What Comes Next with Russia?

One of the best, most realistic assessments of the Russia - Ukranian battle on the internet. The video is an hour in length but ten minutes will tell you how this is likely to end, what to expect from China, and how absolutely bad we (the U.S.) have botched this from the get-go. Our inept leaders are making themselves totally irrelevant -- and fast.

Auto-generated transcript:
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00:00
welcome to the center of the national
00:02
interest seminar on uh ukraine russian
00:06
policies there and what is involved uh
00:09
in u.s relations with russia ukraine and
00:13
of course how china affects this whole
00:15
situation we have three very important
00:18
and interesting experts
00:20
uh george bibi
00:22
uh who will talk about russia is vice
00:25
president at the center for the national
00:27
interest he was a director of russian
00:31
analysis in this year and earlier on
00:34
worked in the white house
00:36
poker
00:38
is a leading expert in china
00:40
he was national intelligence officer for
00:43
east asia and he is a prolific writer
00:46
and the really major authority on the
00:48
region and last but certainly not least
00:51
colonel douglas mcgregor who was a
00:54
senior advisor to the secretary of
00:56
defense in the trump administration uh
01:00
he is a fox contributor and he is again
01:03
a major writer on strategic issues
01:06
welcome
01:07
george why wouldn’t we start with you
01:10
since clearly russia is the central
01:12
player in this whole crisis
01:16
thanks dimitri
01:18
well
01:20
what we’ve been talking about up until
01:23
earlier this week was whether the
01:26
russians intended to invade ukraine and
01:30
what if anything could be done to deter
01:33
that kind of an outcome
01:35
i think that
01:37
chapter in this unfolding saga is now
01:39
over
01:40
whatever might have been done to prevent
01:42
this uh wasn’t done and we we now know
01:46
the answers to whether uh vladimir putin
01:48
would decide to invade or not
01:51
uh and the question that we’re facing
01:52
now is
01:54
uh how far might this go
01:57
and how do we get out of this situation
02:00
on on terms that are acceptable
02:03
uh particularly to the people of ukraine
02:06
uh to europe and to the united states
02:10
and i i think the biggest issue that the
02:12
united states faces in this context is
02:16
how do we
02:18
prevent this situation from escalating
02:21
into a direct confrontation between
02:24
russia and the west
02:26
something that
02:27
the united states government has
02:29
consistently said it does not want
02:32
we’ve consistently said that we will not
02:34
use american military forces directly
02:38
against the russians
02:39
in any way
02:41
i think it’s fair to say that the
02:42
russians are not
02:44
looking for a direct military
02:46
confrontation with the west either
02:49
unfortunately
02:52
in the world of international relations
02:54
uh what people intend doesn’t always
02:56
translate into what actually happens and
02:59
i think there is a significant danger
03:01
that we could wind up in an escalation
03:04
spiral that brings the united states and
03:07
russia eyeball to eyeball to use the
03:10
term that
03:12
we used
03:13
at the cuban missile crisis
03:16
in a way that nobody wants uh and and we
03:18
have to be very careful under these uh
03:21
circumstances to
03:23
make sure that doesn’t happen
03:25
now uh how could this sort of thing
03:27
happen
03:28
well unfortunately
03:30
we’re in a situation where the united
03:32
states and europe
03:34
are both saying
03:36
we’re going to punish the russians we’re
03:38
going to make this as difficult and
03:41
bloody and hopefully unsuccessful an
03:44
invasion as possible
03:46
that approach
03:48
contains within it the seeds of
03:50
potential escalation even though we
03:51
don’t want that how
03:54
well i want to
03:55
harken back to what happened
03:58
with japan imperial japan and world war
04:00
ii when the united states imposed what
04:03
you might call draconian sanctions on
04:05
japan
04:06
as a penalty and deterrent to japanese
04:09
expansion in asia
04:11
the idea was that we were would cut off
04:14
japan and japan’s economy
04:16
from vitally important access to
04:20
resources that it needed to survive
04:23
the hope was that this would cause the
04:25
japanese to think twice about their
04:27
ambitions in in asia
04:30
what in fact happened was that they
04:32
regarded this as an existential threat
04:35
to japan
04:36
and believed that they had no choice
04:39
but to retaliate
04:41
we all know how that unfolded
04:43
historically
04:46
the danger we’re facing with russia is
04:48
that if the united states and europe
04:50
impose such draconian economic sanctions
04:53
on russia that it believes it is being
04:56
strangled
04:57
it is in my view quite likely that the
04:59
russians would retaliate
05:01
most americans don’t think that the
05:03
russian capacity for retaliation is all
05:05
that serious because we we expect that
05:08
it would be limited to reciprocal
05:10
economic sanctions on us and the
05:12
americans don’t fear
05:14
russian economic sanctions the russians
05:16
don’t have much leverage in that way
05:19
over trade
05:20
in the american economy
05:22
what i think is more likely is that the
05:24
russians could look at our
05:25
vulnerabilities
05:27
and say
05:29
we’re going to attack those if you think
05:31
you can bring our economy to a grinding
05:33
hall well we can bring your economy to a
05:36
grinding hall and we won’t do that
05:37
through sanctions we’ll do it because
05:40
your economy is completely dependent
05:42
on a digital infrastructure and
05:45
space-based resources
05:47
that are entirely defenseless you can’t
05:50
do a thing to prevent us from
05:51
threatening those
05:54
our uh
05:55
global positioning system satellite
05:57
constellation
05:59
is not simply a navigation system it’s a
06:02
timing system on which our entire
06:05
economy depends our ability to use atms
06:09
our ability to generate and distribute
06:11
power
06:12
to conduct
06:15
exchanges at stores all of this depends
06:19
on that and it’s completely vulnerable
06:20
the russians know that
06:22
they in fact early on in this crisis
06:25
over ukraine months ago when they were
06:26
first massing forces
06:28
near ukrainian borders they conducted an
06:31
anti-satellite
06:32
uh missile test that was successful they
06:36
actually destroyed one of their own
06:38
missiles
06:39
and then sent us a message afterwards
06:41
and said
06:42
this shows that we are capable of taking
06:45
the entire american gps constellation
06:48
offline
06:50
now would they do that i don’t think
06:52
it’s their choice to do that but that is
06:54
a card that they could play
06:56
if they think the united states and
06:59
europe are severely threatening russia’s
07:02
economy in other words
07:04
when states feel that they face
07:07
existential threats
07:09
regardless of whether those perceptions
07:11
are accurate or not
07:12
they can do things that are
07:14
extraordinarily shockingly risky
07:17
and i think we’re entering into a period
07:19
where the russians think that
07:21
they’ve got a lot at stake here
07:24
we should be careful that they don’t do
07:27
things that we would imagine they would
07:29
never do in all this this situation so
07:32
that i think is a very important
07:34
interest for the united states something
07:36
we’re going to have to take very
07:37
seriously moving forward
07:40
thank you very much before we move
07:41
forward i want to ask you one question
07:44
because i think
07:45
it
07:46
may color our further conversation
07:49
why do you think putin did what he did
07:52
because uh so many people especially in
07:55
russia among our russian colleagues as a
07:58
matter of fact
