The Persuasive Power of Character (Excerpt from Michael Yon piece)

Excerpt From Ghosts of Anbar, Part III of IV A Model for Success ~~ The Persuasive Power of Character

This is where Marines live, surrounded by Hesco barriers, and where some months ago a large car bomb rammed the tower closest. I was told that as the bomber was racing toward the tower, the guard jumped out the back and flew like Superman just before the detonation. He survived.

1-149. Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained. . . . These practices ensure access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish real legitimacy.

Earlier, at the Falahat station, I counted 24 armed Iraqis at one time, but there may have been as many as twice that.

So it was just SSG Lee, me, and dozens of armed Iraqis. Some clearly had been insurgents just months ago. Nobody was denying it. Not us, not them. SSG Lee and I could have been killed or kidnapped at any time, yet I felt not a twinge of danger other than maybe watching for an enemy car bomb or sniper, or starting when someone accidentally fired a burst from an AK, which they occasionally do.

The Marines were constantly outnumbered, yet they were pushing out there with the Iraqis, who are picking up more of the weight in many places.

Back in 2005, many Iraqi Soldiers and Police preferred to hide their identities.Today it seems that most Iraqi Soldiers and Police want their photos taken. Their confidence is growing and their attitude toward the terrorists is increasingly one of being more the hunter than the hunted.

Now I started to understand why the Army officers had been telling me the Marines are more advanced in counterinsurgency.

Normal Marines have morphed into doing vintage Special Forces work. Many of our Army units are excellent at this work, but the Marines, at least these particular Marines, did seem to have an edge for it.

They were even studying Arabic in their filthy little compound. Lightweight study, but they were showing the Iraqis they were making the effort. The Iraqis appreciated it. I have yet to see an Army unit undertake such a clear effort to learn Arabic.

The Marines there live in disgusting conditions. They have two toilets. One is a tube. For more serious business, there are the small plastic baggies called WAG bags. Do your business, seal it up and put it into a garbage can. They don’t complain.

Iraqi Soldiers and Police constantly emulate Marines and Soldiers. When he got back from missions, SSG Lee would work out. The Iraqis would watch and start doing their own exercises. This form of mentoring happens naturally because Lee is just being Lee, and the young Iraqis see it and want to be it.

It’s a cultural touchstone. A man like SSG Rakene Lee is not someone they would overlook. Physically, the man is amazingly strong. But what is most amazing is the strength of his moral fiber. Whatever the man talked, he walked. After all of al Qaeda’s false promises, the people here have learned a hard lesson about the true value of character.

1-139. U.S. forces start with a built-in challenge because of their reputation for accomplishment, what some call the “man on the moon syndrome.” This refers to the expressed disbelief that a nation able to put a man on the moon cannot quickly restore basic services. U.S. agencies trying to fan enthusiasm for their efforts should avoid making unrealistic promises.

In some cultures, failure to deliver promised results is automatically interpreted as deliberate deception, rather than good intentions gone awry. In other cultures, exorbitant promises are normal and people do not expect them to be kept. Effective counterinsurgents understand local norms; they use locally tailored approaches to control expectations.

Managing expectations also involves demonstrating economic and political progress to show the populace how life is improving. Increasing the number of people who feel they have a stake in the success of the state and its government is a key to successful COIN operations. In the end, victory comes, in large measure, by convincing the populace that their life will be better under the HN government than under an insurgent regime.

Over the next several days, I saw how much the Iraqis respected Rakene Lee and the other Marines who were all courageous, tactically competent, measured, and collectively and constantly telling even the Iraqis to go easy on the Iraqis.

It’s people like Rakene Lee who are winning the moral high ground in Iraq. It is people like this who are devastating al Qaeda just by being themselves.

Over those same several days, I would also see the Iraqi Lieutenant Hamid treat prisoners with respect and going out of his way to treat other Iraqis the way he saw Americans treating them. Lieutenant Hamid, in his young twenties, seemed to watch every move of the Marines and try to emulate them.

Lieutenant Hamid is from Sadr City. Hamid is Shia but was working in Anbar Province. (Same last name but no relation to the general arrested by LTC Crissman.) There is civil war in some areas of Iraq, but the Shia and Sunni do not automatically explode when they mix. Many Iraqis make a point to explain this to me. Many neighborhoods and families are mixed, as are military units.

Over days of operations, I found Lieutenant Hamid to be courageous, intelligent, and with natural leadership abilities. Hamid asked me to publish his photo. He said he wants al Qaeda to come to Sadr City and look for him.

One night, after a long day out in the sun, when we were all were exhausted, I sat talking with Hamid. He told me how he’d lost his girlfriend of two years.

