A Freeper non sequitur recommended it to me and i am in his debt
Posted on 06/03/2016 8:35:30 PM PDT by sukhoi-30mki
China’s aircraft carrier program is maturing. The first photos have now emerged that show Liaoning operating with a decent clutch of J-15 fighters, as well as helicopters on deck. The aircraft are now painted in telltale battle gray, rather than the yellow used with the initial prototype aircraft. It is difficult to tell for sure, but one may assume that the testing and training regimen has been intense. True enough, the Liaoning was bought from Ukraine and it is, unlike American “big decks,” conventionally powered rather than relying on nuclear power. It also has a ski-jump bow to assist with take-off rather than catapults, which are one of the most critical technologies for efficient carrier operations since they allow aircraft to extend their range with increased weapons payloads.
On the other hand, the J-15 (a knockoff of a Russian design) appears to be a rather formidable fighter and attack aircraft. Additionally, nuclear-powered carriers are still encumbered by logistics: high-tempo aircraft operations—not to mention the battle group escorts—still require enormous amounts of fuel. The convincing for the argument that the PLA Navy aspires to go beyond a modest flirtation with the aircraft carrier concept is the news that construction of Beijing’s second carrier is now well underway.
For the last five years, the Chinese naval press has produced reams of analysis on carrier operations. One example of this is the detailed reports examining U.S. Navy accidents related to flying off carriers. There is no substitute for experience, of course, but it should be recalled that the U.S. Navy has not employed aircraft carriers in combat against another significant naval force since World War Two.
On the 74th anniversary of the greatest of all carrier battles, Midway, this edition of Dragon Eye will peruse some recent Chinese writings concerning the epic battle that turned the tide in the Pacific War during June 4th and 5th 1942. One such article was published by a researcher of the Academy of Military Sciences (军事科学院) in Beijing in the prestigious Chinese military journal Military History (军事历史). Although not comprehensive, the article does draw on both American and Japanese sources, and could offer some insights into evolving Chinese thinking about aircraft carrier doctrine in contemporary and future naval warfare. Not surprisingly, the analysis establishes at the outset the decisive role of U.S. codebreakers in revealing “all the planning details of the Japanese combined fleet” (日军联合舰队的所有计划细节). Similarly, the United States were also believed to have had superior battlefield surveillance efficiency. However, intelligence failures are not the central thrust of the essay that focuses more on military leadership culture and, in particular, the perverse role of “battleship-ism” (大炮巨舰主义) within the Japanese naval leadership. Japanese admirals are criticized here for their attachment to “traditional methods” in the manner they organized their forces prior to the Midway battle. Thus, it is explained that the “designated main force of battleships” (称为主队的战列舰部队) was placed behind the carrier force, so that after the initial contact, the battleship force could “then enter the fray to launch the decisive blow” (再投入主队展开决战). But that approach, according to this PLA analysis, left the large Japanese aircraft carrier force substantially exposed to American attack. Moreover, it is noted that the four Japanese aircraft carriers were protected by a dedicated force of two battleships, three cruisers and twelve destroyers, but such a force “certainly could not provide an effective screen for four aircraft carriers” against air and submarine attack from multiple vectors.
Other factors in the Japanese defeat at Midway identified by this Chinese military analyst include the ineffective employment of the Japanese submarine force. Here it is noted that out of a total force of twenty-one boats, just one single Japanese submarine was deployed proximate to Midway Island during the campaign. Another mistake pointed out in this piece is that the Japanese carrier strike force had two contradictory missions at Midway, both supporting the invasion of the island and also destroying the U.S. Navy forces in the area, so that at a critical juncture, the Japanese Navy was “chasing two rabbits at the same time” (同时追两只兔子). Finally, a variety of specific command decisions are also criticized. Thus Admiral Nagumo, Commander of the Japanese carrier strike group, is faulted for not sending out enough scout planes and especially for conducting simultaneous sorties from all four decks. To the latter point, it is explained that if Nagumo had timed his strike waves (keeping two decks in reserve) more prudently, than the disaster would not have befallen the Japanese fleet.