07:59
uh they thought uh that russia would
08:02
posture that russian forces would
08:05
move next to the ukrainian border but
08:07
that putin would stop
08:10
and would not proceed with an actual
08:12
intervention
08:13
uh do you believe that we are dealing
08:16
with a russian master plan they knew all
08:19
along when they were
08:21
making the rather extreme proposals
08:24
about ukraine never ever in nato that
08:27
they knew all along that they would
08:29
proceed with that kind of a military
08:31
operation or there is a lot of if you
08:34
wish ad hoc staff there on putin’s part
08:38
and
08:38
he did not anticipate himself how this
08:41
crisis would evolve
08:44
well i don’t think that this is a master
08:46
plan that was
08:48
pre-prepared
08:50
months or years ago
08:51
um you’ll recall in 2014 uh after the
08:56
maidan uh revolution and all that ensued
09:00
from that
09:01
putin faced a choice back then after
09:04
uh lugons and genet’s
09:07
declared independence
09:09
there was a lot of political pressure on
09:11
him in russia to recognize the
09:13
independence of those so-called people’s
09:15
republics he did not do it he took a lot
09:18
of heat from his political right for
09:20
electing not to do that and i think his
09:23
choice was rooted in a fundamental
09:25
strategic calculation that what he
09:28
really wanted in ukraine
09:30
was that ukraine not ever become a
09:33
member of nato or not ever host
09:36
nato military forces on its territory
09:40
and
09:41
the prospect of of that is what drove
09:45
his decision then not to recognize those
09:48
republics because his hope was that they
09:51
would have autonomy inside ukraine
09:54
and that autonomy would effectively
09:56
allow them
09:57
to veto a membership in nato uh
10:01
of that the many in in
10:05
ukraine were advocating in other words
10:08
um they were a cat’s paw so to speak for
10:10
the russians to prevent a geopolitical
10:12
orientation in ukraine that russia found
10:15
threatening
10:16
i think the reason why he launched his
10:20
invasion today
10:21
was that he concluded
10:23
um after an enormous amount of uh
10:27
diplomatic negotiation and frankly you
10:30
know outright um
10:33
you know blackmail
10:35
military compellence coercion on his
10:37
part trying to squeeze
10:40
ukraine and the west into giving up this
10:42
possibility he had concluded that it
10:45
failed that the minsk uh two
10:48
negotiating deal that the russians had
10:50
been insisting be implemented for years
10:53
would never be implemented and he also
10:55
concluded that the west would never
10:58
agree formally to close the door on
11:01
ukrainian military membership in nato
11:03
now he worked himself into a bit of a
11:05
corner
11:06
when you uh
11:08
you know sit down at the table and drop
11:10
your loaded gun next to you and say hey
11:12
let’s talk you either reach a deal or
11:15
you use the gun and he wasn’t able to
11:17
reach the deal and he i think
11:20
maneuvered himself
11:22
i believe unwisely into a situation
11:24
where he had to follow through
11:27
and we’ve we’re seeing what what has
11:29
followed from that
11:30
george thank you very much paul
11:34
oh thank you for the opportunity to
11:35
participate uh
11:37
still trying to overcome the fear that
11:39
george has instilled
11:41
on what the on what the russians might
11:42
do next but uh
11:44
uh i just want to interject a few
11:45
thoughts on where china fits into pc
11:47
equation
11:48
uh
11:49
starting with the idea that china
11:50
doesn’t want to be part of this equation
11:52
uh i think this is a
11:55
uh this has left beijing in a very
11:56
uncomfortable position from their
11:58
perspective uh because among other
12:00
things it’s it’s exposed
12:03
uh a fault line a pre-existing fault
12:05
line between beijing and moscow that had
12:07
been latent for the most part
12:09
but is no longer avoidable for the
12:12
chinese uh and it’s really interesting
12:14
that this comes you know literally less
12:15
than a month after
12:17
uh that very dramatic joint uh sign of
12:20
russian communique that putin and xi
12:22
published
12:23
about there being no limits to their
12:24
cooperation and their partnership and
12:26
their friendship
12:27
uh
12:28
the chinese did not want this to happen
12:31
uh i think they’ve been surprised by the
12:33
uh intensity and the speed uh of it
12:36
uh and i think you know
12:39
they’ve responded
12:41
uh with an effort it seems uh to date to
12:44
be
12:45
uh aimed at trying to walk a tightrope
12:47
and have it both ways uh
12:49
they don’t wanna alienate moscow they
12:51
don’t want to alienate the europeans
12:52
they don’t want to alienate us anymore
12:55
than they already have so i think
12:57
they’ve adopted a really
13:00
kind of obtuse rhetorical position uh
13:03
which they think is you know a principal
13:05
position
13:06
uh in fact i think it’s one that they
13:09
take some comfort in the expectation
13:10
that both washington and moscow will
13:13
will disregard uh but on one side of the
13:16
equation the chinese have uh
13:18
have essentially aligned with moscow in
13:21
terms of criticizing the united states
13:24
uh and the ukrainians for that matter uh
13:26
[Music]
13:28
with respect to nato expansion having
13:30
been one of the catalysts for this uh
13:32
for this crisis having developed
13:34
um and the the chinese have affirmed
13:37
uh the notion that russia had uh
13:40
legitimate security interests that uh
13:42
that it felt was challenged here not not
13:44
to say that they’ve endorsed uh putin’s
13:46
response to it entirely uh but that’s
13:48
really the dilemma they face on the
13:50
other side of the equation there have
13:52
been very subtle
13:54
uh
13:55
hints which
13:56
i i think the chinese believe
13:59
uh
13:59
[Music]
14:01
won’t alienate the russians but do kind
14:02
of establish some distance they’ve
14:04
reaffirmed the importance of uh the
14:06
sovereignty and territory territorial
14:08
integrity of all countries all sovereign
14:11
countries
14:12
uh
14:14
you know because this is their
14:16
one of their mantras uh which is you
14:18
know relevant to taiwan and all the
14:20
other issues uh but it’s not clear how
14:23
we’re supposed to interpret that’s
14:24
application to ukraine itself
14:26
uh the chinese are just trying to trying
14:28
to avoid that and it’s it’s not clear
14:31
apparently xi jinping spoke to putin on
14:33
the phone today and reiterated some of
14:35
these same issues um
14:38
so there seems to be some effort
14:40
to at least subtly exert pressure on
14:43
putin uh
14:44
not to cease and desist but i mean the
14:46
focus that the chinese have always
14:47
adopted in these situations is everyone
14:50
should exercise restraint uh and find
14:52
some way for a peaceful resolution uh
14:55
i think the problem is that this is this
14:57
is a straddling position that is is is
15:00
is not really convincing and frankly is
15:02
not going to be sustainable for the
15:04
chinese uh for much longer uh
15:07
they really face a dilemma here um
15:09
they’re they’re they’re invite by by
15:12
leaning toward the moscow’s position on
15:15
this
15:15
uh by not uh criticizing it more
15:18
explicitly they’re running the risk of
15:20
greater diplomatication diplomatic
15:22
isolation for china itself uh and
15:25
inviting more balancing against it uh
15:28
and against the china-russia partnership
15:30
that we’ve that we’ve seen over the last
15:32
couple years uh
15:34
they’re they’re confronting the the
15:37
the inconvenient truth that there are
15:39
some liabilities for beijing in its
15:41
relationship with moscow and in fact
15:42
i’ve seen some indications that there
15:44
are certainly people within beijing who
15:46
are starting to express discomfort about
15:48
the situation and what they should do
15:49
