Iranian Regime tv Channel One hacked while it was airing Khamenie speech

Iranian Regime national tv Channel One hacked about an hour ago. During a broadcast of Khamenie speech, a red crosshair appeared over his face and chanting of Women. Life. Freedom. There was writing to the side saying "Rise up. Join us". Also 4 photos at the bottom of the screen of young people killed and additional writing: "The blood of our youth is dropping from your paws".

Also, there was a huge banner in the middle of Tehran highway today that read: We are no longer afraid of you. We will fight.

Also, attempted attack on IRI ambassador in Denmark. Her bodyguard was stabbed. Diplomatic Security intervened before the attacker could stab the ambassador.

Iran Update, May 27, 2024

Iranian journalists reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed his policy adviser, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, in March 2024 to lead nuclear negotiations with the United States.[1] The publication of this information could be meant to boost the political standing of Shamkhani ahead of the Iranian presidential election in June 2024. Shamkhani assumed responsibility of negotiations from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which had led negotiations under the Ebrahim Raisi administration. Shamkhani is a trusted adviser to Khamenei and a seasoned diplomat, who served as secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council from 2013 to 2023.[2] Shamkhani in this capacity played a prominent role in negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement.[3] Khamenei has previously delegated responsibility for international talks to his inner circle, making it unsurprising that Khamenei has involved Shamkhani in nuclear negotiations again. The publication of this news could be meant to position Shamkhani to run for president or receive a position in the next presidential administration by framing him as a capable and trusted diplomat.

Iranian politicians are continuing to maneuver and prepare for the Iranian presidential election in June 2024. Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi announced the official start of Iranian presidential campaign season on May 26.[4] Registration for presidential candidates will open on May 30 and close on June 3. Iran will hold elections on June 28.[5]

Prominent hardliner Saeed Jalili has since announced his candidacy.[6] The Guardian Council—a regime body responsible for reviewing presidential candidates before candidates are permitted to run—previously approved Jalili’s candidacy in the 2013 and 2021 presidential elections, which suggests that the council will likely approve his candidacy in this election. Jalili withdrew from the 2021 race to back Ebrahim Raisi.[7] Jalili’s candidacy is particularly noteworthy following reports from an anti-regime outlet that some Iranian officials warned Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei against allowing Jalili to run. These officials included moderates like Ali Larijani and several hardliners such as Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and adviser to the supreme leader Rear Adm. Ali Shamkhani.[8]

Jalili currently serves as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the SNSC and previously served as the SNSC secretary from 2007 to 2013.[9] Jalili also holds roles within Iran’s Expediency Discernment Council (EDC)—a board that advises Khamenei on policy decisions and mediates conflicts between Parliament and the Guardian Council—and a foreign relations council that advises Khamenei.[10] Jalili’s prominence within the regime suggests that he continues to hold Khamenei’s trust. Jalili has criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for abandoning “a hundred (of Iran’s) inalienable rights.” He has made similar remarks about subsequent nuclear negotiations, making such negotiations less likely under a potential Jalili administration.[11]

Other rumored presidential candidates include:

Mehrdad Barzpash:[12] Roads and Urban Development Minister in the hardline Raisi administration. Barzpash previously served as a parliamentarian from 2012 to 2016 and was the CEO of well-known Iranian automakers SAIPA and Pars Khodrow.[13]

Parviz Fattah:[14] Head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO), a parastatal organization directly controlled by the supreme leader. Fattah’s role within the EIKO underscores his loyalty to Khamenei. Loyalty to Khamenei is a critical metric of whether a presidential candidate is permitted to run.[15]

Ali Larijani:[16] Prominent moderate politician and current EDC member. Larijani formerly served as parliament speaker from 2008 to 2020 and was SNSC Secretary from 2005 to 2007.[17] Khamenei has increasingly marginalized Larijani since 2019 and the Guardian Council notably denied his presidential candidacy in 2021.[18] A freelance journalist claimed on May 26 that Khamenei greenlit Larijani’s candidacy in the upcoming elections and that Larijani‘s team is “assessing the situation.”[19]Approval of Larijani would be noteworthy and may indicate that Khamenei is attempting to make Iranian presidential elections appear politically diverse.