Another Chinese naval analysis is also worth consulting regarding the Midway battle. This piece, part of a series that examined all aspects of Japanese naval strategy in the Pacific War, appeared in 2015 in the magazine 现代舰船 (Modern Ships), published by the giant Chinese warship building conglomerate CSIC. An earlier Dragon Eye took a close look at Chinese thinking about Japanese submarine strategy from this same series of articles. One of these papers focuses on Tokyo’s strategic options during the crucial period of 1942 to 1943. While not much detail is offered regarding the Midway Battle itself, the analysis notes that it was the uncomfortable shock that followed the Doolittle Raid (杜利特空袭) that prompted the Japanese to undertake the “high risk” battle for Midway. Indeed, it is noted that Midway was well outside the range of Japanese land-based airpower and that the island had little strategic significance. A major theme of this assessment is that a significant cause of Japan’s defeat was its inability (after Midway) to supply sufficient numbers of well-trained pilots in the context of severe attrition on both sides. In the end, the conclusion is that Japan might have succeeded in bringing about a negotiated settlement with the US if only it had more cautiously sought out battles that were advantageous in time and space to the Japanese Navy. In such circumstances, it could have “caused the Americans to bleed heavily.” (使美军大出血)
On this solemn anniversary of the Midway Battle, Americans must first and foremost remember the extraordinary heroes of those dark days. On June 4th 1942, several entire squadrons of intrepid US Navy pilots were sacrificed. For example, every single one of the fifteen aircraft from Torpedo-8 flying off of USS Hornet was lost in the battle—cruelly yielding up just one lone survivor from the original 30 aviators. The discussion above may offer some limited insights into the contours of China’s future employment of aircraft carriers. However, US leaders surveying numerous flashpoints across the Asia-Pacific would do well to reflect on this solemn anniversary regarding the terrible sacrifices made at Midway so many years ago. Our leaders must eschew the shallow jingoism that is so prevalent in our political discourse and seek energetically to resolve differences among the great powers through creative diplomacy.
Lyle J. Goldstein is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The opinions expressed in this analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
Thanks.
CV1 effectively an escort. So I didn’t count it.
CV8, Hornet, commissioned October 20th, about six weeks prior to Pearl Harbor. First Mission: the Doolittle Raid. Outfitted with B-24s at Norfolk, and then sent via the Panama Canal to the Pacific. I was thinking of the Hornet as the first new fleet carrier of the war. But, there it is, it was part of the inventory from the start. I should have counted it.
They just seem obsolescent to me, in an age of hypersonic guided missiles. We are approaching the 100th anniversary of Billy Mitchell’s proof of their utility after WWI. In the meantime, other systems have emerged which seem to make them more vulnerable and as dated as massed heavy armor on land.
I don’t pretend to expertise, but that is my impression.
Aircraft carries will become obsolete when the concept of having air superiority over huge swaths of ocean becomes obsolete. Which means never.
In fairness to Japan, I don't know about that.
If you're going to take your enemy's fortified island, you're also going to have to take on his naval assets protecting said island. How else could you achieve your invasion goal? Ignore his counter-attacks sinking your transports?
No carrier in the Pacific war was sunk by land based aircraft in WWII.
Just for general info.
Here is a site on one of those CVE’s—Escort Carriers.
http://www.ussblockisland.org/Beta/Welcome.html
USS Block Island—there were two with that name—CVE-21 and CVE-106. CVE-106 was the replacement for CVE-21, sunk in the Atlantic in May,1944.
The two carriers were manned by the same crew—a first in Navy history. The first carrier served in the Atlantic. The second in the Pacific.
Escort carriers could be built much more quickly than a full size carrier, and many were built to take up the slack until larger carriers could come on line.
My uncle was on both these ships.
When CVE-21 was torpedoed, he spent 13 hours in the water until he was rescued, because the destroyers in the group had to hunt down and sink the U-Boat that sank their ship.
The pictures on this site show what an escort carrier was like.
A Freeper non sequitur recommended it to me and i am in his debt
Hopefully, China learned that sneak attacks upon the U.S. are doomed to fail. Hopefully, Obama will not teach them differently.
The mission of the IJN at Midway was to destroy the US Navy’s carriers. The invasion of Midway was to be the means by which the IJN would wipe out the remaining USN carriers.
The “Two Rabbits” scenario is accurate, what doomed the IJN at Midway and in several other battles was the Japanese habit of scripting large multi-force battles of large areas. The IJN Midway operation consisted of at least 4 surface forces spread out from the south of Midway all the way to the Aleutian islands. Another example see IJN operations once the US invaded Leyte!