about it i think basically
15:53
nation has some choices to make
15:55
uh
15:56
uh and some of them are going to be
15:58
forced upon it in the very near future
16:00
uh
16:01
how much is it gonna
16:03
in its cost benefit analysis uh how does
16:05
it weigh
16:06
uh its relationship with moscow uh the
16:09
common agenda that they outlined
16:10
together on the fourth of february uh
16:13
and the risk of alienating uh the
16:15
russians against
16:17
uh their long-standing positions on
16:19
sovereignty and non-intervention in the
16:21
internal affairs of other countries
16:22
other sovereign entities
16:25
and the risks to their relationship with
16:27
the eu
16:29
and the potential for a possible opening
16:31
opportunity for working with the united
16:32
states i think this
16:34
in the end it does provide well not in
16:36
the end for the
16:37
in the immediate
16:39
situation the this does provide an
16:41
opportunity for washington
16:43
to leverage and try to influence some of
16:44
these choices that the chinese uh are
16:46
gonna have to make uh you know not to
16:49
explicitly drive a wedge between moscow
16:51
and beijing uh but to highlight for the
16:54
chinese some of the broader interests
16:56
that might uh motivate it toward
16:58
distancing itself in some way from from
17:00
what putin has done
17:03
uh and in fact there was a report
17:04
published in this morning’s uh new york
17:06
times uh that suggested that uh
17:09
washington seized this opportunity over
17:10
the past several weeks and was even
17:12
sharing intel
17:13
uh with the chinese in an effort to get
17:15
them to put more pressure on moscow uh i
17:18
think the bottom line frankly is that
17:20
you know we may be presumptuous about
17:22
what china’s called cost-benefit
17:24
analysis of this situation is going to
17:26
be
17:27
uh
17:28
they seem to be hesitant uh for the time
17:31
being uh
17:32
because frankly from the chinese
17:34
perspective they see no incentive or
17:35
reason
17:36
to expect that
17:38
uh siding with washington and the
17:41
europeans against moscow is going to
17:42
have immediate or real benefits in terms
17:45
of
17:46
a retreat from what had been a
17:48
contentious
17:49
uh bilateral relationship with
17:51
washington uh
17:53
kind of coalition uh against
17:56
uh china from its perspective
17:58
uh and unfortunately i think the chinese
18:01
may still believe that their
18:02
relationship with moscow
18:04
uh on balance is a better bet
18:07
for them uh at least for the near term
18:09
in terms of what’s conducive to their
18:11
interests uh i think that’s why uh
18:15
and and actually i one of the one other
18:16
thought i mean i i think the uh one of
18:18
the other constraints on the chinese
18:20
distance in themselves uh at our behest
18:23
or in our request or at our suggestion
18:25
is that they really
18:27
uh they strongly agree with moscow on
18:29
the nato expansion issue as having been
18:31
a catalyst for this uh and i don’t think
18:32
that they uh want to endorse uh
18:36
washington’s superior apparent efforts
18:38
to
18:39
to minimize that or disregard
18:41
uh so that’s why i think they’re leaning
18:43
toward moscow for the time being uh but
18:46
i’ll close with this i mean i think
18:47
there are two specific issues that are
18:49
going to force the issue uh force the
18:52
decision for them i mean the real the
18:53
rubber is going to meet the road as
18:55
another colleague said a couple days ago
18:57
the real test is going to be where china
18:59
comes down on sanctions enforcement uh
19:01
whether it’s going to provide relief
19:04
to
19:06
to moscow uh
19:08
in the near well in the near term as as
19:10
the sanctions get ramped up uh and
19:13
secondly where the chinese are going to
19:14
come down uh on any u.n vote uh
19:18
in condemnation or uh in terms of u.n
19:21
action against the russians the chinese
19:24
uh have
19:25
walked this line and danced it before uh
19:28
during the crimea crisis back in 2014
19:30
and earlier uh
19:34
they have on a couple of occasions taken
19:36
the easy way out of abstaining from a
19:37
vote uh but it depends on whether they
19:40
feel strongly enough about the risks to
19:42
their relationship and the benefits of
19:44
with moscow uh and the benefits of
19:46
retreating from it that they might even
19:48
consider a veto on you in action i think
19:49
that would be a disastrous decision for
19:51
them but i think sanctions and u.n
19:54
uh
19:55
deliberations are going to be the two uh
19:57
areas where we need to look next to
19:59
determine how the chinese are going to
20:01
play into the situation
20:03
well uh obviously the u.n vote is very
20:06
important and russians have some
20:08
high hope but my impression is that they
20:12
are not sure themselves what the chinese
20:15
are going to do in the united nations
20:17
but the real question for moscow the
20:19
real question
20:21
is whether they will get any assistance
20:23
with sanctions
20:25
whether the chinese would help them
20:27
would help major russian banks
20:30
to deal with restrictions which were
20:32
just imposed on them and of course again
20:36
new restrictions to technology transfer
20:38
to russia will china be willing to help
20:41
and i think
20:42
that what china is going to do in this
20:45
area will not only have an impact on a
20:48
russian relationship with china it will
20:51
have an impact on how much flexibility
20:54
putin will display in dealing with this
20:57
ukrainian crisis would you dare to make
20:59
any prediction
21:02
uh
21:03
it is hard to predict because i mean i
21:05
think the chinese are still
21:07
uncertain themselves as to where they
21:09
want to come down tactically on some of
21:10
these issues uh i think you’re right
21:13
that uh
21:15
you know if they believe that they need
21:16
to influence uh
21:18
who in a more restrained direction uh
21:21
they they certainly do have the leverage
21:24
uh
21:24
with economic sanctions and technology
21:26
transfers um
21:29
but i i you know i think they have this
21:31
kind of uh
21:32
aversion to
21:34
to doing that of
21:36
if they think it’s primarily a favor to
21:38
us and to the west uh so i i think that
21:41
the i really i
21:43
i’m not in a position to predict uh i’m
21:45
not sure where they’re going to come
21:47
down on this um
21:49
but but i think that they have to
21:52
they have to make a choice as to you
21:54
know what kind of relationship they can
21:56
they can sustain and particularly with
21:57
the europeans
21:59
uh because i think the year
22:01
the europeans might even have a greater
22:02
influence on the chinese than washington
22:04
may have at this stage on this point
22:06
uh
22:08
because the the chinese
22:10
i mean for different reasons the chinese
22:12
may think that the you know a better
22:13
relationship with washington may be
22:15
close to a lost cause but they still
22:16
hold out hope for the europeans and they
22:18
don’t want to alienate them uh so i
22:20
think that has to factor into their
22:22
decision as to how
22:23
um
22:25
how much the how they want to play and
22:26
how much they want to respond on on the
22:28
sanctions issue
22:31
thank you very much
22:32
and that was i hope you will help us to
22:34
understand
22:35
what does it all mean for the united
22:37
states and anything you want to say
22:40
about u.s policy on this issue so far
22:44
thank you very much i i suppose that i
22:46
should begin by saying i agree with
22:48
everything that everybody else has said
22:50
uh that would make it easy uh
22:52
unfortunately there is more to it
22:56
i think the united states has now made
22:58
itself almost completely irrelevant uh
23:01
to what has happened
23:02
uh our unrelenting hostility towards
23:05
moscow
23:06
is not something that
23:08
positions us to
23:10
