Role of air power in the Iraq conflict and lessons for Pakistan

Air Commodore (Retd) JAMAL HUSSAIN discusses what lessons we can draw from Iraq.

The on-going conflict in Iraq has proven once again, if any further proof was required, the dominance of air power in the modern battlefield. While it may be premature to draw any major conclusions from a conflict that is still raging, the all pervading effect of Coalition air power and its near total absence by the Iraqi forces is too obvious to ignore. Imagine, a force of about a hundred thousand combat troops invading a country the size of Iraq, which itself fielded about five hundred thousand reasonably equipped regular and irregular forces and inside three weeks capturing the capital city Baghdad after traversing over 400 Kilometres of hostile desert and even more treacherous (from a military viewpoint) crossing points. This achievement of the Coalition Forces in the present campaign has to be regarded as an unprecedented phenomenon in the history of modern warfare. In a sense, it was a victory of modern technology of the Coalition Forces over the raw courage of a handful of Iraqi defenders. Here it may be added that the cruel and despotic nature of Saddam and his regime only gave an illusion of cohesion among the Iraqi people against the invading forces whereas as USA has been claiming all along and as is apparent at this moment, it did not really exist.

Granted the Coalition Ground Forces had far superior weaponry and were better trained and equipped than their Iraqi counterparts, but this must be balanced by the fact that Iraqi motivation as defenders had to be of a higher level; also they were fighting for survival in their own backyard and their knowledge of terrain had to be superior to those of the aggressors. What was the one single factor which made the entire operation, so lopsided that even conventional resistance in the form of counter-attacks by Iraqi forces was doomed to the extent that for all practical purposes, they were suicidal missions? The answer: Coalition air power which achieved air supremacy from the very beginning of the campaign and practically decimated the Iraqi armed forces, their command and control infrastructure and prevented them from executing any form of military manoeuvre to counter the advancing Coalition ground formations. It paved the way for a relatively easy passage for the Coalition ground troops.

Under similar circumstances with air power taken out of the equation on both sides, such an invading force might have eventually prevailed but at a horrific cost to themselves. It was Coalition air power that practically made it impossible for any reasonable size Iraqi ground troops to manoeuvre for the battle and without the ability to manoeuvre, even a defensive formation will be paralyzed. In addition, with the ability to have a near complete battle picture of the disposition of Iraqi forces through their aerial surveillance platforms, the Coalition commanders had an edge which earlier battlefield commanders could only dream of. Even in their dug in static position the Iraqi formations were easy picking for the Coalition air power which operated with impunity with unerring accuracy of weapons delivery and devastating effect of their state of the art munitions.

The Coalition military strategy for capture of Baghdad was simple. Their mechanised and armoured formations would advance unhindered into the enemy territory till they would come across a major defence line of Iraqi regulars; they would pause, let loose their air power, both in the shape of fixed wing and rotary wing (helicopters) platforms, decimate about 70 percent of the defenders’ combat power and overcome the rest with their superior ground weaponry. This was the pattern throughout the campaign till Baghdad was reached. The final phase of urban warfare, contrary to expectation of many military experts did not last over three days. Under the relentless air and ground offensive, the regime for all practical purpose had collapsed and by the 21st day of the campaign, the Coalition Forces had occupied the centre of Baghdad amidst a section of rejoicing and jubilant Baghdadi citizens. Here too, air power under the new doctrinal nomenclature of Urban Close Air Support (UCAS) made it nearly impossible for the defenders to put up anything but sporadic resistance.

A review of ground operations up till now reveals that the only real impediment to the Coalition advance had come from Iraqi irregular forces in the form of ambush attacks, many under the garb of civilian dress: air power of Coalition Forces almost single handed had rendered the Iraqi regular forces practically irrelevant. This is not to belittle the performance of the Coalition Ground Troops. No matter how much devastation air power had caused among the Iraqi forces, it was the ground forces ‘boots on ground’ that eventually had to occupy the land and secure it. Removal of Saddam and his regime was one of the principal military objectives of the invaders. This could not have been achieved without physical occupation of the Iraqi territory.

