Posted on 04/30/2019 11:51:06 AM PDT by robowombat
Former USS Fitzgerald CO Outlines Defense in Rebuttal to SECNAV
By: Sam LaGrone
Cmdr. Bryce Benson, then-executive officer, assists in bringing down the battle ensign aboard USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) in 2016. US Navy Photo
The former commander of USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) is pushing back against a rebuke from the Secretary of the Navy, disputing major facts in the service’s argument he was criminally negligent leading up a June 17, 2017, fatal collision, according to a copy of the April 26 rebuttal obtained by USNI News.
Earlier this month, Richard V. Spencer wrote that former Fitzgerald commander Cmdr. Bryce Benson failure to prepare his crew and maintain his ship led to the collision with the merchant ACX Crystal off the coast of Japan, killing seven sailors. Benson sustained injuries himself when his stateroom was crushed by the flared bow of the ship, and he had to be rescued by his crew.
“For the entirety of the time you served as the Fitzgerald Commanding Officer, you abrogated your responsibility to prepare your ship and crew for their assigned mission. Instead, you fostered a command characterized by complacency, lack of procedural compliance, weak system knowledge, and a dangerous level of informality,” Spencer wrote in his two-page letter dated April 9. The Navy issued the censure to Benson and the tactical action officer on duty during the collision, Lt. Natalie Combs, in lieu of a court-martial over negligence charges.
In his 18-page Friday rebuttal, Benson lays out what would have been the spine of his case if it had made it to court-martial.
“I am rightly held to account for every action aboard my ship that night, from the performance of my watchstanders to my crew’s heroic efforts to save a sinking ship while I was incapacitated by injury,” wrote Benson. “I reflect on the tragedy, mourn for the lives of my sailors, and pray for the grieving family members and my crew every day. Yet the conclusions … that my leadership was ineffective, my judgment poor, and my responsibility for my sailors’ deaths unequivocal—derive from factual errors and allegations unsupported by evidence. They deserve a considered response, both for my record and for the Navy’s effort to become a true learning organization.”
Specifically, Spencer divided Benson’s failings into to broad categories informed by the prosecutions arguments and Navy criminal charging documents: decisions made immediately before the collision and longer-term decisions he made from when he took command about a month before the collision.
USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) sits in Dry Dock 4 at Fleet Activities Yokosuka to continue repairs and assess damage sustained from its June 17 collision with a merchant vessel. US Navy Photo
In the hours before, Benson had assigned an “inexperienced watch team,” was “disengaged and removed from the tactical control and supervision of the ship,” and “fail[ed] to implement any mitigation measures, such as ordering the Executive Officer or Navigator to supervise the team on the bridge,” Spencer wrote.
On the day before the collision, Spencer wrote, Benson had failed to approve an adequate watch bill, didn’t revise standing orders to account for degraded equipment and had laid out a navigation plan that had Fitzgerald travel too fast too close to shore.
In his rebuttal, Benson argued that his ship and crew were as ready as could be expected given the stresses his crew was under to meet the demands of a no-notice mission from the highest levels of the Pentagon after another destroyer in the squadron was unexpectedly sidelined.
In the letter to Spencer, Benson outlined a dense operational schedule that began shortly after the ship left a maintenance availability in January of 2017 with a crew that had seen 40-percent turnover and little time to train or conduct maintenance on the ship.
The mission came 10 days after Fitzgerald had suffered an engine fire as part of a group underway during an unexpected four-month deployment and had to return to Yokosuka, Japan, for emergent repairs.
Specifically, Fitzgerald had been scrambled by U.S. 7th Fleet to replace USS Stethem (DDG-63) at the last minute for a national tasking in the South China Sea.
“In the case of getting FTZ underway on 16 June 2017 to swap FTZ for STE, there were no other [courses of action]; FTZ was the only ship available,” former Destroyer Squadron 15 commander Capt. Jeffery Bennett told investigators, according to the rebuttal.
Several defense officials over the last several weeks confirmed to USNI News that the sidelined Stethem had suffered a malfunction to its vertical launch system that made the ship undeployable.
