Posted on 03/16/2003 7:35:29 PM PST by bonesmccoy
BioTerrorism Analysis: Weaponsized Infectious Disease and Emerging Disease (A Free Republic Technical Analysis)
About five weeks ago, I started a technical thread that analyzed the space shuttle disaster which killed an international flight crew and lead to wreckage over the southwestern United States. In that thread, we had a remarkable range of technical and analytical skills which this website brought to bear. Because we are anonymous, we can pursue fact without fear of the liberals killing our careers or worse. Tonight, I seek to create a thread on a more serious national security problem, biological weapons of mass destruction and emerging infectious diseases.
The use of weapons of mass destruction had previously been limited due to the inability of other nations to build nuclear fission or fusion weapons. The construction of biological or chemical weapons may not be as technically challenging.
Subsequent to the attacks at WTC, the national security command structure has appropriately realigned US federal policy to reflect the vulnerability of our nation. Use of civilian systems as a vehicle for military-style attack and mass carnage has created significant economic damage in our nation. There is little question that the attacks of September 11, 2001, created a negative economic impact on our entire nation.
However, the negative economic impact of these attacks must be limited by the skill of the citizenry to respond. In particular, the US citizenry must not leave security up to others, we must take action ourselves in order to limit the damage of terror in our cities.
Use of agents of biological terror can create ripple effects that are more significant than the attacks of September 11, 2001. These effects will manifest in the economic impact of increased apprehension in the populace. Failure of our medical services to appropriately mobilize to react to threat will cause increased economic damage.
It is my opinion that our national leadership has not been fully briefed on the gravity of the situation.
While Tom Ridge and Tommy Thompson are making difficult decisions and working diligently to restructure our federal government in the wake of 9-11-01, it is obvious that the public health system is NOT reacting to the threat of BW use by Iraq. The slow response of public health authorities to the release of small pox vaccine by the White House is testimony to the amount of political inertia in the public health system. This inertia appears to be politically motivated. Meanwhile, the private medical system has little fiscal or economic defense against biological attack. If it were not for the President's advocacy for terrorism insurance, we would not have ANY protection whatsoever.
Response to a biological attack requires the following:
1. A confident work force that can mobilize in the face of the attack.
2. An orderly work process that can process hundreds of casualties in a few hours time.
3. Maintenance of social order to insure that civilian enterprises (both governmental and privately owned) can continue to function in the economy.
If social order can not be maintained, the economy will suffer additional damage which will ripple through our nation.
I'm very glad to hear this. I hope this catches on nationwide.
IMO, a nation which doesn't give it's agriculture the highest degree of protection (economic as well as security) is in serious danger.
I would be much more concerned about imports. We already know that they use pesticides and farming practices illegal in the US. There could even be genetically altered product that wouldn't be discovered for years, say something that makes the natural arsenic in potatoes more potent but has to build up for a while before you realize you are ill. It would depend on how many potatoes you ate as to how soon it showed and how ill you got and what are the chances of a doctor relating your illness to potatoes?
The following is a link to what I consider pertinent steps in timely recovery--- Epidemiology of Bioterrorism
SNIPS from the article I found particularly noteworthy:
"However, the military is not the only population at risk for biological attack.
To effectively counter the potentially devastating effects of an attack, we need to understand the basic epidemiologic principles of biological agents used as weapons."
Differential Diagnosis
Any small or large outbreak of disease should be evaluated as a potential bioterrorist attack.
Epidemiologic Approach
The basic epidemiologic approach in the evaluation of a potential bioterrorist or biowarfare attack is not different from any standard epidemiologic investigation.
Epidemic Curve
Epidemiologic Clues
Recommendations for Preparedness
**Training should include basic epidemiologic principles as well as clinical information on diagnosing and treating agents that pose the highest threat.
I know that the Civilian Population Center where I live is poorly prepared. Mainly because of having "their heads in a hole" attitude. I honestly think it will require inclusion of a civil defense network to avoid total mayhem. Which, BTW, is how it really ought to occur.
The Demon in the Freezer is by Richard Preston, author of The Hot Zone
A chunk of "Demon" was excerpted in the New Yorker. It is an unsettling read.
You may also be thinking of Biohazard by Ken Alibek, which details his bioweapons research and production in the old Soviet Union. At one point, Biopreparat was manufacturing some ten tons of weaponized smallpox per year.
We live in interesting times.
Yes, I tend to agree.
Thanks for the 'ping'.
It had to be scary.
Did they say anything about 'DNA'(genetic-splicing) experiments which mixed various animal-plant diseases?
No. They focused on anthrax and plague.
Basically, if Saddam has seeded cells in southern California with this stuff, we're screwed!
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