Posted on 02/01/2003 6:20:40 PM PST by ATOMIC_PUNK
Nasa chiefs 'repeatedly ignored' safety warnings In a letter to the White House, Don Nelson, who served with Nasa for 36 years until he retired in 1999, wrote to President George W. Bush warning that his 'intervention' was necessary to 'prevent another catastrophic space shuttle accident'. During his last 11 years at Nasa, Nelson served as a mission operations evaluator for proposed advanced space transportation projects. He was on the initial design team for the space shuttle. He participated in every shuttle upgrade until his retirement. Listing a series of mishaps with shuttle missions since 1999, Nelson warned in his letter that Nasa management and the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel have failed to respond to the growing warning signs of another shuttle accident. Since 1999 the vehicle had experienced a number of potentially disastrous problems: · 1999 - Columbia's launch was delayed by a hydrogen leak and Discovery was grounded with damaged wiring, contaminated engine and dented fuel line; · January 2000 - Endeavor was delayed because of wiring and computer failures; · August 2000 - inspection of Columbia revealed 3,500 defects in wiring; · October 2000 - the 100th flight of the shuttle was delayed because of a misplaced safety pin and concerns with the external tank; · April 2002 - a hydrogen leak forced the cancellation of the Atlantis flight; · July 2002 - the inspector general reported that the shuttle safety programme was not properly managed; · August 2002 - the shuttle launch system was grounded after fuel line cracks were discovered. Nelson's claims - which The Observer could not independently verify yesterday - emerged against a background of growing concern over the management of safety issues by Nasa. They followed similar warnings in April last year by the former chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory panel, Richard Bloomberg, who said: 'In all of the years of my involvement, I have never been as concerned for space shuttle safety as I am right now.' Bloomberg blamed the deferral or elimination of planned safety upgrades, a diminished workforce as a result of hiring freezes, and an ageing infrastructure for the advisory panel's findings. His warning echoed earlier concern about key shuttle safety issues. In September 2001 at a Senate hearing into shuttle safety, senators and independent experts warned that budget and management problems were putting astronauts lives at risk. At the centre of concern were claims that a budget overspend of almost $5 billion (£3bn) had led to a culture in Nasa whereby senior managers treated shuttle safety upgrades as optional. Among those who spoke out were Democratic Senator Bill Nelson of Florida, who warned: 'I fear that if we don't provide the space shuttle programme with the resources it needs for safety upgrades, our country is going to pay a price we can't bear. 'We're starving Nasa's shuttle budget and thus greatly increasing the chance of a catastrophic loss.' Although Nasa officials said that improvements were being made they admitted that more needed to be done. A year earlier, a General Accounting Office report had warned that the loss of experienced engineers and technicians in the space shuttle programme was threatening the safety of future missions just as Nasa was preparing to increase its annual number of launches to build the International Space Station. The GAO cited internal Nasa documents showing 'workforce reductions are jeopardising Nasa's ability to safely support the shuttle's planned flight rate'. Space agency officials discovered in late 1999 that many employees didn't have the necessary skills to properly manage avionics, mechanical engineering and computer systems, according to the GAO report. The GAO assembled a composite portrait of the shuttle programme's workforce that showed twice as many workers over 60 years of age than under 30. It assessed that the number of workers then nearing retirement could jeopardise the programme's ability to transfer leadership roles to the next generation to support the higher flight rate necessary to build the space station.
Peter Beaumont
Sunday February 2, 2003
The Observer
Fears of a catastrophic shuttle accident were raised last summer with the White House by a former Nasa engineer who pleaded for a presidential order to halt all further shuttle flights until safety issues had been addressed.
The STS design probably does carry a failure rate in the 2% range.
The program as designed requires hardware with a 0.00001% failure rate.
The hardware and the program design are incompatible. This disconnect between reality and fantasy, maintained for almost thirty years now, has led to increasingly politicized leadership at NASA, and, I suspect, a go along to get along culture (because those are the only sort of people who will follow leaders like that).
I weep for the brave astronauts, but I also weep for my country which here, as in so many other areas, is dying of inadequate development-intellectual, moral, physical-and is using fantasy to cover it up.
In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man should goddam well be king BUMP.
Don't confuse the absolute necessity of "high flight" with justification of the design and management of STS.
I agree that 1/75 is a probable failure rate.
The problem is that the managers have been ordered to design and operate a program that assumes a 1/100000 failure rate.
Using your number, after 300 flights we would have no more orbiters.
Where is the assembly line? What design work is going on for the replacement vehicles? What are the budget assumptions to support a program with a 1/75 failure rate? How are the flight test personnel being selected? Is the use of civilian mission specialists consistent with a failure rate of 1/75?
Nothing-absolutely nothing-about the shuttle program is consistent with a 1/75 failure rate. Except reality.
Remind them and slam them with the facts that the x42 administration budget cuts toward the space program were just the begining of a long failed presidency and unlike the trickle down prosperous economy left to us by Ron Reagan x42's trickle down is one of a broken economy filled with lies and failure due to the greed of a theiving liberal president who only had his legacy in mind for selfish communist reasons.
Congress will beat the snot of this dead horse for months.
A project that was suppossed to cost 5 million per launch that now exceeds 500 million per launch is unsustainable except by one force on earth: the US Government.
When are those that want more government going to realize?
Life is unsustainable with budgets like this. The question must be why did costs get so high and where are the inefficiencies? Why did the Government fail these brave people?
Algore got $2 BILLION of NASA funds funnelled by Golden to the the chief civilian and general in charge of the Russian space station parts. The bribes were paid so that at least something would be built, even if it was substandard. The Russian parts of the ISS were built maninly to keep the scientists and engineers from going to work for some other enemy country.
Space, like everything else, was viewed as just another source of pork and pandering by the klintons.
The waste in the program was monumental, as with every other bureacracy. So let's not focus on the finances but focus on the engineering and see if we can't minimize future risk.
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