Also regards the “two rabbits’ look at Spruance’s decisions during the Mariannas Turkey Shoot battle. One may argue with Spruances decision but at least he made a decision.
Nagumo’s dithering on the second strike at Midway put the IJN carriers in no-mans land. The IJN could not launch a strike on either objective. Had Nagumo launched the strike on Midway then quite possibly he would have been able to launch on the US carriers.
Shifting to the the role on the US Navy’s torpedo squadrons at Midway. While historians tend to focus on the devastating loses suffered by the VT squadrons, something like 80+% IIRC and the VT squadrons role in bringing the IJN CAP down to the ocean surface freeing up the way for the dive bomber squadrons to wreak havoc on Kido Butai. What is not noted is that the VT squadrons attack took place about 1 hour before the VB squadrons showed up. During that fateful hour time lag was the attacks by the Midway air forces. B-17s, B-26s carrying torpedos!, TBFs, and Marine SBDs and SB2Us all attacked in piecemeal fashion. The IJN carriers were busy landing and launching CAP aircraft to protect the IJN carriers.
One final note if I may. IJN carrier flight operations were about 180 degrees from the way the US Navy conducted flight ops. This led in a small part to the demise of the IJN carriers.
See Shattered Sword by Jon Parshall and Antony Tully for the battle from the Japanese side as well as puncturing some of the “myths” of the battle.
Production stats for US vs Japan in WW-II as well as a “possible” timeline in the event that the IJN won at Midway.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
Regards
alfa6 ;>}
Yet land based aircraft sure posed a threat to an invasion force.
The planes sent form midway to attack the Jap fleet didn’t do so well.....
Great book. It is interesting how the differences in carrier construction and fire fighting tactics differed between the IJN and USN and contributed to the former’s defeat at Midway.
“Japanese admirals are criticized here for their attachment to “traditional methods” in the manner they organized their forces prior to the Midway battle. Thus, it is explained that the “designated main force of battleships” was placed behind the carrier force, so that after the initial contact, the battleship force could “then enter the fray to launch the decisive blow””
True enough. But here is the conclusion that I draw from the “PLAN Conclusion”... they are not going to build a large carrier fleet for Blue Water operations. They plan to fight within the seas that they control, and under land-based air cover. Moreover, they plan to use unconventional methods, like their sea-denial DF-21 “carrier killer” ballistic missiles to upset US naval planning. This is not to say that they aren’t going to build a couple of carrier divisions for sea-lane control, and “show-the-flag” operations.
“Another mistake pointed out in this piece is that the Japanese carrier strike force had two contradictory missions at Midway, both supporting the invasion of the island and also destroying the U.S. Navy forces in the area, so that at a critical juncture, the Japanese Navy was “chasing two rabbits at the same time”.”
That wouldn’t have happened if the USN hadn’t penetrated the IJN naval cipher. The idea was to hit Midway fast & hard, taking it before the US fleet intervened. The Japanese planned to take the 2 rabbits sequentially, and was not sufficiently flexible to account for the possibility of having to take them on simultaneously.
The only escort carrier sunk in the Atlantic.
In the Pacific, five escort carriers were sunk (six counting Langley).
Curiously, that matches the five fleet and light carriers sunk in the Pacific.
But since escorts outnumbered fleet & light carriers about four to one, you could argue they had a better survival rate.
Of course, none of the new Essex class were sunk and Hornet was the last of the pre-Essex fleet carriers sunk (October 1942).
Escort carriers continued being sunk by kamikazes well into 1945.
Please meet the USS Princeton, CVL-23, sunk by land based Japanese bomber during the Battle of Leyte Gulf (1944):
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Yes, it was the only one, unless you count kamikazes.
Kamikazes sunk three escort carriers, Bismark Sea, Ommaney Bay and Saint Lo.
The closet that a fleet carrier came to being sunk by land based aircraft was the USS Ben Franklin. Only miraculously super human effort kept her afloat.
But smaller carriers were sunk throughout the war by all of the above, plus kamikazes.
Perhaps China is “fighting the last war”. Everyone thought BB’s would be decisive in WWII; but, in that case CV’s air power won the day.
Autonomous drone submarines are yet to be fully appreciated.
I understand that. However, the second Jspanese fleet was tasked with an invasion of Midway. Hence the attack fleet had to address land based aircraft on the island.
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