Posted on 12/01/2014 9:17:03 AM PST by george76
A large association of battlefield target spotters has written to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to oppose the planned retirement of A-10 Warthog strike jets — a debate that now encompasses the “friendly fire” deaths of five American soldiers in Afghanistan.
The A-10 endorsement from the Tactical Air Control Party Association is significant because, outside of the Warthog’s pilots themselves, perhaps no other warriors know its ability to protect ground troops under fire better than the ground controllers who guide it to enemy targets.
...
The five fatalities occurred on June 9, when a B-1B strategic bomber — a planned replacement for the A-10 — dropped a 500-pound bomb squarely onto U.S. soldiers protecting a helicopter landing zone.
An investigation showed the flight crew lacked basic knowledge about the bomber’s sensors, which did not have the capability to detect friendly infrared strobes worn by soldiers that night. Not knowing the sensors’ limitations and not seeing any strobes, the crew unleashed the deadly bomb.
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The Air Force is sticking by its guns, portraying the Warthog as a limited aircraft ... The Air Force retired 61 A-10s in 2013 and now operates 283.
(Excerpt) Read more at washingtontimes.com ...
It isn’t rivalry when one service starts killing the other through bad doctrine, bad training , or just indifference. It’s a defect that needs resolution.
No service does that. NONE. Friendly fire has been with us as long as there has been fire, and NO SERVICE TAKES IT LIGHTLY. Not in the USA, at least.
Targeting pods and improved communication make fratricide less likely. It will never eliminate it. Targeting pods are a huge advance over dropping low with 3 seconds down the chute. It is even harder to do a level delivery accurately on the right target at 100’.
My SIL & oldest daughter were in the Marines. My son is in the Army. I was USAF, with 2 years on an Army fort and I deployed to Afghanistan in support of an Army project. I also did a 3 year tour attached to a US Navy squadron. I take perverted pleasure in having never had a joint tour, but having decorations from the Army & Navy to go with USAF ones.
Joking with each other around Thanksgiving is fine. Pretending “one service starts killing the other through bad doctrine, bad training , or just indifference” is horseshit.
Good info...
“Back in the day” referred to props and pistons, not anything since jets hit the battlefield.
Though, I do remember a training flight on an A4 where we most definitely went vertical during our gun run on a surface target. That was the early 70s, and I was in the back seat.
Your attitude explains part of the problem. Air Force doctrine has always emphasized strategic employment of air power and made close air support of ground forces a bottom priority. Imagine how much better Omaha Beach would have gone with dedicated CAS.
My resentment comes from seeing fellow Marines die because of negligence, followed up by arrogance. The Air Force never apologizes and in the case of the deaths of those Brit soldiers, even refused to have the pilots meet with the soldier’s parents when they were asked to.
An Air Force plane bombed my battery in Vietnam after I had already been evaced home. They used cluster munitions but luckily only 6 men were wounded, nobody was killed that time. The big insult was that the Air Force sent an investigation team to our battery - not to apologize - but to see why the bombs were so ineffective.
My Dad and both Uncles were Air Force. That doesn’t make things better for me. I’ll be impressed when I see that culture changed.
And that right there is why your post does not deserve a response. Massive ignorance on display for anyone with any time calling in CAS or flying CAS. (I don't believe you when you say you are familiar with CAS because no one who is would ever say such nonsense.)
Cheers.
You can choose to:
a) Act as a responsible adult and move on as this “debate” is over. . .or
b) Cave in to your overwhelmingly and compelling inner child to throw a fit.
Have a good day.
And your qualifications are?
Dittos
In the infantry war, the enemy is always very close. if you ever watch a firefight from the air, you'd be struck by how short the tracers lines are and how close everyone is to each other. For that kind of war, the aircraft supporting us had to get down close and make a pass or two to make sure they were running parallel to our front and they knew exactly where we were and the enemy was before releasing anything.
