Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Addendum The Guardian Council approved six candidates to participate in the June 28 Iranian presidential elections.[9]

CTP-ISW will publish additional analysis on the approval of these candidates on June 10. These candidates include Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Raisi administration Vice President and Martyrs and Veteran Affairs Foundation Head Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh, Supreme National Security Council Supreme Leader Representative Saeed Jalili, Parliamentarian Masoud Pezeshkian, former prosecutor and Interior Minister Mostafa Pourmohammadi, and Tehran Mayor Ali Reza Zakani. Pezeshkian is the only reformist politician whom the council permitted to run. The Guardian Council notably did not approve prominent moderate politician Ali Larijani--marking Larijani’s second consecutive disqualification--or Vahid Haghanian, a close aide to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[10]

Iran Update, June 10, 2024

The Iranian Guardian Council approved a pool of six candidates that included mostly hardliners for the upcoming 2024 presidential election. The six approved candidates include five hardliners and one reformist on June 9 for the upcoming presidential election.[1] The Iranian regime likely approved the sole reformist candidate to feign political diversity and therefore increase voter participation. Iranian officials have emphasized the need for “competitive” and “participatory” elections.[2] Iran recorded record low voter turnout in its March 2024 parliamentary election, though the real voter turnout was likely even lower than the officially recorded turnout.[3] The Guardian Council approved the following individuals to run for president:

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (Hardliner). Ghalibaf is a hardline politician who has served as Iran's parliament speaker since 2020.[4] Parliamentarians recently re-elected Ghalibaf as parliament speaker on May 28.[5] Ghalibaf is a long-time member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), having served as the IRGC Air Force commander between 1997 and 2000.[6] He is a very well-connected politician who maintains close personal relationships with the highest echelons of the IRGC dating back to the Iran-Iraq War.[7] Ghalibaf also served as Iran's police chief between 2000 and 2005.[8] This marks Ghalibaf’s fourth bid for the presidency.[9]

Saeed Jalili (Hardliner). Jalili is a hardline politician and diplomat who currently serves as a member of the Expediency Discernment Council.[10] Jalili previously served as the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and chief nuclear negotiator from 2007 to 2013.[11] Jalili currently serves as the Supreme Leader's representative to the SNSC.[12] This marks Jalili’s third bid for the presidency.[13]

Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi (Hardliner). Hashemi is a hardline politician who has served as vice president and the head of the Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation in the Raisi administration from 2021 to the present.[14] Hashemi served as a representative for Mashhad in parliament from 2008 to 2021.[15] Hashemi ran for president and lost in 2021.[16]

Ali Reza Zakani (Hardliner). Zakani is a hardline politician who has served as the mayor of Tehran since 2021.[17] The Guardian Council barred Zakani from running in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections.[18] Zakani competed in the 2021 presidential election but ultimately withdrew his candidacy in support of Raisi.[19] Zakani previously headed the Student Basij Organization during the crackdown on student protesters in July 1999.[20]

Mostafa Pour Mohammadi (Hardliner). Pour Mohammadi is a hardline politician and cleric from Qom.[21] Pour Mohammadi served as the Justice Minister under President Hassan Rouhani from 2013 to 2017.[22] Pour Mohammadi notoriously served with former President Ebrahim Raisi on the 1988 “Death Commission,” which approved the executions of thousands of political prisoners.[23]

Masoud Pezeshkian (Reformist): Pezeshkian is the sole reformist politician the Guardian Council permitted to run in the 2024 presidential election. Pezeshkian is an ethnic Azeri who has represented Tabriz, near the Iran-Azerbaijan border, from 2008 to present.[24] Pezeshkian was initially disqualified from running in the 2024 parliamentary elections, but the Guardian Council later permitted him to run. Pezeshkian has criticized the Iranian government over the issue of hijab enforcement.[25] Pezeshkian announced that Mohammad Javad Zarif would serve as his foreign minister should he be elected president.[26]

The candidacy of five Iranian hardliners risks an electoral challenge for the hardline camp, wherein the hardline votes could be split among the five candidates. The hardline camp may split its votes amongst the five hardline candidates, which would benefit the sole reformist candidate.[27] It is likely that some hardline candidates will withdraw from the election to prevent the vote from splitting. The moderate-reformist camp, by comparison, appears relatively united. Reform Front Spokesperson Javad Emam stated on June 8 that reformist politicians would not participate in the upcoming presidential election unless one of their candidates—including Masoud Pezeshkian—was approved.[28] Multiple elements of the reformist camp expressed support for reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian on June 10.[29]

