“The ruling Conservatives believe that if Great Britain refuses to negotiate with the dictators now, she will lack a moral case, such as that which she found so helpful in the United States and elsewhere in 1914. The dominion Prime Ministers apparently feel that same way, for as long ago as last June they urged the British Government to “conciliate” to the utmost.”
I consider this statement extraordinary, but it makes sense.
In the First World War, Britain’s own army was more than doubled in size by contributions from its empire, and from the US. So Chamberlain’s concern to make absolutely certain that these folks would be on board once again, when war finally came, would be more than understandable.
And if that required Neville to play the fool to Adolf... well, so be it.
On the other hand, I think most historians strongly suspect that Neville really LIKED being a fool.
Has anyone ever argued otherwise?
Chamberlain played the fool so well that he became one. But it is not exclusively his fault — a lot of people believed in wishful thinking rather than in the unpleasant facts. Some things never change.
I feel a certain amount of sympathy for poor old Neville. In 1938 we were not quite twenty years past the World War. In 2008 we are over thirty years past our Vietnam experience. Now compare the casualties from those two events. Our 58,000 dead in Vietnam over ten years or so would have amounted to a fairly good month for the Allies in WWI. Yet the anti-war types are still using Vietnam as a rallying issue to this day. If I was a Brit in 1938 I would have required a lot of convincing before I would be willing to go to the continent of Europe to fight the Hun. Threats to Austria and Czechoslovakia would not have done it. I realize it is a leader's job to anticipate emerging problems and convince the people of the need to take painful steps when necessary, but for Chamberlain it would have been a tall order. Especially in a democracy, where the leader first has to be elected. Hitler and Stalin didn't have such constraints.
Added to which, the year’s delay bought time for Britain to build at least the foundation of credible war-fighting forces, especially the air force - without which, in 1938, war might have been near suicical. Perhaps not quite such a fool after all.