ISIS Core revenue has been declining, as the group has lost millions of dollars due to pressure from Coalition forces in the Middle East. Law enforcement efforts also have disrupted financial support to ISIS members in Syria and Iraq. As a result of counterterrorism efforts, ISIS Core is unable to meet its financial obligations, particularly payments to family members of deceased and imprisoned ISIS personnel, which probably constitute the groups’ largest expense.
ISIS Core has relied on its regional General Directorate of Provinces (GDP) offices to provide funding and operational guidance to ISIS branches and networks around the world. The GDP's Bilad al-Rafidayn Office in Iraq has financed families and relatives of ISIS prisoners and martyrs; al-Furqan Office is responsible for West Africa and the Sahel; the Dhu al-Nurayn Office oversees North Africa and Sudan; al-Karrar Office covers East, Central, and Southern Africa, and Yemen regions; and Afghanistan-based al-Siddiq Office is responsible for South, Central and Southeast Asia. While ISIS has continued sending funds globally to operationally capable branches, ISIS leaders in Iraq and Syria have increasingly emphasized to their subordinates the importance of fundraising. For example, the ISIS branch in West Africa may have received external support from ISIS leadership, but it probably generates most of its funding—an estimated few hundred thousand dollars per month—from local criminal activities. ISIS-West Africa has extorted local agricultural businesses and fishing operations in Lake Chad, kidnapped and ransomed civilians in Nigeria, and acquired weapons and vehicles, among other valuable items, during militant operations in the region.
Similarly, ISIS-Somalia receives most of its revenue from extorting local businesses—including financial institutions and mobile service providers—and civilians, generating hundreds of thousands of dollars per month. In fact, ISIS-Somalia is one of the most important ISIS franchises in Africa. ISIS-Somalia serves as a hub for disbursing funds and guidance to ISIS branches and networks across the African continent. The January 25, 2023, U.S. military counterterrorism operation in northern Somalia that killed ISIS senior leader and al-Karrar Office official Bilal al-Sudani and other ISIS members disrupted these efforts and represented a setback for ISIS in Africa. Al-Sudani was responsible for fostering the growing presence of ISIS on the continent and for funding the group's operations worldwide, including in Afghanistan. The recovery of numerous devices, including a computer, hard drives, and cell phones, revealed new insights into al-Sudani’s role in managing ISIS funds, procuring weapons, facilitating funds transfers to ISIS affiliates and directing their financial activities. In one example, Bilal al-Sudani sent a letter to ISIS-West Africa with guidance on collecting zakat and distributing spoils. Despite this loss, we anticipate that ISIS networks in Somalia will try to reconstitute, continue generating funds, and provide financial support to ISIS affiliates.
ISIS-Somalia probably transfers a portion of its funds to other ISIS affiliates in Africa, in some cases using hawalas, money services businesses, cash smugglers, and, occasionally, bank accounts. ISIS-Somalia usually spends a few hundred thousand dollars per month on member salaries. In 2022, ISIS-Somalia paid weapons traffickers hundreds of thousands of dollars to procure light arms and explosive materials from Yemen-based suppliers. Additionally, Somaliabased ISIS members and facilitators raise funds through criminal activities, including illegal fishing and black-market smuggling. They sometimes conduct smuggling in collaboration with al-Shabaab, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and regional organized crime groups.
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2023.06.16-Fact-Sheet-on-Countering-ISIS-Financing.pdf
CSP has denied any cooperation with JNIM in these battles. Though CSP has many reasons to officially deny any such coordination, it seems likely that the two sides deconflicted with each other, at the very least, to avoid clashing. At the maximum, the two communicated to drive the retreating Russians into JNIM’s ambush.
Several CSP factions, including the aforementioned HCUA, have long had strong organizational and familial ties with JNIM’s factions in Mali's northern Kidal Region. HCUA was formed as a splinter from the former Ansar Dine, one of JNIM’s constituent groups, which JNIM’s current emir, Iyad Ag Ghaly, founded.
Others, including the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), are openly more antagonistic towards JNIM, as JNIM’s constituent groups previously fought MNLA in 2012 for control over northern Mali.
Factions from the CSP and JNIM also clashed closer to central Mali earlier this year, but the JNIM and other CSP factions still enjoy closer ties in Kidal. This relationship was reinforced by Alghabass Ag Intallah, the leader of HCUA, calling for the CSP to agree to a non-aggression pact with JNIM just a month after that clash.
None of these ties mean the two groups are intrinsically one and the same, as both fight for different causes and ideologies. However, the situation also does not mean they cannot cooperate against what each considers the ‘bigger enemy’—Mali and its Wagner allies. The arrangement benefits both groups, and Al Qaeda specifically permits a ‘big tent’ approach that allows cooperation with non-jihadists when it benefits its goals.