Posted on 03/27/2024 8:53:14 PM PDT by bitt
so we can’t even protect our country...
Because Biden ordered DHS to stop doing its job, that makes it OK? Chinese cartels control marijuana farms in Oklahoma.
Some people just want to see the world burn. Most of them are Democrats.
Fascinating. I knew the Chinese cartels were embedding in other states - but I hadn't heard about Oklahoma.
… No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.That clause is clearly written for emergencies in which there is no time to wait for an, at framing, distant, federal government to declare it's an invasion. No other interpretation fits the plain original intent of the text. The states were left with the power to so declare and act on their own. By separation of powers this explicit exception falls under the individual sovereign states, not the Federal Congress—and its inferior court creations. Gov. Abbott should declare Fed courts, at least short of SCOTUS, have no jurisdiction to overrule Texas, and that as the matter, in the governing opinion of Texas, "will not admit of delay" that Texas will also not accept any Federal judicial delays, at least not short of SCOTUS.
Now if Biden wants to to appeal to SCOTUS, Texas AG Ken Paxton should argue there that not only is Texas clearly acting constitutionally, but also that the Federal Government, specifically President Biden, is acting not only unconstitutionally, in violation of the responsibilities he accepted with his Oath of office. AND that these officially declared invaders of Texas deserve to be considered both as its "enemies" and by extension under the Full Faith and Credit Clause as "enemies of the United STATES." And that by "adhering to [these] enemies, giving them aid and comfort" Joe Biden has committed Treason as defined by Article III §3. Thus AG Paxton should ask SCOTUS to order all appropriate employees of the Executive Branch to cease and desist such behavior, resume normal enforcement of the laws as written, and for SCOTUS to refer Joe Biden to Congress for Impeachment and Removal on grounds of Treason.
> two to one decision - Smirking Chimp stooge Priscilla Richman and Biden stooge Irma Carrillo Ramirez, with Trump judge Andrew S. Oldham dissenting.
Richman attended Baylor, wondering what is up with her (besides the supposedly obvious).
Supporting this interpretation is the writings of James Madison in Federalist #43 on the subject of Article IV Section 4 "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence."
The republican form of government and protection from from invasion was for the fear of larger states invading smaller states and expecting neighboring states to band together to repel the invasion. It had nothing to do with the federal government protecting the border; the states were expected to protect each other's borders.
From Federalist #43 (James Madison):
6. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the Constitution?
Madison sets up the argument by pointing out that the several states are of like disposition. A "superintending government" (the federal government, in this case) is the natural home for the authority to defend the system (republicanism). The more alike the states are, the more interested the states will become in each other's affairs, and the more desirable it will be for each state to maintain its form of government in harmony with the others.
Madison then gives a brief history lesson of past confederacies of dissimilar city-states.
Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate republic of Germany,'' says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes, experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland. '' "Greece was undone,'' he adds, "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons.'' In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form, of the new confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves.
Madison goes on to say that the federal government is not expected to enforce republicanism onto the states, it is enough to simply "guaranty" to the states a republican form of government, and the states will take care of enforcing it on each other.
These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, bound to pursue the authority.But the authority extends no further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.
This is how Madison disposes of the word "guarantee" in Article IV -- it is limited to the federal government issuing the guaranty to the states, but not enforcing it onto the states from above. The states were expected to police themselves based on their mutual common alignments, unlike how the "free cities and petty states, subject to different princes" of Europe behaved.
Regarding invasion, Madison expresses the fear that larger states will invade smaller states, but the other states will intervene to keep the peace.
A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its more powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and modern confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article. Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded;
Regarding insurrection, Madison writes that the federal government must support the state governments to quell insurrections because the federal and state constitutions are too interwoven to let domestic violence go unchecked. Madison thinks that the threat of federal involvement is sufficient to prevent an insurrection from starting.:
Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.
Madison writes about the fear of foreign influence in a state (an invasion of aliens) fomenting violence amongst the citizens, but that the remedy is the federal government organizing the neutral states to intervene on behalf of the rest of the nation.
...May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves. In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection of friends...and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which no possible constitution can provide a cure. Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound."
We have to understand that the Framers were less concerned about foreign invasion than they were about one state invading another state. Madison discusses protection from invasion and protection from domestic violence as the same issue from a federal perspective.
...the history of [the Swiss cantons] informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded...Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State...
there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other.
Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government.
It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest.
Madison then suggests that it is the neighboring states that should be the active bodies that quell domestic violence, not the federal government.
In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection of friends.
