Unclassified Version of Director of CIA's Testimony on Terrorist Attacks Against the US

cia ^

[chance33_98]

Unclassified Version of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet's
Testimony before the Joint Inquiry into Terrorist Attacks Against the United States

Note:

1.  The Joint Inquiry members asked that the highly classified testimony DCI Tenet presented to them June 18 be modified to make it unclassified so that it could be released publicly.  To that end, intelligence sources and methods and all other classified text have been replaced with unclassified text.  The thrust of the Director's statement remains intact.

2.  The numbers following names in the text—e.g., "(#14)"—are keyed to the photos in the accompanying graphic, which is offered in both JPG and PDF formats.

---

Before Director Mueller and I focus on the 9/11 plot, as you've asked us to do Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with some remarks on the context in which the attacks occurred.  There are two key points: 

• First, we had followed Bin Laden for many years and had no doubt that he intended a major attack.

• Second, the eighteen months prior to 9/11 were a period of intense CIA/FBI efforts to thwart dramatically heightened UBL operational activity. 

We first locked onto Bin Laden in the period from 1991 to 1996 when he was in Sudan.

• During those years, he was principally a financier of terrorist attacks and our efforts against him competed with other deadly threats, such as those posed by Hizbollah – which at that point was responsible for the deaths of more Americans than any other terrorist organization.
  
  
• Bin Laden jumped right to the top of our list with his move to Afghanistan in 1996 and his drive to build the sanctuary that subsequently enabled his most spectacular attacks.  This focus resulted in the establishment within CTC of a Bin Ladin-dedicated Issue Station staffed by CIA, FBI, DOD, and NSA officers.
  
  
• Bin Laden showed his hand clearly that year when he said that the June bombing of Khobar towers marked the beginning of the war between Muslims and the United States.
  
  
• Two years later, he issued a fatwa stating that all Muslims have a religious duty "to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military worldwide".
  
  
• He then attacked our East African embassies in 1998 and said that an attack in the US was his highest priority.
  
  
• We took this as his unequivocal declaration of war, and we in turn declared war on him, inaugurating an intensive period of counterterrorist activity that filled the months running up to 9/11. 

There were three broad phases in that struggle before 9/11 and I want to set the stage for the 9/11 plot by telling you about them:

• First, the pre-Millennium Period in late 1999.  UBL operatives planned a series of attacks against US and allied targets designed to exploit the millennium celebrations planned around the world.  CIA and FBI worked closely and successfully to defeat these terrorist plans.   We acquired information that enabled us to break up a large terrorist cell in Jordan that had been planning to blow up the Radisson Hotel, holy sites, and Israeli tour buses, and that had plans to use chemical weapons.  The arrest of Ahmad Ressam coming across the Canadian border into the US was the single most compelling piece of evidence we had that UBL was intending to strike at us in the United States.  During this period, we identified numerous terrorist suspects around the world and carried out disruption activities against more than half of these individuals including arrests, renditions, detentions, and interrogations. 
  
  
• Second, the Ramadan Period.  In November and December 2000, we had an increase in Ramadan-related threat reporting. Working with a number of foreign governments, we were able to successfully preempt attacks including a planned attack against US interests.  Overall, these operations disrupted several al-Qa'ida plans and captured hundreds of pounds of explosives, as well as weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles.  You will recall that the attack on the USS Cole had just occurred in October 2000, a serious defeat.
  
  
• And finally, the Pre-9/11 Period. Starting in the spring and continuing through the summer of 2001 we saw a significant increase in the level of threat reporting.  Again, working with the FBI and foreign liaison services, we thwarted attacks against US facilities and persons in Europe and in the Middle East.

Thus, even before September 2001, we knew that we faced a foe that is committed, resilient and has operational depth.  The Intelligence Community was already at war with al-Qaida. 

• Few wars are a series of unbroken victories or defeats.  We had had some successes and suffered some defeats—and we are finding things we could have done better. 
  
  
• But we were already in action. 

We had, in fact, considered ourselves at war with al-Qa'ida since 1998.  By 1998, key elements of CIA's strategy were emphatically offensive rather than defensive.  And in the spring of 1999, we put in place a new strategic operational plan whose central focus was to gain intelligence on Bin Ladin through penetrations of his organization.  This strategy structured our counterterrorist activity for the years leading up to the events of September 11. 

