M1-A1 Abrams: tough to kill, but not invulnerable

U.S. News- Washington Whispers ^ | 06/09/03 | Paul Bedard

[Pokey78]

They call them "lessons learned" reports in the Pentagon, and few are getting as much attention as the review of the Army's lumbering M1-A1 Abrams tank's performance in Iraq. Revered by soldiers as the world's best, the report found that lone Iraqis armed with simple rocket-propelled grenades halted a few Abramses in their tracks. Just like those Battle of the Bulge scenes of GIs firing at the bellies of Nazi tanks, a rocket aimed at the armored skirts on the side and back of the Abrams would occasionally disable the tank. That's led some to question the plan to replace some M1s with lighter and thinly skinned "Stryker" vehicles. But then, the report shown to Whispers also found that the heavy Abrams guzzled more gas than expected. And getting parts to busted tanks was a problem. Still, like the Terminator, it didn't die easily. Some completely disabled tanks were abandoned, and airstrikes were called in to keep the gizmos inside from Iraqi spies. It took a grenade detonated in the crew compartment, a massive tank round, and two precision Maverick missiles just to put one down.

[Doctor Raoul]

That first M-1 column into the center of Baghdad came within seconds of firing on another tank column coming the other way. Luckily they figured out they were friendlies.

[gcruse]

Not once was the M1's frontal armor penatrated.

I don't disagree.  But that is like saying the Maginot line
worked because the Germans didn't go over it.

[ntnychik]

Thanks to the Putineers for teaching the Iraqis where our vulnerable spot was. Pres. Bush is in St. Petersburg, why??

[I got the rope]

What? Are you trying to compare a modern day US battle proven machine to a WWI Frog monstrosity? Try again.

[gcruse]

Work with me here.

The Maginot line worked because the Germans never breached it.
They went around it like it wasn't there.

The M1-A's frontal armor was never penetrated.
They went around and fired from another angle.

As I said, I was not disagreeing with the poster,
but with the logic.

[Fred Mertz]

I read a military related article several days ago. I believe it said that of the 250 tanks in Iraq, 14 were damaged and two were destroyed. However, there was only one death of a crewman, and that was the one that tipped over in a canal and the driver perished; that tank was destroyed lest it fall in the hands of the enemy.

I hope my memory is accurate on this.

[glorgau]

You are dead on about the speed of an M1A1... ;)

The speed is kept down to keep the tracks on. It would really make a mess to have the 2 ton tracks coming off at 70 mph.

[Valin]

M1-A1 Abrams tank's performance in Iraq. Revered by soldiers as the world's best, the report found that lone Iraqis armed with simple rocket-propelled grenades halted a few Abramses in their tracks.

And that's why you don't put out armor unsupported.

[Jimmy Valentine]

Correct. Let us also remember that no one who hit an Abrams with a rocket propelled grnade is around to brag about it.

[Criminal Number 18F]

Thanks for the correction. I've got some friends on the heavy side of things but the only thing heavy in my career has been my rucksack!

The worst exercise scare I ever had was walking through a field at night, in the days before universal NVGs, and realising that the big looming shapes around us were a battalion of Leopards (the exercise enemy). There were three of us that night. The enemy (the union-labour Dutch) were sleeping. It was a black night, and all the machines were powered down, as we tiptoed through their assembly area.

Weren't the initial test units (IBCTs) also formed from a light division?

I feel for the poor Guard guys... they only have a few days to train, and I don't see how they can do that and maintain their vehicles. Of course, they were a mech unit already so they already have the problem, and I'm sure deal with it as best they can. Maybe they have more full-time AGR or tech positions for maintainers. Glad it's not my problem.

d.o.l.

Criminal Number 18F

[Criminal Number 18F]

Specific beefs about Stryker:

1. It's still not heavy enough to survive. Look like a tank on the battlefield and people will shoot antitank weapons at you. If you're not wearing a tank, that's a very unpleasant feeling.
2. It's mobility is a problem, both tactical and strategic. It's large and lots of 3rd World bridges and culverts will not hold it. And it needs a dedicated C-130 to move it. (Or a C-17, but the USAF is unenthusiastic about operating its -17s too close to the battle area. Since they too get budget and procurement cuts, which makes each unit more costly and more rare, you can't blame them). Where are we going to get the airplanes? Where are we going to get the airfields? The Air Mobility Command likes nice long and smooth runways, especially with heavy loads.
3. It is essentially the LAV in Army drag, but the minute interservice differences cause it to be much more expensive (and heavier. See above about mobility). Why didn't TAMC work with the Marines to get a single compromise vehicle for economies of scale here?
4. We are not sitting on Reagan-era budgets. Budget is a zero-sum game, and frankly, the USAF and Navy have had a better war than the Army's conventional ground forces.

Thanks again for your detailed clarification.

