Posted on 06/25/2011 8:15:40 PM PDT by EveningStar
Chivington's attack was immediately condemned far and wide, there were several investigations in which he was reviled in no uncertain terms, he was forced to resign from the militia, he was forced out of politics and he ended up hauling freight in Nebraska. He wasn't hanged, but he was never celebrated for what he did at Sand Creek.
The Favreau story is awesome. I did a search and was glad to find out that he is still working.
I remember an old episode of, (I believe it was and circa 1961 or so), the original ‘Twilight Zone’ where a tank crew out on maneuvers in the area of the battle were somehow transported back in time to the fight. IIRC the 3 soldiers, along with their tank, were armed with .45 auto feeders and M-1 carbines. Interesting episode to say the least.
But what is leadership without it?
No one gets to wear scrambled eggs for followship.
At least, in theory.
Couple of comments here.
Custer was young, very young. Took his command at 23, and died at 36. That takes with it the mindset of charging hard and fast, which is not a bad thing for a calvary commander. Custer wasn’t an exceptional tactician. Graduated last in his class.
He made a name for himself by being bold and brash. Got noticed and took command as there weren’t many Union commanders who had the spirit to fight. Pretty much rose through the ranks thereafter.
As he got older, he didn’t change he was pretty much the same man as he was at 23. He was appointed to command the 7th by Sheridan, ostensibly to find him a position when it was revealed that he was not in the employ of the army after the end of the war.
He used mostly the same tactics on the indian tribes, round up a group of calvary charge the enemy and break them.
What went wrong at Little BigHorn? Lots of things.
1, he was not with his usual command. He was explicitly requested to go out and lead the forces there, despite that they had a different command then his own. He was walking with a force that was not used to him or his command, and didn’t have the time to get everything sorted out.
2, the supply situation. Yes, he had enough men. Yes he had enough armament, but he was dumped into the situation without prior planning. This accounts for much of the confusion both before or after the battle, as when he took command, they left to confront the folks at Little Bighorn.
3. The situation at Little Bighorn. Again, as noted in the thread, Custer was unfamiliar with the surrounding area. Rather then take the time to scout and become familiar, which was a key to his successful charges, he just wanted to be done with the whole thing. He believed that his prior experience would be successful, because it had always been successful.
4. His organization, baggage train and communication with his other commanders was poor. Again, taking over a brigade not accustomed to bold action will endure hesitations and delays. One of the delays that was bothering Custer was the command to collect his forces together rather then just taking who he had there at the time and throwing it out. He believed the delay to consolidate was unnecessary and didn’t take the time to properly assess the situation.
5. What the Sioux did at Little Bighorn is rather remarkable. Most of the time, they kept to scattered tribes, which meant that they couldn’t consolidate very meny men and even fewer fighting men. The Sioux consolidated everyone into their village. One of the recorded comments is that the village was substantially larger then those that Custer had encountered throughout his career. They were also equipped with arms, and were well led, again as a result of Sioux organization and consolidation.
This was all unparelleled, a new trick to an old dog. Custer, rather then wait for all his men to gather, decides to haul out an unfamiliar brigade load them all together and charge at the enemy. Without scouting the area first, just go and charge. Would have probably worked too, if the situation hadn’t changed.
He then proceeded to divide his forces once more so to provide an encirclement. Had he not done this last move he likely would have survived the battle. He lost the battle before he even marched out, but he died because of the last fatal mistake.
He lost communication with the second division in the middle of the battle, and the second division wasn’t sure where he was or what was going on. They later dug in to try to fight, rather then ride into the fray and try to relieve Custer. Made sense at the time, dig in and try to fight. They were destroyed to a man.
So yeah, Custer made quite a few mistakes to lose the battle. I’m really not sure why it’s such a mystery. He broke a bunch of his rules and was so accustomed to force of habit that he didn’t notice his own rules were broken as he did as habit would have him do. Those missed things caused him to make the poor decisions later on.
Custer lost the battle because he lost the toss.
Back in ‘95, I visited the site of the Fetterman Massacre as well as the site of the Wagon Box Fight.
