You did not read Rustbucket data:
Month ... % change from 1860 to 1861
Feb ..... -15.6
Mar ..... -22.8
Apr ..... -12.3
May ..... -11.5
Jun ..... -34.0
Jul ..... -40.0
Aug ..... -65.7
Sep ..... -55.1
Fifty to Sixty per cent drops cannot be passed off as normal fluctuations.
Next, it was the tariff/trade derivitives that jeopardized Northern ports. Gold was already flowing South after Morrill passed the house and just before secession. Credit resolution was in jeopardy due to the politicians in Washington.
Read this comment: "In 1860,...the secession crisis was reflected in a business panic," wrote historian James A. Rawley. "The stock market fell, New York merchants found difficulty in collecting bills in the South, and gold began to flow to Southern ports. It was estimated that $3,500,00 in gold moved in ten days. New Yorkers engaged in Southern trade feared debt repudiation; by November 14 panic had set in and business failures began. Found here
You then said: "Second, Republican policy was to reduce imports and encourage domestic production through use of higher protective Morrill Tariff rates. So Lincoln could not "start war" just because Republican policy succeeded!"
Do you realize how utterly stupid that comment is....with all due respect. I would suggest you go backward about 25 posts and read the commentary of the newspapers, businessmen, and politicians....all of whom realized the meaning of the Confederate Tariff rates relative to Morrill.
Of course I read them.
You did not record that in January 1861 imports rose 23.5% which means that as of April (end of March report) year-to-date imports were down overall about 15%.
That does not sound to me like "panic time", especially since the whole idea of a protectionist Morrill Tariff was to increase US manufacturing and reduce foreign imports.
Sure, by August, imports were down 50% & more, but that was well after war began, in April 1861.
PeaRidge: "Read this comment: 'In 1860,...the secession crisis was reflected in a business panic,' wrote historian James A. Rawley."
Your link refers to events after the election on November 6, 1860, which certainly had nothing to do with the Morrill Tariff.
But what rusty's numbers show is that this November 1860 "secession crisis" on Wall Street did not really hit Main Street imports until well into 1861.
But if you are just trying to make the simple point that New Yorkers were upset and afraid of consequences from Deep South secession, then of course, you're correct in that.
Was there something else you want to add?
PeaRidge: "Do you realize how utterly stupid that comment is....with all due respect.
I would suggest you go backward about 25 posts and read the commentary of the newspapers, businessmen, and politicians....all of whom realized the meaning of the Confederate Tariff rates relative to Morrill."
With all due respect...
Do you realize how "utterly stupid" it is to assume that 1860 era Republicans were overly concerned with opinions of their Northern Democrat countrymen?
The simple facts here are that protectionist Morrill Tariff passed the House in 1860 because Republicans wanted it, and neither Southerners nor Northern Democrats were solidly opposed.
But Morrill was not finally passed and signed into law until March 1861, and is not mentioned in any official secessionist document.
Sure, doubtless there were disruptions in the period after November 1860, but how much was caused by fears of secession resulting in financial disruptions, how much by fears of war, then by actual war's blockade, embargo and disruptions, and how much by the effects from Morrill's rise in tariffs, I doubt if we can say.
But none of this, imho, was the main concern on Lincoln's mind after inauguration on March 4, 1861.
What Lincoln was hoping to do then was preserve as much of the Union as possible, while maintaining peace, if possible.
Failing that, then Lincoln wanted to make certain that if war came, it was started by Confederates.
So Morrill was not the driving force.