VIEW MAP OF BATTLEPosted on 11/13/2019 7:02:01 PM PST by topher
In this decisive action WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA engaged a Japanese force termed around the battleship KIRISHIMA. SOUTH DAKOTA suffered extensive topside damage, but WASHINGTON's accurate fire mortally injured KIRISHIMA. Set aflame and racked by explosions, KIRISHIMA was scuttled by her crew. The last major Japanese naval thrust at Guadalcanal had been turned back, and WASHINGTON had done what she had been designed to do -- sink one of her own kind in a gunnery action. WASHINGTON was the only American fast battleship to defeat another capital ship.
WASHINGTON ACTION REPORT
On the night of November 14-15 WASHINGTON was flagship of Commander Task Force 64 (ComBatDiv 6). In column, with four destroyers ahead and SOUTH DAKOTA astern, she stood north between Russell and Guadalcanal, then east and southeast, passing north of Savo. Standing west from this point, first radar contact was made at 0001 with enemy ships east of Savo. From 0016 to 0019 fired 42 rounds 16", opening at 18,500 yards, at large cruiser or battleship which it is believed was sunk. From 0016 to 0017 fired 100 rounds 5" at ranges 12 to 13,000 yards at enemy cruiser or large destroyer which was also engaged by SOUTH DAKOTA and was left burning. Standing on north-westerly courses fired 133 rounds 5" from 0025 to 0034 at ranges about 10,000 yards at light craft close to south-east shore of Savo which were engaging our destroyers; all were silenced and one was left burning. From 0100 to 0107 fired 75 rounds 16'' and 107 rounds 5" at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, at battleship northwest of Savo which was firing at SOUTH DAKOTA. This battleship was silenced and was subsequently tracked...
Map of Battle: November 14-15, 1942
VIEW MAP OF BATTLE
(Excerpt) Read more at usswashington.com ...
In a span of 25 minutes, the battleship USS Washington fired on the opposing Jap battleship KIRISHIMA. At that point, Admiral Lee ceased fire and left the Kirishima in a sinking condition. This proved that the US had effective radar for gunfire at night and at long ranges.
The 'Fighting Sullivans' were lost in an earlier battle at Guadacanal, and the loss of so many cruisers forced the battleships to be committed.
One can more in the 15 volume US Navy History of World War II written Samuel Elliot Morrison...
The excerpt is from the USS Washington webpage: http://www.usswashington.com
Posted between Veterans Day and the 77th anniversary of the battle...
USS South Dakota had a crew of untrained sailors to go with the ship not having a proper shakedown.
The South Dakota was between the enemy ships and the Washington.
The South Dakota was targeted and took over 40 hits in the night action
The South Dakota used her guns in this action too.
My late father had a friend who fought with the Marines on Guadalcanal. My father received a simple note from his friend Ed. The sentence that my Father never forgot was short. About a place no one had heard of up to then. “We fought on a small Island called Guadalcanal. It was an awful Hell.”
Am right now reading Neptune’s Inferno by James Hornfischer, the author of The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. The Japanese got some payback for Midway at Guadalcanal.
Waters around Savo island are referred to as iron bottom sound and not for nothing. The USN parked serveral heavy fighting ships on the bottom in the area. Early in the battle for Guadalcanal, peace time Captains didn’t trust radar and older ships didn’t have it. It was a steep learning curve and the Navy paid a hell of a price for the education. On Guadalcanal our marines were in a steep learning curve too. There are a lot of good books on both sides of the battle.
impressive to me. I don’t think any modern us navy ship could take that many hits and still keep going.
I read, years ago, that what destroyed the destroyers at Savo Island was - Linoleum. In the battles it caught on fire destroying the destroyers.
After the battle, all ships were ripping out their linoleum flooring and dumping it into the sea.
Try the book Dawn Like Thunder by Mrazek about torpedo squadron 8, some of those pilots ended up at Guadalcanal after they managed to live through Midway. They helped start with the forming of the Cactus air group at Guadalcanal. I’ve read the books you mentioned. Amazing men all.
The captain of the Kirishima, Sanji Iwabuchi, survived the battle and returned to Japan, but was reassigned to shore duty and more-or-less told he would never be granted another ship command.