According to two defense officials familiar with the operation, the national-level tasking assigned at last minute to Fitzgerald was a South China Sea freedom of navigation operation that was aimed at contesting Chinese regional claims.
Benson argued against the declaration of his incompetence, saying the crew of Fitzgerald had performed well under the time crunch required for the last-minute mission, citing several successful training events after leaving Yokosuka.
Vice Adm. Phil Sawyer, commander of U.S. 7th Fleet, awards the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal to 36 crew members of the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) who distinguished themselves for their bravery and contributions to damage control efforts after a collision with a merchant vessel on June 17, 2017. US Navy photo.
“I say without reservation: 16 June was the best day that I had at sea during my then-eighteen years of service. I had no basis—fatigue or otherwise—to request an amended schedule and postpone our training certifications or delay or forego our national tasking in the South China Sea,” he wrote. “Likewise, at the end of this day, I had no doubt that my watch team could safely navigate a straight-line transit through unrestricted waters.”
Benson also contested that his crew was satisfied with degraded equipment, citing several instances when the sailors aboard worked to fix dozens of material deficiencies in the periods they had to work on the ship. He also contested the assertion in the censure that his navigation track was poor and his watch team was inexperienced.
“Each had been qualified by at least one previous commanding officer. In January 2017, Destroyer Squadron 15 certified our crew, after assessing our watchbills and watchstanders’ level of knowledge; our navigation equipment certification followed shortly thereafter,” Benson wrote. “I too had assessed, based on direct observation and Fitzgerald successful operational schedule in 2017, that each of these watchstanders was capable of safely and effectively manning their watches in accordance with applicable Navy orders and my standing orders.”
The point-by-point refutation of the censure outlines the heart of Benson’s legal argument: though the watch team misjudged the risk posed by Crystal, the operational realities in 7th Fleet shaped the situation and the mistakes didn’t rise to the level of criminal negligence.
To that point, Benson quoted from the Comprehensive Review that was written after the collision of Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) by then-U.S. Fleet Forces commander Adm. Phil Davidson
“[T]he FDNF-J force generation model could not keep up with the rising operational demands for cruisers and destroyers in the Western Pacific. 2016 was the tipping point for the combined FDNF-J force generation, obligation and force employment demand. Rapidly rising operational demands and an increase in urgent[] or dynamic tasking led to an unpredictable schedule and inability to support training and certification,” wrote Davidson. “There was an inability of higher headquarters to establish prioritization of competing operational demands.”
Still, in his letter Benson doesn’t offer an explanation for what specifically went wrong when the collision occurred.
“I was responsible for evaluating Fitzgerald operational risks and mitigating them to the point of acceptability. Throughout this rebuttal, I have described the process by which I attempted to fulfill that responsibility. I did not accurately foresee the risk of my watch team’s breakdown in communications, teamwork, and situational awareness, and so manifestly I did not take sufficient action to manage that risk,” Benson wrote. “My responsibility for risk-management was unique, but it was not singular… All levels of the Navy are responsible for evaluating, communicating, and mitigating risk. And the Navy also demands that risk decisions be made ‘at the appropriate level,’ which ‘is the person who can make decisions to eliminate or minimize the hazard, implement controls to reduce the risk, or accept the risk’.”
A spokesman for Secretary of the Navy acknowledged a Friday USNI News request for comment on the rebuttal but did not immediately provide a response.
Correction: Captain “Benson,” not “Bryson.”
When I had command, I had the guts to call them as I saw them and stood by my decisions. I inspected, I monitored training, I submitted my Combat Readiness reports accurately and I didn't lose anyone.
I didn't have to call any of my men's parents and tell them that they had lost them forever.
Exactly. Attempting to defer blame for a collision at sea that was the USN fault is unforgivable. He should be dismissed if he hasn’t been already. He refuses to accept any responsibility whatsoever.
Well maybe. The rebuttal seemed to reference this guy named Risk and a lot of his relatives. Clearly no one in the Navy is responsible for this mess. I hope congress soon holds a closed door hearing to appoint a committee to investigate the infiltration of (nmn) Risk into maritime operations and our elections. Findings should be promptly referred to a very special counsel to probe precisely just what the Heck here goins on.
