Posted on 12/11/2001 2:43:05 PM PST by Bill Rice
....At the time Col. Prouty retired from the U.S. Air Force, in 1964, he was the liaison between the Secretary of Defence and the CIA Director, Allen Dulles. Prouty was in a unique position to perceive what was going on in the CIA and what pressures were on President Kennedy. On frequent occasions, Prouty would work out of the home of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles with the Dulles brothers on fast breaking world affairs. Allen Dulles was the CIA Director that John Kennedy fired after the Bay of Pigs fiasco who sat on the WARREN COMMISSION. All knowledgeable researchers place the Dulles brothers within the circle of the conspirators.
If we only knew then, what we do now, it would have been easy to identify the other conspirators. Lyndon Johnson lived across the street from J. Edger Hoover for 22 years in Washington D.C. Johnson was associated with Jack Ruby in Dallas. Hoover attended the meeting at the Clint Murcheson ranch, along with Richard Nixon and high ranking military, where the last minute details of the assassination were worked out. Richard Nixon first told the FBI he did not remember where he was when JFK was murdered. Then he said he was in Dallas but flew out an hour before the shooting. He lied. Executives at the PEPSICO meeting attended by Nixon related that not only was Nixon there when the shooting happened but Nixon was the only person who wanted to go on working after the shocking news of the President's death.
At the street level below these conspirators we find the CIA Bay of Pigs operatives Frank Sturgus, Jack Youngblood and E. Howard Hunt being photographed in the famous "tramp photos". These three suspects were arrested in a boxcar which was parked behind the grassy knoll picket fence over which the fatal shot was fired. These 3 assassins were released after 15 minutes by the FBI without being finger printed, photographed or identified and were last seen leaving Dallas in a police squad car. As a litmus test, any documentary which omits these photos is probably a fraud. These photos have never been shown by the mass media to the American public.
Another important detail that is omitted here: all of these people ate cucumbers at least once in the year preceding Kennedy's assassination. I am sure this fact must lead to something.
Come to think of it, there was a coffee shop right across Hoover's home; its owner must have been a part of that plot...
The Report repeatedly characterizes the shots as "very easy" and "easy." However, the experts who made these evaluations for the Commission did not consider two essential factors that cannot be excluded from any hypothesizing: 1) the President was a living, moving target, and 2) the shots had to be fired in a very short period of time. First quoted in the Report is FBI ballistics expert Frazier:
From my own experience in shooting over the years, when you shoot at 175 feet or 260 feet, which is less than 100 yards, with a telescopic sight, you should not have any difficulty hitting your target. (R190)
Frazier testified at the New Orleans trial of Clay Shaw, where he modified his previous Commission testimony. How would the added consideration of a moving target affect his previous assessment?
it would be a relatively easy shot, slightly complicated, however, if the target were moving at the time, it would make it a little more difficult.[2]
The next "expert" quoted is Marine Sgt. James A. Zahm, who was involved in marksmanship training in the Marine Corps:
Using the scope, rapidly working the bolt and using the scope to relocate your target quickly and at the same time when you locate that target you identify and the crosshairs are in close relationship to the point you want to shoot at, it just takes a minor move in aiming to bring the crosshairs to bear, and then it is a quick squeeze. (R190)
Zahm never used the C2766 Carcano; his comments related to four-power scopes in general as aids in rapid shooting with a bolt-action rifle. Another expert, Ronald Simmons, was directly involved in tests employing the Carcano. Although this is not reflected in the Report, he told the Commission that, contrary to Zahm's generalization of a "minor move" necessary to relocate the target in the scope, such a great amount of effort was needed to work the rifle bolt that the weapon was actually moved completely off target (3H449). There is yet another factor qualifying Zahm's evaluation. This was brought out during Frazier's New Orleans testimony:
Mr. Oser: . . . when you shoot this rifle . . . can you tell us whether or not in rebolting the gun you had to move your eye away from the scope?
Mr. Frazier: Yes, sir, that was necessary.
Mr. Oser: Why was that necessary?
