FReeper Book Club: The Debate over the Constitution, Federalist #60

Would the rules surrounding elections create a special class of men, separate from the people, who would occupy public office? Hamilton takes on a criticism based on social class.

² We have seen that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not without hazard be committed to the state legislatures.

³ Let us now see what would be the danger on the other side, that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself.

⁴ It is not pretended that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any state from its share in the representation.

⁵ The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all.

⁶ But it is alleged that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others by confining the places of election to particular districts and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice.

⁸ On the one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition, which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever find its way into the national councils, and on the other, it may be concluded with certainty that if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive.

⁹ The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection: that it could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed by the state governments.

¹⁰ It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbulent and factious seasons, be violated in respect to a particular class of citizens by a victorious and overbearing majority, but that so fundamental a privilege in a country so situated and enlightened should be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the people by the deliberate policy of the government without occasioning a popular revolution is altogether inconceivable and incredible.

¹¹ In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a more precise nature which forbid all apprehension on the subject.

¹² The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national government, and still more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches, must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial scheme of elections.

¹³ There is sufficient diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners and habits of the people of the different parts of the Union, to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society.

¹⁴ And though an intimate intercourse under the same government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as well physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less degree, permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect.

¹⁵ But the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government.

¹⁶ The House of Representatives’ being to be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the state legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people, there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.

¹⁷ As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of “time and manner,” which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members.

¹⁸ The collective sense of the state legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of that sort, a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted.

¹⁹ For what inducement could the Senate have to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included?

²⁰ Or to what purpose would it be established in reference to one branch of the legislature if it could not be extended to the other?

²¹ The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other.

²² And we can never suppose that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary cooperation of the state legislatures.

²³ If we make the latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is placed, whether in their hands or in those of the Union.

²⁴ But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the national councils?

²⁵ Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property?

²⁶ Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest?

²⁷ Or to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of “the wealthy and the well-born,” to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?

²⁸ If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property, I presume it will readily be admitted that the competition for it will lie between landed men and merchants.

²⁹ And I scruple not to affirm that it is infinitely less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the national councils than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils.

³⁰ The inference will be that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former than from the latter.

³¹ The several states are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce.

³³ In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most of them has a considerable share of influence.

³⁴ In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation, and for the very reason that this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and in much more various proportions than are to be found in any single state, it will be much less apt to espouse either of them with a decided partiality than the representation of any single state.

³⁵ In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government.

³⁶ As long as this interest prevails in most of the state legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national Senate which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies.

³⁷ It cannot therefore be presumed that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the Federal Legislature.

³⁸ In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am governed by the consideration that the credulous votaries of state power cannot upon their own principles suspect that the state legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence.

³⁹ But in reality the same situation must have the same effect in the primitive composition at least of the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the other.

⁴⁰ In order perhaps to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may be asked: is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national government which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the federal administration to the landed class?

⁴¹ As there is little likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it, a labored answer to this question will be dispensed with.

⁴² It will be sufficient to remark first, that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the Union than in those of any of its members.

⁴³ Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire.

⁴⁴ And thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in the management of them.

⁴⁵ The importance of commerce in the view of revenue alone must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body which would be continually importuned in its favor by the urgent calls of public necessity.

⁴⁶ I, the rather, consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property because, as far as I understand the meaning of the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind.

⁴⁷ They appear to have in view, as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of “the wealthy and the well-born.”

⁴⁸ These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious preeminence over the rest of their fellow citizens.

⁴⁹ At one time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the representative body; at another time it is to be effected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body.

⁵⁰ But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference?

⁵¹ Are “the wealthy and the well-born,” as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several states?

⁵² Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of residence?

⁵⁴ Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors?

⁵⁵ If the latter is the case, as every intelligent man knows it to be^*, is it not evident that the policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account?

⁵⁶ The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected.

⁵⁷ But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government.

⁵⁸ Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, the manner of elections.

⁵⁹ The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution and are unalterable by the Legislature.

⁶⁰ Let it, however, be admitted for argument sake that the expedient suggested might be successful, and let it at the same time be equally taken for granted that all the scruples which a sense of duty, or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers; still I imagine it will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the people.

⁶¹ The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers, but that the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment that such a force might exist, and the national government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of it.

⁶³ With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community, and with the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of men?

