Posted on 11/21/2023 2:56:52 PM PST by george76
Two private planes collided on the runway of a Houston airport early last week. Luckily, no one was seriously injured, and the ultimate nightmare scenario of a midair collision did not transpire. Investigators are still looking into the incident, though early reports suggest the air traffic controllers were responsible.
...
“We just had a midair,” the pilot of the Hawker is heard saying in an audio recording posted on LiveATC.net, which shares live and archived recordings of air traffic control radio transmissions.
Someone in the control tower responds by saying, “Say what?”
“You guys cleared somebody to take off or land, and we hit them on a departure,” the Hawker pilot says.
The recent accident in Houston is just the latest noteworthy instance in what a major New York Times investigation this summer determined to be “an alarming pattern of safety lapses and near misses in the skies and on the runways in the USA.” According to internal records of the Federal Aviation Agency, the Times reported that these safety lapses and near misses occurred as a “result of human error.” The Times report further revealed that “runway incursions” of the sort described above have nearly doubled, from 987 to 1732, despite the widespread proliferation of advanced technologies.
A follow-up report by the Times revealed that Austin’s airport alone has experienced so many close calls as a result of air traffic controller error that a pilot proclaimed, “They’re trying to kill us in Austin.” One such incident involved an air traffic controller clearing a FedEx cargo plane to land on a runway just as a Southwest Airlines jet was set to take off on the same runway. The air traffic controller in question said the Southwest jet would take off before the FedEx plane got too close, though the two planes ended up just seconds from colliding, with the FedEx plane skimming less than 100 feet over the Southwest jet, whose 128 passengers had no clue how narrowly they just escaped death.
...
Despite the remarkable lack of transparency with respect to such near misses and the air traffic controllers behind them, the Times was able to identify the controller behind this incident as one Damian Campbell, a “Navy veteran and self-published poet.” According to the report, even fellow air traffic controllers were “baffled” by Campbell’s actions. Still more baffling is the fact that Campbell is apparently back on the job. FAA’s policy is not to take disciplinary action against a controller unless he or she is guilty of “gross negligence” or illegal activity.
The Times report does not provide a picture of Mr. Campbell. Such is the extreme reluctance to show an image of Mr. Campbell that the only reference we could find is from a Twitter user who posted a screenshot of the LinkedIn profile of one Damian Campbell who works as an air traffic controller in Austin, Texas. The LinkedIn link has since been scrubbed:
...
Notice that, apart from being a Damian Campbell in Austin, Texas, who works as an air traffic controller, the brief bio above mentions service in the military, which would match the Times’ description of Campbell as a Navy veteran. It is also noteworthy, though not dispositive, that there is a self-published book of poems by a Damian Campbell titled “Soul of a Fatherless Child.” The Damian Campbell referred to in the Times report is also a “self-published poet.”
The case of Damian Campbell and the near-collision incident in Austin, together with numerous other such incidents, raise troubling questions that deserve further scrutiny. Revolver News conducted an investigation into the matter in considerable depth. We spoke with several air traffic and FAA personnel, most of whom insisted on staying anonymous and off the record.
While the disturbing decline in aviation safety is complex and multifaceted, we identified two major contributing factors that have received scant media attention. The first such factor is the likely contribution of disastrous COVID-era policies to the staffing shortage of many air traffic control rooms. The second factor is that aggressive affirmative action policies implemented during the Obama administration have resulted in a catastrophic collapse in the quality of controllers. In short, COVID policies have gutted the quantity of air traffic controllers, and diversity policies have gutted the quality of air traffic controllers, creating unprecedented danger for the aviation industry.
The implications of these findings reach far beyond the scope of aviation, as important as this industry is. Rather, the collapse of the aviation industry must be understood in the context of a broader collapse in our ability to maintain the infrastructure of a First World society. This is a major and significant trend that we highlighted years ago in our coverage of the repeated failures of Texas’ electric power grid.
...
The mess with the Texas power grid is only the beginning. In the years to come, American infrastructure will fail more and more often, as America becomes less capable of maintaining the core elements of a First World country.
...
