Posted on 08/12/2016 7:21:04 PM PDT by sukhoi-30mki
The U.S. Army in the coming years will build hundreds of new mobile howitzers, and largely, the project has been a success. Except there will be a problem if the self-propelled howitzers catch on fire.
The Paladin M109A7 PIM — the latest in America’s line of tracked artillery pieces — has an automated fire-suppression system known as an AFES. But during survivability tests, the AFES “did not protect the entire crew compartment” and that “howitzer crews are at increased fire risk” according to a report by the Pentagon’s Inspector General released in August.
Oil, lubricants and the heating system inside the Paladins are all potential fire hazards. And for obvious reasons, there is a risk of fire if the vehicles take a big enough blow. And that’s big trouble for the crews.
The Army will deploy its first PIMs in March 2017, and the howitzers feature a host of upgrades designed for the modern battlefield. But if the problem with the AFES isn’t fixed, “PIM program officials could deploy vehicles that endanger crews.”
All of that is true. Here’s another fact — the PIM is still safer than its predecessor Paladins, which have no automated fire suppression systems at all. Crews have to trust their lives to manual fire extinguishers carried on board.
However, it’s still big deal, especially considering the kind of lethal, massed and accurate artillery fire honed by the Russian army in eastern Ukraine — and which could land on American guns in a potential conflict.
Paladin M109A7 PIM. BAE Systems photo
The PIM is an evolutionary — not radical — upgrade of the Paladin. Outwardly, they look similar and have the same turret, except the PIM has a modified chassis based on the M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
The most important upgrade is the all-electric drive system in the turret and an overhaul of the engine to give the machine a lot more horsepower.
In short, this makes the new Paladin faster, more maneuverable and much easier to work on. Speed was a big problem in the 1992 and 2003 Iraq wars, when Paladins lagged behind the Army’s faster armored vehicles. And the PIM is a better protected from mines, as the chassis rests higher off the ground.
All that extra electrical juice in the Paladin is particularly useful for future upgrades regarding the fire-control systems and communications gear — a vital element of a modern artillery exchange.
It’s a long time coming for the U.S. Army’s artillery corps, which has struggled with questions of relevance in wars on insurgents. To be sure, howitzers have played an important — but reduced — role in America’s recent conflicts.
During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, America went to war with its smallest ratio of artillery to “maneuver” forces — those troops who close and engage the enemy — since the Spanish-American War, according to Armed Forces Journal.
In Afghanistan, artillery battalions often deployed with fewer guns than they were originally intended to field — and troops often found themselves doing other jobs.
Veterans of the Army’s artillery corps fretted over these trends. “So much for the vaunted King of Battle,” retired artillery officer Maj. Lance Boothe wrote in the May-June 2013 edition of Military Review.
In 2002’s Operation Anaconda, the U.S. clashed with hundreds of Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters without any large-caliber artillery. Yet with a more entrenched U.S. troop presence in the following years came an increasing reliance on big guns which — in places — fired relentlessly.
Case in point, one artillery battalion in Afghanistan’s mountainous and remote Kunar province lobbed around 25,000 rounds — including mortar rounds — in a year, according to the New York Times.
To fight the Islamic State, the Pentagon relies heavily on fixed-wing aircraft. But American artillery is still present on the ground.
The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit has fired more than 2,000 artillery rounds at the Islamic State since deploying to Iraq. And the terrorists have shot back. One Marine from the unit was killed in a rocket strike on his artillery outpost near Makhmour on March 19.
Most disconcerting of all, America’s adversaries are not standing still. The Pentagon has closely watched massive amounts of Russian artillery deployed with brutal efficiency in support of the Kremlin’s proxies in Ukraine.
During one of Kiev’s worst defeats in August-September 2014, Russian heavy guns slaughtered hundreds of outgunned and surrounded Ukrainian volunteers at Ilovaisk. Russian-backed rebels have also made frequent use of small aerial drones for artillery reconnaissance.
In response, U.S. Marine expeditionary units now train with similar drones flying overhead to simulate enemy spotters.
In short, the U.S. military must prepare for a battlefield which involves lots of artillery. The Russians have also improved their skills in several conflicts in Chechnya and Georgia, and in Ukraine deployed advanced counter-battery radars which can detect the origin of incoming rounds, allowing them to quickly hit back at the source.
“We are outranged and outgunned by many potential adversaries,” U.S. Army Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster told the Senate in April. “Our army in the future risks being too small to secure the nation.”
That’s a big reason why the Pentagon is rushing to get the upgraded Paladins in service — and it’s emblematic as to why fire suppression systems are critical. If the howitzers get hit, they’ll need them.
But the lack of a system that protects everyone inside is a shortcoming — and not the only one. The Army wants the howitzers to fire a maximum of 12 rounds within three minutes, but they’ve so far failed to accomplish this in tests, according to the Pentagon’s Inspector General.
Perhaps most worryingly, the PIMs keep the same 155-millimeter gun as with earlier Paladins. The cannon has a maximum range of 22 kilometers, ranging up to 30 kilometers with rocket-assisted rounds. That’s well below several foreign self-propelled guns — and Russia’s new 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV mobile gun could significantly outrange the PIM.
And in an artillery war, range is everything.
Ummm.. his designs were made in more countries than just Canada and the real world experience with them is that the accuracy was significantly worse than expected against point targets.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GC-45_howitzer
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G5_howitzer
There is a previous discussion on the matter here: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3415662/posts
See my immediately prior post above, also take a look at Bull’s later career. His artillery pieces (the ones intended for combat) have not been as great as the legend surrounding Bull would have us believe.