Mr. Frazier: To prevent the bolt of the rifle from striking me in the face as it came to the rear.[3]
At best, the Report drastically oversimplified the true nature of the shots. It is true that shots fired at ranges under 100 yards with a four-power scope are generally easy. However, the assassination shots, in accordance with the Commission's lone-assassin theory, were fired in rapid succession (indeed the first two would have occurred within the minimum time needed to operate the bolt) and at a moving target. The difficulty of such shots becomes apparent when it is considered that operation of the bolt would have thrown the weapon off target and caused the firer temporarily to move his eye from the sight.
One is prompted to ask what caliber of shooter would be required to commit the assassination alone as described above. Simulative tests conducted by the Commission, while deficient, are quite illuminating.
The Commission's test firers were all rated as "Master" by the National Rifle Association (NRA); they were experts whose daily routines involved working with and shooting firearms (3H445).
In the tests, three targets were set up at 175, 240, and 365 feet respectively from a 30-foot-high tower. Each shooter fired two series of three shots, using the C2766 rifle. The men took 8.25, 6.75, and 4.60 seconds respectively for the first series and 7.00, 6.45, and 5.15 for the second (3H446). In the first series, each man hit his first and third targets but missed the second. Results varied on the next series, although in all cases but one, two targets were hit. Thus, in only two cases were the Commission's experts able to fire three aimed shots in under 5.6 seconds as Oswald allegedly did. None scored three hits, as was demanded of a lone assassin on November 22.
These tests would suggest that three hits within such a short time span, if not impossible, would certainly have taxed the proficiency of the most skilled marksman.[4] In his testimony before the Commission, Ronald Simmons spoke first of the caliber of shooter necessary to have fired the assassination shots on the basis that only two hits were achieved:
Mr. Eisenberg: Do you think a marksman who is less than a highly skilled marksman under those conditions would be able to shoot within the range of 1.2 mil aiming error [as was done by the experts]?
Mr. Simmons: Obviously, considerable experience would have to be in one's background to do so. And with this weapon, I think also considerable experience with this weapon, because of the amount of effort required to work the bolt. (3H449)
Well, in order to achieve three hits, it would not be required that a man be an exceptional shot. A proficient man with this weapon, yes. But I think with the opportunity to use the weapon and to get familiar with it, we could probably have the results reproduced by more than one firer. (3H450)
Here arises the crucial question: Was Lee Harvey Oswald a "proficient man with this weapon," with "considerable experience" in his background?
While in the Marines between 1956 and 1959, Oswald was twice tested for his performance with a rifle. On a scale of expert-sharpshooter-marksman, Oswald scored two points above the minimum for sharpshooter on one occasion (December 1956) and only one point above the minimum requirement for marksman on another (May 1959) -- his last recorded score. Colonel A. G. Folsom evaluated these scores for the Commission:
The Marine Corps consider that any reasonable application of the instructions given to Marines should permit them to become qualified at least as a marksman. To become qualified as a sharpshooter, the Marine Corps is of the opinion that most Marines with a reasonable amount of adaptability to weapons firing can become so qualified. Consequently, a low marksman qualification indicates a rather poor "shot" and a sharpshooter qualification indicates a fairly good "shot." (19H17-18)
There exists the possibility that Oswald's scores were either inaccurately or unfairly recorded, thus accounting for his obviously mediocre to horrendous performances with a rifle. However, there is other information independent of the scores to indicate that Oswald was in fact not a good shot. In his testimony, Colonel Folsom examined the Marine scorebook that Oswald himself had maintained, and elaborated on his previous evaluation:
Mr. Ely: I just wonder, after having looked through the whole scorebook, if we could fairly say that all that it proves is that at this stage of his career he was not a particularly outstanding shot.
Col. Folsom: No, no, he was not. His scorebook indicates . . . that he did well at one or two ranges in order to achieve the two points over the minimum score for sharpshooter.
Mr. Ely: In other words, he had a good day the day he fired for qualification?
Col. Folsom: I would say so. (8H311)
Thus, according to Folsom, Oswald's best recorded score was the result of having "a good day"; otherwise, Oswald "was not a particularly outstanding shot."
Folsom was not alone in his evaluation of Oswald as other than a good shot. The following is exerpted [sic] from the testimony of Nelson Delgado, one of Oswald's closest associates in the Marines:
Mr. Liebeler: Did you fire with Oswald?