The Guardian Council did not approve the candidacy of some high-profile politicians, including former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and adviser to the supreme leader Vahid Haghanian.[30] The disqualification of Larijani illustrates the increased isolation of the once-prominent Larijani family from the regime.[31] The Guardian Council also disqualified a close aide to supreme leader, Vahid Haghanian.[32] The disqualification of Haghanian illustrates that the regime is going as far as to reject elements of its own government that it has trusted for decades. These disqualifications emphasize the regime's commitment to engineering who will be the next president by limiting the pool of approved candidates.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s advisers have spoken to Western diplomats in recent weeks, possibly to set conditions for the resumption of nuclear negotiations if he becomes president. An Iranian opposition outlet reported on June 10 that Ghalibaf’s advisers have talked to US and European diplomats over the past two weeks, citing an unspecified European diplomat.[33] The advisers have emphasized Ghalibaf’s willingness to “improve Iran's relations with the rest of the world” and to “cleanse” the Iranian regime of “radical elements” during the advisers’ conversations with foreign officials.[34] The advisers have also emphasized that Ghalibaf would play a significant role in stabilizing the Iranian regime following Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s death.[35] Ghalibaf is one of six candidates the Guardian Council approved to compete in the June 28 presidential election.[36] Ghalibaf is a pragmatic hardliner who has previously called for limited political and economic reforms within the framework of the Islamic Republic.[37] Ghalibaf may be trying to signal to Western governments that his administration would be more willing than the hardline Ebrahim Raisi administration to conduct nuclear negotiations and conclude a new nuclear deal.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-10-2024

Iran Update, June 11, 2024

Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian is trying to balance his relatively moderate agenda with his need to maintain the approval of the Iranian supreme leader. Pezeshkian emphasized the Iranian president's subordination to the supreme leader in his first televised interview on June 10, stating that “the general policies of the supreme leader are clear, and any administration that governs must implement [these general policies].”[22] Pezeshkian made these comments in the context of implementing Iran's next five-year development plan. Iran's five-year development plan is a document that outlines Iran's budget and development policies throughout a five-year period. Pezeshkian separately promoted reformist ideas in an interview with a reformist newspaper on June 11, illustrating the precariousness with which Pezeshkian must balance his subordination to the supreme leader and his reformist agenda.[23] Pezeshkian defended Iranians’ right to protest, noting that “all protests stem from injustice. . . you can't take the rights of an individual away and tell them to be quiet” and advocated for a less aggressive veiling enforcement policy. Pezeshkian’s June 10 comments stressing the supreme leader's role in setting Iran's policies are not uncharacteristic of a reformist candidate.

Most—if not all—actors in the Iranian political spectrum are ultimately dedicated to preserving the Islamic Republic and serving its supreme leader. Pezeshkian likely seeks to generate support by discussing popular reforms supported by Iranian youth, including economic engagement with the West and mandatory veiling. Pezeshkian—and any other reformist—must work within the system to implement reforms, all of which would need to be approved by the supreme leader. This means that the reformist camp works from an inherent disadvantage because reforms promised by a presidential candidate will not be implemented unless the reforms have the supreme leader's approval, and he is less likely to grant reformist policies. Hardliners do not have the same restrictions because their policies are more likely to be green lit by the supreme leader.

Voter participation in Iranian presidential elections has significantly decreased in recent years due to decreased political representation and election engineering.[24] It is unclear if Pezeshkian, the sole reformist candidate, will instill greater confidence in the integrity of the regime's electoral system and improve voter turnout. The Guardian Council—the regime entity responsible for vetting and approving presidential candidates—boasted on June 11 that the “unpredictable” list of approved candidates demonstrated the equity with which candidates were reviewed.[25] The council heavily engineered the 2021 presidential elections to favor former President Ebrahim Raisi.[26] It is unlikely that Pezeshkian’s participation in the 2024 elections will repair the damage done by the 2021 election engineering or improve voters’ trust and subsequent participation in the process.

Source: Syracuse University Iran Data Portal, 2009-2021 presidential election voter turnout rates

Presidential candidates are measuring their campaigns against the former Raisi administration. Hardline presidential candidate and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stressed in an interview on June 10 that he would retain Raisi administration officials if he were to win the presidency.[27] Pezeshkian conversely criticized the Raisi administration's economic policy on June 11.[28]

UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported that multiple regime officials worked to disqualify prominent moderate Iranian politician Ali Larijani from the 2021 presidential elections.[29] A June 10 Amwaj Media report cited an Iranian hardline source who said that former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization Chief Hossein Taeb spearheaded efforts to disqualify Larijani in 2021.[30] Taeb maintains close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei.[31] The hardline source told Amwaj Media that unspecified individuals “forced” Larijani’s personal doctor to testify to the Guardian Council that Larijani was physically unfit to be president.[32] Former Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari separately accused Larijani of nepotism.[33] These claims and accusations led the Guardian Council to disqualify Larijani in 2021.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-11-2024

Iran Update, June 12, 2024

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is framing his candidacy in the presidential election around improving the Iranian economy. Ghalibaf has discussed in recent days the need to improve economic conditions in Iran and chose “service and progress” as his campaign slogan.[19] Ghalibaf also emphasized the need to increase production in the automotive, energy and housing industries and advocated against price fixing.[20] Ghalibaf affirmed that he will implement the seventh five-year development plan, which is a Raisi-era document focused partly on curbing inflation, optimizing the state budget, and resolving government debts.[21] Ghalibaf’s emphatic support for the five-year development plan indicates that he is trying to frame his candidacy as least partly as a continuation of the policies of late-President Ebrahim Raisi.