She’d been studying banking in Baghdad, and when Hamid told her of his intentions to join the Iraqi Army, she replied that not only would she not marry him, but that she would break up. He said it was a very tough decision. Hamid’s father had been a soldier in Saddam’s Army, as had other relatives including uncles, some of whom died fighting.

When he told his girlfriend that he must go to the Iraqi Army, she left him. He told me, with remarkable sadness, “Women are crazy.”

Hamid said that he was so sick for two weeks he could hardly eat, and finally he went to a hospital and a doctor gave him an IV. When Hamid returned to duty, he decided he would be a soldier for life and might not ever get married. And then he said it again, “women are crazy,” but this time we laughed.

More from the same report:

~~~~~~~

The Marines and some Iraqi Soldiers drove out one day to check on the “Coolie Village.” “Coolie” is a now derogatory term for manual laborers, often from Asia. A Marine wondered out loud why the Iraqis who live in Coolie Village call it Coolie Village, and I guessed (perhaps incorrectly) that the name can be traced back to the old British base nearby.

These kids seemed different than most Iraqi kids. They seemed unhappy. I asked what was wrong, and quickly realized this was the village that had been recently hit by a massive al Qaeda truck bomb. Some of the kids lost parents and family members.

When the bomb detonated, the Iraqi Army, Police and American Marines evacuated and treated the wounded from the Coolie Village. I do not know for certain that al Qaeda committed these particular murders, but the Iraqis here told me it had been an al Qaeda attack.

In August, when people were groping for answers as to why about 400 Yazidis were murdered with bombs during an attack in Nineveh, the BBC and others asked me why I thought the Yazidis had been targeted.

Al Qaeda and related groups do not need reasons. They buy press with blood.

A short distance down the road, the kids seemed less sad, but still they were not the normal joyous Iraqi kids I’ve grown accustomed to.

((Heartbreaking to see the innocent kids caught up in this.))

Hamid out among the villagers, looking for dinner.

Coolie Village was without water because the bomb detonated over a water pipe. The village was under that dark spell. They had felt the hand of evil. Lieutenant Hamid and Iraqi Soldiers, along with Marines, walked around talking with the kids and the adults.

On Patrol

Days drifted by. This morning, I went out with only two Marines, far outnumbered by the Iraqis, and felt no danger other than normal battlefield hazards.

~~~~

From the Counterinsurgency manual that every Soldier and Marine should read:

The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted

1-151. This paradox is really a corollary to the previous one. As the level of insurgent violence drops, the requirements of international law and the expectations of the populace lead to a reduction in direct military actions by counterinsurgents. More reliance is placed on police work, rules of engagement may be tightened, and troops may have to exercise increased restraint. Soldiers and Marines may also have to accept more risk to maintain involvement with the people.

From “Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5”

~~~~~~

The Iraqi Soldiers were better armed on this patrol than were our guys, but this is how the Marines are making it happen and clearly are winning their part of the war. Courage still counts.

While al Qaeda runs and hides, stuffing its death-cult down the throats of Iraqis in other areas, out in Anbar, once its domain, American Soldiers and Marines are increasingly able to go in small numbers out on patrols with Iraqis.

This morning, only two Marines accompanied an Iraqi-led foot patrol several miles through an Iraqi village. It is important to note that at the time of this patrol, Soldiers who had recently been kidnapped elsewhere in combat were still missing. With no backup, our guys are able to perform such patrols in many parts of Iraq.

On patrol with the Iraqi Army.

No brag, just fact: these Marines are the ones to follow, and the Iraqis here seem to know this.

Look at the knife that Iraqi Soldier carries. The Marines call him “Cowboy,” and said he’s an okay soldier. Eager, but okay. Taking an American off the street and building him into a competent Marine or Soldier takes a long time. It’s no different with Iraqis.

Date Palms: Iraq has plenty of food.

When you really talk with Iraqis, their problems (outside of the war) are mostly like people’s problems all over the world. The shepherds want the wild dogs to leave their flocks alone. They don’t want al Qaeda blowing up their villages and mosques. The farmers want the rains to start at just the right time and end at just the right time, and they want to be able to sell their crops and go about life. That’s just people. From Vietnam, to India, to Afghanistan to Iraq to Britain, the hierarchy of needs does not change.

*snip*

Cowboy.

Cowboy boots.

The Iraqi Soldier called “Cowboy” was a comic from head to toe. Everything about him seemed made for a comedy, but taping the ammunition magazines together like this is a bad idea. During firefights when you get down in the mud and grit, the exposed magazine can get stuffed with gook or the magazine lips get bent and the weapon malfunctions.

They are making good progress, but training is a never-ending story.

~~~~~