• This strategy—which we called simply "the Plan"—as it evolved in conjunction with increased covert action authorities, was a multifaceted campaign against Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida. 

• The campaign involved a multifaceted program to capture and render Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants.  The range of operational initiatives employed included a strong and focused FI collection program using all means at our disposal to monitor Bin Ladin and his network around the world, and to disrupt al-Qa'ida operations.
  

• I do not plan to go into great detail on this campaign now—this hearing is about 9/11. 
  
  
• But my message is that a full understanding of the events of 9/11 requires an understanding of this war in its entirety and, I hope subsequent hearings will develop the details of that story. 

Now, with that as a backdrop, let me begin by characterizing the 9/11 plot in broad terms. 

• First, the plot was professionally conceived and executed—it showed patience, thoughtfulness, and expertise.
  
  
• Second, it was tightly compartmented—we would have had to penetrate a very small circle of zealots to have learned the precise details of this plot ahead of time.
  
  
• Third, the plot was resilient—several blows to the operation occurred without derailing it.
  
  
• I'll amplify each of these points. 

Start with what we know today of the professionalism of the plot.  The 11 September operation was conducted carefully, patiently, and with evident understanding of how to operate in the United States. 

• The hijackers—both pilots and others—entered the US at staggered intervals, from different countries, and through different US cities. 
  
  
• We now know that al-Qa'ida leaders deliberately chose young men who had not carried out previous terrorist attacks and therefore would not have attracted the attention of intelligence services. Seventeen of the nineteen hijackers were in fact "clean," and the two hijackers who had an extensive record of al-Qa'ida involvement—Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14) and Khalid al-Mihdhar (#12)—may have been added to the plot after it was launched.  I'll return to this possibility later in my remarks.
  
  
• They also selected men from countries whose citizens traditionally have little trouble obtaining US entry visas and instructed them to travel under true name using genuine passports.     
  
  
• The most important individuals in the plot—the pilots—had lived for some years in the West, making it even easier for them to operate in the United States. 
  
  
• Once in the US, the hijackers were careful, with the exception of minor traffic violations, to avoid drawing law enforcement attention and even general notice that might identify them as extremists.  They dressed in Western clothes, most shaved their beards before entering the US, and they largely avoided mosques. 
  
  
• They received the money needed to finance their flight training and living expenses through ordinary wire transfers, generally in small enough amounts that they did not attract attention among the millions of financial transactions that occur in the US every day.

I mentioned the plot was tightly compartmented.  For intelligence work, breaking into the compartment is key to gaining the precise details of a plot.  We never achieved this success for the 9/11 plot.  We now have several indications of this compartmentation.

• Bin Ladin himself—in a candid videotape found in Afghanistan after the attacks—said even some members of his inner circle were unaware of the plot.
  
  
• He also indicated that some of the hijackers themselves never knew the targets.
  
  
• Based on what we know today, the investigation of the 9/11 attacks has revealed no major slip in the conspirators' operational security. 

My third characterization of the plot was to call it resilient.  This was not a fragile plot that would have collapsed had the US government been able to achieve a few successes.  In fact, the plot went forward despite several real blows.

• Flight 77 hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14) and Khalid al-Mihdhar (#12) tried to learn to fly in May 2000 and quickly had to abandon their efforts because of their poor technical and English-language skills.  But by the end of 2000, a replacement pilot for Flight 77, Hani Hanjur (#11), was in the US.
  
  
• In probably the most notable example of the plot's resilience, two members of Mohammad Atta's (#1) Hamburg cell—Ramzi Bin al-Shibh and Zakaria Essabar—appear to have intended to join the hijackings but were denied visas multiple times.  Bin al-Shibh ended up supporting the hijacking logistically from abroad.
  
  
• Muhammad Atta (#1) himself, the pilot of the first plane to hit the World Trade Center, was stopped upon re-entering the US from Spain in January 2001 because of questions regarding his application for a change in visa status and was issued a court summons for driving without a license in April, but was not panicked by either incident.  
  
  
• Most important, even after 16 August 2001 arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui—currently under indictment for conspiracy to commit terrorism and aircraft piracy, among other charges—the plan was not aborted.  In fact, the hijackers began buying their tickets for 11 September just over a week after Moussaoui's arrest. 