Ghalibaf appointed Ali Nikzad—a hardline, ethnically Azeri parliamentarian—as his campaign manager on June 10.[22] Nikzad previously worked in Raisi’s presidential campaigns in 2017 and 2021.[23] An Iranian opposition outlet suggested that Ghalibaf hired Nikzad to garner support from the Iranian Azeri population and rural, conservative communities. The outlet also suggested that hiring Nikzad could be meant to balance against reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian, who is an ethnic Azeri as well. Nikzad and Pezeshkian have both represented heavily Azeri constituencies in Parliament.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-12-2024

Iran Update, June 13, 2024

Iran is continuing to expand its nuclear program. Anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, increasing the Iranian capacity to enrich uranium.[15] The diplomats said that Iran is responding to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors censuring Iran on June 5 for failing to cooperate sufficiently with the IAEA.[16] The diplomats noted that the Iranian retaliation to the IAEA Board of Governors censure “is not as big as many had feared.”

This report comes amid other indications of Iran advancing its nuclear program. The Iranian stockpile of 60-percent-enriched uranium increased by over 15 percent from February to May 2024, according to the IAEA, bringing the stockpile to around 6,201 kilograms.[17] Tehran has separately sought to acquire materials for its nuclear program from Niger in recent months. Iran and Niger began negotiating in late 2023 to trade Iranian drones and surface-to-air missiles for 300 tons of uranium yellowcake from Niger.[18] An Iranian opposition outlet reported on June 1 that Iran and Niger finalized the deal, though CTP-ISW cannot verify that report.[19]

Senior Iranian officials, including a top foreign policy adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have repeatedly threatened in recent months to pursue nuclear weapons, as CTP-ISW has reported extensively.[20] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated in May 2024 that Iranian officials “must stop” normalizing such discussions.[21] He also called on Iran to “meaningfully engage” with the IAEA so that the IAEA can guarantee that the Iranian nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.[22]

Iranian hardliners are debating and negotiating amongst themselves to unite their faction behind a single candidate in the Iranian presidential election. The faction is concerned that the five hardline candidates risk splitting the vote and inadvertently advantaging the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian. Some hardliners are urging Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf or Saeed Jalili to withdraw in support of the other.[23] Other hardline officials and media outlets are expressing concerns that that the faction is too divided to win the race.[24] Ali Reza Zakani, who is a hardline candidate and the Tehran City mayor, stated on June 13 that candidates who are behind in electoral polls should withdraw in favor of more popular contenders.[25]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-13-2024

Iran Update, June 14, 2024

Iranian hardline candidate Saeed Jalili launched his 2024 presidential campaign by defining his political platform as a continuation of former President Ebrahim Raisi’s policies. Jalili stated he will continue Raisi’s “neighborhood” foreign policy strategy which focuses on maintaining strong relations with other countries in the region.[42] Jalili previously emphasized that the next government should implement the seventh five-year development plan, which is a Raisi-era document focused partly on curbing inflation, optimizing the state budget, and resolving government debts.[43] Some hardliners urged that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf or Saeed Jalili should withdraw from the race to prevent the hardline camp from splitting the voter base amongst five candidates.[44] Jalili emphasized in a public speech on June 13 that he will remain in the presidential race.[45]

Reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian is adopting an increasingly reformist political agenda likely to bolster endorsements from high-profile reformist individuals. Pezeshkian hosted a conference for his female supporters on June 14 wherein he criticized the regime‘s mandatory veiling policy, stating: “We have been trying to fix the hijab (issue) for 40 years, but we made the situation worse.”[46] Pezeshkian separately advocated for economic reform, particularly to curb inflation, in a televised speech on June 13.[47] Pezeshkian criticized the current economic situation in Iran. Former Iranian reformist president Mohammad Khatami endorsed Pezeshkian on June 13 for the 2024 presidential election.[48] Khatami served as president of Iran from 1997 – 2005.[49] Khatami’s endorsement is not entirely surprising as Pezeshkian served as health minister under the Khatami administration from 2001 – 2005.[50]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-14-2024

The "election" will be held on 28 June https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Iranian_presidential_election

Iran Update, June 15, 2024

US CENTCOM destroyed seven Houthi radar sites in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen on June 14.[16] CENTCOM additionally destroyed a Houthi drone launched from Yemen over the Red Sea. CENTCOM also destroyed two Houthi unmanned surface vessels in the Red Sea.

