Dec. 29,1944. Mine-planting at Hotton, Belgium. A GI carefully places an anti-tank mine to slow up the advance of the 116th Panzer Division.
Posted on 12/29/2014 4:41:16 AM PST by Homer_J_Simpson
Dec. 29,1944. Mine-planting at Hotton, Belgium. A GI carefully places an anti-tank mine to slow up the advance of the 116th Panzer Division.
Nice composition.
Mission #217
Target: Neuwied
The field order information was very slow coming in for a strike against a tactical railroad target — a bridge behind the Anes. At 0600, (29) aircrews were finally given briefings, and at 0800 hours all began take-offs. A total of (27) bombers dropped on the primary with excellent results, while (2) others released on Stadthull — all releases being by GH methods. The Group dropped (186) 1000# weapons on the target areas. Fighter support was rated superior to good and no fighters were encountered. Flak, however, took a grim toll, causing damage to (11) bombers and the loss of (2) others. From the 577th, (2) bombers were severely hit, but fortunately most of their crew members were saved. In ship #875, Lieutenant Shaw’s crew was hit near the IP but managed to release their bombs. The bomber then turned from the formation with smoke coming from the bomb bay area. No chutes were seen, but on the next day good news was received that the aircrew had landed safely on the continent. In bomber #861, Lieutenant Walker’s crew suffered flak damage near St. Vith, position 5016N-0607E and after bomb away at 1330 hours, the ship pulled out to the right of the formation under control. Nothing further was heard until a teletype was received the next day that the crew had landed safely on the continent with (4) casualties, (2) of the aircrew having been killed. The remaining ships returned safely around 1430 hours.
29 DECEMBER 1944:
2/LT Bedore, Cletus P. (N) 577th KIA
S/S Bradford, Thomas M. (RW) 577th KIA
These members were flying on Pilot l/Lt. D.L. Walker’s crew on the mission to Neuweld this date. Their plane was B-24J Model #42-50861, Call Letter "S+" no nickname. This ship was on its 16th combat mission when it was hit by flak near St.Vith above the Ardennes, where the Battle of the Bulge was taking place. Pilot 1/Lt Walker ordered the crew to bail out. Navigator Bedore was killed when his chute failed to open; he died in the neighborhood of the St. Leonardus chapel at Tollembeek, where his body was laid-in-state. S/Sgt Bradford's chute also failed to open; he died in Vollezele near the farm "Ten Berg." 2nd Lt Faust was hospitalized due to pulled tendons and 2/Lt Nunziato was hospitalized at the 108th British Geneal Hospital due to his injuries. The crew was later returned to Wendling. There are no records available indicating the burial locations of Bedore and Bradford.
Fox news advises that the B24 was placed in service 75 years ago today
Just trying to understand the situation a little better. Dunkirk was a shiney for Mongomery. Africa is a shiney but because he ran a defensive WWI strategy then with overwhelming troops over came Rommel? So he is repeating Africa, waiting for overwhelming troops? But England does not have the troops, not being critical, it was a long war for England.
His reputation started to decline when he was put in charge of D-day. His men liked him evidently, what else was going on that changed things with his assignment to D day?
I did find the following humorous, the need to include “by others” as opposed to by himself?
“His command abilities were first appreciated (by others) during the retreat to Dunkirk,....”
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/people_montgomery.html
Abrasive, difficult but successful British General during the Second World War. Montgomery had served on the Western Front during the First World War, and remained in the army between the wars. In 1939 he managed to get command of the 3rd Division. His command abilities were first appreciated (by others) during the retreat to Dunkirk, where his division covered the rest of the retreated army. Montgomery showed an ability to stay on top of the details under pressure that suggested he was suitable for high command.
