Posted on 03/30/2003 7:11:42 PM PST by gaucho
As technically vastly superior and soon to be further reinforced US-led coalition forces reach the vicinity of Baghdad, poised for the final push on the Iraqi capital, the question posed in the headline may seem little more than rhetorical. It is not. Consider why Saddam Hussein made the decision to stay in Iraq and fight in the first place; consider what - in his mind - might constitute victory even as most of his country is occupied by enemy forces.
For answers, first turn to Saddam's war plan as evidenced by developments so far and the mode of conduct of Iraqi military and irregular forces. In the Gulf War, large Iraqi units, dug in and positioned around and north of Kuwait, confronted allied troops in the open desert and, softened and demoralized by weeks of heavy bombardment, quickly buckled and surrendered to massed firepower. No comparable encounters have occurred in this war to date. No coherent Iraqi military moves have been witnessed. Instead, much of the fighting has been done by politically motivated paramilitary forces (Fedayeen Saddam, al-Quds), interspersed with disguised regulars, who blend in with civilians and hit targets of opportunity. Units of the Republican Guard Forces Command (six divisions totaling around 50,000 men) have not offered battle.
This is a clear portent of things to come. The guard divisions around Baghdad and Tikrit (Saddam and his clan's home base) may or may not put up a tough fight. That's a conventional military concern and of less relevance than now accorded in the media. These troops constitute an outer barrier and may be sacrificed - though they, too, are undoubtedly interspersed with irregulars, spread out, and less vulnerable to air strikes and artillery than if they were encountered in open terrain. Saddam's strategy, as is now evident, is to sacrifice open spaces, but to hold urban areas and conduct guerrilla-style harassment operations in coalition rearguard areas. All this is to gain time, even prior to an eventual siege of Baghdad. Such a siege itself will prove time-consuming or, alternatively, be costly in the extreme in civilian lives as well as coalition casualties. Saddam's calculation is simple: Baghdad under lengthy siege could not only lead to ever-growing mobilizations of the "Arab street" in neighboring countries, but also prompt condemnation in the UN by the France-Germany-Russia axis with demands for a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement.
Saddam and his political leadership probably count on a lack of political will on the part of the US and the UK to terminate any siege quickly at the cost of massive civilian and military bloodshed and large-scale destruction of infrastructure. That calculation might prove erroneous. It might also prove erroneous to assume that well-trained and equipped coalition soldiers would necessarily be at a disadvantage when it comes to Stalingrad-type house-to-house combat. In the Stalingrad battle 60 years ago, the Soviet worker militias collapsed early on. The decisive combat was carried out by equally matched regular army units. But, of course, no matter how you look at it, the destruction and casualties were appalling.
And Saddam's options for final victory, at least in his mind, are not necessarily exhausted by forcing a long or bloody siege. He could, and ultimately may well be prepared to enact the "Samson option" of pulling the temple down on himself and the Baghdad population. He would then stand as a martyr for the cause of Arab independence and freedom from foreign occupation of holy lands, making any expected positive post-war settlements, whether in Iraq or Palestine, potentially illusory. The war in Iraq, then, would stand in history not as the beginning of a new period of freedom, democracy, and prosperity, but as the beacon, the signal fire for a Thirty-Years-War style period of unending conflict and clash of civilizations.
This is Spengler-esque; it is not a prediction. But a week into the war and close observation of both sides' strategies and tactics, it has a sufficiently high probability of playing out that it cannot simply be dismissed.
They say the first casualty of any war is the original plan. Actually, the first casualty is the prediction of the pundit. The military is doing a fine job, and a timely one. We have adults in charge.
I still think the best thing if Hussein is still alive, is to capture him alive, and put him in a zoo, for the rest of his worthless life.
SH is dead,.......or,....as good as dead.
Problem is,....he has 5,000 clones.
They're still suffering,......yet.
These SH folks have too much free time on their hands.........yet.
Huh? "Samsom" didn't pull the temple down on himself and HIS OWN people...he pulled it down on his enemies.
Not only is this analogy wrong, but the idea a final act of brutality on the people he's oppressed and brutalized for years would make him some kind of hero, is just warped.
I guess everybody is trying to avoid putting into words what the Samson option really is -- pulling down the house on us as he goes down. That makes a lot more sense, of course, but it's not too pleasant to think about.
Actually, that is what I meant in my response. Thank you.
This seems like a reasonably intelligent article -- at least, allowing for the usual evasive double talk about Saddam's WMD options. With respect to a Stalingrad-type fight for Baghdad, or a long seige with the attendant humanitarian crisis, I see no reason why we have to play Saddam's game. Baghdad isn't going anywhere, after all. Remember that war is just a continuation of politics by other means. For 12 years, we have tried to isolate and extirpate Saddam by diplomatic means, trade sanctions, and covert support for his opponents. That didn't work, but it doesn't necessarily follow that, once we violate Iraq's territorial boundaries, we are inevitably committed to march straight into Baghdad and take the war onto his home turf. We can just continue to squeeze him, making him less and less relevant, giving him less and less to play for. I say, secure the rest of the country, mop up the Baathists, institute some kind of civilized pro tem administration, and leave Saddam to stew in Bagdhad.
By all means, so long as the Republican Guard make themselves accessible around Baghdad, bomb the living sh*t out of them: every dead Republican Guard is another war criminal we don't have to deal with after the enemy is vanquished. By all means, keep up the special ops in Baghdad. By all means, continue with the systematic obliteration of every physical symbol and manifestation of the Baathist regime. (Is the Saddam Mosque still standing, BTW? -- if it is, bomb it!) But I don't see what the hurry is about getting into a shooting match in the city proper, nor do I see any need to cut off food or basic necessities to the people who live there. That would just be to give Saddam what he wants. This is the "outside in" strategy I proposed here six months ago. I'm in good company: John Keegan suggests something similar here: The allies don't need to take Baghdad to defeat Saddam.
Senator John Kyle (R-AZ) was jusy on our am talk radio show. He had just gotten out of some high level briefing and he sounded pretty upbeat. He said exactly that, pretty much, we are pounding the sh** out of the RG.
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