An afteraction report on logistics. The following statement caught my attention.
With the war’s end, only an administrative landing was required in Japan.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/BigL/BigL-6.html
Redeployment—Preparations for Invasion of Japan
This operation, had it taken place, would have been the largest and most involved logistics operation ever engaged in by the U.S. military. It entailed the redeployment of 1.2 million troops from Europe to the Pacific. It was envisioned that 400,000 would come directly from Europe and 800,000 via the U.S. Ten million tons of equipment and supplies were to be transferred out of Europe, 5 million tons to the Pacific and 5 million tons to the U.S. After V-E day the 8th Air Force redeployed to the Pacific and troops began to be staged in the Philippines and on Okinawa. Planning called for the first landing on November 1, 1945 on Kyushu. General MacArthur was to be the Supreme Allied Commander for the operation; however in this restructuring of the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz did not become subordinate to MacArthur, but a “coordinating commander.” Because General MacArthur’s command had never achieved any significant degree of jointness in logistics, or at least not to the extent achieved by Admiral Nimitz’ command, logistics for this final operation represented a step back to each Service doing its own logistics planning. With the war’s end, only an administrative landing was required in Japan.77
Conclusion
From the standpoint of joint logistics, it can be said that they never approached the level of unification envisioned by General Somervell or as agreed by Admiral King and General Marshall, nor should they have. The Army Services Forces organization was designed for the support of a European style land war. In the Pacific
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it was more or less suitable for the Southwest Pacific, but it would not have worked for the Navy. What worked best for the Navy in the Pacific was a decentralized flexible system, in spite of the fact that there was duplication particularly as regards shipping and port facilities. The logistics systems that evolved in the Pacific resulted in large measure from the unique requirements of the theaters and subtheaters. Jointness in logistics planning as well as in other functions was best achieved on the CINCPAC Staff. Cross servicing agreements, formal and informal, were in place at various levels, and probably worked best at the tactical level. Could logistics have been more joint in the Pacific? Certainly. Did logistics work about as well as could be expected owing to the circumstances? Probably. Fleet Admiral King, in his Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy Covering Combat Operations 1 March 1944 to 1 March 1945 summed them up as follows:
Supply operations in the Pacific are not solely naval. The Army has a task of at least equal magnitude in supplying its air and ground forces. The supply systems of the two services have been merged together, as much as possible, under Fleet Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific and General of the Army MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. In some cases, in which only one service uses an item, that item is handled entirely by the service concerned . . . In other instances, it has been found convenient to have one service look out for the needs of both.78
Although the 50 years since the end of World War II have witnessed considerable consolidation of logistics functions in the Armed Forces, they have vet to reach the level of centralized control as envisioned by General Somervell, nor should they. The unique requirements of the Services dictate flexibility. The Services are responsible for providing, equipping, and training forces for the CINCS. The CINCS have limited control over logistics. The system is far from perfect and needs to be continually improved. Many of the improvements made in logistics over the years have been as a result of lessons learned in World War II, particularly in the area of transportation and common user supply.
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Whether the Europe First strategy was a limiting factor in the War in the Pacific, or diversions of resources to the Pacific put an undue strain on the war in Europe, is still being debated. In the early days of the war, the Pacific was a priority area by necessity in order to contain Japan. Pacific Theater priorities also became convenient for the U.S. in order to dampen the British focus on the gradual approach to Germany through the Mediterranean. The strong personalities of both Admiral King and General MacArthur also had much to do with resource allocation for the Pacific. One thing is certain, the key decisions of the war were logistical decisions dictated by logistics considerations, and the continuing debates over priorities between the war against Germany and the war against Japan as well as the intra-theater debates, precluded any long-range logistics planning.79
"Pierre Laval, the former collaborationist premier of Vichy France, testifies at the trial of Marshal Philippe Pétain (seated, right), who was charged with high treason.
Pétain was convicted and sentenced to death, but his sentence was commuted by General Charles de Gaulle to exile on the island of Yeu.
Two months later it was Laval's turn to stand before the court, in a hasty trial in which no defense witnesses were called and at which he was speedily convicted.
Although Laval pleaded his innocence, he was executed on October 9, 1945."
"In August 1945 the leadership of the Zionist movement held the World Zionist Conference in London.
In the first row, from left to right, are Yitzhak Zuckerman, Haika Grossman, Emil Sommerstein, and an unidentified man.
In the second row are Abba Hillel Silver, Moshe Sharett, and Nahum Goldmann.
Third row: Moshe Sneh, Itzhak Gruenbaum, and an unidentified man.
Participants at the conference protested Britain's refusal to permit more Jews to immigrate to Palestine.
In Palestine, the impatience of the Jewish population led to an increase in violent attacks upon the British."
" The writings of Primo Levi, an Italian Jew who survived the Holocaust, comprise one of the most articulate analyses of life in Nazi concentration camps.
"Born in Turin, Italy, and trained as a chemist, Levi fled to the mountains when the Italian government of Pietro Badoglio surrendered to the Allies in 1943, prompting the Germans to occupy much of the country.
After being captured by a Fascist militia, Levi was imprisoned in the Fossoli, Italy, transit camp and then sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau in February 1944.
"The ten months that Levi spent in Birkenau provide the context for his memoir, Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity.
This poignant book describes the notorious death camp as a 'biological and social experiment of gigantic dimensions.'
Levi's suicide in 1987 serves as a painful reminder of the long-term impact of the Holocaust. "
"Vidkun Quisling led the National Socialist movement in Norway, helping to establish the German occupation of his country in 1940.
Over the next five years, thousands of Norwegian patriots died resisting the Nazi occupation.
On June 19, 1945, Quisling was forced to view some of the mass graves of those murdered during the occupation.
On October 24 the traitor Quisling paid for his crimes when he was executed."