Former USS Fitzgerald CO Outlines Defense in Rebuttal to SECNAV

Cmdr. Bryce Benson, then-executive officer, assists in bringing down the battle ensign aboard USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) in 2016. US Navy Photo

The former commander of USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) is pushing back against a rebuke from the Secretary of the Navy, disputing major facts in the service’s argument he was criminally negligent leading up a June 17, 2017, fatal collision, according to a copy of the April 26 rebuttal obtained by USNI News.

Earlier this month, Richard V. Spencer wrote that former Fitzgerald commander Cmdr. Bryce Benson failure to prepare his crew and maintain his ship led to the collision with the merchant ACX Crystal off the coast of Japan, killing seven sailors. Benson sustained injuries himself when his stateroom was crushed by the flared bow of the ship, and he had to be rescued by his crew.

“For the entirety of the time you served as the Fitzgerald Commanding Officer, you abrogated your responsibility to prepare your ship and crew for their assigned mission. Instead, you fostered a command characterized by complacency, lack of procedural compliance, weak system knowledge, and a dangerous level of informality,” Spencer wrote in his two-page letter dated April 9. The Navy issued the censure to Benson and the tactical action officer on duty during the collision, Lt. Natalie Combs, in lieu of a court-martial over negligence charges.

In his 18-page Friday rebuttal, Benson lays out what would have been the spine of his case if it had made it to court-martial.

“I am rightly held to account for every action aboard my ship that night, from the performance of my watchstanders to my crew’s heroic efforts to save a sinking ship while I was incapacitated by injury,” wrote Benson. “I reflect on the tragedy, mourn for the lives of my sailors, and pray for the grieving family members and my crew every day. Yet the conclusions … that my leadership was ineffective, my judgment poor, and my responsibility for my sailors’ deaths unequivocal—derive from factual errors and allegations unsupported by evidence. They deserve a considered response, both for my record and for the Navy’s effort to become a true learning organization.”

Specifically, Spencer divided Benson’s failings into to broad categories informed by the prosecutions arguments and Navy criminal charging documents: decisions made immediately before the collision and longer-term decisions he made from when he took command about a month before the collision.

USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) sits in Dry Dock 4 at Fleet Activities Yokosuka to continue repairs and assess damage sustained from its June 17 collision with a merchant vessel. US Navy Photo

In the hours before, Benson had assigned an “inexperienced watch team,” was “disengaged and removed from the tactical control and supervision of the ship,” and “fail[ed] to implement any mitigation measures, such as ordering the Executive Officer or Navigator to supervise the team on the bridge,” Spencer wrote.

On the day before the collision, Spencer wrote, Benson had failed to approve an adequate watch bill, didn’t revise standing orders to account for degraded equipment and had laid out a navigation plan that had Fitzgerald travel too fast too close to shore.

In his rebuttal, Benson argued that his ship and crew were as ready as could be expected given the stresses his crew was under to meet the demands of a no-notice mission from the highest levels of the Pentagon after another destroyer in the squadron was unexpectedly sidelined.

In the letter to Spencer, Benson outlined a dense operational schedule that began shortly after the ship left a maintenance availability in January of 2017 with a crew that had seen 40-percent turnover and little time to train or conduct maintenance on the ship.

The mission came 10 days after Fitzgerald had suffered an engine fire as part of a group underway during an unexpected four-month deployment and had to return to Yokosuka, Japan, for emergent repairs.

Specifically, Fitzgerald had been scrambled by U.S. 7th Fleet to replace USS Stethem (DDG-63) at the last minute for a national tasking in the South China Sea.

“In the case of getting FTZ underway on 16 June 2017 to swap FTZ for STE, there were no other [courses of action]; FTZ was the only ship available,” former Destroyer Squadron 15 commander Capt. Jeffery Bennett told investigators, according to the rebuttal.

Several defense officials over the last several weeks confirmed to USNI News that the sidelined Stethem had suffered a malfunction to its vertical launch system that made the ship undeployable.

According to two defense officials familiar with the operation, the national-level tasking assigned at last minute to Fitzgerald was a South China Sea freedom of navigation operation that was aimed at contesting Chinese regional claims.

Benson argued against the declaration of his incompetence, saying the crew of Fitzgerald had performed well under the time crunch required for the last-minute mission, citing several successful training events after leaving Yokosuka.

Vice Adm. Phil Sawyer, commander of U.S. 7th Fleet, awards the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal to 36 crew members of the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) who distinguished themselves for their bravery and contributions to damage control efforts after a collision with a merchant vessel on June 17, 2017. US Navy photo.

“I say without reservation: 16 June was the best day that I had at sea during my then-eighteen years of service. I had no basis—fatigue or otherwise—to request an amended schedule and postpone our training certifications or delay or forego our national tasking in the South China Sea,” he wrote. “Likewise, at the end of this day, I had no doubt that my watch team could safely navigate a straight-line transit through unrestricted waters.”