Keep these characterizations in mind as Director Mueller and I walk you through the details of the plot.  Also keep in mind that the 9/11 investigation is ongoing, and we expect to know even more in the future than we present to you here today. 

Let me start with what we knew before the 9-11 attacks:

• We knew, and warned, that Usama Bin Ladin and his al-Qa'ida organization were "the most immediate and serious" terrorist threat to the US.  We said that in several ways, including in my statement to the SSCI in February 2001.

• In the months prior to 11 September, we alerted policymakers that operations that al-Qa'ida had in motion were likely to cause large-scale loss of life and be spectacular in nature.     
  
  
• Beginning in June 2001, we received a barrage of intelligence indicating that al-Qa'ida associates in Afghanistan and abroad expected imminent attacks against unspecified US interests.

• Over the summer of 2001, it became evident that multiple attacks were in the works, especially abroad.  Some of these were interdicted, such as planned attacks against US targets in Europe and the Middle East—successes for US intelligence.  
  
  
• Finally, we knew—and warned—of Bin Ladin's desire to strike inside the US.
  

Malaysia

A major question surrounding the 9/11 investigation is how the United States government was able to identify two of the hijackers as al-Qa'ida but not uncover the plot they were part of.  To explain how the intelligence case against Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14) and Khalid al-Mihdhar (#12) developed, I'll walk you through the case.

• We had learned in late 1999 that two suspect Bin Ladin operatives, "Nawaf" and "Khaled," were planning to travel to Malaysia.  At that point we only knew of their first names, and only suspected that they might be Bin Ladin operatives because of a link between them and a facility known to be connected to Al-Qa'ida and Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives. 

• Based solely on this tenuous link, CIA initiated an operation to place "Khaled" under surveillance.  Recall that we did not know either Khaled's or Nawaf's true identities at this time.  The subsequent operation to learn more involved eight stations and bases and a half-dozen liaison services. 

• Our interest in monitoring the meeting was based on our suspicion that Khaled's travel to Malaysia was associated with supporting regional terrorist plans or operations.  We believed that the meeting was likely for discussion of regrouping from extensive disruptions around the world that the CIA had engaged in. 

• In early 2000, just before he arrived in Malaysia, we acquired a copy of "Khaled's" passport, which showed a US multiple entry visa issued in Jeddah in April 1999 and expiring on 6 April 2000. 

• It is at this point that we learned that "Khaled's" name was Khalid bin Muhammad bin `Abdallah al-Mihdhar (#12). This was the first point at which CIA had complete biographic information on al-Mihdhar.

• On 5 January 2000, the US intelligence community widely disseminated an information report advising that "Khaled", identified as an individual with ties to members of the Bin Ladin organization, had arrived in Malaysia. 

• It was not until 5 March 2000 that we obtained information from one of our overseas stations that enabled us to identify "Nawaf" as Nawaf al-Hazmi (#14).  This was the earliest time that CIA had full biographic information on al-Hazmi (#14).  By that time, both al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12) had entered the US, arriving on 15 January 2000 in Los Angeles.

The Malaysia meeting took on greater significance in December 2000 when the investigation of the October 2000 USS Cole bombing linked some of Kahlid al-Mihdhar's Malaysia connections with Cole bombing suspects.  We further confirmed the suspected link between al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi and an individual thought to be one of the chief planners of the Cole attack, via a joint FBI-CIA HUMINT asset.  This was the first time that CIA could definitively place al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar with a known al-Qa'ida operative.

In August 2001, because CIA had become increasingly concerned about a major attack in the United States, we reviewed all of our relevant holdings.  During that review, it was determined that al-Mihdhar (#12) and al-Hazmi (#14) had entered the US on 15 January 2000, that al-Mihdhar had left the US on 10 June 2000 and returned on 4 July 2001, and that there was no record of al-Hazmi leaving the country.  On 23 August 2001, CIA sent a Central Intelligence Report to the Department of State, FBI, INS, and other US Government agencies requesting that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar be entered into VISA/VIPER, TIPOFF, and TECS [Treasury Enforcement Communication System].  The message said that CIA recommends that the two men be watchlisted immediately and denied entry into the US.

The fact that earlier we did not recommend al-Hazmi (#14) and al-Mihdhar (#12) for watchlisting is not attributable to a single point of failure.  There were opportunities, both in the field and at Headquarters, to act on developing information.  The fact that this did not happen—aside from questions of CTC workload, particularly around the period of the disrupted Millennium plots—pointed out that a whole new system, rather than a fix at a single point in the system, was needed. 

