Please explain what you mean by “serialized copies with strict depositing controls”. That term is not one I’m familiar with.
Thanks in advance.
I'm not all that familiar with it either. It was off the top of my head and its been a long day.
Essentially, I think the computer method is fraught with risk. Driving home from a recent election I worked out a scheme which I thought at the time was bullet-proof. You know how those "great ideas" sound initially.
As I recall, when the voter was determined to be entitled to vote, the voter would be given a serialized paper ballot and the serial # would be checked off on a separate list - the # would not be recorded with the voter's name.
The ballot would consist of a top original with a second copy that was a faithful reproduction of the voter's markings on the top form; i.e., a state of the art carbon copy, etc. Both forms would bear the same serial #. The voter would place the voter's choice of either in one of two unmarked boxes that were on two unmarked tables that were monitored by two unmarked individuals - who were appointed by the two major parties (there would be no need for other tables for other parties).
Such a procedure would seem to ensure a reliable counting, auditing and reconciliation process.
terycarl's variation of that scheme sounds good but it could raise issues when the monitors had to take a potty break.
Your thoughts?