⁶⁴ Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement?

⁶⁵ Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation than to trust to precarious expedients which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the [dismissal], disgrace and ruin of their authors?

⁶⁶ Would they not fear that citizens, not less tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock from the remote extremes of their respective states to the places of election to overthrow their tyrants and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the people?

This is Hamilton’s second foray into class analysis, the first taking place at the end of Federalist #35 and the beginning of #36, where Hamilton reminds the reader that social class, learned by the examples of Britain and France, was not swept aside by any presumption of a classless society, but was instead at the forefront of contemporary political thought.

The topic was reopened by Brutus in his #7, wherein he suggests that a federal government so inclined might manipulate the nature of the electorate by radical measures in declaring the time and place of elections, a function normally reserved to the states, but within Article I capable of being overridden by the federal government should it find reason sufficient to do so. Specifically, he suggested that the federal government might declare the state of New York to be a single district and place the only poll within the city of New York, thereby skewing the electorate toward urban dwellers and away from smallholding farmers and others who would find the necessary travel to vote to be infeasible. In the previous essay Hamilton’s answer was a simple disbelief that the federal government would be capable of anything so outrageously provocative, an answer that he echoes here.

⁹ The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection: that it could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people...

Imaginable, yes; probable, no; with immediate and lasting consequences were anyone silly enough to try. In historical retrospect Hamilton was likely correct about the matter, and Brutus guilty of a hyperactive imagination in that single suggestion, but it reasserted a line of discussion concerning the extant social classes within the United States of the time, and what mechanisms existed within the proposed Constitution to ensure that they all achieved representation. To that discussion Hamilton proceeds.

In this essay he identifies the four main classes as “the landed interest, the moneyed interest, the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest” (26). In Federalist #35 he added an additional class, the “learned professions,” by which he meant academics and specifically lawyers, which class was intended to act as an intermediary between the conflicting interests of the other classes within government just as the attorney portion of it did within the existing court system.

^35-57 Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to the [rivalries] between the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of the society?

It is Hamilton’s case for the heavy presence of that “learned” class within the existing Founders, both Federalist and anti-Federalist, and it makes perfect sense as far as it goes. The implication is that such a class will be more likely to take the part of its sundry constituents than pursue its own class interests, a case for which Hamilton offers no evidence and subsequent experience, a certain skepticism. The current Congress some two centuries hence consists of a House of whose members 45%, and a Senate of whose members some 60%, possess law degrees, and of these, the majority began in private practice. This must be kept in mind during the discussion of Hamilton’s points.

Nevertheless, the three points he made in #35 are germane to this discussion: first, that the members of these various other classes are more likely to vote in favor of a representative that represents their interests than in favor of one that represents their identity, that is, who is actually a member of that class; second, that a rigid restriction by membership did not allow for the class mobility that was and remains a characteristic of American society; third, that such tokenism was both impossible to manage and incompatible with the freedoms of representative government. But what would prevent a single class from assuming all power in all branches of the federal government? It was, according to Hamilton, the “dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government.” (15)

Part of this dissimilarity has been sacrificed on the altar of democracy by the 17th Amendment, wherein the Senate is subject to popular election. For Hamilton, however, it is not a direct guard against class interest, but a guarantee that such would necessarily be filtered through the state governments.

²⁹ And I scruple not to affirm that it is infinitely less likely that either of them [landed men and merchants] should gain an ascendant in the national councils than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils.

In a predominantly agricultural nation, the “landed class” must prevail in terms of numbers (32), coming into inevitable conflict with the mercantile class (31) – agriculture versus commerce, in Hamilton’s formulation. It is no Manichean rivalry: these need one another as much as they find themselves in rivalry (44, 45).

But what of another sort of class, one based not on the source of wealth but of the size of wealth of its members?

⁴⁷ They [the opponents of the Constitution] appear to have in view, as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of “the wealthy and the well-born.”

At 49, Hamilton deftly returns the topic to whether such a class is geographically distributed and thus subject to Brutus’ original speculation. The answer is obviously negative. But whether other factors might result in the advent of that class to a disproportionate power within the new government Hamilton dismisses rather too easily.

⁵⁶ The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected.

Despite an odd modern popular conviction that such a thing was written into the Constitution, it was not (57). But time would supply another method.