The Indians had no idea of Fetterman’s arrogance but they had seen enough of the Army’s tactics to realize that an ambush was likely to succeed.
I’m probably wrong but I always thought that what had Fetterman’s command so badly was their inability to keep up a good rate of fire on the Indians. IIRC, the infantry were still using primarily Civil War-era rifles.
If more of them had been equipped with repeating carbines, I suspect they could have kept up a rate of fire strong enough to drive off the Indians and hopefully let most of the command get back to the fort.
The happenstance of having visited Gettysburg a few days prior was kind of interesting as well. Gettysburg was one place where Custer made his reputation by helping thwart JEB Stuart. Stuart was all too eager to prove himself after having left Lee without accurate reconnaissance and having suffered Lee's admonishment for it.
Visits to the two locations were like historic bookends of a reputation won and lost.
Not sure what you are talking about here, he was with the 7th Calvary, as he had been for nearly ten years. The officers and men were very familiar with Custer and his tactics.
He had 718 men under direct command.
Of that 718, roughly a third of his officers and 200 men were detached and unavailable to him.
Of the remaining 500, 250 were raw recruits.
Of the remaining 250, about half had served with him over the last 5 years, and the remainder were Civil war vets who had signed on from before that.
So that leaves him with a core of about 125 men who had served with him beyond one engagement with the indians during the indian war.
That’s not very many men.
The 7th prior to Custer’s last stand was under direct command of Sturgis, not Custer. Custer was called out in anticipation of battle given his prior civil war experience.
Forensic analysis of shell casings at the site seem to support your comment — they track the movement of individual native firearms in a move-and-shoot approach which conicides with terrain features, rather than a circular pattern.
No, the basic problem of Fetterman was that he was stupid, brash and didn’t listen to orders.
Col. Carrington told Fetterman to NOT pursue the Indians, only to protect the woodcutting party, to NOT cross Lodge Trail Ridge, because supporting Fetterman’s party once they got beyond that ridge would be difficult from the fort.
Fetterman didn’t listen. Crazy Horse baited Fetterman by waggling his bare buttocks at Fetterman and Fetterman took the bait and led the men over the ridge and into the tall grass. See the similarity to Custer already?
On the reverse slope, there were thousands of Indians, who executed what could only be called a textbook-perfect ambush. They lured their quarry over the slope, away from supporting fire or observation, deep into the interior of a 10X+ numerically superior force who remained well hidden and under tight discipline until Fetterman’s forces were all within the kill zone. The US Army learned little to nothing from this slaughter, and blamed Carrington for a failure to call Fetterman back.
BTW - two civilians with the Fetterman group had Henry rifles, and many of the mounted men had 7-shot Spencer carbines. The infantry had muzzle-stuffers.
Again, looking at the lay of the land and how the ambush was sprung, I doubt that putting up a higher rate of fire with Henry or Spencer rifles would have enabled an escape, unless you have something akin to today’s SAW weapons with 200 round magazine belts. A huge problem was the mix of Fetterman’s forces - some mounted, some not. Pulling off a withdrawal from such a numerically superior force when you have two very different speeds of movement - very tricky. The US Army also had a very stupid reaction to engagement with the Indians - they’d dismount and form skirmish lines. The Indians seemed to intuit that rapid, fluid movement was more effective than attempts at a dug-in defense.
A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn - the Last Great Battle of the American West [Paperback]
James Donovan (Author)
Custer lost a Major and 18 or so other troopers at that Washita fight. They left the village to pursue a group of Indians, and were attacked by Indians from other villages coming to Black Kettle’s rescue. Custer had to make a hasty retreat and left them behind. This became one of the contentions that grew within the 7th Cavalry, and split it into two camps; pro/against Custer.
He got his whole command wiped out by seriously underestimating his enemy. It’s the most one sided loss in US history. I think that’s worthy of contempt.
A lot like MacArthur, except in December 1941 MacArthur had a good defensive plan that he completely failed follow. Each failure was comprehensive and effects their reputation.
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