https://www.julesduhamel.com/central-sahel-map-of-jihadist-militant-groups-activity-jan-may-2024/
Posted on 07/26/2023 4:51:53 AM PDT by AdmSmith
Access to the residence and offices of Niger President Mohamed Bazoum was blocked off Wednesday by members of the elite Presidential Guard, a source close to Bazoum said, although the reason was unclear. Access to the residence and offices of Niger President Mohamed Bazoum was blocked off Wednesday by members of the elite Presidential Guard.
The landlocked West African state is one of the most unstable nations in the world, experiencing four coups since independence from France in 1960 as well as numerous other attempts on power.
The country is struggling with two jihadist campaigns -- one in the southwest, which swept in from neighbouring Mali in 2015, and the other in the southeast, involving jihadists based in northeastern Nigeria.
Africa has a long history of Western military interventions and security engagement aiming at stabilization and countering security threats. Few of these have had lasting benefits for local populations. In the Sahel, Western security assistance has in general garnered limited returns on investment. Even if it has improved capacities at the tactical or operational level (impacts that are hard to measure), its systemic impact has contributed to coup-making and popular anger at the Western backers of regional governments.
This alone should induce caution about expanding security assistance efforts elsewhere in the region. This is especially the case with costly outlays such as the construction of major bases or permanent troop deployments. There is perhaps no way to meaningfully provide security assistance without empowering precisely those military and other state actors responsible for exacerbating regional insurgencies through human rights abuses, corruption, and massacres. Furthermore, it is not possible to train partner militaries to not launch coups.
https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/why-washington-failed-in-niger/
Orano said it has been excluded from the Imouraren mine in northern Niger which sits on an estimated 200,000 tonnes of the metal. Orano said it was “prepared to keep open all channels of communication with the Niger authorities on this subject, while reserving the right to contest the decision to withdraw the mining licence in the national or international courts”.
The company added that mine infrastructure had reopened from June 4 and dozens of people were involved “to make progress with the work”. It said Imouraren would eventually provide jobs for 800 people on the project, including subcontractors.
The French firm has been present in Niger since 1971. A uranium mine at Arkokan has been closed since 2021 but Orano runs another uranium mine in the northern region of Arlit despite what it calls “logistical” difficulties.
Niger in 2022 accounted for about a quarter of the natural uranium supplied to European nuclear power plants, according to data from the atomic organisation Euratom. Kazakhstan is Europe's main supplier, ahead of Niger and then Canada.
The junta vowed to review foreign mining concessions in the country after it took power in July last year. The military rulers have also turned against France, ordering out French troops based in the country and increasing criticism of the former colonial power. Niger has increasingly turned to Russia and Iran for support.
Chinese, Australian, US, British, Italian, Canadian, Russian and Indian firms have secured uranium mining licenses in recent years. In 2022 there were 31 prospecting permits and 11 mining licences.
The Azelik mining company, majority held by Chinese interests, is increasingly taking over uranium mining in the north of the country that have been suspended for the past decade because of poor profitability.
The junta in the capital, Niamey, has recently denied such reports as US-produced “fake news,” but few would be surprised if the uranium shipments Tehran has been expecting for years were to arrive in Iran soon.
The risk becomes even greater when one considers the advanced agreements between the coup plotters in Niger and Russia, according to which the Russian nuclear giant Rosatom is to take over the management of Niger's uranium capacities from the French operators.
Rosatom, a Russian state nuclear company, has been trying to take over the management of Niger's uranium facilities, although the French owner Orano stated that it knows nothing about the deals and is continuing its activities in Niger.
However, the junta in Niamey has shown great affection for Moscow since the coup last July, and the deal with Rosatom would only be a logical continuation of the shift that resulted from the military coup.
Although Niger, the world's seventh-largest uranium producer with about 4–5% of the world's reserves, cannot significantly disrupt global supply, its accelerated slide into secret deals with rogue regimes is cause for concern.
https://tomorrowsaffairs.com/the-uranium-triangle-between-niger-iran-and-russiaa-cause-for-concern
After the French and American troops who have already left the country, it is the turn of the the German soldiers to exit. The Germany’s air base in Niamey will no longer be operational after 31 August 2024
The Bundeswehr, the German army, is planning an orderly withdrawal of the forty or so troops deployed in Niger.