At last, Hamilton returns to his belief that blatant manipulation of election law in this way would require a cabal promoting it that is capable of resorting to military means to enforce it (60), and that even that would fail in the face of an aroused public (66).

Hamilton has dealt with Brutus’ speculation to his satisfaction. With the broader speculation that one or another social class could dominate within the strictures of the Constitution, Hamilton has opposed the concept of the different sources for the three branches of government. The “learned profession” class does not, in his view, constitute a class large or powerful enough to consider alongside the others.

There is, however, the additional point that a government coalescing from the different sources Hamilton names might form its own class, that is, a collective of identifiable and lasting membership that tends to pursue common interests. Hamilton hopes to address this by a frequent turnover, in the case of the House, every two years. This was, ironically, the same man who had spoken in favor of membership for life in not only the Judicial branch, but the Executive and in the Senate as well during the early debates at the Constitutional Convention. One sees here the evolution of Hamilton’s ideas, or at least of his interests.

But in a government that is not subject to frequent turnover, this will not serve as a defense. In the current federal government, only a very small minority of members are subject to the periodic defense of their positions in the public forum. For the rest – bureaucrats, functionaries, the infrastructure of government – there is a perceptible tendency toward collective identification and a discernible pursuit of class interest, culminating in a classic example of class action that would have been a startling phenomenon to Hamilton, Madison, Yates and the rest: the advent of government unions.

It might have been a problem in a government of any size containing members unelected and thereby indirectly accountable to the public if at all. Where a government has grown to a point where the majority of its members are in that position, a governing class is highly likely. In governments where no members are elected or accountable, such as the bulk of the communist governments of the 20th Century, the formation of such a class is inevitable. In 1957 the Czech communist Milovan Djilas documented this process in his memorable The New Class, a volume whose arguments were promptly validated when Djilas was immediately ejected from the class he had identified.

The United States federal government is, in the early years of the 21st Century, arguably at that perilous midpoint at which a governmental ruling class begins to coalesce and pursue its own interests. Those who seek to reduce its size and scope do so from interests that are at least as compelling as cost and efficiency.

Hamilton takes to task those who would argue that representation in Congress would accrue to the wealthy and well-born, rather than to the average citizen. He failed to anticipate how modern mass media would change the political playing field in the late 20th Century.

In the early years of the Republic, the mercantile class, landed class and lawyers all mixed and mingled in Congress along with the occasional average citizen. As frontier land became settled over time, average citizens were replaced in politics by the wealthy. It was a natural progression from the yoeman farmer, elected to Congress by his neighbors, to the wealthy farmer, manufacturer, banker or lawyer sent to Washington City.

In the early years, a man of substance would “stand” for office, rather than run, for the act of running for office was not considered gentlemanly. This changed with the arrival of Andrew Jackson, for now the yoeman farmer saw himself as the equal of the wealthy farmer, manufacturer, banker and lawyer. This was reflected in a new form of mass entertainment known as “speechifying”. Political oratory took on the status of both sport and art form in the 1820's, and the stump speech was the standard of measurement. A candidate would stand on a tree stump or the back of a wagon and speak to the issues of the day. The crowd would rate the candidate on both style and substance. The rule book for substance was the Pocket Constitution.

Thanks to Jackson’s emphasis on federalism, citizens who had the right to vote carried Pocket Constitutions to political events for reference. These were bound in red or blue, but not white, for Americans of that era worked with their hands and would have sullied a white cover. Once the politician began speaking, Constitutions would come out of pockets, and people would thumb through the document, evaluating the speech and asking whether something proposed by the politician fit within the Constitution’s enumerated powers. Woe betide the politician who did not know his Constitution by heart!

Following the Civil War, federalism became a discredited doctrine, and Pocket Constitutions disappeared from American politics.

The art of the stump speech and the political rally, however, survived. Presidents such as Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush could be deadly dull working from a prepared text, but could give masterly performances speaking extemporaneously to a crowd. There are films of Truman and Johnson using barnyard humor to make a point and entertain a crowd with an old fashioned stump speech. Pocket Constitutions, however, are nowhere to be seen.

The arrival of broadcast mass media changed everything. Franklin Roosevelt showed an impressive grasp of the new medium with his Fireside Chats on radio, but it was television that became the great game changer.