To study the impact of air power the quote of Richard P Hallion in his article “Future of Air Power” is very relevant. He writes:-

“In a century time span, airplane has transformed from a crude hopping machine to a globe-girdling engine of societal change. In this period of time, the rocket has gone from firework to an arbiter of global nuclear deterrence, and the bomb has evolved from a crude shell with fins to a sophisticated precision munition capable of hitting a target within a negligible distance from its aiming points. The reputation of air power itself has changed from myths and misunderstandings surrounding its use in earlier wars to more positive sentiments often echoed today.”

As with most things in life, there are two sides to the use of air power. What you can do with it to your enemy; or if you are at the receiving end, what havoc enemy air power can cause to your forces.

While drawing lessons from air campaigns involving advanced western nations against relatively weak and backward opponents, one must be careful not to get enamoured by air power’s sophistry, some of which may have little relevance in our environment. The first point to remember is that the technology, expertise and high cost of maintaining a credible air power force effectively means that the benefit of air power primarily is with the advanced western states, particularly USA and NATO forces. Air power has tilted the balance of forces between advanced and poor nations to a degree where any armed conflict between them has become totally lopsided. This immense advantage gives the former the ability to enforce their will on the latter without colonizing them.

Although technical advances have made air power very effective to the extent that it dominates the modern battlefield, it is unlikely to be the dominant factor in low intensity conflicts. Most of such conflicts require a dual military/non-military strategy in which both halves have equal importance. Air power can only play a significant role in half of the overall strategy; no matter how effective a weapon it becomes. The present Israeli effort to counter Intifada with its massive military superiority in which air power is a vital component is a case in point. Air power has been unable to make a decisive impact in the situation. The on-going freedom struggle in Kashmir and the Indian effort to crush it is also a witness to the relatively low impact of air power; its role is mostly limited to providing logistic support through helicopters/transport aircraft in the comparatively inaccessible areas of conflict.

By virtue of its location, Pakistan is placed in a volatile region of the world. It has a powerful and hostile neighbour to its east, which has usurped a part of the Indian subcontinent (Kashmir) that rightfully belongs to Pakistan under the principle on which the Indian subcontinent was granted independence. This single factor has kept the two neighbours virtually on war footing ever since their independence. Two full fledged wars on the Kashmir issue and a number of serious skirmishes have already taken place in the last five decades and the problem is still unresolved. India, with its much larger base uses its superior strength to coerce Pakistan into giving up its claim on Kashmir, which Pakistan has resisted by ensuring it fields a credible military force to deter any Indian aggression. This deterrence was initially at the conventional level but when India decided to become a nuclear weapons capable state, Pakistan followed suit. The induction of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent has led to the involvement of the advanced western nations, especially USA, in the region. Their involvement has resulted in further challenges for the state of Pakistan, which can no longer remain oblivious to the threat to its security from USA.

Prior to events of 11th September, 2001, the likelihood of USA committing military aggression against Pakistan was remote. It preferred to safeguard its interest by manipulating the enormous financial clout it enjoyed in the world, Pakistan’s fragile economy being very vulnerable to any such pressure. After the 11th September incident, USA’s attitude towards Pakistan has undergone a radical transformation, generally for the worse. It is true that it needed Pakistan’s goodwill and extensive co-operation to punish those it considered responsible for the 9/11 incident and after coercing it to co-operate with USA in its offensive against Afghanistan, it rewarded it materially and politically to some extent. Despite all these gestures, USA still remains uncomfortable with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability and would be having contingency plans to deal with a situation, militarily if necessary, where in their opinion, the control of Pakistan’s nuclear assets falls into the wrong hands. Pakistan should be aware of the dangers and take steps to safeguard itself from this potent threat.