Bombing from nice, safe altitudes above the reach of small arms also introduces variables - relative wind, air density, variable conditions in the weapon's drag among others - and the CEP gets larger. A big CEP means that the odds increase that the munitions will hit us instead of the enemy - or in many cases, the wrong damn treeline and innocent villagers get killed.
My point, which seems to be lost on you, is that even a dedicated weapon like the A-10 was used badly sometimes and killed our guys because they didn't make runs above the target to make sure of its identity and more than a few of the pilots wouldn't be able to recognize our stuff anyway, since they never spent any time with us.
This stuff isn't just tough luck or the way war always is - those guys on the ground are every bit as important to their friends and their families as those pilots.
My point was and remains that unless the USAF really is committed to the proper and safe application of CAS, they should hand that mission over to people who will learn who they are supporting and take the risks and precautions needed to ensure that none of our brave kids dies at our own hands. We've seen too much of it.
Active Duty ping.
“Bombing from nice, safe altitudes above the reach of small arms also introduces variables - relative wind, air density, variable conditions in the weapon’s drag among others - and the CEP gets larger. A big CEP means that the odds increase that the munitions will hit us instead of the enemy - or in many cases, the wrong damn treeline and innocent villagers get killed.”
I’ve dropped thousands of bombs. I also worked on the SNIPER targeting pod, and worked with PGMs.
If you don’t know the difference between bombing in 1965, or 1985 (when I started doing it) and 2010 or 2014...well, listen. Target ID is vastly BETTER at altitude. Accuracy with PGMs is vastly BETTER. Communication is vastly BETTER. Datalinks allow a JTAC and the pilot to exchange pictures, to make sure both are seeing the same thing. That makes it SAFER for the guy on the ground.
Targeting pods were developed in part to make CAS BETTER. They largely take the pilot of 200 hours and let him put bombs on target like a pilot of 5000 hours. That was an investment in CAS by people who believe in the mission.
I’ve also had to fight with Army officers who didn’t know squat all about HOW to get bombs on target. The ARMY doesn’t know CAS very well, or airpower. I know, because I’ve spent time teaching them as an ALO.
Despite all of the newest technologies, a USAF Bone crew managed to kill several Special Forces guys and the Afghan battalion commander due to "failures of tactics, techniques and procedures" and an over dependence on the SNIPER pod.
I would love to believe that the Air Force is past the bad old days of bombing us instead of them but new technologies or not, it's still happening.
What's missing is cultural. Since the days of Mitchell, the Air Force has accepted as Gospel that their mission is strategic, not tactical and that the ground forces will benefit more from interdiction fires than being employed as "airborne artillery". Implicit with that concept is an implication that the ground forces are inferior and some Air Force guiding lights still suggest that air power can win the wars all by themselves without us humble crunchies.
I was stuck with being the Assistant G-3 for a Bright Star exercise in Egypt years ago, with the US Army 3rd Infantry Division staff acting as Army Theater Command. We had an Air Force staff in a large camouflage-netted tent alongside us throughout that exercise but they had nothing to do with us. I gained entry to the Air Force planning cell (despite some opposition) and found out that they were completely unconnected from the Army play of the problem and refused to provide CAS for the live fire portion of the exercise which the division and the Egyptian Army and the Marine MEU were taking part in near Wadi Natrun. I ended up using Egyptian MiG-21s for live fire CAS instead.
I believe that technology will eventually give us safe and dependable CAS. Unmanned CAS. I do not believe that any iteration of the Air Force's mentality or culture will ever provide what the ground-pounder needs because the Air Force will never give a damn about us.
Well, if you actually READ their posts above yours BEFORE you posted this, you would have seen that Hulka WAS AN A-10 PILOT, and Rogers flew years of combat air support and was on the ground as a forward air controller. And thank you sir, for your service. You said the Air Force NEVER apologizes. So I'll do it for them.
It is a horrible--indescribable--ordeal that we bombed your men. There is no excuse, but there it is. Friendly fire has got to be about the worst that can happen in combat. It cannot get more personal than being under fire from your OWN GUYS!
