Conventional Forces in Afghanistan

Newsweek, Inc ^ | Sept 2002 | Colin Soloway

[SFBiker80814]

They didn’t get far before the team’s captain looked back. Six paratroopers from the 82d Airborne, also part of Mountain Sweep, were lined up outside the farmer’s house, preparing to force their way in. “I yelled at them to stop,” says the captain, “but they went ahead and kicked in the door.”

[SFBiker80814]

Once again our failure to understand other cultures and running roughshod over situations because immediate results are necessary will cost us more in the long term.

[Larry Lucido]

Interesting article. As much as I admire the 82nd, I think I might defer to SF units with respect to the best overall strategy and tactics.

[Larry Lucido]

Anyone else you think might want to be pinged to this?

[willgetsome]

Yep....too many Army officers who think its their way or else. This is typical conventional, light infantry, Airborne Ranger mentality...hit everything with a sledge-hammer and do not deviate from the FMs. I was an Army officer in the 25th ID from '92-'96. While there, I saw a lot of guys with the light infantry, Airborne Ranger bravado and rigidness. This is what got them promoted. IMHO, these folks spent more time yelling "hooahhh" than they did thinking of creative solutions or taking risks on the battlefield. It boils down to a zero-tolerance, "who you are is what badges you wear on your uniform" culture that exists in the conventional, light infantry forces.

[Dead Dog]

No kidding, and it's not putting down the 82nd, they just aren't being used for what they are trained to do.

[Marobe]

Our war on terrorism:
“It’s the victory of form over substance, substituting action for results,”
“It’s thinking if you do a lot of stuff, something
will happen. Something will, but it might not be what you
want. The unhappiness is building.”
Here come the bodybags ... when the tough guys are through beating up local villagers they'll start picking up frag-grenades and collecting war memorabilia from their
fight against terrorists. Like Desert Storm we'll loose more soldiers to pissed off locals, ignorance, and poor training than to terrorists.

[Stentor]

Once again our failure to understand other cultures and running roughshod over situations because immediate results are necessary will cost us more in the long term.

Crap.

[Travis McGee]

Thanks for the ping! Very important article!

[Travis McGee]

When you think the Army is finally learning.....

Pair this stupidity with the Perfumed Princes ordering the SFs to shave, which is just saying "snipe me" as they ride the boonies in the back of open pickups visible from thousands of yards around.

[Cogadh na Sith]

While there, I saw a lot of guys with the light infantry, Airborne Ranger bravado and rigidness. This is what got them promoted. IMHO, these folks spent more time yelling "hooahhh" than they did thinking of creative solutions or taking risks on the battlefield. It boils down to a zero-tolerance, "who you are is what badges you wear on your uniform" culture that exists in the conventional, light infantry forces.

Yep, I was in a Light Inf unit in the 2nd ID in the early 90's. I was the S2.

The BN CO was out of SF and 'knew the deal', but the Co CO's were dumb as a box of rocks and constantly made stupid decisions--but they were in great shape and handed out a lot of Art. 15's...

[FreedomPoster]

Crap.

I'd be really curious to get Travis' commentary on your analysis of this. I suspect he might have a different opinion. I certainly do. Handling a "hearts and minds" issue with a "total war" mentality is no way to run a counter-insurgency, which is what we now have in Afghanistan. Anyone who has paid any attention at all to Vietnam history should be aware of this.

[Larry Lucido]

Crap.

Interesting opinion. Care to elaborate?

[Larry Lucido]

You're welcome.

[Travis McGee]

The article is spot on. Kicking down doors and frisking the women is INSANE.

The way to find the well hidden bad guys is to develop such tight relations (the SF way) by treating the kids eye infection, purifying the well etc that the kid later whispers to the SF the exact location of the hut where the Al Qaeda is hiding.

Kicking in doors and frisking women totally trashes what the SF has accomplished.

If you want the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, then throw old men to the ground and frisk their wives: you'll get it.

[Prodigal Son]

From the article:

“If you establish rapport with the people—establish you are not an occupying army—and prove you are here to support the transitional government, they will tell you where to find Al Qaeda.”

The guys on the ground in Afghanistan see it differently. But what do they know?

[willgetsome]

I was a light infantry brigade asst. S-2 and I was an MI platoon leader and company XO. I was amazed on field exercises when our battalion scout platoons were almost always eliminated within 1-2 days. The reason that many cited was that battalion commanders always placed their most aggressive and "hooahhh" LTs in charge and their most aggressive and "hooahhh" soldiers in the ranks. Thus, when the scouts went out they were more eager to kill the enemy, draw attention, and then get wacked, than they were in staying hidden and reporting on enemy movements.

[Squantos]

Sorry Mr Afghan Peasant but line up your ladies in their burkas and wand em with a metal detector and search the house.......no disrespect it's just business.

War/conflict/police action ain't pretty and the hearts and minds has never worked because it's ruled with commanders that have no heart or mind.

Kick the doors , Kick their butts and leave. If they support terrorism again then we'll be back.

Stay Safe !

[Travis McGee]

Which guys? The SFs who do this for a living, or the "kick down the door and frisk the women" conventionally trained groundpounders?

You want to lose this war, push the SFs aside and start throwing old men to the ground.

[Travis McGee]

I disagree. We don't have enough troops to do that, we will be getting sniped and boobytrapped from all sides like the Soviets. We can get the info on the bad guys with honey, if we use vineger we'll lose big time.

This is a classic "hearts and minds" situation which can still break either way.

The key is to get the 15 year old boy to snitch on the Al Qaeda to the SFs he has learned to trust and respect, and not carry RPG warheads for them at night because his father was humiliated and his sisters and mother were roughly searched by screaming helmeted non-language speaking foreign storm troopers.

[river rat]

"....more time yelling "hooahhh" than they did thinking of creative solutions or taking risks on the battlefield."

I hope you didn't mean by that statement- that we are now training our forces to "take risks" on the battlefield.

I would hope that the commanders would focus on minimizing risk by planning, strategy, training, discipline, mission parameters and forces assigned to mission. "Risks" should be avoided and only considered once the shit hit the fan and are unavoidable.. "Risks" on the battlefield is like playing Russian roulette when EVERYONE has FULLY loaded weapons.

My own quick reading of the article - gave me the impression that forces were put into close contact with a "mixed loyalty" population, without PRIOR instruction from the SF familiar with the situation, on HOW they would conduct the sweep they were conducting.

Seems things have gotten "out of control"....
There are many in this forum that know how troublesome and fraught with INHERENT "risk" the scenario of attempting to find the "bad guys" when they are hiding within the community that supports them. It is very difficult to produce warriors in large numbers that can deal professionally with this problem.
Semper Fi