The crew from an unspecified commercial vessel that the Houthis attacked evacuated and abandoned the vessel on June 15, marking the second such incident in 24 hours.[17] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on June 15 that the vessel is no longer in command of the crew, on fire, and sinking. The vessel is currently 30 nautical miles northeast of Djibouti. The Houthis struck the vessel 98 nautical miles east of Aden, Yemen, on June 13 with three unknown projectiles.[18] The crew from another unspecified commercial vessel evacuated their craft on June 14 following a Houthi strike.[19]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-15-2024

Iran Update, June 16, 2024

United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported two explosions near a vessel approximately 40 nautical miles south of al Mokha, Yemen, on June 16.[22] The explosions did not cause any injuries or damage to the nearby vessel, and the vessel continued to its next port of call.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) published an update about the Palauan-flagged, Ukranian-owned, Polish-operated commercial vessel Verbena on June 15.[23] The Houthis struck the Verbena in the Gulf of Aden on June 13 with two anti-ship cruise missiles, causing fires onboard.[24] CENTCOM reported that the Verbena’s crew issued a distress call and abandoned ship on June 15 due to “continuous fires and an inability to control them.”[25] The Cayman Islands-flagged commercial vessel Anna Meta responded to the distress call and rescued the crew. CENTCOM noted that the Iranian Artesh Navy frigate Jamaran was eight nautical miles from the Verbena but did not respond to the distress call. UKMTO reported on June 15 that the crew of an unspecified vessel abandoned their vessel after the Houthis attacked it, likely referencing the Verbena.[26]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-16-2024

Iran International English @IranIntl_En

Iran’s Interim President Mohammad Mokhber on Monday visited Hamid Nouri, the former Iranian jailor who faced life imprisonment in Sweden for his role in Iran’s 1988 mass executions but was released and swapped with two Swedes jailed in Iran.

https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1802682644183806066

Iran Update, June 17, 2024

The Houthis conducted four attacks that caused physical damage to commercial vessels between June 9 and June 13, possibly indicating an increase in the effectiveness of Houthi attacks. A British maritime security firm said on June 14 that recent Houthi attacks on commercial vessels demonstrated a “significant increase in effectiveness” in Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[11] CTP-ISW has observed that Houthi attacks have struck commercial vessels at a rate of about 0.4 impacts per week since the beginning of the Houthi attack campaign in November 2023. Separate Houthi attacks on two ships on June 9 caused fires aboard both vessels.[12] The Houthis then launched a remote-controlled, one-way attack naval surface drone targeting the Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned Tutor on June 12.[13] A British maritime security firm said that one crewmember died in the attack, marking the second crew fatality in the Houthi attack campaign.[14] The Houthis struck the Palauan-flagged, Ukranian-owned, Polish-operated M/V Verbena with ballistic missiles on June 13, causing the vessel to catch fire and the crew to abandon ship.[15]

Western and Houthi officials told the Wall Street Journal on June 16 that the Houthis used routes through Djibouti and Lebanon to import Iranian weapons and equipment and Chinese-manufactured weapons parts.[16] Anonymous Western and Houthi officials said that Iranian arms arrive in Djibouti and that unspecified actors transfer the weapons to civilian ships. The Houthis use an established corridor between Djibouti and Houthi-controlled ports along the Yemeni Red Sea coast to smuggle “illicit cargo.”[17] The officials also noted that the Houthis are using Lebanon as a base through which to purchase spare drone parts from China.[18] The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen found in two 2023 Panel of Experts reports that the Houthis smuggled weapons that were manufactured or partially manufactured in China.[19]

A hardline Iranian cleric and parliamentarian claimed on June 17 that unspecified hardline presidential candidates have agreed to withdraw from the election if they perform poorly in upcoming presidential debates.[26] Iran will hold five televised debates beginning on June 17.[27] Reza Taghavi claimed that four unspecified “trusted institutions” will rate the hardline candidates based on their performance in the debates and that “some candidates” have agreed to withdraw in support of the candidate with the best performance.[28]

Taghavi’s claim follows repeated statements from hardline officials calling on the hardline camp to reach a “consensus” ahead of the June 28 election.[29] These calls are driven by concerns that the five hardline candidates risk splitting the vote and inadvertently advantaging the sole reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-17-2024

Iran Update, June 18, 2024

Iranian presidential candidates discussed the economy in the first debate for the upcoming election.[1] The debate occurred on June 17. Below are the key takeaways from what the three presumed frontrunners said in the debate.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (hardliner): Ghalibaf expressed openness to nuclear negotiations with the West in order to remove sanctions from the economy.[2] Ghalibaf suggested that a phased agreement could work to secure sanctions relief. Ghalibaf’s comments are consistent with reports from Iranian opposition outlets saying that advisers to Ghalibaf have approached Western diplomats in recent weeks. CTP-ISW noted at the time that the outreach is possibly meant to set conditions for the resumption of nuclear negotiations if Ghalibaf becomes president.[3] Ghalibaf also lamented that economic agreements that Iran has signed with China and Russia have not yet been operationalized.[4] Ghalibaf separately identified inflation as one of the most pressing economic issues.