So many here condemn the USAF for being concerned with air-to-air combat, but because they are, no American troops have been under constant aerial attack since WWII. Imagine what the Marine close air support could do to American troops. What the USAF does is make sure that such devastating attacks don't happen, at least by enemy air power.
“Since the days of Mitchell, the Air Force has accepted as Gospel that their mission is strategic, not tactical and that the ground forces will benefit more from interdiction fires than being employed as “airborne artillery”.
The idea that the USAF rejects tactical level flying is as insane as the rest of your ideas.
And no, airplanes should not normally be used at flying artillery. It should be a force multiplier, not a force additive. That often includes CAS.
The Army agrees with me. I made that point at an NTC rotation years ago, and the ARMY asked me to meet with other units at Fort Hood and explain what we did and why we did it.
You’re obviously deranged. You know nothing about the US Air Force, modern equipment or tactics or how CAS is done and why. All you want to do is bitch about the US Air Force and wish the Marines were there to scrape their bombs off of their jets instead of someone using PGMs from up high.
Happily, the people who make decisions, including the US Army, disagree with you. I’m strongly in favor of keeping A-10s, just as I once supported the A-10C program (although my part was fleeting and microscopic) - but I also know why a lot of CAS is done with fast moving aircraft and targeting pods.
It works. It works extremely well - much BETTER than it did in Vietnam. But it fails if someone provides the wrong target coordinates and tells the aircraft to attack that location - just as bad ground control always causes problems.
Couldn't have expressed it better myself. Like my dear Uncle - an Air Force P-51 pilot in WWII said to me "I can't believe I have a Nephew stupid enough to join the Marines during a war".
You say the Army's happy with your new and improved CAS? Sure they are, since something's better than nothing. The difference with your version of CAS and ours is that our pilots start out as infantry officers as all of us do and we know them and they know us. They are committed to helping us gain our ground objectives even if they lose their lives doing it (and our helicopter pilots will come for you if you're wounded, no matter what). We are a single team and that's the secret of our success and why we hang onto our air wing with all of our strength.
Close Air Support is very, very effective at cracking the enemy's hold if it is precise and it is the right weapons. General MacArthur discovered that for himself in the battle for Luzon when he used Marine SBDs and our FACs to eradicate Japanese strongpoints in front of his advancing infantry. He requested Marines because the Army Air Forces wouldn't or couldn't provide that kind of responsive support. As I said earlier, Normandy would have gone much better if the landing forces had dedicated and pinpoint CAS to take out the German defenses. Would have saved innumerable soldiers' lives. Instead the Army Air Forces provided medium and heavy bomber interdiction which was for the most part helpful except for the big strike that landed on our forward force near Caen, killing scores and breaking our assault for the Germans.
There are two points you don't want to understand:
1. Air power supports ground objectives. You don't win any wars by air power alone. You don't win any war until the ground forces run our flag up the enemy's flagpole, period.
2. The ground Marines and Soldiers and Navy Corpsmen are just as valuable as any pilot. Their lives are every bit as worthwhile. We aren't just customers for bombs, we aren't expendable and our families grieve just as much as any airman's family. Rabbiting off 30mm or rockets or bombs or any other munition when you aren't absolutely sure - so sure your own son could be there on the ground too - before you pull the trigger is a crime, period.
"Somebody just gave the wrong grid" is an excuse, a poor excuse for flaws in the targeting and coordinating and deconfliction system. You have to have skin in the game.
“Somebody just gave the wrong grid” is an excuse...”
Actually, it is the reason things went wrong in the case you cite. The airplane wasn’t wrong, the bombs used were not wrong, the crew was not wrong - they hit the target ground commanders told them to hit. The error was not in the air, but on the ground.
“Just “we do things better now”...”
Yep. This is not 1944 nor 1964. Ground pounders were MORE LIKELY TO DIE in 1944 or 1964 from poorly done CAS than they are now. Because in the US Air Force (and Army & Navy and even Marines), we keep trying to get better!