Full Spectrum Forces are indeed what the US needs. Full Spectrum on the widest possible view. Currently we have an Air Force, Naval Forces including a very capable Marine Corps (that was punished less than the other forces during the 90s drawdowns and Clinton/Aspin reorgs). In the Army, which is what I think we know best, we have forces from highly specialised intelligence gathering and special operations forces, to effective light infantry (yeah, you worried about the 173rd. Were they ever really threatened? Remember, we have air), to the mailed fist of our tank/mech forces. (There was an American general in WWII who said, "when Hitler put his war on wheels, he sent it right up our alley.") We also have a whole division that is organised as a heliborne unit. Where does the Stryker unit fit in all of this? It sits uneasily in between the light infantry unit and the heavy mech unit. And it costs money we haven't got.

As far as reinforcing the 173rd with a Stryker Brigade, where are you going to get the airlift, even if you had the brigade in your pocket? If the Army passed on the Stryker procurement and sank the whole amount into C-17 procurement, that would give the ARMY more power by giving it more strategic and operational mobility. Air flow was our biggest problem in Stan, and I'm hearing it was/is a problem in Iraq as well. More strategic airlift would answer two legs of your future-army triad: moe deployable and more sustainable.

Have you ever considered that general Shinseki has earned many of the "cheap shots" aimed at him? Part of it is his personal style. He's not exactly a consensus builder, is he? And part of it is the professional manifestations of that same personal arrogance. I'll not forget his attempts to undermine and embarrass the civilian leadership of the Department in the days before Iraq kicked off. I also was witness to some of his machinations in the Crusader debate. First, in his attempt to lobby Congress, he crossed the line, and then pushed a subordinate onto his sword over that. We all know where the buck really stopped on that one, and his not owning up to it gives a moment of clear insight into his character. Then, when he was embarrassed over the question of artillery in Afghanistan, he threw a small fit -- ever since, there has been an artillery unit sitting on its hands in Afghanistan. Neither the military situation nor the terrain allow any role for artillery. But this unit has to be supplied, etc., and amounts to "useless mouths to feed" in theater. They're there to soothe the ego of a vain and weak man -- no more, no less.

Twenty years from now, he will probably only be remembered as the guy that put the spoons in berets. Even in that, what he did was a Clintonian diversionary strike: by firing the beret fait accompli out over the heads of the audience at AUSA, he diverted the Army down that rathole and cut off debate on his transformation agenda. It was cunning. It was effective. It was underhanded. It was Eric K. Shinseki at his best.

I give Shinseki credit for outstanding combat service. I give him credit for transformation, which was a Big Idea (but I'm a little cynical, haing soldiered through many other Chiefs' Big Ideas... Remember "Army of Excellence?" How about "No More Task Force Smiths?" Let's see... "Airland Battle?" If you look at history books you'll see more examples, like the "Pentomic Division"). We'll be seeing more of him, because Daniel Inouye (another decorated combat veteran, although I have to say his medal-lobbying was kind of unseemly) is retiring, and Eric K. Shinseki, D-HI, will be taking his place in the Senate. (There'll be an election, but in Hawaii it's just a formality). You'll have plenty of years to judge whether I called his character correctly.

d.o.l.

Criminal Number 18F

[centurion316]

You make some good points, and we agree in part. I'll try to address a few of them.

1. Stryker is less survivable than the M-1 or M-2, but more survivable than M113 or the BDU (Battledress Uniform). I understand this issue from vivid personal experience, but hold that the Stryker brigades provide a much wider range of combat capability than the light infantry brigades that they replace. Like any mechanized force, there comes a point when you must dismount and fight as light infantry, but its nice to have battlefield mobility, protection from indirect fire and small arms, and substantial fire support capability. Everyone praises the USMC's organization and combat capability, and then knocks the Stryker Brigades - makes no sense to me. The Marines used LAV-25's and AAV's to do what Stryker brigades can do. The LAV III is a much more capable vehicle than the LAV-25. Useful to remember that the LAV-25 was developed in response to Army requirements for the High Mobility Test Bed (9th Inf Div) at Ft. Lewis. The Army decided they didn't have the money and didn't procure it. The Marines did, in small numbers. I doubt the Marines would buy it today. Both Marine vehicles were RPG magnets, yet the Marines were able to employ them effectively within their limitations.

2. Mobility and protection are competing requirements. You have to make trade-offs. The dirty little secret about our strategic mobility is that the USAF uses all of the strategic lift to deploy themselves in the early days of a criss. Nothing available for the Army. The answer is more strategic lift (C-17) - they can carry three Stryker or 1 M1. But we also will need high speed vessels (catamarans). These ships can carry a brigade to an austere port in the time it takes for the Air Force to cough up the first airplane. This leaves us with a problem in places like Afghanistan and Northern Iraq, but that's life. Unlike most other armies in the world, we have a capability for strategic force entry operations. We can seize airfields with parachute assault and then reinforce the airhead - Strykers provide us with an important reinforcement capability.