Benson also contested that his crew was satisfied with degraded equipment, citing several instances when the sailors aboard worked to fix dozens of material deficiencies in the periods they had to work on the ship. He also contested the assertion in the censure that his navigation track was poor and his watch team was inexperienced.

“Each had been qualified by at least one previous commanding officer. In January 2017, Destroyer Squadron 15 certified our crew, after assessing our watchbills and watchstanders’ level of knowledge; our navigation equipment certification followed shortly thereafter,” Benson wrote. “I too had assessed, based on direct observation and Fitzgerald successful operational schedule in 2017, that each of these watchstanders was capable of safely and effectively manning their watches in accordance with applicable Navy orders and my standing orders.”

The point-by-point refutation of the censure outlines the heart of Benson’s legal argument: though the watch team misjudged the risk posed by Crystal, the operational realities in 7th Fleet shaped the situation and the mistakes didn’t rise to the level of criminal negligence.

To that point, Benson quoted from the Comprehensive Review that was written after the collision of Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) by then-U.S. Fleet Forces commander Adm. Phil Davidson

“[T]he FDNF-J force generation model could not keep up with the rising operational demands for cruisers and destroyers in the Western Pacific. 2016 was the tipping point for the combined FDNF-J force generation, obligation and force employment demand. Rapidly rising operational demands and an increase in urgent[] or dynamic tasking led to an unpredictable schedule and inability to support training and certification,” wrote Davidson. “There was an inability of higher headquarters to establish prioritization of competing operational demands.”

Still, in his letter Benson doesn’t offer an explanation for what specifically went wrong when the collision occurred.

“I was responsible for evaluating Fitzgerald operational risks and mitigating them to the point of acceptability. Throughout this rebuttal, I have described the process by which I attempted to fulfill that responsibility. I did not accurately foresee the risk of my watch team’s breakdown in communications, teamwork, and situational awareness, and so manifestly I did not take sufficient action to manage that risk,” Benson wrote. “My responsibility for risk-management was unique, but it was not singular… All levels of the Navy are responsible for evaluating, communicating, and mitigating risk. And the Navy also demands that risk decisions be made ‘at the appropriate level,’ which ‘is the person who can make decisions to eliminate or minimize the hazard, implement controls to reduce the risk, or accept the risk’.”

A spokesman for Secretary of the Navy acknowledged a Friday USNI News request for comment on the rebuttal but did not immediately provide a response.

“Even if he and the XO were the only competent persons to man the bridge. they don’t call it “Port and Starboard” for nothing!”

Well, I think you’ve arrived at the core of the matter. If the safety of the ship required the CO and XO to stand OOD on port and starboard, then that’s what they should have done.

And if they needed to send the BMOW to go down and drag cooks and yeomen out of their racks to stand lookout, well, when I was one of Remington’s Raiders I stood a lot of deck and engineering watches.

One of the main things that guided me when I was a battalion commander was that I had 565 young men who were their family's greatest treasures. Firing live artillery rounds even in training is hideously dangerous and even the movements in convoys posed huge risks.

The answer is always to train, inspect and supervise, all the time and in all areas. And get your subordinate leaders to inspect and be watchful too.

I didn't lose any of those young men, even though we were sent on some really dangerous missions (such as fighting a 128,000 acre forest fire in Chelan Washington).

The principles of leadership never change. I didn't get a whole lot of sleep during that year and half but those men were well-trained, competent and ready and I could face all of their parents afterwards.

Commander Benson may have only had command for one month, but he reported to FITZ as the Executive Officer in November, 2015. The XO is responsible for all training and is traditionally the disciplinarian - he had 18 months to fix ‘issues’.

Your claim that one month ‘was not nearly enough time to remedy long-standing training deficiencies’ actually ignores the fact that HE WAS RESPONSIBLE for ALL those deficiencies as the XO.

Yes, I’ve been an XO on a DDG and yes, I was always on the Bridge during this type of transit. So was the CO.

Regarding the ‘not enough watch-standers’ comment - that’s pure BS. Everybody stood watch on our DDG - Supply Dept., Command Career Counselor, Command Master Chief - every single person attached to our ship was on a watch bill. If there weren’t enough lookouts, then the Ship’s Bosun and all the BM1’s would be standing the watch. That’s a command decision, so it’s unfortunate the FITZ didn’t actually have anybody who could make a tough decision. They failed and Sailors died.

“One of the main things that guided me when I was a battalion commander was that I had 565 young men who were their family’s greatest treasures.”

I hope my son’s leaders while he is in the Corps are equally attentive to their duties.

As I posted shortly after the event, It is my professional opinion (I hold a Coast Guard Masters License) The problem is systemic through out the navy. My last vessel was a FSV or Fast Service Vessel capable of carrying 200 tons of cargo on the deck,65 passengers and large quantities of fuel and water at speeds up to 28 knots. Normally I was the sole occupant of the wheel house. My duties included navigation, radar watch, communication/traffic control and vessel handling. I was also responsible for crew training and supplies. I never felt like I was overwhelmed because I had ability and need to understand and perform all duties with little help. It made me aware of the responsibility and helped me become more aware of our surroundings.

