Skip to comments.CIA China Ops Wiped Out By 'Botched' Spy Contact System
Posted on 08/18/2018 5:10:30 PM PDT by UMCRevMom@aol.com
CIA China Ops Wiped Out By 'Botched; Spy Contact System: Investigation results show indicted spy Jerry Chun Shing Lee was not the CIA's only security breach. Sloppy coding led to a back door hole in the messaging system, used by the Chinese to 'wipe out' our entire spy network.
Suddenly, in late 2010, undercover agents in China were being rounded up and hauled off for interrogation.
Under Barack Obama's administration, the Central Intelligence Agency suffered what intelligence officers are calling one of the worst disasters in decades. Suddenly, in late 2010, undercover agents in China were being rounded up and hauled off for interrogation. Eventually, its believed at least 30 were executed. The pinpoint accuracy of the arrests was unnerving.
"You could tell the Chinese weren't guessing. The Ministry of State Security were always pulling in the right people," one source relates. The investigators final report concluded that a "confluence and combination of events" had "wiped out the spy network," another of the former officials adds. Every agent arrested was eventually killed. Hillary Clinton and John Kerry escaped retribution, just like Benghazi, some say.
Over a span of the next two years (2010-2012), the Chinese government "systematically dismantled" the CIA's network of spies. To play it down, it was originally reported as "more than a dozen" instead of almost three dozen assets killed by China. Since then, everyone has been wondering how they were able to do it.
A combination of three factors came into play, but one crucially overshadowed the others. Bad coding left a security hole big enough for the Chinese to walk right in the CIA's back door.
A group of five "current and former intelligence officials" agreed to meet with reporters at news outlet Foreign Policy, to discuss the results of a "special task force" probe into what happened. The individuals requested anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the investigation.
The task force found three "potential causes of the failure," the former officials report. A double agent might have passed "information about the CIA asset network," on to his Chinese handlers but overshadowing factors are more likely to blame.
The "CIA's spy work had been sloppy and might have been detected by Chinese authorities," the sources confirm. Most importantly, "the communications system had been compromised."
"Shellshocked" intelligence officials tried to minimize the damage and hustle sources out of the country. "the last CIA case officer to have meetings with sources in China distributed large sums of cash to the agents who remained behind, hoping the money would help them flee."
When they brought the software in from Middle East operations, they thought it was secure but didn't factor in that the environment there was "considerably less hazardous."
They also underestimated China's capabilities to hack their way in. One source said the China office felt "invincible." The attitude was "that we've got this, we're untouchable."
CIA officer Jerry Chun Shing Lee was recruited about then as a double agent. Working extensively in Beijing, Lee "was in contact with his handlers at the Ministry of State Security through at least 2011."
According to court documents from his May indictment, Lee was paid hundreds of thousands of dollars by the Chinese.
The officials explain that as bad as Lee's alleged treachery was, it still can't explain what happened, simply because "information about sources is so highly compartmentalized that Lee would not have known their identities."
Other clues support the theory that the worst part of the compromise was "that China had managed to eavesdrop on the communications between agents and their CIA handlers."
Brand new sources are never trusted because they might be a spy already. Newbies only get to use a temporary "covert communications system." The one they used in China was "Internet-based and accessible from laptop or desktop computers," two former agents agreed.
The "throwaway" system was still encrypted, the agents explain and it allowed "remote communication between an intelligence officer and a source." More importantly, it "also separated from the main communications system used with vetted sources, reducing the risk if an asset goes bad."
They were supposed to be totally separate. If the interim system was breached, those using the main system should still be safe. If done correctly, there would be no way to "trace the communication back to the CIA."
It was not done correctly. According to the sources, the CIAs interim system contained a technical error. It was architecturally connected to the CIAs main covert communications platform.
As soon as the link was discovered, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency ran penetration tests, that failed miserably. Cyber experts with access to the interim system could also access the broader covert communications system the agency was using to interact with its vetted sources.
If we could find the digital links then so could the Chinese. That would have made it relatively easy for China to deduce that the covert communications system was being used by the CIA. One expert asserts some of these links pointed back to parts of the CIAs own website.
As far back as 2010 U.S. technicians were aware of Chinas highly sophisticated internet monitoring. With their Great Firewall, they constantly monitor internet traffic looking for any unusual patterns.
The agency was well aware at the time, online anonymity of any kind was proving increasingly difficult.
Either double agent Lee gave the Chinese access to the communications platform, which he got from his handler or the Chinese may have identified another agent and accessed that persons computer.
The interim system may have been detected simply through routine pattern analysis of the internet data.
Even assets who didnt use the communications system were vulnerable. Once a person was identified as a CIA asset, Chinese intelligence could then track the agents meetings with handlers and unravel the entire network.
The sources are convinced that the Chinese shared the information they gathered with Russia, where a similar system was in use.
At the same time Chinese sources were being purged, multiple sources in Russia suddenly severed their relationship with their CIA handlers, NBC news reported and the former officials confirmed. Going dark is not a good thing. If they didnt escape, they are dead.
I’m sure someone was well paid. Possibly Brennan.
Did Peter Strzoh know that emails from Hillary’s server went to the Chinese?
Who was Director of the CIA then? John Brennan: finally had his security clearance revoked.
Remind me again who was in charge of the CIA at that time?
Im sure someone was well paid. Possibly Brennan.
I agree. But I wouldn’t doubt that Brennan did it for free.
Yep. Brennan sold the names.
Just as slick Willie sold the Chinese rocket tech.
And on this “successful” action basis, Brennan deserves a continuing Security Clearance?
And that, folks is the worst disaster in modern history.
My thoughts, exactly. It wasn’t a botched job. It was designed that way on purpose. Sigh.
More blood on the hands of Clinton and Kerry by the day. Why doesn’t the White House publicize this? Force the media to pay attention.
my thoughts...I think we have to build a new agency from scratch....you look at the timing and I wonder if Hillarie’s server was to blame. there are a lot of individuals that would of been executed in the 1950s and 1960s for there criminal and treasons endeavors
Historians may view the period 1992202? as the era of an American Civil “Cold War” one day. It’d be a hair-raising history book once all the dots are connected.
[Did Peter Strzoh know that emails from Hillarys server went to the Chinese?]
Because it may be just what the article says, a coding screwup. I write SW and it seems like it would be easy to make this kond of screwup.
Once again,under Odungo,things turn to shittz...
Hillary’s emails outed the spies.
With Brennan in charhe in 2010, who’s to say the back door left open was an oversight? Maybe it was a feature, not a bug.
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