Mohammad Mokhber:[20] Interim President and hardline member of Raisi’s cabinet. Mokhber formerly served as the EIKO and Mostazafan Foundation head, a separate regime business conglomerate that contributes to regime self-enrichment.
Ali Reza Zakani:[21] Tehran Mayor and hardline politician. Zakani previously ran in the 2021 presidential elections before withdrawing to support Ebrahim Raisi.[22] The Guardian Council denied Zakani’s candidacy in the 2013 and 2017 election cycles.[23]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-27-2024

Iran Update, May 28, 2024

Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels amid recent statements from Iranian officials about Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon.[1] The Associated Press reported on May 27 that Iran possesses 142.1 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, citing a confidential International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report.[2] This amount marks a 20.6 kilogram (16.95 percent) increase in Iran's stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium since the IAEA published its last quarterly report in February 2024.[3] Weapons-grade uranium is uranium that is enriched to 90 percent purity.[4] The IAEA report follows repeated statements in April and May from senior Iranian officials, including a top foreign policy adviser to the Supreme Leader, that have begun to normalize discussions about Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon.[5] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi recently expressed concern about Iran's nuclear program after visiting Tehran from May 6 to May 8, stating that Iranian cooperation with the agency is “not at the level it should be.”[6]

The IAEA report added that Iran's overall stockpile of enriched uranium is currently 6,201.3 kilograms, a 675.8 kilogram (12.23 percent) increase since February 2024 when Iran's total stockpile was 5525.5 kilograms.[7] A US expert noted on May 28 that, based on the confidential IAEA report, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for almost eight nuclear weapons in the first month after breakout.[8]

Iranian Members of Parliament re-elected hardline politician Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf as parliament speaker on May 28.[9] Ghalibaf has served as parliament speaker since May 2020.[10] Ghalibaf received 198 out of 287 votes, while his competitors, former Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Mojtaba Zonnour and former Foreign Affairs Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, won 60 and five votes, respectively.[11] Ghalibaf will serve a one-year term.

Iran's continued support for Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) and provision of lethal aid to Russia is bolstering Russia's technological output and military capabilities on the battlefield in Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published a report on May 28 detailing Russian efforts to produce Shahed-136/131 drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan using Iranian-provided technologies and a labor force recruited largely from eastern Africa.[30] WSJ cited the international hacking group Prana Network, which reportedly hacked an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) email server in February 2024 and revealed that Russia intends to produce 6,000 Shahed drones at the Alabuga SEZ in 2024 alone. The Institute for Science and International Security (IISS) assessed that the Alabuga SEZ has already produced 4,500 Shaheds as of the end of April 2024, ahead of schedule, and could produce all 6,000 by mid-August 2024.[31] WSJ found that Russia is currently producing more advanced models of Iranian Shaheds domestically and intensively using them to strike Ukraine.[32] WSJ also noted that Russian authorities are recruiting from African countries, particularly Uganda, and especially enticing young women to participate in work-study programs at Alabuga to produce Shahed drones. Russia would not be able to operate the Alabuga SEZ without Iran's consistent support for the Russian war effort—Iranian production models for Shahed drones and Iranian drone technologies are at the center of the entire Alabuga enterprise.[33] German outlet BILD similarly reported on May 27 that Iran has also likely supplied Russia with Qaem-5 television-guided air-to-ground bombs, which Iran started producing as recently as 2019.[34] BILD noted that an Iranian-provided Mohajer-6 drone carrying the Qaem-5 bombs crashed in Kursk Oblast for an unknown reason but that Russian forces may have intended to strike Sumy Oblast. ISW has not yet observed confirmation that Russia has used these projectiles in Ukraine, but their use would be consistent with the pattern of continued and intensified Iranian military support to Russia.[35]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-28-2024

Exclusive: Iran believed to be developing chemical weapons, decades after publicly giving them up

But while the world has been focused on Tehran’s nuclear programme, reports from inside Iran and statements from the US government point to a growing industry of pharmaceutical-based weapons. “Iran maintains a chemical weapons program that includes… incapacitating agents for offensive purposes,” Nicole Shampaine, the US ambassador to the OPCW in The Hague, told Tortoise. “This is an area that is a significant concern to us.”

Pharmaceutical-based chemical weapons are based on substances such as fentanyl, the synthetic opioid which has ravaged the US. They are aimed at rendering targets unconscious. Leaks from regime-backed universities in Iran appear to show that fentanyl and other central nervous system-acting substances are being developed into aerosolised forms for use on civilians in riot control situations.