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has provided it a very high level of deterrence against any form of serious aggression but at the same time it has exposed it to a different and far more serious challenge to its security.

An awareness of the danger(s) would help in taking necessary steps to minimize it. An assessment of the latent military threat emanating from USA is the first step. Is Pakistan on USA’s hit list now or is likely to be in future? The answer to that question would depend on a number of factors. When does a superpower become a threat to smaller states especially those that are not located in its close vicinity? Three different factors could lead to such a situation. First, if the small states have some resources which the superpower covets or whose control is vital to its well-being, the small states become a legitimate target from their point of view. The invasion of Iraq is a classic case. Bereft of oil, Iraq would be of little consequence to USA, Iraq’s supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction notwithstanding. Pakistan for better or worse does not have any such resources and is unlikely to become a target for USA or for that matter any other power on that count.

The second reason for becoming a target for the superpower(s) and their willingness to commit aggression against Pakistan could be if for any reason it becomes a threat to their security or vital interests. While Pakistan does not pose any direct threat to USA, our possession of nuclear weapons remains a serious concern for them. For reasons we may or may not agree with, after the eleventh September incident the US government is convinced that the greatest threat to its security and superpower status is from similar asymmetric attacks by individual groups or nations. The thought that similar attacks carried out in future by the “terrorist” groups, this time armed with nuclear weapons is a nightmarish scenario for the US government. While Pakistan’s nuclear weapons do provide it with a high degree of security from foreign aggression, be it from India or a superpower, any perception that Pakistan is helping to export its nuclear weapons technology to other Third World nations or to what the West considers as terrorist groups, would provoke serious reaction from the western nations in general and USA in particular. In world politics, perceptions are more important than reality and if Pakistan is to avoid making itself vulnerable to foreign aggression, it has to, besides ensuring safety and security of its nuclear assets, demonstrate to the world that no aspect of its nuclear technology is for export.

The third and final factor to be kept in mind relates to fight against terrorism. Before nuclear weaponisation of South Asia, and before the events of 9/11, the Kashmiri freedom struggle was essentially a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan that brought the two nations to the brink of war on a number of occasions in the eighth and ninth decades of the previous century. The world looked at the two countries with benign neglect, bordering on contempt. The situation has changed drastically since then. The world, especially USA, is far less tolerant of any freedom struggle that is not directly beneficial to their cause and lumps all such struggles under the generic definition of terrorism. Pakistan has always maintained that it only provides political and moral support to the freedom struggle in Kashmir while India has been constantly accusing Pakistan of supporting the cause financially, materially and militarily. In today’s environment, USA would be intolerant of any perceived deviation by Pakistan of their stated policy in Kashmir. If the perception in the West and USA continues that Pakistan’s support to the struggle goes beyond political and moral plane, depending on the perceived level of violation, Pakistan will come under increasing political and financial pressure and debilitating sanctions may be imposed on it. While a direct military aggression by USA on this issue would be very unlikely, it might not be averse to an Indian military adventurism. With a Pakistan weakened economically and militarily through sanctions, India may be sorely tempted to carry out a military aggression against its sworn enemy. Pakistan must remain mindful of this serious threat to its security and it must tailor its policies accordingly.

Conventional defence against the might of a US led coalition will meet the fate similar to those of the Taliban and Saddam. Does that necessarily imply that we become subservient to the whims of USA? Not if we behave in a mature manner and are aware of our strengths and limitations and operate within these limits. Perhaps the strongest deterrence against any military aggression would be a cohesive nation with a government that has grass root support and which imbibes the spirit of justice and fair play, qualities inherent to the spirit of Islam, which most Muslim states profess to uphold but rarely do so. Iraq was let down by the tyranny of its rulers. Without genuine support of its people, it collapsed like a house of cards against the onslaught of the invading force.