In August 1942 he was appointed to command the Eighth Army, facing Rommel in the Western Desert. In a war so far dominated by movement, Montgomery reverted to First World War tactics, forcing Rommel to attack a strong defensive line. With this victory behind him, Montgomery was able to stand up to Churchill, refusing to go on the offensive until he had been reinforced. When he finally went on to the offensive at El-Alamein (23 October-5 November) his army massively outnumbered the Germans and was able to inflict a crushing defeat on Rommel, one of the first suffered by the Germans. This made Montgomery a national hero in Britain, and helped to mark the turning point of the Second World War (along with the siege of Stalingrad).
Montgomery and Leigh-Mallory during Overlord
Montgomery and
Leigh-Mallory
during Overlord
In December 1943, Montgomery was recalled to Britain, where he took control of the planning for Operation Overlord. He was in direct command on D-Day (6 June 1944), but his reputation now started to decline. German resistance away from the beaches was greater than expected, and when the breakthrough came it was in the American zone. His relationships with his American colleagues were increasingly hostile, especially after Eisenhower took over direct command of the army. Montgomery was promoted to Field Marshal in the aftermath of the breakout from the beaches.
The biggest blot on Montgomery’s record is Operation Market Garden, the attempt to capture the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem. However, bad luck played a significant part in this defeat – a crack German division was recovering from the Eastern Front in the area, and victory at Arnhem could have dramatically shortened the war.
Montgomery was a very capable general, who played a key role in the allied victory, both in Africa and on D-Day. Moreover, he was careful with the lives of his men, and won his victories without suffering huge casualties. His ability to irritate his colleagues should not be allowed to distract from his reputation.
I wonder, was he as careful with the lives of Americans, Canadian, Poles, and Australians?
One can’t read “careful with the lives of his men” without thinking of George McClellan. When General A is very careful, General B’s men pay the price, as I think is clear when we look at the Italian campaign
Slowness may save some lives, but it takes others. Look at what’s going on in Nazi-occupied Europe, as we see in Bro JoeK’s posts. I’m not saying the Allies would have relieved Central Europe faster if Montgomery had acted differently: we can’t know that. But every action or inaction has consequences beyond the immediate decision-maker and his subordinates.
It makes me wonder if Monty had some kind of personality disorder. The man seemed utterly unaware of the consequences of his actions on others.
Lust for power, the same "disorder that all of us have. One could speculate on varied things like overcompensation for an inadequate penis, hunger for acclaim, lack of parental affirmation, etc., but there's no point. Lust for power is universally the human condition--he just had an opportunity that few others do and decided to go for it.
My little crystal ball says this power grab is gonna backfire on ol' Monty.
But I’d bet they weren’t such good “friends” after the war.
They were bitter toward each other.
I’ve never quite figured out what to make of Bernard Montgomery. As colorado says, Monty may have had a personality disorder. Probably true, and it had some narcissistic overtones to it. Part of it might be that Monty was highly insecure. In “Guns at Last Light,” Atkinson mentioned that Monty didn’t get high marks at St. Paul’s, never made it past cadet private, and had never been invited to the Headmaster’s office. He may have been haunted by the phrase “not good enough.”
As for his generalship, I agree that Monty had a good early run, but that his star was waning later in the war. I’m not that familiar with his record with 3rd Division in 1940, but generally the BEF maintained its cohesion during the retreat to Dunkirk. As for Africa, you can’t fault Monty for conducting a fight in such a way that maximized his army’s strengths and guaranteed every chance of success. War is not meant to be a fair fight, you fight to win. And having won in Africa, Monty was a hero.
I disagree that Monty didn’t do well in Normandy. In many ways, Normandy was his best fight. He planned it meticulously, and corrected a number of flaws in the early concept. He knew the campaign would hinge on the race betwen the Germans and Allies to bring divisions to the battlefield. The actual battle didn’t go as Monty planned, and the Allies initially fell far behind Monty’s lodgement schedule. Part of that was due to things beyond Monty’s control, such as atrocious flying weather or the flagging morale of war weary British troops who, after years of fighting, felt they’d “done their part.”
