pointed to a NASA culture that may make questioning decisions difficult.

"There's this cultural mind-set that's present here," said Clark. "It's not an evil thing. It's great to have that 'let's go' spirit, but sometimes you push things to beyond where you should. But this is not about fault, it's about cause."

Salton worked five years at NASA designing tools used on spacewalks. He said that while he believes there was nothing malicious about the space agency's faulty assessment of the foam strike, he thinks it fell prey to a cultural attitude that's existed since before the 1986 Challenger accident.

"You want to succeed so badly that you tend to justify things that may not be logical to a more objective party," he said. "All the technical recommendations seem somewhat obvious. The biggest thing that I'm anxious to see is what they say about the cultural practices. Those are much, much more important."

Salton, 37, who now works for Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, said he hopes the board's final report will have accountability measures.

While he wants shuttles to fly again, he is bothered that NASA has already set a time frame to return to space. Overall, he has been pleased by the accident board's work.

"The report should be a sharp, kind of stinging feeling to NASA. I like the fact the board has been pretty candid. It's a good example of the kind of integrity that NASA could follow," he said.

The reactions of others are more tempered.

Husband, 44, who lives in Houston, doesn't fault NASA or anybody for the accident.

"Hindsight, like they say, is 20/20," she said. "So now it's easy to say, 'Oh we should have done that.'"

Later in a statement she issued after the foam impact test, Husband said: "My prayer is that NASA will fix it and get back into space. That is what my husband Rick would have wanted."

Michael Anderson's mother, Barbara Anderson, also does not cast blame. Her son was a pilot almost 20 years. "There was danger there," she said from her home in Spokane, Wash. "It could have happened in a plane as well as in a shuttle. We accepted it."

Audrey McCool of Las Vegas has only followed in a general way the investigation into the accident that killed her son, William McCool.

She looks forward to the report and a detailed explanation of the cause. But she is philosophical.

"What's done is done," she said. "No repairs will bring Columbia back but you want to prevent future disasters. These seven people will have died in vain if we do not carry on with the work they were committed to."

The Chawla family, too, wants to see future shuttle flights. Girish Chawla of suburban Atlanta, younger brother of crew member Kalpana Chawla, said his family "has accepted that this was an act of existence or an act of God."

"Mother said the show must go on. Father was sometimes emotional, saying it was a stupid thing that caused the accident. But it was just the mood of the moment," Chawla said. "Just because Kalpana died doesn't mean it shouldn't go on."

ON THE NET

Columbia Accident Investigation Board: http://www.caib.us

Actually, they were visible in a picture taken of the left wing edge on the previous flight. The picture was published on drudge for a few days. The Shuttle could fly with such things, but the issue of what something hitting a wing in that condition apparently was another matter. One of the pre-flight checks noted there was also a very deep gouge from a previous insult with the same insulation.

YOU ARE A LIAR!

There are no pictures of damage that was allowed to remain on the shuttle for the next launch. i can believe a POST-flight check noting a "deep gouge" but not one that would be allowed to remain in place for the next flight. There were pictures of wing damage to previous STS missions however it would NEVER be allowed to remain nor would the shuttle be allowed to take off with such damage!

Before every STS launch, ALL damaged tiles are replaced and the shuttles launch with a surface that meets launch standards.

The political decisions and the arrogance of NASA management is enough without you falsely raising the spectre of criminal negligence and depraved indifference. The BS you disinformation artists post is reprehensible.

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