influence anything in any sort of
23:12
positive direction so i don’t think it
23:14
really matters what we say or do at this
23:15
point
23:16
we’re no longer welcome at the table
23:19
i think the initiative uh for any sort
23:21
of resolution that makes sense probably
23:23
rests uh with the europeans other than
23:27
uh mr putin undoubtedly schultz and uh
23:30
secondarily macron
23:32
let’s be frank when you talk about the
23:35
eu it’s a gathering of pygmies except
23:38
for the one six foot five giant in the
23:40
room and that’s germany
23:42
everything else almost shrinks to
23:43
insignificance
23:44
the russo-german relationship is
23:46
extremely important
23:48
uh schultz is paying
23:50
lip service to a lot of things but he’s
23:52
privately made it very clear the germans
23:55
will not support
23:56
excluding russia from swift i think as
23:59
time goes on and things settle down in
24:02
ukraine and i think they will there will
24:04
be less and less interest in europe but
24:06
specifically with germany
24:09
in doing anything that could disrupt or
24:11
harm
24:12
commerce and business
24:14
with russia
24:15
i think mr putin is should be very
24:18
pleased with the conduct of the
24:20
operations for what it’s worth
24:22
i’m sure that we will continue to pour
24:24
buckets of filth and abuse all over the
24:26
russians but the truth is
24:28
i think the operation is being
24:29
professionally conducted
24:31
and the russians have exercised great
24:33
restraint with regard to the use of
24:35
firepower trying to minimize unnecessary
24:38
damage
24:39
and i think now
24:41
they’ve essentially accomplished most of
24:43
what they set out to do which is to
24:44
seize eastern ukraine all the way down
24:46
to the southern coast and up to the
24:48
border with russia
24:50
the question is what’s next
24:52
uh
24:53
there are reports coming out that he’s
24:55
talking to macron and others and trying
24:58
to meet with the ukrainians in minsk who
25:00
knows
25:02
he controls the situation he’s decided
25:04
at least for the moment to pause at the
25:06
upper river
25:07
which i think is very wise on his part
25:10
he is going to define the parameters of
25:13
the ukrainian state there’s no question
25:14
about it
25:15
but if the germans and the french and
25:17
others weigh in they will have some
25:19
influence i just don’t see that we will
25:21
and eventually we will be isolated
25:24
because the hard sanctions and the
25:26
reaction is not going to be supported
25:28
throughout most of europe
25:30
a quick note on the chinese i think we
25:33
can bet very with great certainty that
25:35
the chinese are opposed to conflict in
25:37
any form they’re all about business and
25:39
making money end of discussion
25:41
and they need the russians desperately
25:43
in central asia
25:45
the russians provide the muscle and also
25:48
have the relationships in central asia
25:50
to keep that stable
25:51
if central asia is not stable then the
25:53
russians cannot move commerce or excuse
25:56
me the chinese cannot move commerce to
25:57
europe
25:58
it’s as simple as that
26:00
but the notion that china is going to
26:02
step out and somehow another criticize
26:04
russia or
26:05
join a sanctions regime i think is
26:07
ridiculous
26:08
and even though the japanese have their
26:10
reasons for feeling hostility towards
26:12
russia because of the cure islands and
26:13
other matters
26:15
uh i think they’ll end up buying russian
26:17
oil through china if necessary and gas
26:20
and so forth so my prediction is this
26:22
will all settle down
26:24
uh we’ll end up with a new ukrainian
26:26
construct who runs it i have no idea
26:28
will will the west simply become a
26:30
neutral
26:31
almost landlocked lily pad it may
26:34
uh it’s hard to tell but i think we’re
26:36
going to watch nato fragment i think uh
26:39
washington’s leadership will be
26:40
diminished and eventually become
26:42
completely irrelevant as we turn inwards
26:45
uh well we will have to make one
26:47
decision which will make us relevant at
26:50
least i think so uh it seems to me uh
26:53
that
26:55
the russians will have
26:57
at least a partial military victory in
26:59
ukraine i completely agree with you that
27:02
the russians are running a rather
27:05
professional operation their force is
27:07
clearly much stronger than ukrainian
27:09
force uh we already have a lot of
27:11
reports that ukrainian nationalist
27:14
battalions
27:15
are fighting bravery but ukrainian
27:18
regulars well uh some of them go to the
27:21
russian side and some of them uh create
27:24
an impression that uh they just don’t
27:26
feel that this this war has much to do
27:30
with them i i think that
27:32
from the military standpoint
27:34
russian victory is practically assured
27:37
at the same time
27:39
what i see from the russian press and
27:41
conversations with the russians
27:43
is that they take european and
27:46
particular sanctions quite seriously
27:49
much more seriously than ever before
27:52
and they don’t understand that for the
27:54
first time these sanctions can inflict
27:57
real pain on the russian economy and
28:00
have destabilizing impact on the russian
28:02
regime so there is a question
28:05
uh if putin is interested in
28:08
having a deal
28:10
and clearly this deal would not be so
28:12
much with zerensky it would have to be
28:15
with the united states and the european
28:17
union particularly with the united
28:19
states
28:20
if you were running american foreign
28:22
policy
28:23
what kind of a deal would you offer the
28:25
russians or would you would simply say
28:29
look you bastards you misbehaved you
28:31
have done terrible things
28:33
it is your
28:35
own responsibility to find a way out or
28:38
would you try to negotiate with them
28:40
some kind of a deal your
28:42
advice well i would advise talking
28:45
immediately to president putin of course
28:48
thus far any attempt to reach him from
28:50
washington has failed
28:52
and i think we need to keep that in mind
28:53
he’s been talking to us for a very long
28:56
time and we’ve ignored him but i would
28:58
urge us to simply accept the facts on
29:00
the ground
29:01
look at the map which we’ve seen many
29:03
many times
29:04
and try to negotiate
29:07
neutrality for the western portion of
29:09
ukraine
29:10
that’s a convenient buffer for him and a
29:13
convenient buffer for us
29:15
that keeps russian forces and
29:17
capabilities far from
29:19
nato’s eastern border
29:21
i think the nato allies would accept
29:23
that
29:23
i simply see no evidence that we’re
29:26
going to be even remotely reasonable
29:28
we we we have truly painted ourselves
29:31
into a corner if you continue to insist
29:33
that the president of russia is a
29:34
vicious thug
29:36
and that anything he does is unlawful
29:38
and illegal you have no influence so the
29:40
first thing you have to do is step back
29:42
and acknowledge what’s happened there’s
29:43
a rationale for it accept it
29:45
and let’s talk about what we can do from
29:47
this point forward to end the conflict
29:50
as quickly as possible and restore some
29:52
measure of order and prosperity to the
29:54
region i think that will resonate
29:56
strongly with the germans with
29:58
hungarians the slovaks i think even the
30:02
baltic states would welcome that as
30:04
would romania
30:06
but i don’t see us doing it
30:07
unfortunately so as a result of our
30:10
unwillingness to do that to dimitri i i
30:13
think we’re going to be marginalized and
30:14
over time we’ll lose all our influence
30:17
in europe because the rest of the
30:18
europeans will say thank you very much
30:20
we don’t want to participate with the
30:21
exception of course of our friend
30:23
boris
30:25
who’s ultimately interested in being the
30:27
principal blowhard for the
30:28
anglo-american alliance
