“Both of these accidents were preventable and the respective investigations found multiple failures by watch standers that contributed to the incidents, said Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson. “We must do better.”
It’s been a little expensive gutting our military branches and making sure our soldiers and sailors get their sex-change operations, and have safe places to play!
Thanks, 0bama!
P.S. F.U.
Well if they would shitcan “diversity” and “affirmative action” and a host of other stupid social engineering BS and get back to serious sailing of warships and making war, they might improve their success rate. In the interim, let’s just call em “The Keystone Navy” because that’s what the track record indicates.
Good grief.
The OOD should practically be court-martialed, but the CO should've never allowed them to drive the ship on their own. I speculated quite a bit based on the early reports of this accident; after reading the final report, I can't believe the sheer incompetence that permeated throughout this command.
In related news:
Navy destroyer collides with building in downtown Houston
https://www.duffelblog.com/2017/08/navy-destroyer-collides-with-building-in-downtown-houston/
“The collisions were avoidable...”
WOW!! What insight!!
Perhaps of interest.
Having read the entire report, I am speechless at the incompetency of the crew of this ship. If this is the situation throughout our entire Navy, I would be scared shitless if we had to go to war today.
Excerpt from the Final Report, Section 3:
Of the 42 Sailors assigned to Berthing 2, at the time of collision, five were on watch and two were not aboard. Of the 35 remaining Sailors in Berthing 2, 28 escaped the flooding. Seven Sailors perished. ... The occupants of Berthing 2 described a rapidly flooding space, estimating later that the space was nearly flooded within a span of 30 to 60 seconds. By the time the third Sailor to leave arrived at the ladder, the water was already waist deep. Debris, including mattresses, furniture, an exercise bicycle, and wall lockers, floated into the aisles between racks in Berthing 2, impeding Sailors’ ability to get down from their racks and their ability to exit the space. The ship’s 5 to 7 degree list to starboard increased the difficulty for Sailors crossing the space fromthe starboard side to the port side. Many of the Sailors recall that the battle lanterns were illuminated. Battle lanterns turn on when power to an electrical circuit is out or when turned on manually. The yellow boxes hanging from the ceiling in Figure 14 are battle lanterns. Sailors recall that after the initial shock, occupants lined up in a relatively calm and orderly manner to climb the port side ladder and exit through the port side watertight scuttle. Figure 14 provides an example of the route Sailors would have taken from their racks to the port side watertight scuttle on a ship of the same class as FITZGERALD. They moved along the blue floor and turned left at the end to access the ladder. Figure 14 provides an example and sense of scale. Even though the Sailors were up to their necks in water by that point, they moved forward slowly and assisted each other. One Sailor reported that FC1 Rehm pushed him out from under a falling locker. Two of the Sailors who already escaped from the main part of Berthing 2 stayed at the bottom of the ladder well (see Figure 8) in order to help their shipmates out of the berthing area. The door to the Berthing 2 head (bathrooms and showers) was open and the flooding water dragged at least one person into this area. Exiting from the head during this flood of water was difficult and required climbing over debris. As the last group of Sailors to escape through the port side watertight scuttle arrived at the bottom of the ladder, the water was up to their necks. The two Sailors who had been helping people from the bottom of the ladder were eventually forced to climb the ladder as water reached the very top of the Berthing 2 compartment. They continued to assist their shipmates as they climbed, but were eventually forced by the rising water to leave Berthing 2 through the watertight scuttle themselves. Before climbing the ladder, they looked through the water and did not see any other Sailors. Once through the watertight scuttle and completely out of the Berthing 2 space (on the landing outside Berthing 1) they continued to search, reaching into the dark water to try to find anyone they could. From the top of the ladder, these two Sailors were able to pull two other Sailors from the flooded compartment. Both of the rescued Sailors were completely underwater when they were pulled to safety.
They won’t do better. They’ll continue the AA crap.
Sickening in confidence.
The Fitzgerald happened more or less the way I proposed it happened after the initial reports. The Wan Hai (and one other ship) were the ones the OOD was concerned about to the point where he even thought the reports coming to him about the ACX Crystal were reports of a different ship he was observing. In the confusion, he never realized the Crystal was there until it was too late.
The McCain turned out to be due to a steering problem as some initial reporting indicated, although it wasn’t so much loss of steering as it was confusion over who was steering what backup system, apparently. By the time it was figured out, it was too late to avoid the collision.
The appendix to each report lays out the minute-by-minute, and at times the second-by-second, positions of the ships involved and the decisions being made (or not made that should have been made.) All in all, not good advertising for today’s Navy.
If I had a son or daughter on a Navy ship today, I would be very concerned for their safety given the obvious lack of training, and probable over assignment, of the sailors on those ships.
.
The Obama rainbow navy.
My heart goes to the Damage Control crews that worked to counteract the damage.