Mr. Delgado: Right; I was in the same line. By that I mean we were on the same line together, the same time, but not firing at the same position . . . and I remember seeing his. It was a pretty big joke, because he got a lot of "maggie's drawers," you know, a lot of misses, but he didn't give a darn.
Mr. Liebeler: Missed the target completely?
Mr. Delgado: He just qualified, that's it. He wasn't as enthusiastic as the rest of us. (8H235)
The Report tried desperately to get around this unanimous body of credible evidence. First Marine Corps Major Eugene Anderson (who never had any association with Oswald) is quoted at length about how bad weather, poor coaching, and an inferior weapon might have accounted for Oswald's terrible performance in his second recorded test (R191). Here the Commission scraped the bottom of the barrel, offering this unsubstantiated, hypothetical excuse-making as apparent fact. Weather bureau records, which the Commission did not bother to check, show that perfect firing conditions existed at the time and place Oswald last fired for qualification -- better conditions in fact, than those prevailing during the assassination.[5] As for the quality of the weapon fired in the test, it is probable that at its worst it would have been far superior to the virtual piece of junk Oswald allegedly owned and used in the assassination.[6] Perhaps Anderson guessed correctly in suggesting that Oswald may have had a poor instructor; yet, from the time of his departure from the Marines in 1959 to the time of the assassination in 1963, Oswald had no instructor.
For its final "evaluation," the Report again turned to Anderson and Zahm. Each man is quoted as rating Oswald a good shot, somewhat above average, as compared to other Marines, and an "excellent" shot as compared to the average male civilian (R192). That the Commission could even consider these evaluations is beyond comprehension. Oswald's Marine scores and their official evaluation showed that he did not possess even "a reasonable amount of adaptability to weapons firing." If this is better than average for our Marines, pity the state of our national "defense"! The testimonies of Folsom and Delgado -- people who had direct association with Oswald in the Marines -- are not mentioned in the Report.
Thus, Oswald left the Marines in 1959 as a "rather poor shot." If he is to be credited with a feat such as the assassination, it must be demonstrated that he engaged in some activity between 1959 and 1963 that would have greatly developed his rifle capability and maintained it until the time of the shooting. The Report barely touched on the vital area of Oswald's rifle practice. In a brief two-paragraph section entitled "Oswald's Rifle Practice Outside the Marines," the Report painted a very sketchy picture, entirely inadequate in terms of the nature of the issue (R192-93). In all, Oswald is associated with a weapon eleven or twelve times, ending in May 1963.
Let us examine each of the Commission's assertions from this section of the Report:
1. During one of his leaves from the Marines, Oswald hunted with his brother Robert, using a .22 caliber bolt-action rifle belonging either to Robert or Robert's in-laws.
A footnote to this statement refers to Robert Oswald's testimony at 1H327, where essentially the same information is found.
2. After he left the Marines and before departing for Russia, Oswald, his brother, and a third companion went hunting for squirrels and rabbits. On that occasion Oswald again used a bolt-action .22 caliber rifle; and according to Robert, Lee Oswald exhibited an average amount of proficiency with that weapon.
Here again the Report cites Robert Oswald's testimony at 1H325-327. Although Robert did say that Lee showed "an average amount" of proficiency (1H326), his other descriptions of the occasion would indicate that none of the men showed any proficiency at all that day. This excursion took place in a "briar patch" that "was very thick with cottontails." Among the three men, eight rabbits were shot, "because it was the type of brush and thorns that didn't grow very high but we were able to see over them, so getting three of us out there it wasn't very hard to kill eight of them." Robert further illuminated the proficiency of the shooting when he revealed that it once took all three men firing to hit one rabbit.
3. While in Russia, Oswald obtained a hunting license joined a hunting club and went hunting about six times.
As mentioned in chapter 1, Liebeler criticized the inclusion of this statement in the Report, for Oswald hunted with a shotgun in Russia. Wrote Liebeler, "Under what theory do we include activities concerning a shotgun under a heading relating to rifle practice, and then presume not to advise the reader of that?"[7] The sources given for the above-quoted statement are CEs 1042, 2007, and 1403 (which establish Oswald's membership in the club) and 1H96, 327-28, and 2H466. The latter references to the testimony do not support the Report's implication that Oswald's Russian hunting trips helped to further his marksmanship abilities.
