Army general chosen to advise Bush on wars is skeptical about military buildup in Iraq

Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute testifies on Capitol
Hill in Washington, Wednesday, before
the Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing on his nomination to be Deputy
National Security Advisor for Iraq and
Afghanistan. (AP Photo/Dennis Cook)

WASHINGTON (AP) - The military buildup in Iraq has a high-profile skeptic in the Bush administration: the army general President George W. Bush has chosen to manage that war and the one in Afghanistan.

Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute questioned Bush's strategy of sending thousands more troops into Iraq, a position he was expected to discuss Thursday at his confirmation hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee.

In a written response to questions by the Senate panel, Lute confirmed news reports that he had voiced doubts during a White House-led policy review before Bush announcement Jan. 10 that 21,500 more combat troops would go to Baghdad and Anbar province.

"During the review, I registered concerns that a military 'surge' would likely have only temporary and localized effects unless it were accompanied by counterpart 'surges' by the Iraqi government and the other, nonmilitary agencies of the U.S. government," Lute wrote in a document obtained by The Associated Press.

"I also noted that our enemies in Iraq have, in effect, 'a vote' and should be expected to take specific steps to counter from our efforts," he added. "The new policy took such concerns into account. It is too soon to tell the outcome."

If confirmed by the Senate, Lute would hold the title of deputy national security adviser. He would report directly to the president - briefing Bush daily - and work with other government agencies, including the Pentagon and the State Department.

Fighting the War on Terror
A counterinsurgency strategy
James S. Corum

page 26
Counterinsurgency Theories
(snip)
The American and British counterinsurgency experts outlined the following basic principles of counterinsurgency warfare
1 The civilian population is understood as the center of gravity in an insurgency. One cannot fight insurgents effectively without winning the support of the population. Ideally the counterinsurgency strategy should be geared to driving a wedge between the population and the rebels.

2 Successful counterinsurgency requires a comprehensive strategy that combines military, political, and economic action. Since insurgencies grow out of large scale dissatisfaction with the government, the means must be found to address the social, political, and economic problems that provide the fuel for insurgency.

3 There needs to be a unity of effort by government forces, that is close coordination between the military and civilian agencies at every level.

4 Effectively fighting the insurgents, who usually live among and draw support from the civilian population, requires good intelligence. Military and police action without good intelligence is largely a wasted effort. To fight the insurgent one has to find him.

5 Military and civic action campaigns need to proceed simultaneously and be coordinated with each other.

6 The government needs to wage an effective media campaign to reassure the population and undermine support for the insurgent.

7 Military and police powers needs to be applied carefully and with discrimination. A heavy handed approach is wasteful and can cause discontent among the population.

______________________________________________________________________

In addition to the British/American theory of counterinsurgency some officers in the French army developed their own theory
(snip)
The French view, expressed by French army Colonel Roger Trinquier and published as Modern Warfare in 1961 was widely read in both French and English editions. The French model differed considerably from the British/American model. Trinquier, who had long experience in counterinsurgency, outlined some very useful tactics in dealing with urban rebellion, including discussions of how to seal off a city district, collect comprehensive data on the population and register the whole population as a means to identify the insurgents from outside the area, and limit the ability of the insurgents to move within the country.
Trinquier’s theory differed enormously from the Anglo-Saxon model on several key points.
First he saw counterinsurgency primarily in military terms. For Trinquier, establishing military presence and crushing the insurgents by force was the first priority. In contrast with the British and America view that military action had to be carried out simultaneously with civic action programs, Trinquier argued first for military action to crush the insurgents. While civic action programs were important, they would be carried out only after the insurgency had been crushed by force.
Whereas British and American theorists of the 1950’s and 1960’s believed that building up a legitimate government and supporting indigenous institutions were the key elements of counterinsurgency strategy, there is little of this in Trinquier’s work. Essentially, Trinquier believed in strong arming the population into compliance with French rule.

Trinquier’s approach could bring short team success. The most notable example was Algeria, where the French army essentially broke the back of the insurgent movement by 1960. However in the long run, by ignoring the need to build public support for the government, the French approach led to strategic failure. One illustration of the French approach’s lack of political considerations was to policy of torturing and abusing insurgent prisoners in Algeria. Trinquier advocated the widespread use of such means’s of obtaining intelligence information, although he did not advocate the widespread use of such means. He failed to understand the breakdown in army discipline that occurs when moral and legal boundaries are crossed.
(snip)

Also, there's a difference between sniping and biased, unfiar criticism, and important, constructive criticisms

Exactly the point I have often tried to make with some of Bush's defenders.

Up to now, I have thought that Bush was a decent, honorable man who could probably be persuaded to change his views if he was made to realize that he had made a mistake on one thing or another. Everyone makes mistakes. That was the spirit in which I opposed the Miers nomination--that it was a disastrous choice, and that it would hurt Bush as well as our country if he went through with it.

Now, with this illegal immigration amnesty, I'm no longer sure whether Bush is persuadable. Surely he must have seen that the country doesn't want this bill, and the arguments made against it have been extremely persuasive and revealing. Evidently he hasn't listened to a word that was said. I will continue to hope that this is fixable, but the destructive effects if the amnesty bill were to pass are too enormous to contemplate. We simply cannot afford to let it pass.

Frankly, I thought Bush had more sense. He has always reached out to the Hispanic vote, often with great success, but I thought he understood the difference between legal and illegal. Evidently not. What I'm afraid that reveals is that like most of the ruling class in Washington, he has contempt for the law when it doesn't suit him.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.