Erm, even with his shell design, there was a big accuracy loss. From the Wiki (go there for original citations):
***
The gun designed to fire it had a 23,000 cm3 (1,400 cu in) chamber, a 45-calibre rifled barrel with 1/20 right hand twist fitted with a conventional muzzle brake.[2] Its breech was a conventional screw with interrupted thread.
Key performance data, from the Firing Table[1][3] are:
ERFB-BB shell, weight 48.0 kg (105.9 lb), M11 Zone 10 muzzle velocity 897 m/s (2,940 ft/s), QE 898 mils, time of flight 112 s, range 39.6 km (24.6 mi; 130,000 ft). Probable error in range 212 m (696 ft), in line 36 m (118 ft).
ERFB shell, weight 45.5 kg (100.4 lb), M11 Zone 10 muzzle velocity 897 m/s (2,940 ft/s), QE 881 mils, time of flight 99 s, range 29.9 km (18.6 mi; 98,000 ft). Probable error in range 189 metres (620 ft), in line 42 metres (138 ft).
HE M107 shell, weight 43 kg (95 lb), M119 Zone 8 muzzle velocity 675 m/s (2,210 ft/s), QE 764 mils, time of flight 65 s, range 17.8 km (11.1 mi; 58,000 ft). Probable error in range 59 m (194 ft), in line 12 m (39 ft).
The dispersion of the EFRB shell is more than three times that of the FH-70 field howitzer at its maximum range of only 5 km less, and is twice as great as FH-70s at 20 km (66,000 ft; 12 mi). Its maximum range with the M107 projectile is the same as any 39 calibre 155-mm gun and its dispersion about the same. (The “dispersion” figure means that 50% of shells will fall up to the stated distance either side of the mean point of impact, but 100% will fall within 4 times the probable error either side.) Dispersion of this magnitude significantly reduces the tactical value of the equipment.
***
It had *reduced* accuracy with his shell designs. It means your artillery is only effective against area targets and when used in close support with infantry you are likely to shell your own guys.
The Crusader looked pretty good on paper but it had a lot of problems when you looked at the details. Chief among which was the fact that the gun was fully automated and in the event of a misfeed or other problem, the crew could NOT get access to the gun to correct the problem. In the event of automation failure, the gun could NOT be loaded by humans, even if they had been able to get access.
The next problem was that the Crusader had to be escorted around by a separate ammunition supply vehicle, the XM2002. The Crusader only carried 48 rounds, which it could fire at ten rounds per minute. Then it would take *twelve* minutes to reload 48 rounds from the ammo carrier. Once the piece ran through the 110 rounds in the XM2002, the 2002 would have to scuttle back to the rear to reload, which would take slightly less than an hour once it got to the ammo dump. So you get four minutes of fire, then nothing for twelve minutes (because apparently it couldn’t reload while firing) and then two more cycles, then nothing for at least an hour.
Did I mention that the gun could *not* be reloaded by hand? You had to load the ammo carrier vehicle *then* load the gun from the carrier via the automated feed system - and you better hope it doesn’t screw up.
Yeah, we really didn’t need the Crusader. We should have bought the PzH2000 instead.
I never said it was Mickey Mouse, just that it was done on a shoestring by comparison with most projects.
And, I did know that the HARP barrel was reamed to a smoothbore. OTOH, the M1A2 (and predecessor versions) Abrams Tank has a 120 mm smoothbore main gun, and it is no slouch for accuracy. Smoothbore is not necessarily inaccurate, and always produces higher velocity than a rifled barrel under the same conditions.
I do recognize that artillery is different than an armor piercing round at much shorter ranges, but I think the real difference between Bull's results and the 120 mm smoothbores is the development funds expended.
I remember hearing at the time that a major argument against Crusader was it was too heavy at a time when the US needed to prepare more for rapid deployment. But it looks like the PzH2000 weighs a lot more than Crusader.
As you can see in my photo, it was very well designed and more than stiff enough for the purposes. The description you presented was not accurate - actually misleading. The system was never designed for accuracy as such. It was designed for high launch energies and exceptional range.
Good engineering of an experimental system doesn't actually require a huge budget. Just enough to get the job done, if the audience understands what the tests represent. Note that he never had any tube failures.
BTW, I am an artillery Program Manager/Senior Engineer.
I have been fighting a one-man fight for a couple of decades against the "rangeophiles" at Fort Sill and MCCDC who seem to have forgotten that the old M107 175mm we had in Vietnam could reach out a wonderful 32,000 meters using Zone 3 but never, ever killed anybody on purpose. It had a Circle Error Probable (CEP) of about 1,000m at max range and a lousy frag pattern - you could sit at a surveyed target for the rest of your life and you'd be as safe as you would be, sitting behind the gun!
Remember the Kaiser Wilhelm Geschutze (Paris Gun)? Lots of Reichmarks, huge gun crew, unbelievable range, no combat usefulness at all.
Obviously, guided rounds have the potential of making long-tube artillery useful but they are very expensive and can be neutered with GPS jammers and plain old smoke to blank out laser designators. The only hope long-range gunnery has is to investigate further tube stiffness/shape migration sensing (tubes change shape while heating) and really great fire control algorithms combined with instantaneous MET. Might help, but it will take some serious experimental work to find out. Until then, anything that shoots past 25,000 meters or so is just an expensive noisemaker.
There is a lighter version of it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artillery_Gun_Module
Also, the argument that the PzH was heavier than the Crusader falls over when you realize that the Crusader had to have a second equally large, about equally heavy vehicle following it around at all times to carry its ammo.
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