In the portion of her testimony cited (1H96), Marina Oswald said that Oswald hunted only once during the time she knew him in the Soviet Union. This prompted a brief exchange not complimentary to Oswald's performance with his weapon during the hunt:
Mr. Rankin: Was that when he went hunting for squirrels?
Mrs. Oswald: If he marked it down in his notebook that he went hunting for squirrels, he never did. Generally they wanted to kill a squirrel when we went there, or some sort of bird, in order to boast about it, but they didn't. Robert Oswald testified that Lee hunted "about six times" in Russia (1H327-328). He too revealed the poor nature of Oswald's performance:
We talked about hunting over there, and he said that he had only been hunting a half dozen times, and so forth, and that he had only used a shotgun, and a couple of times he did shoot a duck.
The third reference to testimony is most revealing. The source is Mrs. Ruth Paine, who related what Marina had told her:
She quoted a proverb to the effect that you go hunting in the Soviet Union and you catch a bottle of Vodka, so I judge it was a social occasion more than shooting being the prime object. (2H466)
Information not mentioned or cited in the Report corroborates the informal nature of Oswald's hunting in Russia as well as his usual poor performance with his weapon. CD 344 contains the transcript of a Secret Service interview with Marina recorded Sunday night, November 24, 1963, at the Inn of the Six Flags Motel at Arlington, Texas. This was Marina's first interview conducted while she was in protective custody. When asked about Oswald's membership in the hunting club, she made this response through an interpreter:
While he was a member of this hunting club, he never attended any meetings. He simply had a card that showed his membership. She said Lee enjoyed nature and as a member of the club he was entitled to free transportation in an automobile which enabled him to go out of town.[8] Marina added that Lee owned "a hunting gun" in Russia but "he never used it."
Other information came from Yuri I. Nosenko, a Soviet KGB staff officer who defected in February 1964 and apparently participated in or knew of the KGB investigation of Oswald in Russia. CD 451 contains an interview with Nosenko, but it is currently withheld from research. Liebeler, who saw CD 451 during his Commission work, composed a staff memorandum on March 9, 1964, repeating some of the information obtained from Nosenko. According to the memorandum, "Oswald was an extremely poor shot and it was necessary for persons who accompanied him on hunts to provide him with game."[9]
4. Soon after Oswald returned from the Soviet Union he again went hunting with his brother, Robert, and used a borrowed .22 caliber bolt-action rifle. Robert Oswald is again the source of this information. The hunting trip in question took place at the farm of Robert's in-laws. However, according to Robert, "we did just a very little bit [of hunting]. I believe this was on a Sunday afternoon and we didn't stay out very long" (1H327). 5. After Oswald purchased the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, he told his wife that he practiced with it. Marina Oswald testified that on one occasion she saw him take the rifle, concealed in a raincoat, from the house on Neely Street. Oswald told her he was going to practice with it. Marina Oswald is the source of this above-quoted information. The footnote in the Report refers to 1H14-15; CE 1156, p. 442; CE 1404, pp. 446-48. Marina's progression of statements relevant to Oswald's rifle practice is truly amazing. The Report quotes her incompletely and dishonestly, choosing only those statements which support the belief that Oswald practiced with the Carcano. The following is a chronological listing of Marina's relevant words: 12/3/63, FBI report of interview with Marina: "MARINA said she had never seen OSWALD practice with his rifle or any other firearm and he had never told her that he was going to practice." (22H763) 12/4/63, FBI report of interview with Marina: " She cannot recall ever hearing Oswald state that he was going to fire the rifle in practice or that he had fired it in practice." (22H785) 12/4/63, Secret Service report of interview with Marina: "The reporting agent interviewed Marina Oswald as to whether she knew of any place or of a rifle range where her husband could do some practicing with a rifle, and whether she ever saw her husband taking the rifle out of the house. She said that she never saw Lee going out or coming in to the house with a rifle and that he never mentioned to her doing any practice with a rifle." (23H393) 12/10/63, Secret Service report of interview with Marina: "Marina Oswald was asked if she ever saw her husband