The Fitzgerald had lacked a qualified senior quartermaster for TWO YEARS. When Benson arrived as XO, the senior quartermaster was a reservist who had never completed an operational deployment.
There is plenty of blame to go around.
where is Gordon Lightfoot
when we need him?
Yikes! Doomed from the getgo. Just exactly what genius planned that estrogen laced roster? Good day it was over at the time that watch was set.
What the H is DOD thinkin?
Still resting at the bottom of the big lake I fear.
There’s always a touch of luck in a successful command, and a touch of bad luck in an unsuccessful command.
That’s just the way it works.
My first commander told me,
“Command is just a license to go to jail.”
It can seem that way.
Your question is multifaceted. I took read the full report by the same publisher. Twice. The captain has accepted responsibility as he should. The difference here is criminal culpability. I hadn’t heard of that before. Where were the charges against the Stark CO whose ship was not prepared to defend against Saddams Exocets. Where were the criminal charges against the CO of the Cole whose deck force weren’t empowered to open fire on the speed boat?
I am not defending everything that happened on that ship that night but since I wasn’t there nor do I know any investigators personally so I will read and research but I will not second guess the crew that was there for one primary reason. I have been through it myself, fortunately nobody died, but the resultant investigation was pretty “blame seeking” versus truth seeking.
How often were youcommanding a ship, and refused to carry out an ordered movement?
If the Navy can't find good skippers by playing soft and nice, stop being soft and nice. People's lives and our country is at stake. If females and transfats or whatever are put in positions of responsibility hold everyone to the same standards. Do your job or pay the price. Zero tolerance.
Sorry Bensen, you were the Captain and you blew it. He is responsible for the lives of the men under his command. It goes with the turf, as is the fleet commander and the Chief of Naval Operations.
“His gamble to maybe preserve his career instead of telling his superiors his ship and crew were not ready killed a bunch of young people for nothing.”
Yes, it seems so.
“How would you feel if one of those sailors who drowned in their compartment was your son?”
Where in my post did I express approval of the captain’s actions?
I’m Navy myself, and have a son in the Marines. These events have perhaps a greater significance for someone like me. It is appalling that this should have happened.
As for incompetence in the Navy, just look at what the so called officers the Naval Academy, as well as West Point are turning out.
The standard is and always should be that a Commanding Officer is responsible for everything that goes right or goes wrong in his command.
The Captain went to sea with critical equipment faults (radars and navigation). He went to sea with too few critical personnel. He was asleep while his poorly-trained and apparently mentally deficient duty officers severely damaged a crucial missile defense ship, one of only a few available and killed several irreplaceable young men while they slept.
You don't think that he should be held criminally responsible?
I do.
“I’m not in favor of commanders refusing to execute missions because they don’t believe their people are as ready as they should be. It’s not a risk-free profession. “
The order was correctly given and executed.
Of note: How long do you have to ride with ding bat LtJG before you know she can’t drive?
No competent captain turns over a $2bil warship to somebody they haven’t seen operate it...several times and in all conditions. It’s a very complex system with hundreds of variables, not for the simple or inattentive.
And he knew those on watch that night were simple and inattentive. And he knew there were SOME on the ship who were qualified and competent. Those who take their job as serious as it is. They were not on watch that night.
Even if he and the XO were the only competent persons to man the bridge. they don’t call it “Port and Starboard” for nothing!
And that’s wholly the captain’s fault.
Even after a month.
See my post #36
“Where were the charges against the Stark CO whose ship was not prepared to defend against Saddams Exocets.”
The Stark relieved us on station in the Persian Gulf.
What really happened was that an OS reported to the TAO that an Iraqi jet was up looking for a target, and instead of taking appropriate action, the TAO replied, “We aren’t at war with Iraq.”
Any other story is cover-up.
So, was it a "straight line transit through unrestricted waters" or was it a transit at night through very heavily trafficked and restricted waters with poorly trained/nonfunctional officers on watch?
Did his ship get severely damaged and sailors who were his responsibility lose their lives?
I'd vote to convict.
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