The media explained that the decision to withdraw follows the failure of negotiations between Niger and Germany to keep the air base in operation. Niamey is said to have subjected any extension to demands deemed unacceptable by Berlin.
“Indeed, the military in power would like a defence and security agreement, without any mention of security guarantees for the troops stationed at Niamey airport, or the guarantee of uncomplicated authorisation for aircraft to take off and land,” our DW colleagues explained. The Niger side is also demanding an “equal partnership,” with the German army training Nigerien soldiers and even supplying arms to the Nigerien army.
https://apanews.net/german-troops-leaving-niger/
https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Niger-government-withdraws-GoviEx-mining-rights
24JUN2024
Paladin acquires Fission, creating multi-asset uranium company
Australia-headquartered Paladin Energy Limited is to acquire Canadian uranium project developer Fission Uranium Corp in a transaction the companies say will create a “globally significant uranium company” listed on Australian and Canadian stock exchanges and will help advance Fission's Patterson Lake South project towards production.
https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Paladin-acquires-Fission-creating-multi-asset-uran
Cameco calculates industry average prices from the month-end prices published by UxC and TradeTech. Long-term prices prior to May 2004 are not industry-averages, but are from TradeTech only.
The new confederation will likely create more opportunities for the juntas to continue coordinating diplomatic efforts and strengthening ties with like-minded non-Western partners. All three AES regimes have already been broadly coordinating their diplomatic activity by expelling various American, French, and UN partner forces and security assistance in favor of closer cooperation with alternative “sincere partners” since taking power, such as China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey.[41] The junta leaders reaffirmed the need to continue speaking with “one voice” during the summit.[42] The creation of a rotating CES presidency and parliament will help advance this goal. Mali had already directly facilitated cooperation between Russia and the rest of the AES by either hosting meetings between Russian and Burkinabe and Nigerien officials or serving as a base area for Russian officials to travel to the neighboring AES countries.[43]
Russia has been the primary security guarantor of the AES and has used these ties to expand cooperation in nonmilitary sectors. Russia has nearly 2,000 soldiers that are part of the Ministry of Defense–controlled Wagner Group and Africa Corps in Mali, roughly 200 Africa Corps soldiers in Burkina Faso, and at least another 100 Africa Corps soldiers in Niger.[44] The forces in Mali participate in offensive operations, while the Burkinabe and Nigerien contingents are primarily training local forces and protecting the junta heads.[45] Numerous Russian private and state-owned companies have signed several agreements and memorandums of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation, military-technical cooperation, natural resource mining, gold refinery construction, and telecommunications with the AES states since September 2023.
Sanctions against Africa Corps and Wagner Group entities should be fast-tracked to ensure maximum effectiveness. The Treasury Department and other sanctioning financial institutions need the resources and processing capacity to stay a step ahead, not a mile behind.
Finally, U.S. policymakers must understand that policies to counter Russia are distinct from U.S.-Africa policy. The challenges African nations face are enormous, and Russia's overall impact on the continent is negative but limited. U.S. policymakers can have a large and important positive effect by forging economic relationships, supporting democratic regimes without undermining their legitimacy, and providing aid where it is needed. In doing so, they can accelerate the pace at which Moscow's appeal fades. Maintaining an overly militarized status quo undermines nearly all of those priorities and lets Russia set the tenor of U.S. strategy in Africa.
https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-wagner-group-lives-on-in-africa
Heavy losses of mercenaries of the former “Wagner Group” in Mali.
Video https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1817282576395997628
Background
20MAY2023 Russian mercenaries behind slaughter of 500 in Mali village, UN report finds. Report implicates Wagner group fighters in Moura atrocity, including the torture and rape of civilians
Mali’s northern Tuareg rebels said they had killed and injured dozens of soldiers and Wagner mercenaries in two days of fighting near the Algerian border, after the army said it had lost two soldiers but killed some 20 rebels.
The rebel movement, the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD), said in a statement on Saturday that it had seized armoured vehicles, trucks and tankers in the fighting at the border town of Tinzaouaten on Thursday and Friday.