The year 1998 witnessed the coming out of closet on the nuclear weapons issue by first India, followed soon by Pakistan. Both nations demonstrated their nuclear weapons capability and became overt nuclear weapons capable nations. 1985 to 1998 was the period where India and Pakistan had followed the policy of nuclear ambiguity where possession of nuclear weapons was denied in public while confirming it in private. This policy has been credited with prevention of open hostility when at least on two occasions during that period the two nations were on the brink of armed conflict.

Nuclear weaponisation of the region has brought about fundamental changes in the threat perception especially from the viewpoint of Pakistan. Assuming that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence is credible and remains so, the Indian military strategy is likely to depend increasingly on the air and naval forces for the achievement of their military aims as opposed to its traditional reliance on land forces. Within the nuclear environment of the subcontinent, such a change in strategy would be in line with the perceived nature of future war and Indian military aims which are no longer expected to be space oriented. Even if the objectives remain space oriented in case of an all out war, albeit short of Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, the dominance of air strategy would help achieve them quickly and blunt any counter strokes. In a geographically limited conflict the advantage would be even more pronounced. At the level of military strategy, the increasing dominant role of air power in modern warfare must be recognised.

Generally speaking with the advent of nuclear weapons the danger of escalation has become so great that the area of freedom of manoeuvre has been considerably reduced. In the nuclear environment, the use of force in all likelihood would be limited to two types of wars; in the vital areas action is likely to be limited, probably very violent but short the object being to produce a fait accompli followed immediately by negotiations. In the peripheral areas conflict could take the form of prolonged wars of attrition at a low level of intensity and using a combination of conventional or guerrilla methods2 – the type which India accuses Pakistan of waging in the Indian Held Kashmir.

Translating the general observation on wars under a nuclear environment into the India-Pakistan scenario, a limited intensity conflict (LIC) can erupt in the troubled and disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Out of frustration over its inability to quell the freedom movement in the Indian Held Kashmir and to appease the hawkish elements in India who would like Pakistan to be taught a lesson, India could mount a short and swift offensive in Kashmir across the LOC with a view to capture some sensitive territory, stopping short of Pakistan’s perceived nuclear threshold and declare a ceasefire. The status of LOC would permit India to retain the captured territory even after declaration and acceptance of ceasefire. This is one situation for which Pakistan must have an adequate and effective response.

Fortunately, provided the defenders are prepared and ready, offensive operations in a hilly terrain like Kashmir are a difficult proposition but for as long as tension remains high in Kashmir and an acceptable solution is not found, Pakistan by compulsion has to maintain an excessively forward defensive posture, guarding every inch of the territory. Mobility in hilly areas is never easy and in such terrains a side displaying better mobility than its opponent is at a distinct advantage. Mobility can be greatly enhanced through the use of helicopters, both for troop and equipment movement. Greater use of helicopter force for the defence of Kashmir region should form an important ingredient of Pakistan’s revised defence strategy.

Based on the experience of their counter offensive in Kargil, any future Indian offensive in Kashmir would be supported by the Indian Air Force. In the Kargil conflict, it was the IAF Mirages’ precision laser guided bombing which eventually turned the tide against the freedom fighters. As the bombing was being conducted by IAF inside the Indian Held Kashmir, PAF did not challenge the Indian strike aircraft, which had a practically free run. Should India undertake any fresh offensive across the LOC, PAF must form an integral part of Pakistan’s defensive effort.

For the greater part of its existence, PAF has trained to fight the Indians in the plains of Punjab and Sindh. Greater emphasis on training to fly and fight in hilly and mountainous terrain now forms an important part of PAF’s operational strategy and training syllabus. Close support missions over mountainous areas are more vulnerable to enemy small arms fire and shoulder fired heat seeking ground to air missiles. Equipping aircraft undertaking such missions with flare dispensers, besides other protection suits becomes a must. The Indians had found out fairly quickly in the Kargil conflict, that without the use of smart bombs (PGMs), strikes especially in hilly terrain can be an exercise in futility, and very costly too, if the air is being contested. The ability to deliver PGMs under varying situations must now assume one of PAF’s core capabilities. Since a conflict in Kashmir is predicted to be short and violent, the Armed Forces of Pakistan must respond to the challenge in cohesion and PAF must be prepared, equipped and be ready to support the war effort both defensively by denying IAF control of the air over the battlefield and offensively by providing effective close support to the Pakistan Army formations on ground.

