50 U.S. Code § 3033. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community U.S. Code

50 U.S. Code § 3033. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
U.S. Code

There is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

(b) Purpose The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community is—

(1)to create an objective and effective office, appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independent investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews on programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence;

(2) to provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies for activities designed—

(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of such programs and activities; and

(3) to provide a means for keeping the Director of National Intelligence fully and currently informed about—

(A) problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence; and

(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly informed of—

(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence; and

(1) There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made—

(B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with security standards of the intelligence community, and prior experience in the field of intelligence or national security; and

(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.

(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the general supervision of the Director of National Intelligence.

(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the President. The President shall communicate in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal not later than 30 days prior to the effective date of such removal. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit a personnel action otherwise authorized by law, other than transfer or removal.

Subject to the policies of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall—

(1) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Audit who shall have the responsibility for supervising the performance of auditing activities relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director;

(2) appoint an Assistant Inspector General for Investigations who shall have the responsibility for supervising the performance of investigative activities relating to such programs and activities; and

(3) appoint other Assistant Inspectors General that, in the judgment of the Inspector General, are necessary to carry out the duties of the Inspector General.

(e) Duties and responsibilities It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community—

(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, inspections, audits, and reviews relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence;

(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and regulations, fraud, and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director, to recommend corrective action concerning such problems, and to report on the progress made in implementing such corrective action;

(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and methods described in such reports; and

(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities under this section, to comply with generally accepted government auditing.

(1) The Director of National Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation, inspection, audit, or review if the Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States.

2) Not later than seven days after the date on which the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority.

(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time a statement under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such statement.

(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional intelligence committees any comments on the statement of which the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General considers appropriate.

(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.

(A) The Inspector General shall, subject to the limitations in subsection (f), make such investigations and reports relating to the administration of the programs and activities within the authorities and responsibilities of the Director as are, in the judgment of the Inspector General, necessary or desirable.

(B) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community needed for the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.

(C) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other materials that relate to the programs and activities with respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section.

(D) The level of classification or compartmentation of information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (C).

(E) The Director, or on the recommendation of the Director, another appropriate official of the intelligence community, shall take appropriate administrative actions against an employee, or an employee of a contractor, of an element of the intelligence community that fails to cooperate with the Inspector General. Such administrative action may include loss of employment or the termination of an existing contractual relationship.

(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate, pursuant to subsection (h), complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of an activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the intelligence community—

(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken, and this provision shall qualify as a withholding statute pursuant to subsection (b)(3) of section 552 of title 5 (commonly known as the “Freedom of Information Act”); and

(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of reprisal, for making such complaint or disclosing such information to the Inspector General may be taken by any employee in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity.

(4) The Inspector General shall have the authority to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an officer having a seal.

(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data in any medium (including electronically stored information, as well as any tangible thing) and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.

(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by subpoenas.

(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on behalf of, any component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence or any element of the intelligence community, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any appropriate district court of the United States.

(6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized by section 3109 of title 5 at rates for individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic pay payable for grade GS–15 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5.

(7) The Inspector General may, to the extent and in such amounts as may be provided in appropriations, enter into contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, and other services with public agencies and with private persons, and to make such payments as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.

(A) In the event of a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an investigation, inspection, audit, or review by both the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an inspector general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and such other inspector general shall expeditiously resolve the question of which inspector general shall conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of the inspectors general.

(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph (A), the inspectors general concerned may request the assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum established under paragraph (2). In the event of a dispute between an inspector general within a department or agency of the United States Government and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that has not been resolved with the assistance of such Forum, the inspectors general shall submit the question to the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the affected department or agency for resolution.

(A) There is established the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, which shall consist of all statutory or administrative inspectors general with oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.

(B) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall serve as the Chair of the Forum established under subparagraph (A). The Forum shall have no administrative authority over any inspector general, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of individual members of the Forum that may be of common interest and discussing questions about jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of contract personnel, records, audits, reviews, documents, recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of assistance to more than one of its members.

(3) The inspector general conducting an investigation, inspection, audit, or review covered by paragraph (1) shall submit the results of such investigation, inspection, audit, or review to any other inspector general, including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review who did not conduct such investigation, inspection, audit, or review.

(A) appoint a Counsel to the Inspector General who shall report to the Inspector General; or

(B) obtain the services of a counsel appointed by and directly reporting to another inspector general or the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on a reimbursable basis.

(2) The counsel appointed or obtained under paragraph (1) shall perform such functions as the Inspector General may prescribe.

(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate office space at central and field office locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices.

(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions, powers, and duties of the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed has security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer or employee.

(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively.

(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector General shall create within the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.

(3) Consistent with budgetary and personnel resources allocated by the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General has final approval of—

(A) the selection of internal and external candidates for employment with the Office of the Inspector General; and

(B) all other personnel decisions concerning personnel permanently assigned to the Office of the Inspector General, including selection and appointment to the Senior Intelligence Service, but excluding all security-based determinations that are not within the authority of a head of a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General from any Federal, State (as defined in section 3164 of this title), or local governmental agency or unit thereof.

