Posted on 04/30/2019 11:51:06 AM PDT by robowombat
Former USS Fitzgerald CO Outlines Defense in Rebuttal to SECNAV
By: Sam LaGrone
Cmdr. Bryce Benson, then-executive officer, assists in bringing down the battle ensign aboard USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) in 2016. US Navy Photo
The former commander of USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) is pushing back against a rebuke from the Secretary of the Navy, disputing major facts in the service’s argument he was criminally negligent leading up a June 17, 2017, fatal collision, according to a copy of the April 26 rebuttal obtained by USNI News.
Earlier this month, Richard V. Spencer wrote that former Fitzgerald commander Cmdr. Bryce Benson failure to prepare his crew and maintain his ship led to the collision with the merchant ACX Crystal off the coast of Japan, killing seven sailors. Benson sustained injuries himself when his stateroom was crushed by the flared bow of the ship, and he had to be rescued by his crew.
“For the entirety of the time you served as the Fitzgerald Commanding Officer, you abrogated your responsibility to prepare your ship and crew for their assigned mission. Instead, you fostered a command characterized by complacency, lack of procedural compliance, weak system knowledge, and a dangerous level of informality,” Spencer wrote in his two-page letter dated April 9. The Navy issued the censure to Benson and the tactical action officer on duty during the collision, Lt. Natalie Combs, in lieu of a court-martial over negligence charges.
In his 18-page Friday rebuttal, Benson lays out what would have been the spine of his case if it had made it to court-martial.
“I am rightly held to account for every action aboard my ship that night, from the performance of my watchstanders to my crew’s heroic efforts to save a sinking ship while I was incapacitated by injury,” wrote Benson. “I reflect on the tragedy, mourn for the lives of my sailors, and pray for the grieving family members and my crew every day. Yet the conclusions … that my leadership was ineffective, my judgment poor, and my responsibility for my sailors’ deaths unequivocal—derive from factual errors and allegations unsupported by evidence. They deserve a considered response, both for my record and for the Navy’s effort to become a true learning organization.”
Specifically, Spencer divided Benson’s failings into to broad categories informed by the prosecutions arguments and Navy criminal charging documents: decisions made immediately before the collision and longer-term decisions he made from when he took command about a month before the collision.
USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) sits in Dry Dock 4 at Fleet Activities Yokosuka to continue repairs and assess damage sustained from its June 17 collision with a merchant vessel. US Navy Photo
In the hours before, Benson had assigned an “inexperienced watch team,” was “disengaged and removed from the tactical control and supervision of the ship,” and “fail[ed] to implement any mitigation measures, such as ordering the Executive Officer or Navigator to supervise the team on the bridge,” Spencer wrote.
On the day before the collision, Spencer wrote, Benson had failed to approve an adequate watch bill, didn’t revise standing orders to account for degraded equipment and had laid out a navigation plan that had Fitzgerald travel too fast too close to shore.
In his rebuttal, Benson argued that his ship and crew were as ready as could be expected given the stresses his crew was under to meet the demands of a no-notice mission from the highest levels of the Pentagon after another destroyer in the squadron was unexpectedly sidelined.
In the letter to Spencer, Benson outlined a dense operational schedule that began shortly after the ship left a maintenance availability in January of 2017 with a crew that had seen 40-percent turnover and little time to train or conduct maintenance on the ship.
The mission came 10 days after Fitzgerald had suffered an engine fire as part of a group underway during an unexpected four-month deployment and had to return to Yokosuka, Japan, for emergent repairs.
Specifically, Fitzgerald had been scrambled by U.S. 7th Fleet to replace USS Stethem (DDG-63) at the last minute for a national tasking in the South China Sea.
“In the case of getting FTZ underway on 16 June 2017 to swap FTZ for STE, there were no other [courses of action]; FTZ was the only ship available,” former Destroyer Squadron 15 commander Capt. Jeffery Bennett told investigators, according to the rebuttal.
Several defense officials over the last several weeks confirmed to USNI News that the sidelined Stethem had suffered a malfunction to its vertical launch system that made the ship undeployable.
According to two defense officials familiar with the operation, the national-level tasking assigned at last minute to Fitzgerald was a South China Sea freedom of navigation operation that was aimed at contesting Chinese regional claims.