War as an element of coercion still remains a valid concept especially between India and Pakistan. In this changed scenario an Indian armed aggression against Pakistan most probably would be as a coercive measure to punish the latter for an alleged act that the former strongly disapproved of. Should India decide to initiate action against Pakistan through the use of force, it can do so by launching a ground operation in conjunction with its air power or through the exclusive use of air strike. Use of air power as an instrument of coercion as against a combined land/air offensive has the following advantages:-

A Air power, of all military forces is the most time sensitive in terms of both force preparation and mission execution.

A Air power will often be the only military means capable of striking at the heart of the problem effectively and quickly.

A Air strikes generally are over with quickly creating less exposure of risks to the participants.

The Indian mobilization of their armed forces as a reaction to the attack on their parliament on 13 December 2001 took over three months at a considerable cost to their exchequer. For over six months the two armies were facing each other eyeball to eyeball in a dangerous game of brinkmanship as the rest of the world held their breath. Eventually under international pressure or because Indian coercion failed to elicit the requisite response (meeting of the Indian list of demands) from Pakistan, India withdrew its armed forces from its offensive posture. If India instead had used the threat of air power only by moving its air strike elements to forward locations while deploying their ground forces in a strong defensive position at full readiness, it would have conveyed a similar message, albeit at lower scale but at a fraction of the cost. De-escalation would have been also far easier without loss of face. These are the lessons which Indian planners must have learned from their last unsuccessful effort.

In a similar situation in future, IAF strike formations would be the instrument of first choice for initiating aggression against Pakistan. Pakistan’s defence strategy must cater for such an eventuality. While not even a fraction as potent as the US and NATO air strike elements, IAF attack aircraft force do pack a powerful punch. To deter the Indian military planners from launching any such raids, Pakistan and PAF must concentrate on evolving a very effective air defence network, capable of exacting a heavy price from the intruding Indian aggressors.

Air Defence has two aspects, ground air defence in the shape of anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air missiles and a net of radar network to detect ingression of hostile formations; fighter aircraft form the other and more effective arm of air defence. Conflicts of the 20th century where air power played a major role has clearly shown that ground air defence by itself is not adequate for effective air defence of a nation; it must be complemented by fighter interceptors. For achieving air superiority or denying air superiority to the adversary, fighter interceptors play a key role. Agile multi-role combat aircraft armed with the best air to air weapons the nation can afford and equipped with effective airborne radars and necessary electronic protective suits should be at the top of PAF’s acquisition plans.

Besides air strikes, the Indians can also exercise the option of naval quarantine/blockade as coercion against Pakistan. A naval blockade may not be an easy option for the Indian planners to exercise given the sensitivity of the international shipping in the region. Nevertheless it is a contingency Pakistan Navy in conjunction with PAF should be prepared to deal with effectively. Besides surface ships, effective long range reconnaissance and surveillance platforms, submarines and strike aircraft in the ASV role are the essential ingredients to counter the Indian move. Joint operations between Pakistan Navy and PAF would be the ideal platform to thwart any Indian quarantine/blockade operation.

In the South Asian context, neither India nor Pakistan has managed a decisive edge in air power capability and a degree of parity exists. This would to some extent explain the uneasy peace that has prevailed in the region. Indians have renewed their effort to enhance their air power capability by massive acquisition of new weapons and technology. For maintenance of conventional deterrence, Pakistan has to invest likewise in its air power or else a dangerous imbalance in conventional deterrence to the detriment of Pakistan will be created.