4. No doubt that the Navy and Air Force are better at the political game than the Army ever was or ever will be. The Marines have managed to get their force structure written into law, so they are untouchable. The Army gets beat up in part because the American nature is to favor high tech, clean solutions offered by the Navy and Air Force. But also because of the ham-fisted nature of the Army when it tries to press its case. Everyone beats up on Shinseki for working to save the Crusader (killing it was the right decision, IMO), but if you don't think the Air Force and Navy aren't in bed with their big contractors and supporting congressmen - you need to seek professional help. Their combined marketing muscle to advance their agenda is a thing to behold.

Shinseki has been attacked by his political masters because he won't kowtow. He was wrong on Crusader, but is proving right on his public testimony of the post-war troop requiremnts in Iraq. Should he have lied to Congress to please Wolfowitz? I know that he is widely believed to be a Clintonista. I don't know if that's true or not. Nor do I know if he really intends to replace Inoyue (one of his mentors). Time will tell. I do know that he has advanced cause of Army Transformation and stuck to his guns against many attempts to gut the Army. We still have 10 divisions because of Rick Shinseki. I believe we will go to 8 once he is gone. BTW, the troops like the berets, including the Rangers, whose tan berets are much better looking than the pedestrian black ones.

[VaBthang4]

More HaterAde being swallowed by the Anti-reality crowd.

The M1 Abrams tank scared the Iraqis to death. It's battle performance is unmatched in the history of armoured warfare from the first bathtub in WWI to today.

The Abrams performed "excellently".

[VaBthang4]

One of those poor performing Hyundaiesque deathtraps outside of Baghdad International like a sitting duck, doing nothing, waiting to be mauled by a lone Iraqi shooting from the grassy-knoll.

[Southack]

Ordinarily when the liberals hate something (especially weapons), I say buy more of it.

But in the case of the Abrams, the 9,000 that we have will suffice...to roll over any and all armies that dare stand in our way.

Our brass is doing something right, guys. No nation has ever walked over Afghanistan and Iraq so fast and so far with so few casualties of their own as we have done.

But for those worried about RPG's occassionally knocking out an Abrams with a lucky shot to the skirts...well, we can design new "urban area" skirts (or use wheels inside that will run even if the tracks are blown off).

I mean, I'd just HATE to have two more Abrams "lost" in our next war. That would just be catastrophic (note: none of our tank crews died - the armor did its job).

< /SARCASM >

[Tailback]

They call them "lessons learned" reports in the Pentagon, and few are getting as much attention as the review of the Army's lumbering M1-A1 Abrams tank's performance in Iraq.

You've got to be frigging kidding me. Lumbering? Are these people high? The Abrams is a dragster among AFV's. Sounds like more of the Stryker mafia leaking ridiculous stories to justify their existence. How many crew members of buttoned up Abrams tanks have been killed by enemy fire? How many crew members of USMC LAV's were killed in this war?

[I got the rope]

I know for a fact that during Desert Storm the 2nd Armored had tanks hit from all angles with RPG fire. I don't know of one instance that the frontal armor was penetrated.
Just because we don't know yet if our tanks were hit from the front doesn't make it a Maginot Line. Tanks move...the Maginot line just stored cheese.

[Tailback]

Please provide information on the STRYKER being more survivable than the M113A3 or the MTVL. My information says that only 2 Strykers can be carried by a C-17 which is the same number of Bradleys. 5 M113's and 4 MTVL's can be carried in a C-17. I'd also like to know how the STRYKER is more capable than the LAV. Other than electronics which can be added to any vehicle, the STRYKER is just a stretched LAV with the same poor off-road performance, vulnerable wheels, cramped interior, and thin armor. At least the LAV turret works, unlike the STRYKERs that were tested at NTC. To apply applique armor to the STRYKER means even worse off-road performance. I seem to remember one of the embed reporters with a LAV unit hanging out in the desert because some of their vehicles were stuck.

[SLB]

I have some info I will email to you tomorrow. You might have to remind me.

[Thunder 6]

Ah, the fearsome Dutch! But they sure could shoot the lights out with those Leos...

The 1st IBCT (which was renamed "SBCT" when the IAV got a name) was 3/2 (which had actually come to Lewis from Germany several years before as a BDE of 3AD due to the drawdown). They are the "test" unit, but it is verboten to describe them as that. The 2nd SBCT (1/25) is/was a Light BDE (which came to Lewis several years ago when the 7ID folded up). One of them will leave Lewis at some point never to return...going to USAREUR probably.

The Guard piece will be harder, but in some areas they are ahead of the game. They already seem to understand better than the AC guys about operating at mulitple locations across great distances (PA is a big state). The intent is there will be a greater slice of resources going to their unit (Full time support, and additional training days). I don't think vehicle/equipment maintenance is going to be their challenge, rather they will magnify the problems the AC already has with maintaining training levels in the digital equpiment, and combining arms at the company level. We'll see soon enough: they've already started initial digital training, and about half the BDE is enroute to Kosovo for a KFOR rotation.
regards,