Benson argued against the declaration of his incompetence, saying the crew of Fitzgerald had performed well under the time crunch required for the last-minute mission, citing several successful training events after leaving Yokosuka.
Vice Adm. Phil Sawyer, commander of U.S. 7th Fleet, awards the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal to 36 crew members of the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) who distinguished themselves for their bravery and contributions to damage control efforts after a collision with a merchant vessel on June 17, 2017. US Navy photo.
“I say without reservation: 16 June was the best day that I had at sea during my then-eighteen years of service. I had no basis—fatigue or otherwise—to request an amended schedule and postpone our training certifications or delay or forego our national tasking in the South China Sea,” he wrote. “Likewise, at the end of this day, I had no doubt that my watch team could safely navigate a straight-line transit through unrestricted waters.”
Benson also contested that his crew was satisfied with degraded equipment, citing several instances when the sailors aboard worked to fix dozens of material deficiencies in the periods they had to work on the ship. He also contested the assertion in the censure that his navigation track was poor and his watch team was inexperienced.
“Each had been qualified by at least one previous commanding officer. In January 2017, Destroyer Squadron 15 certified our crew, after assessing our watchbills and watchstanders’ level of knowledge; our navigation equipment certification followed shortly thereafter,” Benson wrote. “I too had assessed, based on direct observation and Fitzgerald successful operational schedule in 2017, that each of these watchstanders was capable of safely and effectively manning their watches in accordance with applicable Navy orders and my standing orders.”
The point-by-point refutation of the censure outlines the heart of Benson’s legal argument: though the watch team misjudged the risk posed by Crystal, the operational realities in 7th Fleet shaped the situation and the mistakes didn’t rise to the level of criminal negligence.
To that point, Benson quoted from the Comprehensive Review that was written after the collision of Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) by then-U.S. Fleet Forces commander Adm. Phil Davidson
“[T]he FDNF-J force generation model could not keep up with the rising operational demands for cruisers and destroyers in the Western Pacific. 2016 was the tipping point for the combined FDNF-J force generation, obligation and force employment demand. Rapidly rising operational demands and an increase in urgent[] or dynamic tasking led to an unpredictable schedule and inability to support training and certification,” wrote Davidson. “There was an inability of higher headquarters to establish prioritization of competing operational demands.”
Still, in his letter Benson doesn’t offer an explanation for what specifically went wrong when the collision occurred.
“I was responsible for evaluating Fitzgerald operational risks and mitigating them to the point of acceptability. Throughout this rebuttal, I have described the process by which I attempted to fulfill that responsibility. I did not accurately foresee the risk of my watch team’s breakdown in communications, teamwork, and situational awareness, and so manifestly I did not take sufficient action to manage that risk,” Benson wrote. “My responsibility for risk-management was unique, but it was not singular… All levels of the Navy are responsible for evaluating, communicating, and mitigating risk. And the Navy also demands that risk decisions be made ‘at the appropriate level,’ which ‘is the person who can make decisions to eliminate or minimize the hazard, implement controls to reduce the risk, or accept the risk’.”
A spokesman for Secretary of the Navy acknowledged a Friday USNI News request for comment on the rebuttal but did not immediately provide a response.
First of all, I misunderstood the purpose of the Secretary of Navy’s letter of censure.
I thought it was a summary of the case against Benson, and that Benson was going to be prosecuted.
In any event, the fact that the Navy decided not to prosecute Benson means - at the very least - that they do not have enough evidence to convict him.
Benson’s 18 page rebuttal is impressive....
It contains a radar image that clearly shows a straight line transit.
A bow camera clearly shows a ship 6 miles away, but the Crystal, the ship that rammed them, just two miles away, is invisible.
The waters are in fact unrestricted (11 miles offshore), and at the moment of collision, no other ship in the area was a potential threat to the Fitzgerald.
The course that Fitzgerald was on is still being used by the US Navy today.
And the officers and enlisted on Watch were all certified by previous commanders - before Benson got there.
The two enlisted men on Watch actually got promotions to chief petty officer after the collision.