Television is about imagery. It is where style trumps substance. People who listened to the Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960 over the radio rated Nixon as the victor. Those who saw it on television gave the victory to Kennedy, whose medication for Addison’s Disease made him appear like a bronzed god. Ronald Reagan once famously laughed at a critical bit of network television coverage because the images chosen to accompany the criticism were a direct refutation of that criticism and complimentary to his administration.

But the biggest issue with television was its cost. Paid political advertisements on television are expensive, whether as a local buy on a television station or as a national buy with a network. It costs a lot of money to advertise a politician or a policy like toilet paper or hemorrhoid ointment.

Prior to 1974, political contributions could come from individuals and unions, but corporations were forbidden to contribute directly. The post-Watergate political reforms were well intentioned, but they opened the floodgates to corporate giving by way of political action committees, thus creating a whole system of legally sanctioned bribery. As long as there was no specific quid pro quo in the arrangement, there was neither bribe nor payoff, and the law was not violated. Supreme Court decisions would later compound the problem by defining money as speech, rather than defining it as property.

The sheer cost of running a modern television campaign not only pivoted on the new system of legalized bribery, but made it difficult for an average citizen to seek political office without selling himself in advance to his big contributors. Those who could get around this conundrum were the wealthy and well born, who could commit millions of their own dollars to the service of a modern media campaign.

Hamilton got it right for his era, but there was an ugly surprise waiting in America’s future.

Are there constitutional solutions to the problems created by television and Big Money in politics? Can political discourse be elevated above the sound byte? Can the Pocket Constitution play a new role in restoring federalism? Lay out your case for change or stasis.

6 But it is alleged that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others by confining the places of election to particular districts and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice.

They do this in a dispersed, virtual way with vote fraud and allowing illegals to vote. The net effect is to dilute the value of honest votes.

9 The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection: that it could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed by the state governments.

How many hazards of tyranny have I read THAT about? It seems our founders had too much faith in us. [sigh]

"Thanks to Jackson’s emphasis on federalism, citizens who had the right to vote carried Pocket Constitutions to political events for reference. These were bound in red or blue, but not white, for Americans of that era worked with their hands and would have sullied a white cover. Once the politician began speaking, Constitutions would come out of pockets, and people would thumb through the document, evaluating the speech and asking whether something proposed by the politician fit within the Constitution’s enumerated powers. Woe betide the politician who did not know his Constitution by heart!"

I the modern era Arizona Rep. John Shadegg has repeatedly proposed the Enumerated Powers Act that is always fought off by the ruling class of venerable career politicians and establishment liberal elites.

Educating Americans about the value of this proposal would make a great difference in how our congress operates.

Hamilton, America’s first progressive.

“6 But it is alleged that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others by confining the places of election to particular districts and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice.

7 Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems to be the most chimerical.”

It has already happened. Democrats and Republicans have agreed to “minority majority” house districts where a majority of voters are either Black or Hispanic. Democrats like it because Black leaders get jobs as government leaders and Republicans like it because it gerrymanders the rest of the districts into 55% Republican leaning districts. So much for Hamilton’s judgment on what is chimerical and not.

As for the rest of Hamilton’s Federalist, I can’t stand reading through his constant condescension so I just skimmed it. It’s really not worth arguing with.

“Are there constitutional solutions to the problems created by television and Big Money in politics? Can political discourse be elevated above the sound byte? Can the Pocket Constitution play a new role in restoring federalism? Lay out your case for change or stasis.”

The “Big Money” to target is public employee unions funding federal campaigns with money derived from the federal government. This use of Federal money was something specifically debated at the Constitutional Convention. Someday maybe there will be a law against federal employees giving money directly to candidates.

To raise “political speech above the soundbite” (or sound byte for those of you with Mac books), first we need clarity in our laws. They should be simple enough for you or someone you know to understand. Second, we need accountability. That is, we need to know who is responsible who is elected, i.e. a Representative, a President, a Senator, etc. and not a judge nor bureaucrat.

Our current political discourse has the problem of lack of depth. At one level we have soundbites about “death panels” and the next immediate level is 3000 pages of legalese with passages to be created later by people we’ll never hear about, each one a little tiny death panel, maybe.

IMO.

As far as a “pocket constitution” the Necessary and Proper clause has made it a moot point to wonder if it is “in the constitution”. Gone are the days when people will ask if the Federal Government should build the Erie Canal.

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