India-US to hold high-altitude military exercise near LAC amid rising tensions with China

New Delhi: Amid rising tensions with China, India and US will come together for two weeks of high-altitude military exercise in Uttarakhand’s Auli, less than 100 km from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Central Sector, ThePrint has learnt.

The Indo-US joint exercise is known as ‘Yudh Abhyas’ and it will be the 15th edition this year.

Sources in the defence and security establishment said the joint exercise is being planned from 14 to 31 October where the two forces will carry out “maneuvers to exploit the full scope” of high-altitude warfare. Sources also said the location (at 10,000 feet) where the exercise will take place falls in Stage 1 of acclimatization for high altitude.

“This time it is a very important exercise because the Indian side will be showcasing their high-altitude warfare strategies, while the Americans will be showcasing a number of technologies that can be used in such scenarios. This exercise has been planned in such a way that both sides come together for any scenario,” a source said.

Another source said that various activities have been planned for both sides to fully exploit the two weeks of focused high altitude military exercise and to see how the troops can operate together.

Sources further said this edition of the exercise will see a greater integration of air and ground assets, meaning the Indian Air Force will also play a key role.

India-US tensions with China India and China have witnessed rising tensions at the LAC over the last two years following the stand-off in Ladakh. Meanwhile, tensions have also risen between the US and China over House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan stop Tuesday.

Noting that the Chinese military’s infrastructure build-up under its Western Theatre Command — that looks after India — was “eye-opening and alarming”, US Army Pacific Commanding General Charles Flynn had in June said that the Indian and American Army will train together this year at 9,000-10,000 feet to increase interoperability for high-altitude warfare.

Interacting with a select group of journalists, Flynn also said Chinese build up along the LAC and construction of villages in Bhutan was “eye-opening”.

During the 1971 war, Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, spent long hours discussing how they could “scare off the Indians” by encouraging China to threaten India.

The President’s reactions reflected his dislike of Indians and his antipathy to India’s prime minister, Indira Gandhi. A US diplomat recollects that Nixon customarily referred to Mrs Gandhi as “that b***h” and, when her actions ran counter to the President’s wishes, that sobriquet was “replaced by more unprintable epithets”. Moreover, the Bangladesh liberation war coincided with a dramatic breakthrough in US-China relations. Given the close ties between China and Pakistan, Nixon believed that a pro-Pakistan policy would help forge a new entente with Beijing.

On 6 December 1971 — three days into the war — Nixon threw up the idea of urging China to move troops to its border with India. “We have got to tell them that some movement on their part toward the Indian border could be very significant,” he told Kissinger. “Except the weather is against them,” parried his unenthusiastic adviser.

Two days later, Kissinger offered a more elaborate proposal. He suggested sending a US carrier force into the Bay of Bengal as a signal of support for a Chinese intervention, while urging the Chinese to move to the Indian border. This would “scare off the Indians”. Nixon readily agreed.

Accordingly, on 10 December 1971, a new Task Force including the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise was ordered to proceed to the Indian Ocean. The same day, Kissinger met secretly with a senior Chinese representative, Huang Hua, to inform him of the development. He also offered to share US satellite intelligence about Soviet troop dispositions along the Chinese border. In carefully chosen words, Kissinger informed Huang Hua: “The President wants you to know that… if the People’s Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent as a threat to its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the People’s Republic.”

The White House tapes, the recordings that Nixon made of his conversations in office, have long been recognized as a marvel of verbal incontinence. But it is still startling to hear Nixon musing that what “the Indians,” then lucklessly hosting millions of refugees, “need—what they really need—is . . . a mass famine.” Kissinger loyally chimes in: “They’re such bastards.”

India was initially reluctant to arm Bengali rebels and to engage Pakistan militarily, and it would probably not have signed its friendship treaty with the Soviet Union had it not been for threats from Kissinger. And all that Nixon’s bluffing with the U.S.S. Enterprise achieved was, according to Raghavan, to “spur the Indians to capture Dhaka and seal their victory—objectives that had not been on their strategic horizons when the war began.”

On December 10, in a secret meeting in New York, Kissinger told Huang Hua, China’s official at the UN, that the U.S. was “moving a number of naval ships in the West Pacific toward the Indian Ocean: an aircraft carrier accompanied by four destroyers and a tanker, and a helicopter carrier and two destroyers.” Kissinger also offered to provide “tactical intelligence” on “the disposition of Soviet forces” on China’s borders, and added, if the Chinese“were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the U.S. would oppose the efforts of others to interfere with the People’s Republic.”

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