(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or assistance from a department, agency, or element of the Federal Government under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, such information or assistance.

(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the intelligence community and in coordination with that element’s inspector general pursuant to subsection (h), conduct, as authorized by this section, an investigation, inspection, audit, or review of such element and may enter into any place occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.

(A) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall, not later than October 31 and April 30 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate, unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period ending September 30 and March 31, respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall provide any portion of the report involving a component of a department of the United States Government to the head of that department simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of National Intelligence.

(i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, inspection, audit, or review conducted during the period covered by such report.

(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and activities of the intelligence community within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and in the relationships between elements of the intelligence community, identified by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report.

(iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report with respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii).

(iv) A statement of whether or not corrective action has been completed on each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective action has been completed, a description of such corrective action.

(v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.

(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena authority under subsection (g)(5) by the Inspector General during the period covered by such report.

(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and activities.

(C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the report to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any portion of the report involving a component of such department simultaneously with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence committees.

(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to programs and activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence.

(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, or deficiency related to a component of such department simultaneously with transmission of the report to the congressional intelligence committees.

(i) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General;

(ii) an investigation, inspection, audit, or review carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any current or former intelligence community official who—

(I) holds or held a position in an element of the intelligence community that is subject to appointment by the President, whether or not by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis;

(II) holds or held a position in an element of the intelligence community, including a position held on an acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of National Intelligence; or

(III) holds or held a position as head of an element of the intelligence community or a position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of section 3041 of this title;

(iii) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a current or former official described in clause (ii);

(iv) the Inspector General receives notice from the Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current or former official described in clause (ii); or

(v) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary information in the course of an investigation, inspection, audit, or review, the Inspector General shall immediately notify, and submit a report to, the congressional intelligence committees on such matter.

(B) The Inspector General shall submit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves an investigation, inspection, audit, or review carried out by the Inspector General focused on any current or former official of a component of such department simultaneously with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence committees.

(4) The Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees any report or findings and recommendations of an investigation, inspection, audit, or review conducted by the office which has been requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman or ranking minority member of either committee.

(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.

(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar-day period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall determine whether the complaint or information appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of that determination, together with the complaint or information.

(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the congressional intelligence committees, together with any comments the Director considers appropriate.

(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or both of the congressional intelligence committees directly.

(ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee—

(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the employee’s complaint or information and notice of the employee’s intent to contact the congressional intelligence committees directly; and

(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the congressional intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.

(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information under this subparagraph does so in that member or employee’s official capacity as a member or employee of such committee.

(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is taken.

(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.

(G) In this paragraph, the term “urgent concern” means any of the following:

(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information, but does not include differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.

(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity.

(iii) An action, including a personnel action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection (g)(3)(B) of this section in response to an employee’s reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.

(H) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the protections afforded to an employee under section 3517(d) of this title or section 8H of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.).

(I) An individual who has submitted a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this section may notify any member of either of the congressional intelligence committees, or a staff member of either of such committees, of the fact that such individual has made a submission to the Inspector General, and of the date on which such submission was made.

(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, the Inspector General shall expeditiously report to the Attorney General any information, allegation, or complaint received by the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal criminal law that involves [1] a program or operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community, consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each such report shall be furnished to the Director.

Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (h), the performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to modify or affect the duties and responsibilities of any other inspector general having duties and responsibilities relating to such element.

(m) Separate budget account The Director of National Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures issued by the Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

(1) For each fiscal year, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall transmit a budget estimate and request to the Director of National Intelligence that specifies for such fiscal year—

(A) the aggregate amount requested for the operations of the Inspector General;

(B) the amount requested for all training requirements of the Inspector General, including a certification from the Inspector General that the amount requested is sufficient to fund all training requirements for the Office of the Inspector General; and

(C) the amount requested to support the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, including a justification for such amount.

(2) In transmitting a proposed budget to the President for a fiscal year, the Director of National Intelligence shall include for such fiscal year—

(A) the aggregate amount requested for the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community;

(C) the amount requested to support the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency; and

(D) the comments of the Inspector General, if any, with respect to such proposed budget.

(3) The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives for each fiscal year—

(A) a separate statement of the budget estimate transmitted pursuant to paragraph (1);

(B) the amount requested by the Director for the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (2)(A);

(C) the amount requested by the Director for the training of personnel of the Office of the Inspector General pursuant to paragraph (2)(B);

(D) the amount requested by the Director for support for the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency pursuant to paragraph (2)(C); and

(E) the comments of the Inspector General under paragraph (2)(D), if any, on the amounts requested pursuant to paragraph (2), including whether such amounts would substantially inhibit the Inspector General from performing the duties of the Office of the Inspector General.

(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence information relating to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community including methods to contact the Inspector General.