30:30
douglas thank you very much
30:32
let’s go to questions a question from
30:35
kevin black
30:37
any idea of the russian people’s
30:39
response or attitude to putin’s attack
30:42
does it matter
30:44
george i think it’s to you
30:46
i’ll start with the second of those
30:48
questions does it matter and i would say
30:50
no not at this point
30:52
i don’t think it has any impacts on the
30:55
decisions that one man in russia is
30:58
making and that’s vladimir putin
31:01
i don’t think he’s concerned about
31:03
protest at this point he’s indicated
31:05
that he will act decisively to
31:08
squash it as necessary
31:11
so
31:12
it is interesting to watch i don’t think
31:14
it at this point is anywhere close to
31:16
the point where it is threatening putin
31:19
affecting his decision-making or
31:22
threatening prospects for russian
31:23
stability in the near term could it
31:25
evolve in that direction in the future
31:29
sure conceivably it could
31:31
um i i think a lot of russians are
31:33
shocked by what has happened including
31:35
many in the russian elite who didn’t
31:37
expect that uh russia would actually
31:40
initiate this war
31:42
they they believed that this was being
31:44
uh this this
31:45
military force was being assembled for
31:48
purposes of coercion of compelling a
31:51
deal on the part of the west
31:53
uh preparing for the possibility of
31:55
ukrainian attack in some way but they
31:57
didn’t imagine that it would actually be
31:59
a war that russia initiated so that
32:02
shock matters
32:03
and i think putin does uh
32:06
regard his his base within the russian
32:09
elite as important
32:11
right now i think although they’re
32:12
shocked they’re also cowed
32:15
i don’t think there’s anybody in the
32:16
elite that’s willing to step up and
32:18
challenge him and i don’t think that
32:20
will change unless the russians face
32:23
some sort of calamity
32:25
on the battlefield
32:27
or a real crisis with the west that
32:30
endangers russia’s security but for now
32:32
i don’t think there’s a danger
32:34
uh well let me uh uh
32:37
uh push you on this a little bit
32:40
uh there was this uh unprecedented
32:43
letter by a bunch of russian generals
32:46
uh uh criticizing putin for a decision
32:49
to intervene and actually demanding
32:51
information
32:53
and these people were were not some
32:55
pacifists they were led by as in famous
32:59
leonid
33:00
three star general who was always
33:03
considered a hardliner and there were
33:05
some people with a real combat
33:07
experience
33:09
then uh we uh
33:11
you and i know uh that some uh leading
33:14
russian experts
33:16
uh do not want to appear on tv and to
33:19
comment on this situation
33:21
because clearly they are apprehensive
33:23
about what putin is doing
33:25
now in both cases we are talking about a
33:27
minority
33:29
but i haven’t seen even that kind of a
33:31
minority before challenging putin
33:33
sections do we believe that this is
33:36
significant uh that this way a kind of
33:39
indicate a growing opposition to putin
33:42
or if he’s his foreign policy or it is
33:45
just a passing incident
33:48
well i think human beings are such that
33:50
they tend to
33:53
support winners
33:55
and i think that’s what’s going to
33:56
happen in this case if putin pulls us
33:59
off and is in some way successful
34:01
the problem is not going to become
34:03
significant
34:04
if he fails or is perceived as failing
34:07
that’s a different matter so
34:10
that’s really what’s at stake here and
34:12
that actually reinforces i believe
34:14
putin’s determination
34:16
uh to be successful and to do whatever
34:18
is necessary here to to ensure success
34:22
as he defines it
34:24
thanks
34:25
second question is certificate from
34:27
somebody who knows china well grammarism
34:31
he writes with respect i disagree with
34:34
paul
34:35
will china have russia’s back
34:37
what will they say my bet is they will
34:41
uh and i know graham for many years he’s
34:44
not normally a betting man so what i’m
34:46
sure you will take this challenge
34:48
seriously
34:50
i know graham not as well as you perhaps
34:52
but uh
34:53
uh
34:54
i’m not sure i’ll take the bet but uh
34:57
i’m not sure i disagree that much uh
34:59
with him that we disagree i mean i think
35:01
you know what i was trying to say i
35:02
think beijing will basically have
35:05
it will be more it’ll have moscow’s back
35:08
or at least be more on that side than
35:09
the other than the other i think the
35:11
question is you know how substantive uh
35:14
i think it’s going to be less than
35:15
full-throated
35:16
support uh i mean doug made the point
35:19
and i agree that china’s not going to
35:20
join the sanctions regime against moscow
35:23
the only question is what what kind and
35:25
what level of
35:26
sanctions relief
35:28
will the chinese provide uh i think
35:30
that’s going to be calibrated uh and i
35:32
think again
35:34
they will have moscow’s side but there
35:36
will be limits because the chinese are
35:39
uncomfortable with this
35:40
they want this to stop i mean i think
35:42
doug made the point uh
35:44
uh you know there there is i think the
35:47
chinese actually would agree with the
35:48
position that this conflict needs to end
35:51
i think frankly the chinese would
35:52
support the idea of ukrainian neutrality
35:55
being the exit ramp from this uh
35:58
the question is whether there’s a
36:00
version of that that’s mutually
36:01
acceptable to moscow and
36:03
and washington and the europeans
36:05
uh
36:06
the chinese are gonna they’re gonna try
36:09
um to stay out of the center of this uh
36:12
but for the reason for strategic and
36:14
tactical reasons uh and unless they see
36:17
uh both positive uh
36:20
more than just negative positive
36:22
incentives uh
36:25
they’re not going to retreat from that
36:26
they’re going to
36:27
well i mean from
36:30
washington or the europeans uh they’re
36:33
going to stay
36:34
basically aligned with the with the
36:36
russian position because they don’t see
36:38
any powerful incentives to assume the
36:40
risk of alienating moscow
36:43
thank you very much
36:44
uh and now from robert manning of the
36:47
atlantic council
36:49
how does this end is it a question of
36:52
pay payment our emulator can there be
36:55
any stable outcome without some type of
36:59
ukrainian neutrality and understandings
37:01
with russia i think it’s uh douglas
37:06
no i don’t think you can have a
37:09
positive outcome on for anyone without
37:12
some sort of arrangement for neutrality
37:14
but i also think that you’re going to
37:16
have to accept the fact that where
37:17
russian troops currently stand is now
37:20
going to be effectively part of russia
37:22
the notion that the russian forces will
37:24
withdraw from eastern ukraine is absurd
37:26
and that’s one of the points that uh i
37:28
think mr putin has made in the past you
37:30
know stop talking about leaving crimea
37:34
he’s he’s not going to accept the notion
37:36
that they’re going to withdraw from
37:37
odessa from crimea or anywhere else as
37:40
for the rest of it i think he’s
37:42
receptive to it the problem is
37:46
the europeans are going to have to take
37:47
the lead here because washington is
37:50
almost paralyzed it’s paralyzed by its
37:53
own words
37:54
but this administration seems incapable
37:57
of formulating any sort of reasonable
37:59
policy the only thing it can do
38:01
is insult people that it doesn’t agree
38:04
with and then threaten or impose
38:06
economic sanctions but as i said before
38:09
over time these sanctions mean less and
38:11
less and i think in particular
38:14
in europe berlin is not going to support
38:16
it all
38:17
they’ll pay lip service to it i mean the
38:19
joke in berlin is that schultz said sure
38:22
uh you know we’ll delay nordstrom 2.