But this was where Monty adapted. He deliberately drew the bulk of the German armor over to his sector of the front and tied it down in a series of very costly battles around Caen. This freed up the Americans to break out of Normandy and win the Battle of France. Despite the knowledge that the British army was a wasting asset, Monty got the war weary British soldier to summon up one more major bloodletting. And in pursuing this strategy, you can’t say he was winning victories with the lives of other countries’ sons.
But despite what I consider a major victory at Falaise, there has always been the accusation it was an incomplete or “flawed” victory. His generalship was “not good enough.” And coming out of Normandy, Monty was able to do the same type of force ratio calculation he did before the invasion. Except this calculation was one of the relative combat power of the British Army as opposed to his American allies. He knew Britain was going to play an ever shrinking role, and as British commander, so would he. For the thin-skinned insecure Monty, it was equivalent to another personal indictment of “not good enough.” Hence the gamble of Market-Garden, the last offensive effort of the British Army and Monty’s last chance to show his greatness. He failed; “not good enough.”
But Monty’s narcissism, if that’s what it was, or maybe a defense mechanism of denial, wouldn’t let him find any fault in himself. He was perfect. His plan was perfect. If anything went wrong, it had to be for “other reasons.” He had to denigrate the leadership qualities of the Americans, and the Ardennes Offensive and his taking command of the northern flank gave him a green light. If the British Army couldn’t be bigger than the Americans, it had to be better. And that meant he had to be better.
So we have his exchanges with Ike where Monty burns his bridges.
The desire to come off as the “perfect general” will come out after the war in Monty’s memoirs. In describing the Normandy campaign, Monty will make it sound as though everything happened like clockwork according to his master plan. It was far from the truth. And ironically, had Monty written the truth, he would have been come off better in the judgement of history. He had a good plan, but circumstances changed. He adapted on the fly, brilliantly, and won a crushing victory. That’s what great generals do. But Monty couldn’t do that. His towering ego, that masked an underlying insecurity, wouldn’t let him do it.
Sorry about typos. I still haven’t mastered typing on a tablet.
Wait for tomorrow's post, you'll see.
If there were any typos I didn’t notice. I was too busy enjoying and pondering your well-informed and very interesting take on the matter.
Good synopsis on Monty.
You are correct on Normandy. Things changed. Monty checked the German armor and allowed Bradley the time and space to take Cherbourg.
My take on Monty is what Patton was reported as saying about him, and himself.
“Hell, I know I’m a Prima Donna Brad, but so is Monty, only he wouldn’t admit it.”
Patience is a virtue, and virtue is its own reward, so tomorrow I shall be attentive.
I agree Monty's style was just what was needed in North Africa. Churchill made a huge gamble when Britain was alone and under the Blitz that Germany could not mount an invasion of Britain and therefore decided to reinforce and double down on North Africa. A careful commander who would not waste such preciously husbanded resources was just what was required.
Great post. Thanks for sharing. What is is about Churchill and Monty always numbering the lines in their correspondence? Must be a British thing.
Hitler, in his insanity, was intuitively spot on in his objective in the Ardennes Offensive to split the Allied loyalties and forces. With Monty’s unstable ego, it very nearly worked.
Interesting thoughts and analysis.
I think if Monty had had his way in this war, there’s a good chance you and I and the rest of us wouldn’t be here communicating so enjoyably with one another in a relatively free environment.
Another point about Monty, I think, is there seems to be some kind of inherent failure in British command that goes back as far and probably beyond, the 1854 Charge of the Light Brigade, an unnecessary sacrifice of brave soldiers because the British commander wouldn’t listen to reason and had his head up his a##, similar to what I see here with Monty. Probably goes all the way back prior to King George. An arrogance, an aloofness, a stiffness, that binds and blinds a proud heart from seeing clearly. Something like that.
If Germany won WWII then the cold war would have been between the Third Reich in Europe and the USA instead of USA vs USSR. Not much different really.
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