doing any dry practice with the rifle either in their apartments or any place else, and she replied in the negative." (23H402) 12/16/63, FBI report of interview with Marina: "She cannot recall that [Oswald] ever practiced firing the rifle either in New Orleans or in Dallas." (22H778) 2/3/64, Marina makes her first appearance before the Commission: Mr. Rankin: Did you learn at any time that he had been practicing with the rifle? Mrs. Oswald: I think he went once or twice. I didn't actually see him take the rifle, but I knew he was practicing. Mr. Rankin: Could you give us a little help on how you knew? Mrs. Oswald: He told me. And he would mention that in passing . . . he would say, "Well, today I will take the rifle along for practice." (1H14-15) 2/17/64, FBI report of interview with Marina: "MARINA advised OSWALD had told her after the WALKER incident that he had practiced with his rifle in a field near Dallas. She said further that in the beginning of January, 1963, at the Neely Street address, he on one occasion was cleaning his rifle and he said he had been practicing that day. [The rifle was not mailed until the end of March 1963.] "MARINA was asked if she had ever seen OSWALD take the rifle from the house and she replied that she had not. She was asked if she had ever known the rifle to have been gone from the house at the same time OSWALD was gone from the house. She replied that she could not recall any such incident. She was then asked if it were true then that she had never seen OSWALD take the rifle from the house nor knew any occasion when he might have had the rifle at a place other than at home. She then admitted that she did know of such an occasion. She said this occasion occurred on an evening in March, 1963. On this evening, she and JUNE [their daughter] and OSWALD left the house at about 6:00 PM. OSWALD had his rifle wrapped up in a raincoat. . . . When OSWALD returned about 9:00 PM, he told her he had practiced with his rifle." (22H197) 2/18/64, FBI report of interview with Marina: "She advised she had been mistaken on February 17, 1964, when she said she had recalled OSWALD cleaning his rifle at Neely Street, at which time he made the statement he had been practicing. She said she is now able to place the date . . . as being shortly before the WALKER incident. . . . At one of the four or five times that she observed OSWALD cleaning his rifle at their home on Neely Street . . . he told her he had been practicing with the rifle but he did not say when he had practiced. On the other occasions of his cleaning the rifle . . . he did not say he had been practicing. MARINA deduced that he might have been practicing with the rifle." (22H785) 6/11/64, Marina again testifies before the Commission: "Lee didn't tell me when he was going out to practice. I only remember one time distinctly that he went out because he took the bus. I don't know if he went to Love Field at that time. I don't -- after all this testimony, after all this testimony, when I was asked did he clean his gun a lot, and I answered yes, I came to the conclusion that he was practicing with his gun because he was cleaning it afterwards." (5H397) Sen. Cooper: Did he ever tell you that he was practicing with a rifle? Mrs. Oswald: Only after I saw him take the gun that one time. (5H398) Thus Marina, until three months after the assassination, denied any knowledge whatsoever of Oswald's rifle practice; he never told her he practiced, and she knew of no practice. When she first appeared before the Commission, her story changed. She suddenly knew of one or two instances when Oswald mentioned he was going to practice, although she never saw him take the rifle from the house. Subsequent to her testimony, she changed her story again. After telling the FBI she saw Oswald clean the rifle before he even ordered it, she "admitted" an incident in which she saw Oswald remove the rifle concealed in a raincoat to practice at night. The following day her memory conveniently improved as she retracted her statement that she had seen Oswald with the rifle as early as January 1963. She added at this time that although Oswald had actually admitted practicing only once, she "deduced" he had practiced other times. This, essentially, was the final version of her story. Marina was an entirely incredible witness. No honest jury could have believed any of her statements; for everything she said, there almost always existed a contradictory statement that she had made earlier. The Commission merely chose her most "juicy" descriptions of rifle practice and cited them, ignoring completely the other statements. The official use of Marina's testimony could best be described in Aldous Huxley's words, "You pays your money and you takes your choice."