At its bedrock, infrastructure is substantially just people: a population of workers with the expertise and experience to keep a complex system functional, reliable, and accident-free. Decline in this infrastructure — the human infrastructure — may be papered over with improved technology and automation. But when problems do arise, it is impossible to miss the decay.
...
The extensive treatment of the aviation industry that follows builds upon the groundwork described above and represents another entry into a multiple-part series chronicling in detail the collapse of America’s ability to maintain the infrastructure of complex systems.
Safety Concern or Illusion? Loss of Separation, Near Misses, and the Fog of Propaganda..
According to the FAA, a Near Midair Collision (NMAC) occurs when two aircraft are within 500 feet of one another. Commercial flights travel up to 575 mph. In the most extreme case, if two planes with 500 feet in between are flying in opposite directions, they will come into contact within 0.29 seconds—the same amount of time as a blink of an eye. Most near misses do not happen midair but closer to the ground when planes takeoff and land. These are less terrifying in the imagination than midair collisions, but just as fatal to the passengers when they occur. Close calls of this variety are called Runway Incursions, which occur when two planes are too close to each other, or when one plane is landing on the same strip where another plane is taking off, or when someone or something is on the tarmac, which is considered an interference. As mentioned above, from 2002 to 2022, Runway Incursions increased from 987 to 1732 in spite of advanced technologies becoming more available.
The close call metric for midair events is known as a Loss of Separation, which, set by the International Civil Aviation Organization, is defined as a loss of the minimum horizontal and/or vertical distance between two planes in flight. An aircraft is meant to have at least 15 minutes or 3 nautical miles between itself and a plane ahead or behind; there must be a 1,000-foot gap between an aircraft and another above or below. Of course, different flight paths and angles change the calculation, and bad weather such as turbulence should increase the minimum.
Interestingly, the Loss of Separation metric is frequently used to dismiss any media attention to “close calls” as pure fear mongering. A particular interpretation of Loss of Separation events is in fact one of the four common ways the FAA, federal PR spokespeople, and other mendacious actors shrug off the concern that air travel is becoming more dangerous.
The four ways are:
(1) Loss of Separation. A common refrain is the fact that if two planes are only 2.99 miles apart in their longitudinal path and not 3 miles apart, it will qualify as an incident. In online forums, there are countless examples of pilots assuaging the fears of anxious flyers with this least-dangerous example. This could be for many reasons: pilots might want to quell irrational fears about flying; practitioners in the industry might be tired of mainstream media exaggerating minor incidents, such that they feel compelled to overcorrect; or, because these online forums are highly visited, it would be the least surprising if these pilots-cum-posters are official public relations representatives.
(2) Technology. Another diversionary tactic is to reference the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). This technology detects other aircraft through antennae on all planes. It creates a three-dimensional safety bubble around the plane in flight, alerts the pilots to intruders, and advises the pilot to make specific, often drastic, maneuvers. Any intruder appears on a screen, which has a similar appearance to a radar display. It’s something that has saved many pilots from lethal accidents. However, after a collision is narrowly avoided, many media relations experts will hail the success of TCAS and diminish anyone expressing concern.
This line of reasoning has been internalized by some pilots and ATCs. Furthermore, several senior ATCs our investigative team talked to noted that the reliance on TCAS and other helpful technologies has allowed ATCs with poor memory and insufficient skills to seem capable. They compare what’s happened to ATCs with the “Google Effect,” whereby people refuse to learn necessary information because they can simply look it up. This may be trivial for day-to-day work, but it is existential for air safety.
(3) Relative numbers. Many are prone to dismiss the increased number of near-collisions over the past decade on the assumption that there has also been an increase in flights from year to year. But is that true? According to data collected by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, no. In 2002, there were 9.1 million flights by U.S. and foreign carriers landing in America. The total number of flights fluctuated between 9 and 11 million from then until 2020. In 2020, the number dropped to about half: 5.7 million. In 2022, there were 8.7 million flights. It turns out that we are indeed seeing far more close-call incidents, despite better technology, and despite the same or a lesser number of flights.