Over several months in 2022 and 2023, thousands of school girls in Iran became sick and with symptoms including vomiting and streaming nose and eyes. Some have claimed this as evidence that the regime used pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) against its own citizens in an attempt to bring an end to the anti-hijab protests gathering momentum across the country.

https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2024/05/28/exclusive-iran-believed-to-be-developing-chemical-weapons-decades-after-publicly-giving-them-up/

Iran Update, May 30, 2024

The registration period for the Iranian presidential election began on May 30.[13] Only one prominent individual, hardliner Saeed Jalili, has registered thus far. Presidential candidates have until June 3 to register, after which the Guardian Council will vet and approve candidates. The Guardian Council has historically disqualified moderate and reformist figures during this period in order to advantage hardliners in the race.

The following individuals have registered thus far:

Saeed Jalili. Jalili is a prominent hardliner, who serves as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[14] Jalili previously served as the SNSC secretary from 2007 to 2013.[15] Jalili is also a member of Iran's Expediency Discernment Council (EDC) and Strategic Foreign Relations Council, both of which are advisory boards to the supreme leader.[16] An Iranian opposition outlet reported on May 21 that elements in the regime tried to convince Khamenei to prevent Jalili from competing in the election.[17] These elements include some moderates, such as Ali Larijani, as well as several hardliners, such as EDC Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and former SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani.[18]

Mohammad Reza Sabaghian Bafghi. Bafghi represents Bafgh, Yazd Province, in Parliament and is a member of the Parliamentary Internal Affairs Committee.[19] Bafghi previously headed the passive defense office in Yazd Province.[20]

Mostafa Kavakebian. Kavakebian is a reformist candidate, who previously served as a representative for Tehran in Parliament.[21] The Guardian Council disqualified Kavakebian in the 2005, 2013, 2017, and 2021 presidential elections.[22] Kavakebian stated on May 30 that he would facilitate the removal of all international sanctions on Iran and establish relations with all countries except Israel if he becomes president.[23]

Abbas Moghtadaei. Moghtadaei is a hardline candidate, who represents Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, in Parliament and previously served as the deputy chairman of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.[24] Moghtadaei is a faculty member at the Islamic Azad University.[25]

Ghodrat Ali Hashemtian.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-30-2024

Iran Update, May 31, 2024

Candidates have continued registering for the upcoming Iranian presidential election.[23] Among the candidates who registered on May 31 are two prominent moderate politicians: Ali Larijani and Abdol Nasser Hemmati. Presidential candidates have until June 3 to register, after which the Guardian Council will vet and approve candidates. The Guardian Council has historically disqualified moderate and reformist figures during this period to advantage hardliners in the race.

The following individuals registered on May 31:

Ali Larijani. Larijani is a prominent moderate politician who served as the Iranian parliament speaker from 2008 to 2020.[24] Larijani also served as both the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council and lead nuclear negotiator from 2005 to 2007.[25] Larijani previously ran for president in 2005 and 2021. The Guardian Council allowed him to run in 2005 but barred him in 2021 on unclear grounds.[26] Ali is part of the influential and well-connected Larijani family in Iran. Ali's brother, Sadegh Amoli Larijani, is the current head of the Expediency Discernment Council, which is an advisory board to the supreme leader. Sadegh Amoli Larijani also served as the judiciary chief from 2009 to 2019.

Abdol Nasser Hemmati. Hemmati is a moderate politician who served as the governor of the US-sanctioned Central Bank of Iran from 2018 to 2021 under then-President Hassan Rouhani.[27] Former President Hassan Rouhani appointed Hemmati to the Central Bank Governor position. Hemmati ran for president in 2021.[28] He received the third most votes after Ebrahim Raisi and former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei.[29]

Mahmoud Ahmadi Bighosh. Bighosh is a hardline politician who represented Markazi Province in Parliament from 2009 to 2012 and additionally from 2020 to 2024.[30] Bighosh was part of the Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee while in Parliament. Bighoush also served as the governor of North Khorasan Province from 2012 to 2013.[31]

Mohammad Khoshchehreh. Khoshchehreh is a hardline politician who represented Tehran Province in Parliament from 2004 to 2008.[32] Khoshchehreh previously supported President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but became an outspoken critic of Ahmadinejad three months into his presidency.[33] Khoshchehreh is a well-known economist and urban planner.