1. "It contains a radar image that clearly shows a straight line transit." Sure, except for the part where the straight line intersects with a massive, slow-moving cargo ship.
2."A bow camera clearly shows a ship 6 miles away, but the Crystal, the ship that rammed them, just two miles away, is invisible." Well, invisible to folks inside the bridge with an improperly function radar - no body bothered to wander out on a bridge wing to use their Mk 1, Mod 0 eyeballs.
3. "The waters are in fact unrestricted (11 miles offshore), and at the moment of collision, no other ship in the area was a potential threat to the Fitzgerald." Nobody said the waters south of Tokyo are "restricted" but constricted: lots and lots of two way traffic in a highly populated shipping lane. Ever stood bridge watch? Nighttime in highly trafficked waters is a time of intense focus, right?
4."And the officers and enlisted on Watch were all certified by previous commanders - before Benson got there." Oh yeah; the CO is off the hook because someone else said his officers were OK. The BS Flag is on the field: he was the Commanding Officer - it was his job to watch his officers in action and to ensure that the training of his crew or removal of idiots was accomplished to get his ship into fighting trim. As we say in the Marine Corps, a commander needs to know all of his troops, from behind, at night, with their helmets on. Cdr Benson had the immutable duty to watch and drill his crew and he and his XO should have been visiting critical spaces, like the CIC. (the CIC was littered with trash and smelled of piss? He and his XO should have been court-martialed for that alone!)
5. "The two enlisted men on Watch actually got promotions to chief petty officer after the collision." Hadn't heard that but if true, it just means that the navy has fallen even further away from what it used to be.
Seven perfectly able and worthwhile and priceless sailors are dead and their families will never be the same. You figure it was magic, or just bad luck? After all, the Captain "wrote a really good rebuttal". You OK with a navy that runs into slow ships and kills sailors?
Here's what's true: 7 good men dead needlessly, critical and expensive damage to a frontline and rare ship, a mission failed - since they never got to their station.
They're all very fortunate that I was not their Convening Authority.
I stand corrected. But you both knew what I meant.
But I would suppose you have little or no experience in military matters.
And you would both be correct.
However, I did read several in-depth reports on exactly what happened in both of these incidents, and while the CO has the responsibility for what went wrong, it was not his fault.
You didn’t read the investigation did you?
Yes I did. Not just one, but multiple reports.
What reports have you read ?
Now, even to your civilian non military perspective, does it sound like the Captain was doing his job?
Let me ask you this. If the Captain had refused to take the ship out on the mission, due to the fact that it wasn't fully staffed, the crew were overworked and tired, the ship was undergoing repair, various important electronic equipment was unreliable or simply not even working, what do you think would have happened to that Captain ?
Do you know whether or not he told his superiors his ship and crew were not ready ?
When a ship is in dock for repairs, and the work has not been completed, surely even an ADMIRAL has that 'info' and knows it is not ready to go on a mission. Do you think the ADMIRAL in this case is culpable as well as the Captain of the Ship ?
So... did the fleet commander and Chief of Naval Operations face charges ?
PER THE POSTED ARTICLE: "Benson argued that his ship and crew were as ready as could be expected given the stresses his crew was under to meet the demands of a no-notice mission from the highest levels of the Pentagon after another destroyer in the squadron was unexpectedly sidelined. "
That begs the question, WHO, at the highest levels of the PENTAGON, gave that order ?
Also, WHAT MISSION was considered so strategically important that it required sending out a ship that wasn't ready, considering the fact that the ship didn't get to accomplish THAT MISSION at all ?
Which translates into... they were refusing to listen to each other. I bet there was a lot of 'speaking' going on between them.
“Also, WHAT MISSION was considered so strategically important that it required sending out a ship that wasn’t ready, considering the fact that the ship didn’t get to accomplish THAT MISSION at all?”
It was a freedom of the seas mission. The Chicoms often try to claim waters that don’t belong to them, and prevent other nations from sailing through. We then demonstrate our ability to transit those waters whether they like it or not.
One of these days they’ll shoot at us.
It’s more important than it might sound.
No argument. However, it didn't accomplish that mission. What impact was there from that ?
Let me ask you this.
Are you currently in the Navy or on board a ship ?