“Air power supports ground objectives.”
No kidding. That is why, in Afghanistan (while filling in for the ALO), I told the Army BDE/CC he would not get any air support for his mission. He tore me a new butthole. When he ran out of steam, I pointed out the Army General’s direct order - “all available air” would go to a higher priority operations and “none” would be sent to his area of operations.
He stormed off, called his boss, then returned and told his staff that there would be ZERO air sent our way - by order of the 2-star.
When I was in Korea, my 3-star worked for the Army 4-star. When working logistics issues, I always won and the Marines always lost. Why? Because I was arranging what the 4-star said was HIS #1 priority, and the Marines were pushing the Army 4-star’s 8th or 9th priority. Not mine. Not my 3-star USAF general’s. The 4-star USA commander’s priorities.
The Marine officer finally complained it wasn’t fair. The US Army Colonel running the show said the only fairness he was interested in was carrying out the 4-star’s plan. The 4-star US ARMY Commander.
When I was a BDE/ALO, every target I gave the fighters was approved by either the XO or CC. 100%. Not 25%, not 50% - EVERY TARGET I GAVE THE FIGHTERS WAS FIRST APPROVED BY THE GROUND COMMANDER OR HIS XO.
After all: “That’s the Air Force way, alrighty!” The USAF - giving the ground commander what he wants!
I am well acquainted with the anal-retentive Army system of "dueling stars" - but any commander, anywhere that puts folks in contact as a Pri-8 deserves a forced retirement. It also tells you why we Marines rabidly resist parceling our sorties out to area commander control.
You do not "work for the 3-or 4-star" you work for the troops in contact and the mission. I am well aware of the USAF and Army culture - I once had the "pleasure" of having two USAF captains working for me and the strident whining about have their FitReps signed by me, a lowly Marine was heart -rending.
Again, the reason for CAS is for aiding the ground guys in succeeding in their mission and to help the enemy die/our guys live. Parceling out sorties to only one parochial unit should be court-martial fodder.
The "that's the Air Force alrighty" comment was in reference the well-known arrogance of the Air Force. Some of it is justified - you fly well. Some of it isn't. Those of us who have survived the beaten zone are not impressed if the air support isn't there or misses the bad guys or gets us.
The story Mr. Rogers related about the colonel demanding air support for a unit in Afghanistan and denied it because "it was a Major General's direct order that all air support goes to somebody else" is a travesty. Did that unit that needed air support lose anyone? If so, those deaths, those wounds are yours and that pigheaded Major General's to hold as your own. Didn't you have the career courage to stand up to that Major General to do the right thing? Moral courage demands taking the right action even when a bad fitness report or relief for cause may result. Afghanistan is a special case because almost all of the credible fire support is air support - there is very little in the way of artillery and mortar within range - so responsive air support is vital.
We have lessons to learn as professionals and we should be looking for methods to reduce the lag time between sensor to shooter while ensuring precision and safety. It isn't "somebody else's problem" when fire support fails, it's all of our problem.
If there's any one thing my ranting should bring to the surface it is the responsibilities of all of us involved in the combat and combat support chain to do what is right at any cost to ourselves. The "well, it looked OK when it left" excuse doesn't wash if our own young people are killed and wounded by our actions or inactions.
“...Combat power exists in two forms, ground-gaining power and support for the ground-gaining forces. ...”
Chainmail must regard the First World War as a screaming success, then.
The “everything must serve the infantry” attitude went out of date some 2350 years ago. Or earlier, perhaps: about the time when humans began building boats strong and tight enough to survive a little longer than was needed to execute river crossing.
How reassuring, to be told we needn’t bother spending money on ships, aircraft, radio, radar, spacecraft, cyberwar, drones, whatnot. Heck, why not just go back to smoothbore flintlocks? No, we have no choice. We must go back to throwing rocks; even the armament of 200 years ago required some rudiments of the military industrial complex.
A very odd response but I guess that shouldn’t be surprising. Not exactly a graduate of the Command And Staff College, are you?
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