Saeed Jalili (hardliner). Jalili contrastingly downplayed the importance of nuclear negotiations with the West.[5] Jalili criticized past Iranian presidents, specifically Hassan Rouhani, for relying on international agreements to solve economic issues. Jalili instead promoted an agenda focused on autarkic policies and self-sufficiency. Jalili attributed issues, such as inflation and the struggling private sector, to resource mismanagement.

Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist). Pezeshkian advocated for expanding economic diplomacy with regional and extra-regional countries.[6] Pezeshkian asserted that Iran needs economic interaction with other countries in order to grow its economy. He specifically called for Iran to increase its exports and foreign investment. Pezeshkian separately stated that international sanctions have been a “disaster” for Iran, which is consistent with his historic support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[7]

Iran has begun running computer models that could support the research and development of nuclear weapons.[9] The purpose of the models is unclear. US and Israeli intelligence services have learned of the models and are investigating further, according to Axios.

The use of these models comes as Iran has expanded its nuclear program in recent months.[10] Anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, increasing the Iranian capacity to enrich uranium.[11] The Iranian stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium separately increased by over 15 percent from February to May 2024, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), bringing the stockpile to around 6,201 kilograms.[12] The expansion of the Iranian nuclear program is especially noteworthy given that senior Iranian officials have threatened repeatedly to pursue nuclear weapons in recent months.[13]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-18-2024

Iran Update, June 19, 2024

Iranian reformist presidential candidate Masoud Pezeshkian is continuing to struggle to consolidate support among Iranian youth ahead of the June 28 election. Pezeshkian promoted reformist ideals such as increased international engagement and freedom of thought during a meeting with Esfahan University students on June 19.[11] This meeting marked Pezeshkian’s second meeting with university students—a key voter demographic—since June 16.[12] Pezeshkian called on Iranian students to vote in the upcoming election, warning that boycotting the election could lead to greater restrictions and repression.[13] A Esfahan University student accused Pezeshkian of participating in the election to increase voter turnout and claimed that 90 percent of Iranian youth intend to boycott the election.[14] The student added that many Iranian youth do not care who becomes president because they oppose the regime as a whole.[15] Another Esfahan University student questioned Pezeshkian’s ability to challenge mandatory hijab enforcement.[16] These statements follow a similar statement by Sharif University students on June 16 that questioned the impact of the Iranian president on regime decision-making and called on Pezeshkian to withdraw from the election if he cannot guarantee meaningful change.[17]

Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that will install 1,400 new centrifuges at Fordow, which has the capacity to produce nearly 320 pounds of weapons-grade uranium within one month of being installed. IAEA inspectors confirmed on June 19 that Iran plans to increase its uranium enrichment capacity at Fordow and Natanz.[43] Iran notified the IAEA early last week that it plans to install 1,400 IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow within four weeks, according to the Washington Post. A US weapons expert noted on June 19 that the installation of 1,400 centrifuges would increase Fordow’s enrichment capacity by 360 percent. The weapons expert added that the centrifuges could produce approximately 320 pounds of weapons-grade uranium (WGU)—enough WGU for five nuclear weapons—within one month of being installed. The Washington Post report comes after anonymous diplomats told Reuters on June 12 that Iran is installing new centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow.[44] The diplomats said that Iran is responding to the IAEA Board of Governors’ decision to censure Iran on June 5 for failing to cooperate sufficiently with the IAEA.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-19-2024

Iran Update, June 2020, 2024

Iran and Hamas are continuing to coordinate politically to maintain alignment across the Axis of Resistance during the Israel-Hamas War. Acting Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani met with Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Doha, Qatar, on June 20.[6] Bagheri Kani emphasized that the Axis of Resistance should pursue alternative methods of “resistance” against Israel including through legal and political forums as well as public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is the practice of advancing national goals and objectives through informing and influencing foreign publics.[7] Iran and Hamas have both used information operations to inform and influence foreign publics during the current war. Bagheri Kani appears to be continuing to pursue political coordination with Haniyeh in line with the precedent set by his predecessor, Hossein Amir Abdollahian.[8]

Bagheri Kani further encouraged members of the Axis of Resistance to use ”all capacities” to exact a heavier cost on Israel for its actions in the Israel-Hamas war.[9] Haniyeh stated the actions of the Axis of Resistance have made it impossible to return to a pre-October 7 world. Haniyeh said that Hamas ”welcomes any [ceasefire] that will meet the demands of the Palestinian people. Haniyeh presumably is referring to Hamas’ maximalist ceasefire demands that will leave Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip.[10]

Iran is holding its second televised presidential debate on June 20 with a focus on economics and judicial governance.[55] All six Guardian Council-approved presidential candidates, including five hardliners and one moderate, are participating in the debate. The candidates will provide potential solutions to the country's problems.[56] The Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) published a survey that illustrated 73% of those polled did not watch the first presidential debate on June 17.[57] The survey added that 35.9% of those polled do not follow the elections. IRGC-affiliated media reported that the first presidential debate failed to “sway the audience in any direction.”[58] The debate is still ongoing at the time of writing. CTP-ISW will provide complete analysis of the second televised debate in our June 21 update.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-20-2024