He was commander of the naval garrison at Manila when MacArthur’s forces returned to the Philippines, and when General Yamashita decided to abandon Manila and withdraw into the mountains of Luzon, Iwabuchi ordered his Naval ranks—including Special Naval Landing Forces (I won’t dignify them with the title of “marines”) and land-based garrisons—to stand and fight. The Japanese Naval forces committed horrible atrocities on the trapped civilian population as they fought to the death, building by building, for over a month in early 1945. Around 100,000 Philippine civilians died during the Battle for Manila.
Ironically, General Yamashita paid the “official” price for Iwabuchi’s atrocity, even though as an Army commander he had zero authority over the Navy’s doings.
Yes, that was a major reason for the loss of the Lexington at Coral Sea.
The long peace time interlude between WW1 and WW2 took a toll on pretty much every branch of service. In war time experience by servicemen to Timid inexperienced commanders, to equipment short comings. It’s impact is everywhere you read the historical accounts of events. Getting up to a wartime level cost US dearly.
I have read a lot on this subject, and one of the most informative and entertaining (entertaining in the way the story was told, not the subject which was terrible battle) was the book “Neptune’s Inferno”.
Their description of Admiral “Ching” Lee was fascinating. He was an early adopter and guru of radar directed gunfire. He knew the systems better than the men who worked on them and often better than the people who designed them.
He understood the strengths and weaknesses of the technology at that current date and was the first in history to use it effectively in a ship to ship engagement.
But what I enjoyed most was their description of Admiral Lee, the man. He apparently had a mild disposition and a spectacled face that made him approachable, but was a steely competitor and fighter.
He won 7 medals (5 gold, 1 silver, and 1 bronze), all in team shooting events.
He once designed a electronic guillotine with a meat cleaver for rats that they put in the overhead of the wardroom on a path rats were known to take. They had contests to see who could trigger the solenoid on the meat cleaver to get the rat as it ran under it during its journey on the pipes!
However, what was sobering was the butchery of naval gunfire battles at night in those waters. I once read someone’s characterization of one of those battles (I do think it was the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal) as a barroom fight where all was pitch black until a light was continually switched on and off.
Also makes you pause when you realize that Marine and Army deaths on Guadalcanal were around a thousand, but in the naval battles around Guadalcanal, around 4,000 men died. And when you realize a lot of those deaths were compressed into combined time frames that could be measured in hours, whereas the land battle went on for months.
I remember reading an account of one of the US ships caught in a searchlight of a Japanese ship, and everyone had a feeling that, if they could simply hide behind a turret or bulkhead to get out of the glare, they would somehow be safe. Being individually visible in the beam of light was apparently unnerving and gave rise to that irrational desire to get back in the shadows.
Great subject, thanks for posting it.
It wasn’t only linoleum. They had fat, stuffed couches and such. I forget where I read it, it might have been Samuel Eliot Morison’s description in “The Two Ocean Navy” of the sound of the US Navy for the remainder of 1942 was the chipping of paint.
I have read a lot of Navy history about WW II but have never heard a description of what should have resulted in a significant number of casualties. The shock of a shell exploding or just impacting armor would be largely undiminished for quite a distance. If you were standing against the wrong bulkhead, on the wrong deck, or in the wrong passageway, you could be ripped open or parts of you turned into jelly.
BKMK for ltr
*Guadalcanal ping*
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During my time with 3rdBn 26thMar in Vietnam, the battalion went afloat twice. The second time, I was aboard the USS Paul Revere, an amphibious attack transport (APA). One afternoon, all the embarked Marines were ordered to remain in their berthing spaces while the ship’s crew did gunnery training with the multiple twin 40mm antiarcraft gun mounts positioned around the ship’s weather deck. My berthing space was on the lowest billeting level in the forecastle (bow). There were two twin 40mm mounts immediately above. When the firing began, the effect was like some huge sledge hammer beating on the hull just outside the compartment.
I write all of this as a preamble for you to appreciate what that hour aboard the USS Washington at Salvo Island must have been like:
Extracted from the article text:
- From 0016 to 0019 fired 42 rounds 16”, (42 rounds in 3 minutes)
- From 0016 to 0017 fired 100 rounds 5” (100 rounds in 1 minute)
- fired 133 rounds 5” from 0025 to 0034 (133 rounds in 9 minutes)
- From 0100 to 0107 fired 75 rounds 16’’ and 107 rounds 5” (182 rounds in 7 minutes)
In 51 minutes, the USS Washington fired 117 rounds of 16” and 440 rounds of 5.”
Wow.
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