The Commission's test firers were all rated as "Master" by the National Rifle Association (NRA); they were experts whose daily routines involved working with and shooting firearms (3H445).
In the tests, three targets were set up at 175, 240, and 365 feet respectively from a 30-foot-high tower. Each shooter fired two series of three shots, using the C2766 rifle. The men took 8.25, 6.75, and 4.60 seconds respectively for the first series and 7.00, 6.45, and 5.15 for the second (3H446). In the first series, each man hit his first and third targets but missed the second. Results varied on the next series, although in all cases but one, two targets were hit. Thus, in only two cases were the Commission's experts able to fire three aimed shots in under 5.6 seconds as Oswald allegedly did. None scored three hits, as was demanded of a lone assassin on November 22.
-archy-/-
Whether you agree with it or not, the HSCA, the official government final finding, found that JFK was assassinated as a result of a conspiracy. There have been no further official investigations----that I am aware of.
The HSCA if a great source of material. It was started by people who believed in a conspiracy. It was run by congressmen and staff that were looking for a conspiracy. They tried to the best scientific analysis they could to answer all the nagging questions. All that material is online too, so you can go see what they found about the 3 tramps, or the backyard pictures. Everyone forgets all these things have already been addressed.
Given all that, they concluded that Oswald fired three shots from the rear and killed Kennedy, just like the Warren Commission had said.
The only major change came at the last minute. The acoustic evidence gave them a reason to find that there was another shooter, who missed. Without the acoustic evidence there would have been NO finding of conspiracy.
The acoustic evidence is false.
I wrote a little essay on that somewhere on FR a while back, giving my own estimation of his motive. The short version is, he was an inadequate person and he had a driving need to compensate for it. He had a deep psychological need to be important. He went through a series of events in his life to try to make himself so, including his defection to the Soviet Union and his adoption of communism. But none of it worked. His frustration combined with his violent tendencies prompted him to resort to shooting at important people, thinking that by such action he would make important changes in the world and therefore be important himself. He shot at General Walker, was prepared to shoot at Nixon, and then one day Kennedy drives right under his window.
Oswald did not have to fire three times in 5.6 seconds. That is a myth. I believe there were other reasons why these particular tests failed, but I'll have to look it up. Whether it was these tests or others, Shooter is right that it is an easy shooting job and that it has been done.
What is supposed to be so hard about it anyway? The target wasn't far away. As someone else pointed out, there was little motion across the field of view, he had plenty of time, and he completely missed one shot out of three.
A total of 7 seconds? For the first shot to start the clock? Try it yourself and tell me that it's such a hard series of shots to do.
They were testing the rifle. They were not testing themselves.
The longest shot was 88 yards.
I just can't buy into that line of thought.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Oswald worked for a company called Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall and it was under contract to the Army's Map Service. In his address book next to the company's listing, Oswald had written the word "micro-dots." My understanding is that micro-dots is information on microfilm so small, it can be placed under a postage stamp. Maybe he was photographing maps. I don't know the answer, but the coincidences are too familiar in this case. There's too many of them, imo.
None of the acoustic studies actually place the shots at specific frames. They came up with a timing and decided how that best fit with the Z-film. There have been differences of opinion on that even amongst people who believe the acoustics. Thomas believes that the alleged knoll shot hit at Z313 while that HSCA thought it missed.
There is nothing that can place the impulses at the right time. On the contrary, there are a lot of indicators (sirens, engine speed, background) that indicate the impulses don't happen at the right time or that the mic wasn't in Dealey Plaza at all.
The National Academy of Sciences panel that looked at this after the HSCA found proof that the impulses had to have happened after the assassination took place. They did this by using crosstalk, background voices from the other radio channel, that got picked up faintly by the open mic.
Thomas presented arguments to try to explain the timing problem, but his arguments were based on faulty data and have been refuted.
What were the impulses? I am working on that. It would be premature to get into it now. I believe there is a simple explanation for them. There are other similar patterns where nobody claims there are shots, and there are other causes that make patterns like the ones they were examining for echoes.
The only "magic bullet" that exists is the one that you created that was supposed to come from the Grassy Knoll.
If anyone had shot from the Grassy Knoll, Zapruder would have heard it come from there. He did not.
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