(4) Fatalities. The USA hasn’t seen a fatal airplane accident since 2009, when 49 passengers were killed. This is admittedly a compelling statistic. The worst thing we could do, however, is to use this tremendous record as an excuse for negligence or indifference to a genuinely dangerous trend that could prove catastrophic. Since 2009, there have been over 300 near-collisions, which is more than double the previous decade. Just a decade ago, there were also headlines such as this one: “Tarmac trouble: U.S runway close calls soar.” Obviously, things have become not better but worse.
Though it’s relatively easy to see who’s acting in bad faith, it’s very hard to understand the exact magnitude of the problem. On the one hand, very little information is publicly available. Most close-call incidents are recorded by voluntary submission, so it’s very hard to know the precise numbers (and many ATCs our investigative team spoke with wanted to remain off the record out of fear of losing their job; the clear incentive is to keep these incidents discreet).
Without exception, the agencies in charge of air safety have abdicated their commitment to transparency. In response to our request for very basic information, the FAA refused to comment. Instead, their Public Relations Specialist, Crystal Essiaw, evaded all questions with the added sass that’s typical of American administrators who naturally comport themselves with a manifestly unearned air of superiority despite typically possessing an IQ between 85 and 90. While federal agencies generate PR to make everything seem safe, legacy media, on the other hand, tends to sensationalize, stoke fear, and encourage hysteria.
...
Understaffing.
....
Many factors since then have contributed to understaffing.
...
Whenever there is a shutdown, the Federal Aviation Administration must stop all controller hiring and training. That leads to staffing shortfalls as controllers age out or retire and no new controllers come in behind them. To make matters worse, the controller workforce must continue to provide services but do not receive pay during the shutdown. This significantly impacts morale over time and may cause controllers to retire when they may have worked a few more years.
Second, during the height of the COVID pandemic, the FAA stopped all hiring and training to mitigate the risk of spreading the virus amongst the active controller workforce. The hiring process restarted last year when the vaccines were widely available. Also, retirement increased during the pandemic.
Combined, these two factors lead to today’s staffing shortages. It takes 3-5 years to hire and train a new controller.
...
Whatever one thinks about COVID and the vaccine, the question of how many people quit their jobs when it became a requirement is a simple math question.
...
a spokesman for American Airlines admitted to NPR that 40% of pilots were holding off from the vaccine because of concerns over long-term effects. Southwest informing its pilots about mandated vaccines just so happened to coincide with about 2,000 flight cancellations
...
Decline in Competency
The aggressive substitution of merit in favor of diversity has led to a so-called competency crisis, jeopardizing not only our ability to generate innovative technology but, in a more dire sense, our ability to simply maintain the proper functioning of various complex systems vital to our existence as a first-world civilization
...
Very simply, adverse impact is eliminated by deleting response options from the key that demonstrate differential criterion prediction across protected groups (e.g., race, gender).” Or, in other words, the way to remove differences is to remove the questions that led to them. It’s essentially creating a test that doesn’t test for anything.
And here we have the money shot:
As the workforce continues to become more diverse, organizations are more likely to face tradeoffs between maximizing validity versus maximizing organizational diversity. The continued concern that cognitive ability tests unfairly screen out minorities from selection consideration (Gottfredson, 1986) coupled with increasing workforce diversity has made alternative prediction techniques with less adverse impact, such as biodata, more attractive.
Again, in other words, the fact that bio-data tests sacrifice validity in favor of increasing diversity is a feature, not a bug. In 2013, these reports and their suggestions culminated in the Obama administration’s decision to force the FAA to abandon its Air Traffic Collegiate Training Initiative (AT-CTI) schools, which used clinically verified aptitude tests to admit and train ATCs.
I NEVER want “DEI” Persons to :
Be my brain surgeon
BE my back surgeon
BE my aircraft pilot
Be my Air Traffic Controller
Be my train engineer
Be my bus driver
Be my auto mechanic
Be my HVAC service person
ETC ETC ETC
The author of the article is generally correct about staffing and training of air traffic controllers. But the opening statement about the collision at Houston Hobby between a Hawker and a Citation was NOT controller error. It was pilot error.
Auburn Calloway was the sterling example of an affirmative action pilot. He illuminated and proved the effectiveness and actions of the 9-11 Terrorists.
Thank you.
But diversity is our strength.../s
It all depends on the individual.
One of my best friends, who happens to be black, retired a few years ago after 30 years of flying heavies.