38:24
well the truth is the north stream 2 is
38:26
being delayed anyway it’s going to come
38:28
into effect within the next 90 days he
38:31
knows that he can sit tight wait for
38:33
this to stop and then it’ll be turned on
38:36
i think we’re the ones that have
38:37
marginalized ourselves so to go back and
38:39
say we’ve got to have the u.s involved
38:40
in this i think it would be nice if we’d
38:42
shut up
38:43
sit be somewhat more reasonable and
38:46
encourage europeans to cut some sort of
38:48
arrangement with moscow but i don’t see
38:50
us doing it so unfortunately
38:53
i think the whole thing can end i think
38:56
macron and schultz can do that and
38:58
others in europe orbon can certainly
39:00
help with that but i don’t see us having
39:02
much impact
39:05
uh george
39:06
uh when you look uh at this whole
39:09
situation
39:10
uh in ukraine and how it was approached
39:13
by putin
39:14
i at least
39:16
have an impression
39:17
that very few people in the russian
39:19
leadership
39:21
quite knew
39:22
what kind of a decision putin was going
39:24
to make
39:26
my impression is that even uh the
39:28
foreign minister sergey lavrov
39:31
i shouldn’t say was uh in the dark
39:34
but was not entirely informed uh about
39:39
what putin was going to decide and what
39:42
criteria he was going to use
39:44
are we dealing with the situation
39:47
when in moscow there is not just
39:50
one real decider but a situation
39:54
when a formal decision-making system is
39:57
much less relevant uh that uh than
40:00
putting
40:01
personal relations in consultation with
40:05
his inner circle and if uh
40:08
the lady is correct who these people are
40:13
well i i agree with the picture that
40:16
you’ve just painted there
40:17
i think this is a situation where
40:20
uh putin is interacting with a very
40:22
narrow circle of people
40:24
not very many
40:26
russians
40:28
have access to putin’s thinking or
40:30
decision making in all of this
40:33
and i think many people last week
40:35
including myself thought that the
40:37
russians were going to give this a
40:38
little bit more time to see whether a
40:40
deal could be made
40:42
um and it turned out that putin
40:45
decided you know
40:47
i think maybe a week earlier than i i
40:49
expected him to to launch this uh
40:51
invasion
40:53
but um
40:54
who who is in that inner circle um i
40:56
think one can only guess really uh
41:00
i last meant in terms of specific names
41:03
but what kind of people well what kind
41:06
of people i think is pretty clear uh you
41:09
know the the the term that the russians
41:11
use is the syllabic e uh
41:14
the people uh in
41:16
the military and intelligence community
41:19
and largely in the intelligence
41:21
circles over there
41:23
um who are
41:25
uh pretty tough uh hard-nosed people
41:28
they play full contact politics
41:31
uh for them you know war is not a game
41:33
it’s a very serious matter uh they play
41:35
to win um they play to win inside russia
41:38
and outside russia
41:40
and they have
41:41
quite strong views about the west
41:45
and
41:46
regard the united states and and uh nato
41:49
as enemies uh with very hostile
41:52
intentions toward russia who must be
41:54
dealt with
41:56
uh with that in mind so i think we’re
41:58
seeing that play out
42:00
thank you
42:01
now thomas connor senior foreign policy
42:04
right at newsweek
42:05
is there a concern that the breakdown in
42:08
u.s russian relations over ukraine
42:10
paired with the collapse of bilateral
42:12
arms control agreements in the past
42:14
years could lead to a new arms race in
42:17
europe uh as both nato and russia seek
42:20
to once again fortified their petitions
42:23
that was their mind if we will thank you
42:27
well i suppose if you think you can just
42:29
print money in perpetuity without any
42:31
consequences
42:33
we could have an arms race but to be
42:35
quite frank i think we’re nearing
42:37
bankruptcy here in the united states it
42:39
was interesting for me to note that the
42:41
russian
42:42
gdp debt to gdp ratio is about 18
42:46
which is
42:47
easily manageable it makes good sense
42:49
uh our debt to gdp ratio is 120 plus
42:53
percent perhaps more
42:56
we’re not healthy uh we cannot afford
42:59
this major buildup that people talk
43:01
about we’ve wasted trillions on all
43:03
sorts of bright shiny objects there’s
43:05
been no strategic focus to guide any of
43:08
the spending
43:09
i think we’ve about had it so i don’t
43:11
see this arms race necessarily
43:13
materializing as some people do
43:15
obviously there are lots of people on
43:16
the hill that would love that i don’t
43:18
think we can afford it i don’t think
43:19
it’s going to happen and i think our
43:21
internal affairs are going to constrain
43:22
us dramatically in the near future
43:27
ah thank you
43:28
george of bosca
43:30
given the sizeable public protests in
43:32
russia against putin’s law and the
43:35
dissatisfaction of the oligarchs because
43:37
of the punitive sanctions
43:39
is there any plausible prospect of
43:41
regime change
43:43
can they always do anything to further
43:45
the clause i think it’s to you george
43:47
cleary
43:49
well uh the simple answers to that are
43:52
no and uh no we should not um
43:57
the
43:58
americans i think for years have been
44:01
tantalized by the prospect of some sort
44:03
of magic solution to this long-standing
44:07
dispute with russia
44:09
and the the magic solution is that putin
44:12
goes away and once he goes away since
44:14
he’s the source of all our problems
44:16
russia will be become quote-unquote
44:19
normal again and will have some sort of
44:21
rebirth of
44:23
uh new thinking and perestroika and
44:27
partnership with the russians and we
44:29
don’t really have to do anything on our
44:31
own here to make adjustments in this
44:33
relationship
44:34
um and and i think that’s simply a dream
44:38
um
44:39
whoever succeeds putin and i have no
44:41
idea who that might be
44:43
is not going to divert fundamentally
44:45
from long-standing russian traditions
44:49
uh what is a widespread belief that
44:52
russia
44:53
should not have a hostile military
44:55
alliance on its borders
44:57
um
44:59
that that sort of magic won’t happen
45:02
and the danger here is that the united
45:04
states believing that something like
45:06
that is possible will do things to
45:10
threaten russia with internal
45:12
instability in some way that only
45:15
reinforces the belief that
45:18
the united states is an irreconcilable
45:22
enemy of russia fundamentally
45:24
russophobic that there’s no point in
45:26
russia trying to find some sort of
45:28
accommodation with the west
45:30
and we wind up in a real uh
45:33
long-standing and quite dangerous
45:36
confrontation between the two countries
45:38
i think we have to start from the
45:40
premise
45:41
that in the nuclear era
45:44
russia and the united states russia and
45:46
the west are co-hostages
45:50
one security cannot be secured at the
45:53
expense of the others we have to
45:55
recognize that for us to be secure for
45:58
europe to be stable we have to provide
46:01
some measure of adequate security to
46:03
russia as well otherwise we’ll all be
46:06
losers in in this that’s the situation
46:09
that we’re facing we might not like that
46:11
reality but there it is we have to deal
46:13
with it
46:15
may i say something absolutely
46:18
it’s my impression that of the various
46:21
russian leaders that we could have had
46:23
over the last
46:24
20 or 30 years
46:26
we’ve been very fortunate with uh
46:28
vladimir putin simply because he
46:30
actually knows something about the west
46:33
uh historically we haven’t had very many
46:35
people in the kremlin who do
46:37
understand the west so i think that’s
46:39
the real question right now is can we
46:41
repair the damage
46:43
with mr putin again i’m not sure that we
46:46
can and then finally in contrast to
46:49
russia where mr putin is obviously in
46:51
command
46:52