Al-Qaeda in Sahel (JNIM) claims responsibility for the attack on Russian Africa Corps convoy, killing 50 Russians and 10 Mali army soldiers. A photoset of a few corpses for evidence is included
https://x.com/SaladinAlDronni/status/1817317126522450279
If this JNIM claim is true, this ambush is the single largest loss for Russian forces in Mali. Russian propaganda is interesting. If they win a battle, it is credited to the Russian Africa Corps. If the Russians lose, it’s blamed on Wagner (PMC). Either way, the Russians suck.
https://x.com/lhsingapura/status/1817435778663989388
See as well: A rebel coalition in Mali reportedly killed and wounded dozens of Russian servicemen and Wagner Group mercenaries as well as a prominent Wagner-affiliated milblogger on the Mali-Algeria border on July 27
https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=6812#6812 and https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=6813#6813
In the wild, shaky and distristful environment, no way they would leave the ground for the opponent, that would be an enemy if it weren't for Russians and Islamic State.
https://x.com/SaladinAlDronni/status/1817544618159776150
Note: ISIS/Daesh is not the same as JNIM nor CSP although they are Sunnis. All of them are against Shia i.e. Iran and the Houthies.
ISIS Core revenue has been declining, as the group has lost millions of dollars due to pressure from Coalition forces in the Middle East. Law enforcement efforts also have disrupted financial support to ISIS members in Syria and Iraq. As a result of counterterrorism efforts, ISIS Core is unable to meet its financial obligations, particularly payments to family members of deceased and imprisoned ISIS personnel, which probably constitute the groups’ largest expense.
ISIS Core has relied on its regional General Directorate of Provinces (GDP) offices to provide funding and operational guidance to ISIS branches and networks around the world. The GDP's Bilad al-Rafidayn Office in Iraq has financed families and relatives of ISIS prisoners and martyrs; al-Furqan Office is responsible for West Africa and the Sahel; the Dhu al-Nurayn Office oversees North Africa and Sudan; al-Karrar Office covers East, Central, and Southern Africa, and Yemen regions; and Afghanistan-based al-Siddiq Office is responsible for South, Central and Southeast Asia. While ISIS has continued sending funds globally to operationally capable branches, ISIS leaders in Iraq and Syria have increasingly emphasized to their subordinates the importance of fundraising. For example, the ISIS branch in West Africa may have received external support from ISIS leadership, but it probably generates most of its funding—an estimated few hundred thousand dollars per month—from local criminal activities. ISIS-West Africa has extorted local agricultural businesses and fishing operations in Lake Chad, kidnapped and ransomed civilians in Nigeria, and acquired weapons and vehicles, among other valuable items, during militant operations in the region.
Similarly, ISIS-Somalia receives most of its revenue from extorting local businesses—including financial institutions and mobile service providers—and civilians, generating hundreds of thousands of dollars per month. In fact, ISIS-Somalia is one of the most important ISIS franchises in Africa. ISIS-Somalia serves as a hub for disbursing funds and guidance to ISIS branches and networks across the African continent. The January 25, 2023, U.S. military counterterrorism operation in northern Somalia that killed ISIS senior leader and al-Karrar Office official Bilal al-Sudani and other ISIS members disrupted these efforts and represented a setback for ISIS in Africa. Al-Sudani was responsible for fostering the growing presence of ISIS on the continent and for funding the group's operations worldwide, including in Afghanistan. The recovery of numerous devices, including a computer, hard drives, and cell phones, revealed new insights into al-Sudani’s role in managing ISIS funds, procuring weapons, facilitating funds transfers to ISIS affiliates and directing their financial activities. In one example, Bilal al-Sudani sent a letter to ISIS-West Africa with guidance on collecting zakat and distributing spoils. Despite this loss, we anticipate that ISIS networks in Somalia will try to reconstitute, continue generating funds, and provide financial support to ISIS affiliates.