About 10 years ago, in conversation with him, I asked if he had ever experienced any form of emergency, mechanical failure, or otherwise.
He said, no, never, not even a close call of any kind. He went on to say that if everyone did their jobs and paid attention to detail, there should be few, if any emergencies. He is VERY detail oriented about everything.
He flew C-141s in the USAF and got his civilian multi engine Jet license in 1974.
He was REALLY pissed when an airline hired him with no interview, the only time I've ever heard him use the "N" word.
He said he wanted to be hired because of his knowledge and ability, not to be their token "N".
I never had any qualms about getting on a plane he was piloting.
Knowing the present situation though, he has voiced the same concerns the article brings up and you mentioned and is glad to be retired.
The "Revolver" article is dismissing some real concerns about air traffic control. For example, Revolver refers to this NY Times article for information about the Austin airport incident, but it ignores much of what the NY Times pointed out: That the Austin airport doesn't use ground radar, so some ATCs have been using "a free version of the website FlightRadar24.com to help keep track of planes on the ground, even though the site is not approved by the F.A.A. for air traffic control purposes." That the fog was heavy that day. That ATCs there say they're understaffed, exhausted, working overtime, and the working conditions put safety in jeopardy. The ATC who made the mistake had a decade of experience, but he was working overtime that day. A few months later, another ATC made a mistake at the same airport because he said he was fatigued. All those factors create a risky situation.
The real problem seems to be not enough ATCs. They earn six figures and retire by 56, but the job is stressful. It's open to Americans age 30 or younger to start. Maybe the maximum age of 30 should be raised. What's so magical about 30, anyway? Why is 31, 32, or 33 too old to start? The government is considering raising the ATC retirement age because of understaffing. Why not raise the entry-level age?
AI will soon replace humans for most ATC, due in part to the high cost of affirmative action government clock punchers with power tripping bureaucratic attitude. Current AI can already handle the speech part, and could learn the rest of the trade in 4 hours. This can be rolled out to small, uncontrolled airports first. It’s even possible to have a second layer of peer to peer AI powered ATC for backup.
Why would you want to put AI control at an uncontrolled field, which by definition has no ATC controller? Auto-ATIS and reported traffic like some FBOs do on unicoms?
I am very skeptical that AI is the solution. Just off the top of my head, how about planes taxiing in fog and communication errors. Where do you go to get that dataset of experience to pour in in four hours?
AI might be able to have helped with the fog related collision scenario and the miscommunication scenario (Houston story) iff you had more sensors (such as the ground radar), and technical improvement to pilot-ATC communication. (all instructions echoed on a screen to eliminated “what was that”, “what did he say”.) and all the sensors and comm gear always was working.
Aviation is only so safe as it has been in America because it was a lifelong calling and discipline. Trying to make it a great job for people who didn’t feel the calling is the mistake. Humans make the most reliable system under real world failure scenarios. Rickover demonstrated that.
I predict getting rid of the human controller will really require getting rid of the human pilot as we know it.
The big reason for AI is distributed and diluted responsibility, opaque algorithm/rules, and plausible deniability. Secondary reasons, easier and cheaper for a reduced level of quality. And those are the features, not the bugs.
Now add DEI pilots to the mix. The aviation commissioner (who is black) was questioned by congress about his knowledge of the agency and its workings as it pertains to aviation and he knew nothing about aviation or its workings but you can bet he knew a lot about DEI. JUST ONE MORE WAY OF KILLING AMERICANS AND THIER FAMILIES
.
Everything ATC is already recorded, which is enough for AI to learn from. ATC is an ideal project for AI in that there are no moving parts, no physical robots needed, just digital inputs and outputs. Years ago, Google's AI AlphaZero self-learned chess from nothing to grand master in 4 hours. No human can beat it.
Small airports are uncontrolled because their activity isn't enough to justify the high expense of a roster of government clock punchers. AI will get that cost down to about one month's pay of one pension chaser. Safety will improve, and small airports will become training for pilots to get acquainted with the same Bitching Betty at big airports.
The people in ATC with a true passion for it will still have jobs building out AI for the whole world to use. There's still plenty of important work for the masters. AI is just a force multiplier.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.