The United Nations has given President Saddam Hussein a choice between co-operation and confrontation, between disarmament through inspection or disarmament by force. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Saddam has made his choice. I have hoped and prayed all along that this crisis could be resolved by Iraqs co-operation with weapons inspectors. But as each day passes without an Iraqi response to the inspectors outstanding questions, so the prospect of a peaceful outcome diminishes. It seems increasingly clear that Saddam will never voluntarily relinquish his weapons.
Calls to give the inspectors more time are futile as long as Saddam refuses to co-operate. We must not allow endless calls for more time to become a cop-out. Iraqs non-compliance stretches back not just 60 days but 600 weeks. The chief inspectors will report to the Security Council on February 14 and we will listen with care to their view on whether there is any sign of active co-operation. The teams are employed to verify compliance, not to act as detectives conducting a hunt for evidence in the face of persistent obstruction.
For the past 13 years, Saddam has typified the threats the world faces in the post-Cold War era. WMD weapons of mass destruction is a rather abstract phrase. But it covers poisonous gases, chemical weapons, and viruses for deadly diseases like anthrax and smallpox, biological weapons, as well as nuclear missiles and bombs. Saddam has not only developed but used WMD in contravention of international arms control agreements and a host of UN resolutions. And he has been a consistent supporter of terrorist causes.
At times, the world has struggled to respond. But in unanimously adopting SCR 1441 last November, the international community showed that it could yet summon the collective will to meet the Iraqi threat. Given the UNs painful experience of Iraqi prevarication, deceit and contempt for previous resolutions, the demands of SCR 1441 were necessarily simple: full Iraqi disarmament via immediate and active co-operation with UN inspectors. The consequences of non-compliance could not have been clearer. Saddam was to expect serious consequences, diplomatic code for disarmament by force.
Despite the clarity of its uncompromising message, there are no signs that Saddam is about to abandon the habits of a lifetime and comply with SCR 1441. As I am sure the Secretary of State Colin Powells presentation will confirm today, his preferred strategy remains, as ever, concealment, evasion, intimidation and deceit.
Iraq will no doubt claim the contrary, and that it is co-operating with the UNs demands. On a superficial level, it is. Weapons inspectors have largely been granted access to all sites. But the reports by the UNs chief weapons inspector last week set out a disturbing account of how Iraq is avoiding compliance. Dr Hans Blix has described a pattern of concealment and obstruction. These are the very tactics that Iraq has used for 12 years to prevent disarmament, thereby allowing the regime to stockpile an arsenal of deadly weapons. We cannot let Saddam get away with it indefinitely.
Why is Iraq refusing to allow UN inspectors to use a U2 plane to conduct aerial imagery and reconnaissance operations? When will Iraq account for its missing stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, including 6,500 bombs which could carry up to 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent? How will Iraq justify having a prohibited chemical precursor for mustard gas? And how will Iraq explain the concealment of nuclear documents and the development of missile programmes in contravention of UN resolutions?
I am not holding my breath for a response. British intelligence shows that Iraq is deliberately hampering the work of the inspectors. There are presently around 110 inspectors in Iraq, vastly outnumbered by more than 20,000 Iraqi intelligence officers who are disrupting inspections and concealing WMD. Crucial documents have been moved to private homes, universities and even hospitals and mosques. Those in whose homes this material has been hidden have been warned of the consequences if it is discovered.
Most serious of all, Iraq is refusing to allow unfettered interviews with those who know about its WMD programmes. Saddam has made this impossible. Co-operation and confession is punishable by death. Meanwhile, the inspectors are subjected to psychological pressure and 24-hour surveillance. Their work is disrupted by staged demonstrations, and there have been incidents of harassment such as the recent episode when Iraqis tried to enter the inspectors compound armed with knives.
In the weeks leading up to the adoption of SCR 1441, my Security Council colleagues and I took pains to establish a clear mechanism to judge Iraqi compliance. We set two tests. First, that Iraq must not make false statements or omissions in its declaration. But the document it submitted to the UN on December 7 is long on repetition, but short on fact. It was neither full, accurate, nor complete.
The second test was a failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co-operate fully in, the implementation of SCR 1441. In the wake of Dr Blixs report, it is clear that Iraq is not meeting this test either. The inescapable conclusion is that Iraq is in material breach of the resolution.
The time has arrived for the Security Council to recognise that Iraq can no longer be allowed to hold its demands in contempt. In the Security Council today, I will be making clear that we must all face up to the responsibility to deal with this issue, not defer it.
Our world faces many threats, from WMD to poverty, from disease to terrorism. By living up to the fine words of its founding charter, the United Nations has the capacity to tackle these challenges. But if we are to do so, the decisions it takes must have a force beyond mere words.