In the modern battlefield, conceding air superiority/air supremacy to the invaders would sound the death knell for the defenders. Despite its high level of professionalism and skill, PAF would stand little chance to survive against a full fledged onslaught by US/NATO forces. Pakistan’s salvation lies in pursuing its policies in a just and mature fashion. A nation united and its government having grass root support of its population will rarely be aggressed against and even if a superpower commits the error of mounting an aggression, it should be able to defend itself through conventional and asymmetric warfare, provided as a nation it is willing to pay a price to maintain its freedom. China under Mao, Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh, Afghan Mujahideen against the might of Soviet Union and the Chechens against Russia are historical examples.

The Indian military threat to Pakistan is very real although the induction of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent has to some extent modified the nature of this threat. Limited conflicts in the shape of a short sharp combined ground/air offensive in the disputed territory of Kashmir or across the international border are possible. The use of air power/naval power as instruments of coercion is some of the other options available with the Indian military strategists.

In all the three eventualities, PAF’s contribution would be vital, especially in the air defence role. Strengthening the air defence network of Pakistan has become critical in the nation’s overall defence strategy. Within the ambit of air defence, quality multi-role fighter interceptors with the requisite air to air weaponry and electronic defensive suits would form a key ingredient.

Close support missions in the mountainous regions of Kashmir and northern area have gained additional significance and PAF’s operational and training doctrines should reflect this reality. Use of PGMs and the necessary accessories that go with it has now become indispensable for successful mission accomplishment in the hostile modern battlefield environment.

And finally as both Gulf War-I and Gulf War-II have shown, joint operations by all the three services, land, air and sea are absolutely essential to success. Pakistan needs to re-evaluate its defence training doctrines and incorporate the concept of joint operations at a much wider scale than is being followed presently. While Pakistan Army, PAF and Pakistan Navy must be having their individual doctrines, do the Pakistan Armed Forces have a joint operational doctrine? If one does not exist, there is an urgent need to formulate one and then base the operational and training concepts on the guidelines provided by the joint doctrine.

Notes 1Air Commodore Nasir M Butt (Retd), “Implications of Indian Airborne Early Warning Capability for Pakistan’s Armed Forces.” 2Andre Beaufre, “Deterrence and Strategy.”

While I am a great fan of air power, one has to attribute considerable weight to moral leadership.

American warriors were motivated by national unity, the moral superiority of our cause, exceptional leadership, and unit cohesion. Iraqi troops deserted the tyrannical Saddam.

The prescription of this muslim military analyst's view would have to be the need for a superior air force to match America's. If Saddam had had a better air force, he still would have lost, since the pilots would have flown their billion dollar platforms to a safe country, leaving Saddam undefended still.

Here it may be added that the cruel and despotic nature of Saddam and his regime only gave an illusion of cohesion among the Iraqi people against the invading forces whereas as USA has been claiming all along and as is apparent at this moment, it did not really exist

Guess this author hasn't talked to this one:

After Iraq: Who is next? (Worrried Moslem alert)

Which starts off with this:

Iraq stands devastated today. The once cradle of civilisation, the once centre of Muslim super power, the once greatest seat of Muslim learning is in ruins today. All in the name of ‘Freedom and Liberation for Iraqis’. About 1400 years back, when a single woman cried for help against Hindu atrocities, the sole Muslim power from the same place acted swiftly and the Hindu Raja had to leave his throne. today when millions and millions of Iraqis cried for help, more than 56 Muslim states watched the scene with a sort of helplessness but failed to take any action. Thus the American forces trampled Iraq without any hindrance, and after the occupation things are going from bad to worse. Iraqi civilians are being shot by American troops, and looting, chaos and vandalism still reign on the streets of many towns and cities. Pilfering is being encouraged to ensure a complete devastation.

Apologies: I didn't read far enough. He does get to that point:

"Perhaps the strongest deterrence against any military aggression would be a cohesive nation with a government that has grass root support and which imbibes the spirit of justice and fair play, qualities inherent to the spirit of Islam, which most Muslim states profess to uphold but rarely do so."

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