Do you think the Navy ‘policies’ are the same now as when you were in active service ?
The ‘come right’ mandate is very similar to boating in general. That’s why small boats have red and green lights on the front. If everyone follows the ‘rule’, then no one crashes.
It’s exactly as you said - if the equipment, or the training, or the competence of the ship’s personnel failed, it is the Captain’s fault.
= = = = = = = = = = = =
Used to be that a CO was ‘God’ in respect to his command.
He could be on leave, 1000 miles away and ANY incident involving his ship and/or crew eventually landed on his shoulders, if nothing more than a bad remark in his fitness report.
Changes started to be made along those lines when the Navy had the audacity to bring the CO of a Japanese Submarine to the CourtsMartial of the CO USS Indianapolis to testify against him...
Fast forward to LCDR Bucher, USS Pueblo who eventually got exonorated because he was not allowed into certain spaces because of clearances yet it was LCDR Bucher that was being tried for derelection of duty for not destroying sensitive material.
His defense was ‘how can you charge me with something that I had absolutely NO control over— BY YOUR ORDERS’?
When the ‘rubber hits the road’, the Government has no qualms or problem abandoning men in the field..
Two great examples are the USS Pueblo & USS Liberty who were left on their own with the President & SECDEF personally stopping any and all ‘rescue attempts’.
Let me elucidate: the ship in questions is a hugely expensive and rare Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense ship that was ordered to head for Korean waters to track and if necessary, aid in stopping North Korean Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles.
The Captain obviously would be under pressure to get underway as fast as possible but ships are a combination of machine and crew and highly important mission critical equipment. One of the very first responsibilities of the Commanding Officer is make sure that all systems are combat-ready .(his second mission is to make sure that his ship doesn't sink or run into things).
As a commander, he has the main duty of inspecting his ship and his crew and his equipment and reporting deficiencies. If he is not combat-ready, it is his duty to report that fact and NOT hazard his ship and his crew..
He could have:
1. Refused the mission - for the same reasons the previous ship turned down the mission - they weren't operationally ready. If he had done that, chances are he would have possibly taken a career hit, but his ship would be safe and seven sailors would be alive. - or-
2. He could have delayed the deployment a few days to get additional crew/replacements and effect urgent repairs after going to his Task Force or Cruiser-Destroyer Squadron commander and laying out his issues and getting the priority the mission required. - and his ship would have been intact, seven sailors would have lived and the mission would have been accomplished. - or -
He could have just gone ahead and sailed with equipment deficiencies, and inept and careless Operations staff and killed some good men and wrecked the ship.
If I were in charge, he'd be making little rocks from big rocks at Leavenworth, forever.
No, I am not on active service anymore (though I do wait by the phone, hoping that they'll realize how important to our national defense I really am). I have served aboard navy ships and have stood OOD while at sea, including while transiting narrow waters, at night, with a lot of traffic.
I believe that Navy policies have been diluted and damaged through reduced training, taking candidates who must have had their IQ requirements waivered in order to fill out "inclusivity" checklists, and more than likely, less rigorous command screening as well.
So, it would seem we agree.
1. Refused the mission - or-
2. He could have delayed the deployment a few days.
From what I read he was given no choice.
FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE PENTAGON
Heading out right now, and don’t want to miss saying this.
Thank you for your service to our country and helping keep our nation and people safe.
Thank you for your informative and experience based responses.
Chainmail
“But I would suppose you have little or no experience in military matters.
And you would both be correct.”
I never wrote or implied such. In fact I thought you had a very valid point, the upper levels accepted risk to deploy that specific tin can, and that risk needs to be factored into the consequences.
That being said, he was responsible for everything because he was in command. So his ship had a collision, his career is over, the military is not fair. It’s a loose loose situation, the Navy has to hold the CO accountable, but they don’t want to convene a courts martial to have the Fleet CDR asked “Did you accept combat risk to deploy the Fitzgerald knowing the ship’s repairs were not complete nor had its full crew compliment? and what did you do to mitigate that risk?”
Re: “They’re all very fortunate that I was not their Convening Authority.”
LOL!
No.
America is fortunate that the US Navy had the wisdom to force you into early retirement.
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