Larijani could be a particularly strong contender for the presidency given his deep connections in the Iranian political and security establishment. Those connections could prove useful, given that the Iranian regime manipulates elections to install favored candidates. Larijani has framed his candidacy in recent days around bolstering Iranian defense and national security, improving the economy, and managing US sanctions.[34] An anonymous Iranian official told Reuters that the Guardian Council would allow Larijani to run despite disqualifying him during the 2021 race.[35] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Guardian Council could permit Larijani to run to diversify the field of candidates beyond just hardliners and encourage voter participation, which has hit record lows repeatedly in recent years.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-31-2024

Iran Update, June 2, 2024

The Houthis claimed six drone and missile attacks targeting US Navy ships and merchant vessels in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean on June 1.[36] The Houthis claimed that they conducted two attacks targeting the US aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower north of the Red Sea in the past 24 hours.[37] The Houthis purportedly used drones and missiles in the first attack and unspecified weapons in the second attack.[38] There is no evidence that these attacks occurred. The Houthis also claimed they “directly hit” a US destroyer in the Red Sea using drones.[39] US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that it intercepted two Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles targeting the USS Gravely destroyer in the southern Red Sea on June 1.[40]

The Houthis additionally claimed two attacks targeting the Malta-flagged MAINA merchant vessel in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, one attack targeting the Marshall Islands-flagged AL ORAIQ LNG tanker in the Indian Ocean, and one attack targeting the Malta-flagged ABLIANI crude oil tanker in the Red Sea.[41] CENTCOM reported that it intercepted one Houthi drone in the southern Red Sea on June 1 and that two other Houthi drones crashed into the Red Sea without causing damage or injuries.[42] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported that a vessel observed an explosion “a significant distance from the vessel” approximately 48 nautical miles southwest of al Hudaydah, Yemen, in the southern Red Sea on June 1.[43]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-2-2024

People often think that “Iran” is a name imposed on Persia after Islam. This is a misconception.

Iran is, in reality, the native name of the Iranian people, while “Persia” is the popular Western designation given by the Greeks and adopted by the Western World due to Greek-Roman influence.

In fact, the Sasanian Empire, which was the last Iranian empire before the Islamic conquest, was officially called “Eranshahr,” which stands for “The Kingdom of Iranians” or simply “The Kingdom of Iran.” That is the native name which the people and rulers used for themselves. “Iranian” here comes from Old Persian and means “Aryan,” which reflects their Indo-European roots. The use of “arya” as identity by these people goes as far back as the Indo-Iranians in the 2nd millennium BCE.

On the other hand, Persia, the name used by others, is based on the region Pars, which is where Cyrus the Great established the great Persian Empire, known as the Achaemenid Empire.

So, no, Iran is not an Islamic name or a post-Islamic imposition on Persia. Iran is the name of the natives. There is no need to call it Persia.

https://x.com/ApostateProphet/status/1796604324644057203

Iran Update, June 3, 2024

Hardliners overwhelmingly dominate the candidate pool for the upcoming Iranian presidential election. The registration period for the election ended on June 3, and 80 individuals registered to compete in the election.[1] The Guardian Council—a regime body responsible for supervising elections and approving candidates—will vet candidates between June 4 and 10, and the Interior Ministry will then announce the final list of presidential candidates on June 11.[2] The Guardian Council has historically disqualified moderate and reformist figures to advantage hardline candidates.[3]

Iran is continuing to increase its enriched uranium stockpile, according to a statement by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi during an IAEA Border of Governors meeting on June 3.[37] Grossi stated that the IAEA had not been able to access Iranian nuclear sites for over three years and that Iran had made no progress in resolving outstanding safeguards issues. Safeguards are IAEA activities that enable the IAEA to verify that a state is not using its nuclear programs for nuclear-weapons purposes.”[38] Grossi added that “public statements made in Iran” made about Iran's ability “to produce nuclear weapons and possible changes to Iran's nuclear doctrine” increased his concerns about the “correctness and completeness of Iran's safeguards declarations.”[39] Iranian officials have increasingly normalized discussions about Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon in recent months, as CTP previously reported.[40]