Iran Update, June 21, 2024

Iranian presidential candidates discussed government management and service provision during the second debate for the upcoming election.[1] The debate occurred on June 20. The candidates spoke in generalities without describing substantive policies to address domestic issues for much of the debate. Below are the key takeaways from what the three presumed frontrunners said in the debate.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (pragmatic hardliner): Ghalibaf presented the most discrete policy positions among the frontrunners. Ghalibaf reiterated readiness to negotiate with the West in order to secure relief from international sanctions.[2] He discussed increasing wages to match inflation and launching a “multi-layered” social security insurance program.[3] Ghalibaf also reiterated support for foreign currency investment in Iran. Ghalibaf separately advocated for building a border wall dividing Iran from Afghanistan and Pakistan.[4]

Saeed Jalili (ultraconservative hardliner): Jalili discussed resolving domestic issues but downplayed the importance of external economic interaction. Jalili discussed increasing food subsidies, managing energy consumption, and preventing brain drain.[5] Jalili also hesitated to endorse negotiations with the West and dismissed the need for Iran to adhere to international anti-corruption and transparency standards. Jalili separately criticized the Iranian healthcare system.

Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist): Pezeshkian emphasizes his subordination to the supreme leader, as he has done repeatedly throughout his campaign.[6] His rhetoric reaffirms that, if elected, he would be constrained by whatever political boundaries the supreme leader sets just as every Iranian president is. Pezeshkian expressed support for loans and public works projects for rural communities. He also emphasized the importance of countering corruption and promoting education.[7]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-21-2024

Iran Update, June 22, 2024

The Houthis claimed on June 22 two attacks targeting vessels in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea.[38] Houthi spokesperson Brig. Gen. Yahya Sarea stated that the Houthis fired ballistic missiles targeting the bulk carrier Transworld Navigator in the Arabian Sea. Sarea also said that the Houthis fired ballistic and cruise missiles targeting the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the northern Red Sea. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported explosions near a vessel east of Aden, Yemen.[39]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-22-2024

Iran Update, June 23, 2024

The Houthis claimed on June 22 that they conducted a combined attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias targeting five vessels in and around Haifa Port.[10] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Houthi military spokesperson issued separate but complimentary statements claiming to target four commercial vessels in the Haifa Port using drones on June 22.[11] The Houthi military spokesperson said that the groups targeted two unnamed “cement tankers” and two cargo ships that violated the Houthis’ unofficial blockade of Israel.[12] The groups also claimed a drone attack on a Luxembourg-flagged livestock carrier in the Mediterranean Sea as it approached Haifa Port.[13] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether any attack occurred. These attacks mark the third time that the Houthis have claimed a combined operation targeting Israel with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq since June 6.[14] The growing cooperation between the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias furthermore reflects the desire of the Axis of Resistance to present itself as an interoperable coalition.[15]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-23-2024

The Houthis are training their kids to be a mix of Jihadists and Nazis

https://x.com/MarinaMedvin/status/1805043836554555814
1 min video

How Nazis courted the Islamic world during WWII

David Motadel: At the height of the war in 1941-1942, when German troops entered Muslim-populated territories in the Balkans, North Africa, Crimea, and the Caucasus, and approached the Middle East and Central Asia, Berlin began to see Islam as politically significant. Nazi Germany made significant attempts to promote an alliance with the “Muslim world” against their alleged common enemies — the British Empire, the Soviet Union, America and Jews.

https://www.dw.com/en/how-nazis-courted-the-islamic-world-during-wwii/a-41358387

Iran Update, June 24, 2024

Iranian presidential candidates discussed socio-cultural issues during the third debate for the upcoming election. None of the presumed frontrunners (Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Saeed Jalili, and Masoud Pezeshkian) suggested that they would support fundamental changes to long-standing regime policies. All three frontrunners indicated support for the mandatory hijab law and did not suggest that they would support easing restrictions on women’s dress code.[10] That none of these candidates challenged the regime policy reflects their subordination to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has expressed opposition repeatedly to changing the hijab requirement. Khamenei has described veiling as an “irrevocable, religious necessity.”[11] The frontrunners did debate slightly how to enforce the mandatory hijab law.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (pragmatic hardliner). Ghalibaf emphasized that all regime bodies—not just the national police force—should encourage and enforce the hijab requirement.[12] Ghalibaf claimed that some regime bodies have supported the police insufficiently in enforcing the mandatory hijab law, leading to violent confrontations between the regime and unveiled women. Ghalibaf also expressed support for a recent hijab enforcement bill that Parliament is considering currently. The legislation codifies legal punishments, including fines and salary cuts, for women who violate the hijab requirement.[13]