Finally, Madison summarizes the entirety of Federalist #43 with this plea to the states: that the obligations between states is more than just legislative ratification of a compact between states (like the Articles of Confederation). The several states can no longer take a breach of the Articles as an excuse to break the compact. the time has come to put effort into keeping the compact intact by mutually working to protect it.
PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictate.
Madison's point to Article IV Section 4 is this: The federal government doesn't have to act directly, it can empower the states to mutually act on its behalf to protect against invasion. This was the expected intent of the federal government. Things have become so twisted that the federal government is now DEMANDING that states stand down while it refuses to act, when it was the Framers' intent that the states would act on behalf of the federal government to protect against invasion, externally or internally.
I'll add this one postscript...
This is all pre-17th amendment thinking. When the Framers referred to the federal government, they were envisioning a federal government that was being managed by a Senate of the states.
It was the role of the governors of the several states to lead the people of their states.
It was the role of the federal Executive to manage the relationships between the states, to be the voice of the nation in foreign relations with other countries, and to be the commander-in-chief of the military during armed conflicts.
The President's constituents were the governors, not the people. The states were the sovereign governments closest to the people. That's why the Senate was designed to be appointed by their respective state legislatures: 1) to confirm the President's nominations for executive branch offices and judicial picks, and 2) to ratify treaties that the President negotiated with foreign governments.
It was the several states, through the Senate, that were supposed to "lead" the President, not the other way around. This is why Article IV Section 4 says "and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)..." The states were expected to communicate to their Senators to convey to the President what the states were going to do. They were not asking the President for permission, they were informing the President of their intended actions... actions like preventing invasions across their own sovereign borders.
-PJ
2. "...No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal councils. It is needless, therefore, to remark further on this head, than that the manner in which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at once to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in providing for the conveniency of their imports and exports, and to the United States a reasonable check against the abuse of this discretion. The remaining particulars of this clause fall within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark.Madison believed that giving the states the right to defend themselves from invasion had been so thoroughly discussed previously (see Federalist #43) that it wasn't worth repeating it within the discussion of Article I Section 10 Clause 3.
-PJ
it helps to see the state and federal govts as legal entities, as everything in our legal system is.
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as an entity, stategov has the right to self defense. while stategov did entrust fedgov with protecting stategov and its friends, the other stategovs, this does not mean stategov would just roll over and take a beating if fedgov was not available to render the protection. stategov would still put up a fight to defend itself whenever stategov felt threatened.
of course, if fedgov ALLOWED harm to befall stategov, stategov definitely would have the right to seek damages and require fedgov to own up to it’s contract. if fedgov does not adhere to the protection contract, stategov would be fully within its rights to drop fedgov as the protector, remove the equipment and funds provided to fedgov by the stategovs, and find an alternative solution.
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keep in mind, when fedgov spent taxpayer dollars to send men and machines to the border to drag the illegals around the US, they were actively participating in human trafficking, drug trafficking, and child sex trafficking.
also, when they flew 330,000+ illegals from south America to various locations in the US, they were again breaking immigration law and participating in human/child sex trafficking.
Huckleberries
And if Deep State tells Texas that it will yank all federal funding to Texas unless Texas knuckles under...?
Texas is a red state in name only.
It hasn’t secured its elections or its budget from Deep State.
Because SCOTUS only ruled “until the Federal court made its ruling”. It was temporary.
The Supreme Court’s ruling was temporary “until the Appeals court made their ruling”.
I hope this goes to the SCOTUS for a final decision (who knows how they’ll rule).
Federal control of immigration is only a thing when Trump isn’t the one doing it.
This kind of ruling could put sanctuary city status on the chopping block.
Texas should just call it an insurrection. It’s the trendy thing to do these days.
EC
Don’t arrest them. Process them. Give them two days food and transportation to New York, Chicago, and similar Democrat-run places.
The Appeals court needs to take judicial notice of that invasion.The fact that they fail in that is a dereliction of their Constitutional duties which may indeed lead to civil war, or war Between Texas and Mexico.
Do you know how much the TNG is tempted to open up with crew served weapons on the heavily armed cartels who are staging their paramilitary operations of smuggling sex slaves and fenthanyl just across the Rio Grande? I think Abbott has been lenient in not ordering a response using a few dozen MA-Deuce 50 cals.If he did perhaps the courts would take judicial notice of the invasion.
It is my thought that the SCOTUS punted to think about the issue of State’s Rights. Rather than issue a narrow ruling the court seems to have decided to bck off and consider a wider ruling on States Rights.
We’ll see
New York City to Give Migrant Families Debit Cards for Food, Baby Supplies
Here is the concern. One might think that NY would go broke, but
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