(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information related to the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

(July 26, 1947, ch. 343, title I, § 103H, as added Pub. L. 111–259, title IV, § 405(a)(1), Oct. 7, 2010, 124 Stat. 2709; amended Pub. L. 112–87, title IV, § 403, Jan. 3, 2012, 125 Stat. 1888; Pub. L. 112–277, title III, § 309(a), Jan. 14, 2013, 126 Stat. 2474; Pub. L. 113–126, title III, § 304, title VI, § 603(c), July 7, 2014, 128 Stat. 1395, 1421; Pub. L. 114–113, div. M, title III, § 303, Dec. 18, 2015, 129 Stat. 2913.)

The Intelligence Community is defined as follows:

intelligence community
(4) The term “intelligence community” includes the following:

(A) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(C) The National Security Agency.
(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(F) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Energy.
(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.
(L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.

(4) The term “intelligence community” includes the following:

(A) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(C) The National Security Agency.
(D) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(E) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(F) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(G) Other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs.
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Energy.
(I) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
(J) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security.
(L) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the intelligence community.

The “intelligence community” is waaaay too big.

Fire at least 50% of them.

The Draining of the Swamp starts here.

I didn’t read it all but I got quite a ways through it. What I didn’t see and would like to know is who has the authority to change the whistleblower statute?

Only the House, the Senate, with the signature of the President on the resulting Bill. . . But someone changed the IC IG’s reporting form sometime in August, but only posted online for use in the last half of September. That’s mighty convenient when you can see the time line for “urgent” matters in the law I just posted. 14 days for the Inspector General to investigate the matter AFTER he receives the complaint before he has to pass it on to the Director of National Intelligence for his decision on what to do with it. The DNI then has seven days before he spike it or must notify Congress. . . That’s a 20 day time frame, but the IG’s letter to the congressional committees was dated on August 12, 2019, when the phone call occurred on July 25th. . . Just 18 days prior to the letter being sent to the committees.

When was the new reporting form, dated August 2019, but only published on the DNI’s website for use in late September, altered to allow the use of third-hand and hearsay information instead of prohibiting it as the previous form did? The previous form also said that use of such prohibited information would preclude consideration by the IG of the report.

That previous form could NOT have been filed with the IG in July... as the previous form with hearsay and third-party prohibitions was still the form required to be used. So exactly when did all this take place??? When was the new form made available to the complainant when it was not made available to the new DNI John Ratcliffe, who only took office in mid-August, after the 15th? DNI Dan Coats announced his resignation on July 29th. Who approved the new form, if anyone ever did? It doesn’t have the correct government date format (ddmmyy) instead showing “August 2019”, and lacks even a required government form number on it. Odd, don’t you think? Sounds rushed. Do you smell dead fish?

But that law applying a 20 day time limitation for reporting urgent matters to the Congressional oversight committees is FOR INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EMPLOYEES or CONTRACTOR wrong doing only. This so-called “urgent intelligence matter,” which is constrained by statutory definition, did not meet those criteria, and the report went outside intelligence community activities which raised issues outside the boundaries of the intelligence community which required legal rulings from DOJ Legal Counsel about whether those laws relating to the intelligence community urgent reporting even applied.

The career lawyers in the DOJ determined that law did not apply at all because the subject of the hearsay evidence was NOT A MEMBER of any intelligence agency subject whose activities were not subject to being under the authority or jurisdiction of the DNI or IC IG, or to having his activities, behavior, or conversations with anyone, reported by any Intelligence Community member, as he was not a member of the Intelligence Community and certainly not subject to their statutory jurisdiction.

Ergo, the career legal counsel in the DOJ determined the entire topic was not within the jurisdiction of the Inspector General or even the DNI. The elected officials and politically appointed officials in the White House, or similar positions in Congress are not under the jurisdiction of law cited above, as much as the Democrats want it to apply to the President.

You can search through the statute exhaustively and you will find it mentioning ONLY the Intelligence Community members, employees, and contractors and their employees. They also determined that the matter was a matter of political policy, statutorily prohibited from such a report in the law itself.

Someone, at some undated time in August, after the event, changed the regulations and the IC IG’s form (apparently without going through appropriate channels and required public comment) for reporting urgent matters to allow what before was not allowed, i.e. specifically knowing only from first hand knowledge to permitting suspecting from hearsay and third hand rumors. This had to have been deliberate to make the report even acceptable, much less credible. Obviously coordinated shenanigans at work.

From the tenor of the “whistleblower’s” reporting, it looks to me as if the whistleblower arrogated to himself the role of the Inspector General, taking upon himself the task of investigation, interrogating members of the White House staff, asking questions he should have no business asking, gathering information he had no right to know, and collection data he had no business gathering to compile. He, from what I can tell, had no authority to do what he did in the course of collecting information under color of his connections with the CIA, if that is what agency he works for. The most a whistleblower is supposed to do is report what they saw or heard, not take it upon themselves to become Elliot Ness, no matter what level of investigative training they may have. It’s not their job. By doing what he did, he poisons the pool.

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