ISIS-Somalia probably transfers a portion of its funds to other ISIS affiliates in Africa, in some cases using hawalas, money services businesses, cash smugglers, and, occasionally, bank accounts. ISIS-Somalia usually spends a few hundred thousand dollars per month on member salaries. In 2022, ISIS-Somalia paid weapons traffickers hundreds of thousands of dollars to procure light arms and explosive materials from Yemen-based suppliers. Additionally, Somaliabased ISIS members and facilitators raise funds through criminal activities, including illegal fishing and black-market smuggling. They sometimes conduct smuggling in collaboration with al-Shabaab, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and regional organized crime groups.
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2023.06.16-Fact-Sheet-on-Countering-ISIS-Financing.pdf
CSP has denied any cooperation with JNIM in these battles. Though CSP has many reasons to officially deny any such coordination, it seems likely that the two sides deconflicted with each other, at the very least, to avoid clashing. At the maximum, the two communicated to drive the retreating Russians into JNIM’s ambush.
Several CSP factions, including the aforementioned HCUA, have long had strong organizational and familial ties with JNIM’s factions in Mali's northern Kidal Region. HCUA was formed as a splinter from the former Ansar Dine, one of JNIM’s constituent groups, which JNIM’s current emir, Iyad Ag Ghaly, founded.
Others, including the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), are openly more antagonistic towards JNIM, as JNIM’s constituent groups previously fought MNLA in 2012 for control over northern Mali.
Factions from the CSP and JNIM also clashed closer to central Mali earlier this year, but the JNIM and other CSP factions still enjoy closer ties in Kidal. This relationship was reinforced by Alghabass Ag Intallah, the leader of HCUA, calling for the CSP to agree to a non-aggression pact with JNIM just a month after that clash.
None of these ties mean the two groups are intrinsically one and the same, as both fight for different causes and ideologies. However, the situation also does not mean they cannot cooperate against what each considers the ‘bigger enemy’—Mali and its Wagner allies. The arrangement benefits both groups, and Al Qaeda specifically permits a ‘big tent’ approach that allows cooperation with non-jihadists when it benefits its goals.
Mali army admits ‘significant’ losses in Wagner battle
Mali’s army has admitted it suffered “significant” losses during two days of fighting involving Tuareg separatist rebels and al-Qaeda-linked militants. It is rare for the military to own up to battlefield disasters and comes a day after its ally, the Russian mercenary Wagner group, said one of its commanders had died in the fighting that took place during a sandstorm. Neither Mali’s military nor Wagner have given figures, but the estimated death toll for Wagner fighters ranges from between 20 and 80.
Wagner estimated the Tuareg and Islamist fighters had combined manpower of more than 1,000 - and that one of two Russian helicopters that went to the aid of the mercenaries and Malian soldiers was downed. JNIM said 50 Russians and 10 Malian soldiers had been killed, although these numbers have not been verified. The extent of the co-ordination between the separatists and Islamists is also unclear.
Tuareg and Arab groups in the north feel ignored by the more prosperous south. Northern Mali is a vast, arid, under-developed and sparsely populated area, which the separatists call Azawad.
The security situation in the whole country remains precarious - and these recent losses for the Russian-backed junta are humiliating. Russia’s defence ministry has been approached for more help by Wagner, but it is unclear whether that will be forthcoming given the war in Ukraine.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cq5xvl1111yo
The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, ECOWAS Commission, Amb Abdel-Fatau Musah, said, “We've got challenges, but collaboration is the best way to go. So that is why we meet here today. And one of the key items on our agenda is the activation of the ECOWAS standby force in its kinetic mode to fight terrorism in our region”.
According to him, we need to fight terrorism. Our region is in immortal danger and you can see terrorism moving from the Sahel to the coastal countries. “In the past few weeks, we've had at least about four or five very powerful attacks in our region, in Niger, in northern Mali, and we've had cross border incursions into the coastal countries of Benin and Togo. So nobody is sort of safe from the terrorist. That is why the committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff have met here to work out modalities for confronting this existential threat that is facing our sub region,” he said.
https://www.arise.tv/tinubu-pledges-ecowas-commitment-to-reintegrating-niger-mali-and-burkina-faso/
Just look at the Sahel Region countries. All of them have radical Islamic insurgencies waging war on their respective secular governments. In Burkina Faso Muslims are 60%. Mali 95%. Niger 99%. Chad 55%. Nigeria 52%. Etc
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