Masoud Pezeshkian (reformist). Pezeshkian emphasized his opposition to using violence to enforce the mandatory hijab law but did not propose changing the law itself.[14] Pezeshkian described regime treatment of unveiled women as immoral. Pezeshkian also argued that the regime could stop women from questioning the need to veil by changing how it educates girls in mosques and schools. This statement mirrors similar remarks from Khamenei calling for greater emphasis on indoctrinating Iranian youth in order to resolve social issues.[15]

Saeed Jalili (ultraconservative hardliner). Jalili avoided addressing the hijab issue directly and instead focused on criticizing the West. Jalili accused the West of hypocrisy for condemning Iran for treating women harshly while ignoring the deaths of Palestinian women in the Gaza Strip.[16]

The frontrunners’ comments on the mandatory hijab law reflect their efforts to appeal to certain demographics. Pezeshkian has consistently tried to rally Iranian youth who are frustrated with the harsh enforcement of the hijab requirement. Jalili contrastingly tried to pander to hardline, anti-Western voters in order to distinguish himself from Ghalibaf.

The frontrunning candidates separately expressed support for ongoing censorship and internet restrictions in Iran. Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian both claimed that they support internet freedom but added that censorship is necessary during “crises.”[17] Ghalibaf emphasized the need to “carefully and intelligently monitor” the internet and expressed support for building the national intranet, which would increase regime control of the Iranian domestic information space.[18] Jalili praised regime efforts to develop indigenous communications and social media platforms as alternatives to Western platforms.[19]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-24-2024

The war in Yemen is set to break out anew as the parties to the conflict prepare to launch a new cycle of hostilities. A memorandum issued this week by the Ministry of Defense in the Yemeni government directed the army forces to raise combat readiness on all frontlines.

The Defense Ministry ordered various military units to “exercise caution and high vigilance and confront any hostile actions” by the Houthi group.

The memorandum indicated that the Houthis’ plan aims to assault the Karesh Frontline in Lahj province, control the Al-Ahkoum-Al-Dhabab-Jabal Habashi road, and head to the western coast.

It also revealed that the Houthi group plans a surprise attack targeting army forces’ positions in the Marib and Taiz provinces.

Military sources said yesterday that the National Army forces thwarted a Houthi infiltration attempt in the Kalaba area northeast of Taiz.

The government-run Saba News Agency quoted a military source as saying, “The Houthi group targeted, with an RPG shell, on Sunday afternoon, army positions in the Wadi Salah area, and targeted, with medium weapons and mortar shells, army positions in the Al-Karifat area, east of Taiz City.

Over the past few months, the Ansar Allah (Houthi) group has mobilized thousands of fighters in areas under its control. It has also launched attacks on its opponents on multiple frontlines and conducted military maneuvers in provinces under its control.

Thousands of popular fighters have been trained in several Houthi-controlled provinces to use light and medium weapons, attack opponents, and prevent reinforcements from reaching enemy forces, besides reconnaissance, shooting, and sniping. The Houthi group has also conducted military exercises in Sanaa, Al-Baydha, Dhamar, Sanaa, and Amran.

On Saturday, the Houthi group announced that they laid to rest a “group of martyrs” who were killed on the frontlines while “performing their duty”. Such an announcement indicates the group's continued attempt to gain ground by force.

Meanwhile, the Houthi attacks on shipping lanes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden continue unabated. Spokesperson of the Houthi armed forces Yahya Saree said they targeted two ships in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean in “support of the Palestinian people” and in response to the Israeli war on Gaza.

According to the statement, the attack directly hit the Transworld Navigator ship in the Red Sea with a drone boat, causing it damage. Another attack hit STOLT SEQUOIA ship in the Indian Ocean with several winged missiles, he said.

According to senior U.S. military commanders, the Houthis have learned how to modify old weapons and manufacture new ones, becoming the first group to use anti-ship ballistic missiles to strike naval targets.

With the Houthi capability to modify and produce weapons and mobilize fighters, the group is ready to keep launching attacks on shipping lanes off Yemen and engage in a ground war.

https://shebaintelligence.uk/a-call-for-preparing-for-war-in-yemen

Iran Update, June 25, 2024

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei expressed foreign and nuclear policy views on June 25 that closely align with ultraconservative hardline presidential candidate Saeed Jalili’s views, possibly indicating that Khamenei endorses Jalili in the upcoming election. Khamenei’s views also signal the supreme leader's opposition to reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian. Khamenei expressed strong opposition to mending ties with the United States during a speech on June 25, which mirrored similar statements made by Jalili in a foreign policy debate on June 24.[1] Jalili defended Iran's “nuclear rights” and criticized the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during the debate.[2] Khamenei also indirectly criticized Pezeshkian, stating that politicians who are “attached to America” cannot be “good managers.”[3] Pezeshkian expressed support for improving relations and resuming nuclear negotiations with the West during the June 24 foreign policy debate.[4] Pezeshkian stated that “no country in history has been able to achieve prosperity and growth by closing its borders and wanting to work alone.”[5] Khamenei’s criticisms of Pezeshkian may also stem from the fact that Pezeshkian has closely coordinated his presidential campaign with Mohammad Javad Zarif, who served as Iran's foreign affairs minister under former moderate President Hassan Rouhani. Pragmatic hardliner Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf also expressed support for nuclear negotiations during the June 24 debate, which is consistent with recent reports from Iranian opposition outlets that advisers to Ghalibaf have approached Western diplomats in recent weeks.[6]