The Associated Press cited a confidential IAEA report on May 27 that reported that Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium from 121.5 kilograms to 142.1 kilograms (a 16.95 percent increase).[41] Weapons-grade uranium is uranium that is enriched to 90 percent purity. A US expert noted on May 28 that, based on the confidential IAEA report, Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium (WGU) for almost eight nuclear weapons in the first month after breakout.[42]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-3-2024

Iran Update, June 4, 2024

Senior officials tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are supporting Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the Iranian presidential election. Iranian media reported on June 4 that former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei and Interim President Mohammad Mokhber recently met with Ghalibaf and expressed support for his candidacy.[18] Their backing alleviated Ghalibaf’s “doubts” about running, according to the Iranian reports.[19] The Telegraph similarly reported that IRGC factions, including former IRGC Air Force Commander Hossein Dehghan, are supporting Ghalibaf.[20] Dehghan is currently a senior adviser for defense industrial policy to the Iranian supreme leader. The Telegraph reported that individuals close to Dehghan ”are contacting everyone they know” to improve Ghalibaf’s chances. Ghalibaf—like Rezaei and Dehghan—is himself a former IRGC commander. Ghalibaf headed the IRGC Air Force from 1997 to 2000. He also has deep personal ties dating back to the Iran-Iraq War to many senior officers in the Iranian security establishment.[21]

Ghalibaf and other prominent figures are apparently focused on preventing Saeed Jalili in particular from winning the election. The Telegraph reported that some IRGC factions are trying to prevent Jalili from winning because they consider him too extreme politically.[22] Jalili serves as one of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s personal representatives to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and was the SNSC secretary from 2007 to 2013. A former official from the Iranian Interior Ministry told the Telegraph that individuals close to Ghalibaf oppose Jalili and “are contacting everyone they know to block Jalili.” An Iranian opposition outlet similarly reported in May 2024 that elements in the regime tried to convince Khamenei to prevent Jalili from competing in the election.[23] These elements included Ghalibaf as well as other hardliners, such as Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani and senior adviser to the supreme leader Ali Shamkhani. These elements also included some moderates, such as Ali Larijani, who is the brother of Sadegh.

Ghalibaf and Jalili were previously at odds during the Mahsa Amini protest movement in Iran in late 2022. Ghalibaf accused Jalili of adopting too harsh a stance vis-a-vis the protests and exacerbating frustrations among disaffected Iranian youth.[24] Ghalibaf contrastingly called for limited economic and political reforms to address protester grievances. Ghalibaf could use this contrast to appeal to more moderate elements in the Iranian political establishment.

Two factions from the Ebrahim Raisi administration are vying for the Iranian presidency, according to Iranian media.[25] These factions revolve around Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Mohammad Esmaili and Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash, both of whom registered as candidates for the election. Esmaili’s faction includes Planning and Budget Organization Director Davoud Manzour and Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare Minister Solat Mortazavi. Bazrpash’s faction includes Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-4-2024

Iran Update, June 6, 2024

Iranian hardline officials are continuing to try to promote an electoral consensus among hardliners ahead of the June 28 presidential election. These efforts probably seek to avoid infighting between Iranian hardliners that could provide an opening for a more moderate candidate to win the presidency. Former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei called for “synergy and unity” among hardliners in a Twitter (X) post on June 5.[1] Rezaei similarly called for a “consensus” among “revolutionary forces” during a meeting with Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and Parliamentary Economic Committee Chairman Mohammad Reza Pour Ebrahimi on June 4.[2] Hardline politician Gholam Ali Haddad Adel separately called on hardliners on June 6 to support a single candidate in the upcoming election.[3] Haddad Adel warned that hardliners could suffer a “defeat” in the election if they support a “plurality of candidates.”[4] Haddad Adel added that supporting a “plurality of candidates” could lead to a repeat of the 2013 presidential election in which a reformist candidate, Hassan Rouhani, won the presidency.[5]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-6-2024

Iran Update, June 7, 2024

Some senior members of the Ebrahim Raisi administration are backing Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Mohammad Esmaili in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. They have framed their support for Esmaili as meant to continue Raisi’s agenda. Fifteen senior officials signed a letter on June 7 urging the Guardian Council, which is responsible for vetting and approving electoral candidates, to allow Esmaili to compete in the election.[4] The officials praised Esmaili’s “intellectual, political, and managerial abilities and qualifications.”[5] The letter’s signatories include the following:

Vice President for Executive Affairs Mohsen Mansouri
Vice President for Women’s Affairs Ensieh Khazali
Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani
Energy Minister Ali Akbar Mehrabian
Oil Minister Javad Owji
Industry, Mines, and Trade Minister Abbas Ali Abadi
Agricultural Jihad Minister Mohammad Ali Nikbakht
Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zareh Pour
Environmental Protection Organization Director Ali Salajegheh
Administration and Employment Organization Director Meysam Latifi
Esmaili leads a faction affiliated with Raisi’s son-in-law, Mekdad Nili.[6] Mekdad’s brother, Meyshem Nili, and Mohsen Mansouri accompanied Esmaili when he registered for the presidential election on June 2.[7] Esmaili’s faction also includes Planning and Budget Organization Director Davoud Manzour and Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare Minister Solat Mortazavi.[8] Esmaili’s faction is reportedly competing against another faction in the Raisi administration that is led by Roads and Urban Development Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash.[9] Bazrpash has also registered as a candidate in the presidential election. Bazrpash’s faction includes Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and is affiliated with Presidential Office Cultural Deputy Mehdi Mojahed.[10] Bazrpash, along with Interim President Mohammad Mokhber, did not sign the letter to the Guardian Council endorsing Esmaili.[11] Mortazavi, who is part of Esmaili’s faction, also notably did not sign the letter.[12]

Some elements in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) appear to be supporting Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf in the upcoming Iranian presidential election. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency published an article on June 4 indirectly criticizing Ghalibaf’s competitor, Vahid Haghanian.[13] The article accused Haghanian of “unethically” using his relationship with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to advance his presidential campaign. The article was referencing that Haghanian has long worked in the Office of the Supreme Leader as a senior adviser to Khamenei. Haghanian responded to the article by vowing to end Iranian media’s “interference in internal politics” if he becomes president.[14] Reformist and opposition media attributed the attack on Haghanian to Tasnim News Agency supporting Ghalibaf in the upcoming election.[15] These reports are consistent with other reports that Tasnim News Agency has defended Ghalibaf against corruption allegations in recent months.[16]

Tasnim News Agency’s support for Ghalibaf could indicate that the top echelons of the IRGC also support him. Hamid Reza Moghadam Far, who is one of the outlet’s founders and current chairman of its board of directors, serves as a cultural and media adviser to IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami.[17] The close relationship between Moghadam Far and Salami suggests that there is a broader IRGC effort to help Ghalibaf win the presidency. Tasnim News Agency has notably left an article of Salami congratulating Ghalibaf on his reelection as parliament speaker on its politics home page since May 28.[18]

It would be unsurprising for significant elements in the IRGC to support Ghalibaf in the presidential race. Ghalibaf has decades-old ties to many senior IRGC officers dating back to their time fighting Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1980s. Ghalibaf is moreover part of a close circle of current and former IRGC officers who have repeatedly come together in times of domestic crisis to interfere in Iranian domestic politics.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-7-2024

Iran Update, June 8, 2024

nothing special

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-8-2024

Iran Update, June 9, 2024

The Houthis conducted a drone and missile attack targeting three commercial ships in the Arabian Sea on June 9. The attack caused two ships to catch fire. Houthi spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed on June 9 that the Houthis conducted a combined drone and missile attack targeting two vessels, the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged Norderney and the Liberia-flagged MSC Tavivshi, in the Arabian sea.[36] The Houthis said that both ships violated the unofficial Houthi blockade on Israeli ports. British maritime company Ambrey stated that a missile struck the Norderney 83 nautical miles southeast of Aden, Yemen.[37] UKMTO reported that vessel’s mooring station caught fire.[38] UKMTO reported that a second vessel was struck by an unknown projective 70 nautical miles southwest of Aden, resulting in a fire.[39] The unnamed ship proceeded to its next port of call without casualties. UKMTO also reported that a missile struck a third vessel in the Arabian Sea, 89 nautical miles southwest of Aden.[40]

Sarea also claimed on June 9 that the Houthis launched ballistic missiles targeting UK Royal Navy destroyer HMS Diamond in the Red Sea.[41] A spokesperson from the British Ministry of Defense stated that the Houthis’ claim is false.”[42]

Houthi media claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted three airstrikes targeting al Jabaneh, west of Hudaydah, Yemen, on June 9.[43]

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-9-2024

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