Air Force explains nuclear weapons incident

Minot Daily News ^ | 20 October 2007 | Eloise Ogden

[Racehorse]

Airmen not following the proper procedures that they were trained in, along with a lack of leadership and supervision, caused the incident in late August where nuclear weapons were loaded on a B-52 bomber at Minot Air Force Base and were flown to Barksdale AFB in Louisiana, said Maj. Gen. Richard Newton, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations, plans and requirements.

“Their lack of attention in detail is where the failure occurred,” Newton said at a news conference at the Pentagon Friday.

. . .

He said the incident began with the failure of airmen to conduct a required examination before the weapons were loaded on the B-52.

. . .

He said Air Combat Command officials made the decision to relieve from duty three colonels – Minot AFB’s Bomb Wing commander and Maintenance Group commander, and the Operation Group commander at Barksdale. Barksdale’s Operation Group commander was Col. Todd Westhauser.

Newton declined to go into details about others involved in the incident and any actions against them, but he said it was fewer than 100 people.

. . .

“This was an unacceptable error,” Newton said. He said the B-52 involved was from Barksdale. He said a lack of attention to detail and personnel not following checklist procedures caused the incident.

[gunnyg]

Look again—it is posted to one of my webpages, but clearly shows where it originated—it is just info—no indication that I have/have not come to any conclusion, etc.

I am open to the opinions/info of others, obviously a minority opinion, but my opinion and as good as anyone else’s.

Things are not always as they seem or as some wish them to be. And anyone reading this may/or may not do the same.

Thankfully, many viewers are of the silent majority and who refrain from getting involved in purposeless responses. It is for these of the “silent majority” that I direct my posts.

Semper Fidelis
Dick G
~~~~~~~~~~

[puppypusher]

Its time to reactivate SAC.SAC never would have allowed that to happen.That’s one of the reasons why I never could understand the DOD’s reasoning to get rid of a dedicated nuclear attack force and combine it into what is Now called the Air Combat Command.

Air Combat Command knew nothing about the Strategic Mission.It was previously known as the Tactical Air Command.

[Eastbound]

Thanks for the update, Vn.

Best -- Dave

[DoughtyOne]

Thanks Larry.

[billbears]

Well since we’re not at war, I’d sort of like an explanation if nuclear material, decommissioned or not, is flying over my head without proper care

[Guenevere]

You must have missed seeing Cindy Sheehan’s signature.

[DuncanWaring]

He said the incident began with the failure of airmen to conduct a required examination before the weapons were loaded on the B-52.

It seems to me that the incident began when the "Nuclear Weapons Custodial Officer" (or whatever the appropriate title is) failed to know exactly where every darned one of his (or her) warheads was.

[Vn_survivor_67-68]

you may thank none other than GEORGE HERBERT WALKER BUSH

On 1 June 1992, Strategic Air Command passed into the history books,

http://www.zianet.com/jpage/airforce/history/majcoms/sac.html

(the installation list at this link shows the coordination that was so critical in SAC.....even if it is incomplete for security reasons)

[Vn_survivor_67-68]

LOL.....no.....I purposefully mis-spelled kennebunkport.....apparently YOU missed THAT :)

[Guenevere]

No, I didn’t miss your creative spelling of Kennebunkport :)

[Cold Heart]

Same paint job. One article I read (with a picture) described how the way to tell if the missile was nuclear armed was by looking into a small inspection window (looked about like silver dollar size) to see the radioactive icon.

My first question, the pilot didn't even do a walk around of his plane?

[ReignOfError]

I doubt the kind of specific and detailed information you and I and others really want will come out until the courts martial start up, if they do.

Not even then. The Pentagon traditionally does the "can neither confirm nor deny" dance on any incident involving nukes, and there have been several over the last half-dozen decades. The disclosures on this incident, vague as they are, are unprecedented.

[HawaiianGecko]

  According to on AP article that can be found at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21382005/

"Some 65 airmen have been decertified from handling nuclear weapons. The certification process looks at a person's psychological profile, any medications they are taking and other factors in determining a person's reliability to handle weapons.m handling nuclear weapons."

When I was a 463 we had a program called HRP-99 that monitored us (HRP= Human Reliability Program).  For 65 airmen  to be netted at one time tells me the USAF has canned the program,  is grossly incompetent, or is being run by a bunch of San Francisco liberals on drugs themselves.

Same article says: "The airmen replaced the schedule with their own 'informal' system, he said, though he didn't say why they did that nor how long they had been doing it their own way."

The above statement is the scary part. I hate to agree with Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), chairwoman of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, but when she said:  "These are not just rules that people dreamed up ... just so they could check off the boxes," she said. "This is fundamentally important to the security of the country and the world." she hit the nail square on the head.

We had a MSgt at Malmstrom in the early '70s that wanted to deviate from procedures when we were replacing the Minuteman IIs with Minuteman IIIs.  He was hell bent to win some speed-medals I guess, and he managed to get burned for it. 

[DuncanWaring]

...the way to tell if the missile was nuclear armed was by looking into a small inspection window (looked about like silver dollar size) to see the radioactive icon.

My first question, the pilot didn't even do a walk around of his plane?

Walk-around inspections typically aren't done with ladders.

Maybe they should be.

[Travis McGee]

ping

[Vn_survivor_67-68]

HRP-99

I was curious

http://www.google.com/search?q=%22Human+Reliability+Program%22+99&hl=en&client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&start=0&sa=N

[HawaiianGecko]

  Curious about what?

[Vn_survivor_67-68]

HRP-99 initially, but now wondering about clinton/richardson......the orig DOE pdf is gone, but the html is still up......

http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:yhjySeOeFcIJ:hss.energy.gov/IndepOversight/SecEvaluations/directives/o4524.pdf+%22Human+Reliability+Program%22+99&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=13&gl=us&client=firefox-a

[baclava]

I used to work at a nuke site - I did the interviews and paperwork needed to medically decert someone. Those guys had no room for error, and always walked on eggshells, I can’t see this happening unless the commander was a complete doofus.

Just removing an asset from the WSA to the flightline was a major protocol exercise.

[Wilum]

When I was loading Nukes I was under then, 35-99, which had a max. 12 hour workday and saved me from an Article 13. The incident happened at hour 14, hee, hee, hee. HG, I’ll give you a hint, it had to do with a Jammer.

And I still have my doubts about this!

Wilum