Khamenei’s possible endorsement of Jalili would diverge from some Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) factions’ support for pragmatic hardline candidate Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The Telegraph reported in early June 2024 that some senior IRGC commanders, including former IRGC Air Force Commander Hossein Dehghan, are supporting Ghalibaf.[7] An IRGC member told the Telegraph that some IRGC factions are trying to prevent Jalili from winning the election because they regard him as “too hardline.”[8] IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Haji Zadeh separately stated on June 24 that Iran's next president must have “strong executive management” experience.[9] Some Western commentators and analysts have interpreted Haji Zadeh’s statement as an implicit endorsement of Ghalibaf given Ghalibaf’s experience serving as Iran's parliament speaker since 2020.[10] Ghalibaf has decades-old ties to many senior IRGC officers dating back to their time fighting in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.[11] Ghalibaf is also part of a close circle of current and former IRGC officers who have repeatedly come together in times of domestic crisis to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.[12]

Khamenei’s explicit opposition to engagement with the West also challenges recent Western reports that incorrectly suggested that Iran is seeking to renew nuclear talks with the West. Iranian Permanent Representative to the UN Saeed Iravani stated that the JCPOA is “not perfect” but is the “best option” during a UN Security Council meeting on June 24.[13] Some Western media outlets incorrectly interpreted Iravani’s statement as signaling the Iranian regime's readiness to renew nuclear negotiations. Iravani’s statements were instead consistent with repeated statements by regime officials blaming the current state of the JCPOA on the United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany). Iravani accused the United States of “unilaterally and illegally” withdrawing from the JCPOA and accused the E3 of “failing” to fulfill their JCPOA obligations.[14] Jalili additionally accused the United States and the E3 of lacking “sincerity and determination” to revive the JCPOA.

Iranian-backed groups are continuing to recruit members and smuggle and manufacture weapons, likely to destabilize Jordan and facilitate Iranian efforts in the West Bank. Jordanian police discovered and detonated two separate caches of unspecified explosives in east Amman on June 21 and June 24.[34] An initial explosion tipped police off to the first cache of explosives in Marka, a dense residential neighborhood.[35] Former Jordanian officials said the explosion may have been a failed attempt to manufacture more explosives.[36] Police discovered a second cache of explosives tied to the Marka suspects in a car repair shop in an industrial area of Abu Alanda, Amman, on June 24.[37] Jordanian police are still investigating the incidents and have not released the suspects’ identities.[38] However, anonymous Jordanian security officials told Reuters the quantities of discovered explosives indicated that the incidents are “terror-related.”[39]

These explosive caches and other security incidents in Jordan, including weapons smuggling, are part of a possible Iranian effort to destabilize Jordan and use it as a springboard to increase Iranian influence in the West Bank. The Jordanian security officials said that the Marka and Abu Alanda incidents are linked to Iranian efforts to recruit agents within Jordan to destabilize the Kingdom.[40] Jordanian territory offers multiple ground routes through which Iran could move military materiel into the West Bank. Tehran has sought to develop its militia capabilities and infrastructure in the West Bank in recent years, but the Israel-Hamas war has highlighted Iranian shortcomings there.[41] Iran and Iranian-backed groups have shown a recently shown greater interest in developing networks in Jordan, including by threatening to equip thousands of “Islamic Resistance in Jordan” fighters with weapons.[42] This threat is likely aspirational at present, but Jordanian police disrupted an attempt by Iranian-backed militias in Syria to smuggle weapons to a Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood cell in late March 2024.[43] Both Jordanian and Israeli police have thwarted several attempts in recent months by Iran and its partners to conduct attacks within the kingdom or smuggle weapons into the West Bank.[44]

Iranian efforts to manufacture weapons, arm Jordanian agents, and undermine the Jordanian state are consistent with CTP-ISW’s previous assessments that Iran is adopting a more confrontational approach towards Jordan in its regional strategy.[45] An expanding Axis of Resistance network in Jordan could destabilize a major Western partner in the region and facilitate Iranian efforts in the West Bank by providing a ground line of communication over which Iran could transport weapons and other capabilities to its allies in the West Bank. It is notable in this context that Iranian-linked actors were reportedly manufacturing weapons in Jordan. Weapons smugglers—Iranian-linked and otherwise—continue to face significant difficulty in moving weapons and other materiel into the West Bank.[46] These smugglers will continue to attempt to move weapons into the West Bank, however, and a destabilized Jordan could facilitate an Iranian effort to accelerate this process.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-25-2024