The bottom line was that I did not have to rely on 8 to 10 people in a chain of command to take evasive action in the event of a problem situation. My feeling has always been that a large division of responsibility insures that a certain amount of responsibility is lost.

Thank you for your service and semper fi. I do not believe he should be held criminally responsible. Get your ship ready for sea is a lawful order. By his own written statement his crew ( senior command) has bee previously qualified on at least one other ship. The equipment, based the long version from the same publisher, was in ill repair but functional for Navigation.

By your statements you have had an exemplary career but where is the part where you had to go through something that happened and you weren’t the investigator but the investigated?

As for me, I am just a nobody who did nothing in places that don’t exist.

And the CIWS was not working and the SLQ32
Was secured because the fans were to noisy. And the CO never went to jail which is the discussion at hand. Relieved of command, termination of service because he was the CO and the buck stops there. But going to jail for following a lawful order, is not right.

You are right that somebody in the chain of command allowed standards to be glossed over or faked - and those people need to be identified and held accountable. No question.

But the Commanding Officer is responsible for his command, period.
He has to know his people, his ship’s systems, his mission. He has a host of staff members responsible to him to keep him on top of every potential problem - but he’s the one on the dot and he owns his men’s deaths.

If I had been in his shoes, his useless OOD with have been the Library Officer and nowhere near a position of responsibility.

One of the first and hardest thing to do as a CO is recognize dead wood and get rid of it - fast, before they get somebody killed.

Well, thank you - Semper Fi right back to you. The “nobody that went nowhere doing nothing” sounds like fun..

No, I never needed to be investigated - I am a former enlisted, so when I was commissioned, I knew how things worked - and valued the expertise and talents of my NCOs. If you put the effort into it, you can the tough jobs done well and keep your people alive.

Combat means that all bets are off, but a leader will do everything possible to keep the mission done and his troops survive.

Military careers and the professions within them require talent, dedication, and really intense attention to detail. You have to inspect, test, and inspect some more. You don’t leave anything to chance.

All of the things that happened that night on the Fitzgerald were preventable; all of them. The CO should have known all of them and corrected the problems long before.

If you decide to gain in responsibility in the navy, do it - but don’t use that CO as an example.

In 1986 I was one of three OOD’s on a NIMITZ class CVN, 100,000+ tons combat loaded with 5800 passengers, 3.5 million gallons of JP5, a working airport and a nuclear plant capable of propelling us at speeds in excess of 32 kts. None of the OODs had to rely on anybody to take evasive action - that’s the reason the USN has Officers of The Deck. They are the Captain when the Captain isn’t on the Bridge.

Don’t quite understand where you got the impression an OOD has to rely on ‘8-10 people to take evasive action’. It’s never been that way.

We are saying the same things in different ways and I fully appreciate where you are coming from and I know you feel the same about me. Because that is what brothers in arms means even though we never served together.

I have been involved in two unscheduled encounters with material that was not sea water. Both resulted in investigations. One in particular remains in my memory where I was in control and watched my shipmates before and after. When I read the reports and saw that they were accused of things that I had personally seen with my own eyes weren’t true I became a permanent skeptic when I read reports like the very detailed accounts because I wasn’t there and the lawyer types asking blame before seeking the truth. I don’t mean to offend but that is my personal experience

And I tip my hand in salute you your service and career. BTW. Two of my kids served as well.

I tip my hat to yours and your kid's service: as patriots go, you and your family are the real deal.

If you are still within the age bracket, becoming a officer exposes you to a whole new world. Where before you were responsible for yourself and maybe a few more, once you're commissioned, you're suddenly responsible for 40, then 120, then 535 younger servicemen. It sobers you up fast when you realize that just a small lapse in professionalism could mean death and maiming of those that you are leading.

If you put the hours into it, carefully developing the training and watching it carried out and supervising your officers' inspections and repair any discrepancies, and most of all, letting your troops know that what we're doing is important that you are depending on them, they respond by rising to the challenge, every time.

Yes we are Brothers in Arms at a time when so few want to join us in our mission to protect out country. Makes us value your brothers even more.

“But going to jail for following a lawful order, is not right.”

The thing is, Mariner was right. The safety of the ship was the captain’s responsibility, and he was asleep in his cabin with three incompetents on the bridge, no port lookout, and no starboard lookout.

Further, IIRC, once in extremis, the OOD came left.

If we still had Surface Warfare Officer School, she would have known that you *never* come left to avoid a collision.

Never?

Never.

But what if that’s the only way to avoid the collision?

Come right.

But what if God himself appears and tells you to come left?

Come right.

But...

Right.

Well, what if...

Come right!

When I heard she came left, I almost pickled one off.

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