we don’t know who’s running what in
46:54
washington dc
46:55
it’s a it’s a collection of people seen
46:58
and unseen with a president who’s viewed
47:00
as very unsteady
47:02
that’s not a good uh recipe for success
47:05
anywhere right now strategically
47:07
doctor thank you very much and the next
47:10
question is about china from somebody
47:13
who doesn’t need much introduction uh
47:15
thomas speakering who of course was
47:18
under secretary of state for policy and
47:20
was a very successful ambassador to
47:23
moscow when i’m saying very successful i
47:26
am not giving my humble judgment but it
47:28
was widely acknowledged at the time in
47:31
washington and moscow alike
47:33
and what uh ambassador pickering is
47:35
asking now is
47:37
who leads
47:38
stalin and mao broke or apart over this
47:45
the second question from ambassador
47:47
pickering is will chinese ukraine as a
47:50
template for brc using force to unify
47:54
taiwan with it
47:56
i think it’s clearly to paul right
47:59
uh yes thank you no those are both
48:01
excellent questions actually and they’re
48:02
getting a lot of commentary uh
48:05
over the last 48 hours uh well on the
48:08
taiwan issue but longer than that uh
48:10
i i think on on on the stalin mao issue
48:13
i i think that’s a that’s a
48:15
that highlights the discomfort that
48:17
beijing feels at this moment uh
48:20
i think beijing has had every reason to
48:23
see itself although not probably
48:26
talking this way with the russians as
48:28
the senior partner in the relationship
48:31
uh
48:32
you know because of the relative uh you
48:34
know material power and weight that they
48:36
have uh
48:37
and and here uh as a colleague of mine
48:40
uh reminded me this morning here the
48:42
chinese are seeing the discomfort with
48:44
that that they’re being held hostage or
48:46
at least being made uncomfortable
48:48
by
48:49
uh actions by the the junior partner uh
48:52
that it wishes had not happened so i
48:54
mean i i think that uh analytically it
48:57
makes sense that this uh could be the
48:59
basis for a decision by beijing uh to
49:02
distance itself maybe not as dramatic as
49:05
the is the break between mao and stalin
49:08
but i still come back to the point i
49:09
made earlier in that calculation i think
49:11
the chinese
49:13
are still disinclined to do that uh
49:16
because they have yet to see
49:18
uh any clear positive benefit
49:21
to their interest that would that would
49:23
uh
49:24
that would accrue uh from a decision to
49:27
break with moscow uh you know i think
49:30
those positive benefits
49:32
uh are readily you know
49:34
observable uh in theory uh
49:38
but i think the chinese are skeptical
49:40
that the washington and the west uh are
49:43
prepared to provide those benefits and
49:45
is some kind of a reciprocal uh response
49:48
uh to a decision by by beijing to break
49:51
with moscow uh on the second question
49:54
about what where what this means for
49:56
taiwan i mean there are all kinds of
49:57
implications there um i think the bottom
50:00
line i mean there’s different ways to
50:01
frame the question too uh i think the
50:03
way that ambassador pickering framed it
50:05
was uh will the chinese see this action
50:08
as a template uh
50:11
or a decision by them to use spores
50:12
against taiwan uh and my my short answer
50:15
is no
50:16
uh because i think there are there are
50:18
there are
50:19
several differences uh between the
50:22
ukraine case and the taiwan case i mean
50:24
certainly from the chinese perspective
50:26
uh the chinese um
50:28
they’re dealing they’re struggling with
50:29
the fact that they’ve always seen
50:30
ukraine as the sovereign entity they do
50:32
not see taiwan as a sovereign entity so
50:34
it’s as far as they’re concerned it’s
50:36
not applicable but i think the more
50:37
important element to answer the question
50:39
is that uh
50:41
it’s it’s about the potential u.s
50:43
response i mean the chinese have
50:44
observed as we all have uh a pretty
50:47
explicit uh indication that the united
50:50
states is not going to intervene
50:52
militarily
50:53
at least up to this point uh in defense
50:56
of uh of of ukraine uh the chinese i
51:01
think have long assumed that we would do
51:04
so
51:05
in the case of taiwan
51:07
i think that the chinese
51:09
they can read uh what’s been published
51:12
in the west uh about the difference
51:13
between the vital interests that the
51:15
united states has signed
51:17
appears to assign to taiwan compared to
51:20
the definition of vital interest uh in
51:22
ukraine uh which apparently has not met
51:24
the threshold for military intervention
51:27
uh
51:27
i think you know the bottom line is i
51:29
don’t think the chinese are seeing this
51:31
uh
51:32
as an opportunity or an excuse uh
51:36
to use force against they’re not gonna
51:38
against taiwan they’re not gonna take
51:40
advantage of our preoccupation uh
51:42
because even aside from this crisis in
51:45
ukraine uh i still believe the chinese
51:47
are not looking for excuses or
51:49
opportunities to attack taiwan they’re
51:50
still uh they’re not ready to do so yet
51:53
they’re still looking for reasons not to
51:55
uh so i think that there are lessons
51:57
that can be learned
51:58
uh
52:00
from the taiwan uh with regard to taiwan
52:02
both in taipei and in beijing
52:06
but just as an aside i think one of the
52:07
most important lessons that washington
52:10
uh
52:11
should be taking away for this that’s
52:13
relevant to taiwan uh gets back frankly
52:15
i think and this is just an aside uh to
52:19
the nato expansion issue uh to whatever
52:21
extent putin
52:23
uh attacked ukraine because of what he
52:26
perceived as 20 years of washington’s
52:28
disregard or the west’s disregard for
52:31
his legitimate security interests uh
52:34
with regard to nato expansion uh the
52:37
chinese have a similar prism
52:39
uh
52:41
they perceive washington’s inattention
52:43
to what beijing sees as the erosion of
52:45
r1 china commitments and sooner or later
52:48
their patients might be exhausted uh in
52:51
the same way that putin’s was
52:53
paul thank you very much and the next
52:55
question is from jacob halbron who is
52:58
the editor of the national interest and
53:00
he is asking about michael kaufman uh uh
53:04
who is a prominent uh russian defense
53:07
policy analyst
53:08
and he is asking whether people like mr
53:11
kaufman are correct
53:13
uh suggesting that perhaps
53:16
the russians assault were disappointed
53:18
with the military progress
53:21
in ukraine so far
53:23
george
53:25
well if you don’t mind i’d like to defer
53:27
that question to doug who
53:29
i think is in a better position to
53:31
assess moscow’s military
53:34
progress so far
53:36
well you know dimitri i i think
53:38
at this point it’s premature to reach
53:40
any judgments we have an expression in
53:42
the military i’m sure there’s one for it
53:44
in russian too the first report is
53:46
always wrong
53:49
and of course there’s the famous one the
53:50
first casualty in every war is the truth
53:53
i don’t think we know a great deal of
53:55
what’s been happening on the ground we
53:56
get different reports from different
53:58
people but my impression is on the whole
54:00
putin and the leadership are not
54:02
displeased with how things have gone and
54:05
again putin has tried very hard to avoid
54:08
killing large numbers of people he’s
54:10
given those instructions i’m sure to the
54:11
generals and i think they’ve tried very
54:13
hard to follow those
54:15
uh
54:16
this is it’s too soon to make any
54:18
sweeping judgments about how effective
54:20
or ineffective anybody is
54:23
one the only thing we can say with
54:24
certainty is that the ukrainian
54:26
resistance has largely fallen apart and
54:28
that’s not surprising if you have no air
54:30
cover if you have no air defenses per se
54:33
once you’re identified you could be
54:35
encircled targeted and destroyed
54:40