What we know of the plot now

 We have assembled a body of details that give a pretty clear picture of the plot.  Several things allowed us to assemble large amounts of information after the attacks that were not available before the attack. 

• First of all, the investigation quickly established the hijackers' identities.  Some hijackers were identified by air crews and passengers who made phone calls from the hijacked planes, while analysis of the flight manifests, which the airlines provided immediately, revealed patterns among certain Arab nationals in first or business class: they had purchased one-way tickets and some had used the same telephone numbers or addresses when making their reservations. 
  
  
• Second, some of the hijackers left behind both identifying and incriminating evidence.  Muhammad Atta's (#1) luggage, for instance, had not made it onto Flight 11 from a connecting flight and contained the guidance on preparing for an operation that was found both at the site of the Flight 93 crash in Pennsylvania and in a Flight 77 hijacker's car at Dulles Airport.     
  
  
• Third, the sheer magnitude of the attacks prompted both intelligence services and journalistic organizations worldwide to put a major and immediate effort into the investigation.  Friends, associates, and family members of the hijackers were interviewed by liaison services and often by reporters, which allowed us to build up a picture of the men involved.

The operation fell into three general stages: conceptualization, preparation, and execution. 

Conceptualization

We now believe that a common thread runs between the first attack on the World Trade Center in February 1993 and the 11 September attacks.  We also know that a high-ranking al-Qa'ida member was either the mastermind or one of the key planners of the 11 September operation.

• Mukhtar  is the uncle of Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded the 1993 bombing plot against the World Trade Center. 
  
  
• Following the 1993 attack, Yousef and Mukhtar plotted in 1995 to blow up US planes flying East Asian routes—for which Mukhtar was indicted in 1996.  Philippine authorities uncovered the plot in January 1995 and Yousef was apprehended the following month, but Mukhtar escaped. 
  
  

[chance33_98]

Much more at link, this is an excerpt.

[ladyinred]

Excellent read, frightening yes, but certainly something we all should read in it's entirety.

[DPB101]

First, the pre-Millennium Period in late 1999. UBL operatives planned a series of attacks against US and allied targets designed to exploit the millennium celebrations planned around the world. CIA and FBI worked closely and successfully to defeat these terrorist plans.

Hmmm....as I recall, Project Megiddo was where our intelligence agencies were putting their resources in 1999. Crazed Christians, Freeh and Reno thought, were going to blow stuff up to usher in the year 2000. But who knows. Maybe they were and the professionals in the Clinton administration stopped them.

[chance33_98]

I have that PDF for megiddo on my web site if it ever goes away :)

[chance33_98]

Some PDF's on terrorism, most pre 9/11 clinton era (Interesting reading)

[DPB101]

Ironic that the city where large numbers of people believed the Clinton/Reno/Freeh propaganda about Christians being a terrorist threat got hit by the worst terror attack in American history and the only thing Christians had to do with it was to send hundreds of millions of dollars in voluntary contributions to help the victims.

[Susannah]

Ironic that the city where large numbers of people believed the Clinton/Reno/Freeh propaganda about Christians being a terrorist threat got hit by the worst terror attack in American history and the only thing Christians had to do with it was to send hundreds of millions of dollars in voluntary contributions to help the victims.

Good point! I still find it confusing that these hate groups are always associated with the right-wing. Certainly the left-wing has more of a racist history.

[DPB101]

Started under FDR. In 1934, the House McCormack-Dickstein Committee "uncovered" a fascist plot by conservatives to overthrow the government. Fortunately, the allegations received little traction but Dickstein kept up the attacks until WWII. Anyone who wasn't a New Dealer and who opposed communism was a fascist, a Nazi, a racist, a hater and had to be watched for violent behavior. HCUA (later HUAC) was orginally set up to go after conservatives. Samuel Dickstein (D-NY) introuced the bill which created the UnAmerican Affairs Committee.

Dickstein, it was discovered when the KGB files were opened after 1991, was a Soviet agent. The NKVD was paying him $1,250 a month at the height of the Great Depression--about $15,000 a month in 2001 dollars. On the side, he sold the Soviets visas for their agents (Dickstein chaired an immigration committee).