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The central Sahelian juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger established a confederation that deepens their break with ECOWAS and aims to strengthen their domestic and regional credibility. Malian junta leader Assimi Goita, Burkinabe leader Ibrahim Traore, and Nigerien leader Abdirahmane Tchiani signed four documents that established the Confederation of Sahel States (CES), or Confédération des États du Sahel, following their first joint conference.[1] The three leaders held their meeting on July 6, a day before ECOWAS held its own scheduled conference.[2] The three countries had already been working together under the name Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel, AES) since September 2023.[3]

The new confederation will likely create more opportunities for the juntas to continue coordinating diplomatic efforts and strengthening ties with like-minded non-Western partners. All three AES regimes have already been broadly coordinating their diplomatic activity by expelling various American, French, and UN partner forces and security assistance in favor of closer cooperation with alternative “sincere partners” since taking power, such as China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey.[41] The junta leaders reaffirmed the need to continue speaking with “one voice” during the summit.[42] The creation of a rotating CES presidency and parliament will help advance this goal. Mali had already directly facilitated cooperation between Russia and the rest of the AES by either hosting meetings between Russian and Burkinabe and Nigerien officials or serving as a base area for Russian officials to travel to the neighboring AES countries.[43]

Russia has been the primary security guarantor of the AES and has used these ties to expand cooperation in nonmilitary sectors. Russia has nearly 2,000 soldiers that are part of the Ministry of Defense–controlled Wagner Group and Africa Corps in Mali, roughly 200 Africa Corps soldiers in Burkina Faso, and at least another 100 Africa Corps soldiers in Niger.[44] The forces in Mali participate in offensive operations, while the Burkinabe and Nigerien contingents are primarily training local forces and protecting the junta heads.[45] Numerous Russian private and state-owned companies have signed several agreements and memorandums of understanding on civil nuclear cooperation, military-technical cooperation, natural resource mining, gold refinery construction, and telecommunications with the AES states since September 2023.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-july-11-2024-sahelian-juntas-vs-ecowas-us-base-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire

21JUL2024
Chad might be the next target for the Africa Corps, due to either Kremlin-sponsored regime changes or increasing shared interests. The Kremlin has likely contributed to two separate plots to install new leadership in N'Djamena. The first occurred when Libyan-based militants, allegedly trained by the Wagner Group, killed Idriss Déby Itno in a battle in 2021. Then, last year, U.S. intelligence sources uncovered a plot by Wagner to offer Chadian rebel groups material and operational aid in their attempts to overthrow Mahamat Idriss Déby, Idriss’s son and the recently elected president. This subversion makes a possible alliance between Mahamat Déby and the Kremlin less likely, but domestic pressure and external factors, particularly the Sudanese civil war and both parties’ complex interests in Sudan, may be pushing Déby toward Russia. A group of 30 Russian nationals and 600 vehicles reportedly transited Chad to Sudan in support of the Rapid Support Forces currently fighting the Sudanese government, raising complaints from the government in Khartoum. Then, in late May 2024, Chad and the CAR began conducting joint operations on the CAR’s side of the border, with alleged Africa Corps support. Meanwhile, the Chadian military's recent disagreement with Washington over a status of forces agreement led the United States to withdraw an undisclosed number of special operations forces from Chad. Now that Déby has secured an election victory, he might not face the same internal pressure to ally with Russia that he did previously, but the continuing conflicts along Chad's borders—including in Libya, Sudan, and the CAR—will drive Chadian security assistance agreements moving forward.

Sanctions against Africa Corps and Wagner Group entities should be fast-tracked to ensure maximum effectiveness. The Treasury Department and other sanctioning financial institutions need the resources and processing capacity to stay a step ahead, not a mile behind.

Finally, U.S. policymakers must understand that policies to counter Russia are distinct from U.S.-Africa policy. The challenges African nations face are enormous, and Russia's overall impact on the continent is negative but limited. U.S. policymakers can have a large and important positive effect by forging economic relationships, supporting democratic regimes without undermining their legitimacy, and providing aid where it is needed. In doing so, they can accelerate the pace at which Moscow's appeal fades. Maintaining an overly militarized status quo undermines nearly all of those priorities and lets Russia set the tenor of U.S. strategy in Africa.

https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-wagner-group-lives-on-in-africa