thank you so much
54:42
and the
54:43
christian whiten
54:45
who was a senior advisor at the state
54:47
department uh during
54:50
the trump administration before uh the
54:52
bush administration
54:54
uh he’s asking questions about uh uh
54:57
baltic republics and whether moscow may
54:59
be tempted to try something there
55:05
you know demetria i don’t see any
55:07
evidence that uh
55:09
vladimir putin wants to intervene in the
55:11
baltic states
55:13
i just don’t i think uh he would rather
55:15
have good business relations with them
55:17
obviously he’d prefer that they were
55:19
neutral and not a
55:21
not a platform for nato
55:23
but i don’t see any interest that he
55:24
wants to change that particular set of
55:27
circumstances i think he’s very
55:29
sensitive to what happens now in ukraine
55:31
because that can set the stage for
55:33
future relations with europe and nato
55:36
but i don’t see any evidence for any of
55:38
that furthermore remember the russian
55:40
army is very small it’s only about 420
55:43
000 it’s smaller than the united states
55:45
army i think it’s a good army it’s well
55:47
equipped well trained properly organized
55:49
better than ours
55:50
but i don’t think
55:52
that’s the sort of force that you build
55:54
if you want to launch large-scale
55:56
offensive operations against the west
55:58
that’s just nonsense
56:00
uh yesterday i was on russian tv uh with
56:04
uh a gentleman who is fast vice chairman
56:08
of the russian parliament committee the
56:11
russian domain committee on this
56:13
so-called newly independent states and i
56:16
actually raised the same question and i
56:19
mentioned estonia as an example and his
56:22
answer was very interesting
56:24
he said that uh for many years
56:27
russia did not view baltic states as any
56:31
kind of security challenge to russia and
56:33
did not even have forces positioned
56:36
against them but the more they become
56:38
involved in conflict with ukraine
56:41
provide ukraine with new weapons
56:44
and the more uh uh us and european
56:47
forces
56:48
the native infrastructure are being
56:51
moved to places like estonia and history
56:54
as some of you know is very close to uh
56:58
saint petersburg he said that inevitably
57:00
he said russian military planners
57:04
begin to view estonia as a challenge not
57:07
estonia in terms of its own capabilities
57:10
but because of uh growing nato presence
57:13
would you have a response to that
57:15
you know i i think you just made a very
57:17
important point and this is
57:19
the argument in washington people are
57:21
now
57:21
making very very ill-advised statements
57:24
concerning the shipment of weapons to
57:26
ukrainians with the goal of cultivating
57:29
an insurgency this is precisely the sort
57:32
of thing that rubs moscow in the wrong
57:35
direction
57:36
if anything
57:37
we should be interested in halting this
57:39
kind of business and again
57:41
it’s back to this question of
57:43
what is moscow going to do with its
57:45
forces where will they be positioned and
57:47
where are we going to position errors
57:48
what partic what do we gain
57:51
from dominating the baltic from
57:53
conducting
57:55
maneuvers and operations in the baltic
57:57
sea 50
57:58
kilometers from st petersburg we gain
58:00
nothing it does nothing for us it’s it’s
58:03
irrelevant the baltic is a pond
58:06
but we continue to treat that as we’re
58:08
showing the russians this is sheer
58:10
stupidity so the point is valid we don’t
58:12
need large numbers of forces in estonia
58:14
lithuania or latvia that’s that’s the
58:17
opposite of what mr putin has been
58:19
trying to achieve we ought to recognize
58:21
that
58:22
and and put a stop to this but again
58:25
it all begins with ending the nonsense
58:28
in ukraine once and for all
58:30
he’s changed the facts on the ground
58:31
we’ve got to accept that and talk about
58:33
this issue of what remains is
58:35
neutralized and then we can go on to
58:37
these other matters about what will or
58:39
will not be forward but the whole idea
58:41
this forward presence
58:43
for the u.s forces is stupid
58:46
we cannot be the first responders for
58:48
these europeans that was president
58:49
trump’s argument he’s right
58:52
and we need to get out of that business
58:54
well that would be a great answer uh to
58:58
complete the program but i have one
59:00
question from our long-term colleague
59:04
who now moved us elsewhere paul saunders
59:07
and i think the last question should
59:08
belong to him
59:10
and paul is asking something very
59:12
important
59:13
has putin already reached the point you
59:15
described considering the united states
59:19
as a reconcilable form given the
59:22
predictable u.s response which surely
59:24
was known to russian leadership
59:27
might his decision to invade ukraine be
59:30
one indication of that george
59:34
yes i do think he’s reached that point
59:36
um
59:37
now what that means however is that uh
59:40
it’s not that he believes he has to
59:42
fight against the united states at
59:44
infinitum
59:46
or that we will fight with russia
59:49
without end either i think what he
59:52
probably has in mind is treating the
59:54
united states as an irreconcilable foe
59:56
with whom
59:58
the conflict can be managed and
60:00
contained within acceptable bounds that
60:02
protects russia’s uh core security
60:05
interests i think that’s what the way
60:07
we’re going to have to proceed moving
60:09
forward as well
60:10
not that we’re going to be friends not
60:12
that we’re going to be competitors we
60:14
are going to be foes moving forward but
60:17
foes that have to find a way
60:20
to manage
60:21
this animosity in ways that
60:25
do not become
60:26
mutually destructive
60:29
george uh
60:30
let me end on
60:32
one last question to you
60:34
putin has said something pretty dramatic
60:38
but i’m not sure everybody understood
60:40
what he meant
60:42
in a
60:43
recent speech he issued a warning
60:46
to anyone in europe and i think probably
60:48
the united states
60:50
not to meddle uh in ukrainian affairs in
60:53
russian campaign against ukraine and
60:56
then he said
60:57
and if somebody tries to do it
61:00
they may face consequences beyond
61:03
anything
61:05
they
61:06
could contemplate or have
61:08
experienced
61:10
was he talking about tactical nuclear
61:12
weapons
61:15
well um
61:17
i doubt that he meant that specifically
61:19
at least not immediately
61:22
but there is certainly concern
61:24
in russia that
61:26
this could escalate to nuclear levels
61:29
and
61:30
when you try to deter
61:32
a nuclear power
61:35
as thomas shelling pointed out way back
61:37
when in his work on deterrence
61:40
it is actually rational to convince the
61:42
other side that you’re willing to do
61:44
things that are in fact irrational acts
61:47
in order to deter them from taking steps
61:50
that would threaten you and i i’ve put
61:52
this in that particular category
61:54
he is
61:55
attempting to tell us that he’s willing
61:57
to do things that appear irrational in
62:00
order to prevent us from taking steps
62:02
that he would regard as as fundamentally
62:05
threatening to russia that’s the
62:07
situation we’re dealing with it’s a very
62:08
dangerous situation
62:11
uh george i have to say it’s very
62:14
difficult for me
62:15
to mention
62:16
that putin would really use
62:19
tactical nuclear weapons let’s say even
62:22
against estonia simply because they
62:25
don’t like estonian weapons supplying to
62:27
ukraine it’s very difficult for me to
62:29
imagine
62:30
but the situation that the head of
62:32
nuclear power would even mention this
62:35
possibility i think it is a a new
62:38
development in european and
62:40
international politics and we have to
62:43
take it seriously on this happy note
62:45
thank you so much for taking part in the
62:47
program thank you for our speakers and
62:50
for the audience goodbye

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