Victor Davis Hanson: The Wonders of Hindsight. Looking back is a sure way to stumble

Most of the blame game being played over the Iraqi occupation — and always with the wisdom of hindsight — is now irrelevant.

That’s basically settled: There will be no sizable increases in our troop presence, but gradual downsizing, as more provinces must come under Iraqi control and we seek to avert Iraqi perpetual dependence. Debating how many soldiers should have been deployed in the three-week war of 2003 and its aftermath is about as helpful in the present as fighting over culpability for the surprise at the Bulge.

It doesn’t matter now — the new army is nearing 300,000 strong and growing. It will either rise to the occasion or fail. The decision of 2003 to leave it scattered is ancient history.

Perhaps, but three years later that’s not an issue any more either, now that former Hussein government officials have long been welcomed back into the military and civilian bureaucracy.

Absolutely, but now, after three elections, Iraq is autonomous, and American proconsuls are not on television hogging the news of someone else’s future.

Wasn’t it terrible that Tommy Franks left in the middle of a long theater campaign, as if he sensed that Centcom’s three-week victory might well devolve into his three-year messy aftermath?

It used to be blood sport to blame the supposed flawed architects and implementers of the Iraqi war and occupation — neocon advisers to President Bush, the proconsul Paul Bremer (whose blazers were emblematic of his out-of-touch, unrealistically optimistic, rather than workable and good enough, solutions), or the nice, but deer-in-the-headlights Gen. Sanchez.

Even if these purported scapegoats have been accurately portrayed, and their mistakes account for the current pessimistic Iraqi prognosis — neither of which I grant — what are we to say about those currently in charge? Even critics of the war have praised the Middle Eastern Ambassador Khalizad, the savvy Gen. Petraeus, the Arab-speaking Gen. Abizaid, and the best and the brightest fighters in the field, such as a Lt. Col. Kurilla or a Col. McMaster. All of these players are not only in, or about to be back in, Iraq, but are pivotal in crafting and adapting American tactics and strategy there.

Many wars metamorphize into something they were not supposed to be. Few imagined that the Poland war of 1939 would within two years evolve into a war of annihilation involving the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, Japan, and Italy. So too with the third Iraqi war of 2003 (following the first 1991 Gulf War, and the second, subsequent 12-year no-fly zone stand-off) that has now become a fight against jihadists for the future course of the entire Middle East.

What matters now is not so much what the war was or should have been, but only what it is — and whether we have learned from our mistakes and can still win. The answer to both questions is yes. We have the right strategy — birthing (through three elections already) an autonomous democracy; training an army subject to a civil government; and pledging support until it can protect its own constitutional government.

Few American officers are talking about perpetual occupation or even the need for more troops, but rather about the need for a lighter footprint, bolstered by teams of Special Forces and air support, to ensure Iraqi responsibility for their own future,. And the key to success — a diplomatic squeeze on the Sunnis to suppress terrorists in Nineveh and Anbar provinces in exchange for Shiite guarantees of more government inclusion — is now the acknowledged goal of both the Iraqi and American governments.

Thousands in Iraq accept that they have crossed the Rubicon, and they must either make their own democracy work or suffer a fate worse than that of the boat people and the butchered in Southeast Asia when the Americans left.

As for how to ensure against this disastrous outcome, multilateral talks are no magic bullet, as we see from the failed EU3 efforts with Iran and the stalled six-party negotiations over the North Korean problem. The “more rubble/less trouble” solution that the Russians employed against the Chechnyans in Grozny is out of the question for a humane United States. The U.N. is no answer as we have seen from serial genocides from Rwanda to the present killing in Darfur.

No, only the United States, and its superb military, can stabilize Iraq and give the Iraqis enough time and confidence to do what has not been done before, and what apparently no one any longer thinks will be done: a surviving, viable democratic government in the heart of the dictatorial Middle East. Though the necessary aims are clear, they are not quickly and easily attained. Everyone understands that there is no single military answer to Iraq, but rather that the political solution depends on soldiers providing enough security long enough for free commerce and expression to become established. So rather than agonize endlessly over past perceived errors, we must realize that such lapses are not unprecedented in our military experience and focus on whether they are still correctable.

By the standards of Grenada, Panama, and Serbia — where few American died and some sort of tenuous consensual government emerged fairly quickly — Iraq is indeed messy. But if we grant that the effort to replace Saddam with democracy in the heart of the ancient caliphate is a far formidable enterprise, and thus akin to the challenge, and cost, of taking an Okinawa or saving a Korea, then our losses and heartbreak so far are not extraordinary.

For all the Democrats loud criticism, if they do regain Congress, they would probably rely on the present expertise of a Khalizad, Abizaid, or Petraeus, and not the often quoted wisdom of three years past of a Gen. Shinseki or Zinni. I doubt they will bring back Gen. Wesley Clark to fix the “mess.” They will either have to cut off funds, ensure a pull out before the end of the year, and then watch real blood sport as reformers are butchered; or they will have to trust that our present military and civilian leadership has learned the hard lessons of three years in Iraq, and can find a way to stabilize the nascent democracy.

How do we define success in Iraq, in the context of a dysfunctional Middle East where elections in Lebanon and Palestine bring turmoil, the “correct” multilateral NATO war in Afghanistan is still raging, and we still can’t do much to find bin Laden in a “friendly,” but nuclear and Islamic, Pakistan? No mention is necessary about an Algeria still reeling from a horrendous bloodbath in the 1990s, the nightmare that was Qadhafi’s Libya, perennial Syrian roguery, the theocratic disaster in Iran, or all the other butchery that passes for the norm in the Middle East.

We can only ask: Are the tribal leaders of the troubled Anbar province now more likely to join the government or the insurgents? Are the old controversial barometers of Iraqi wartime electrical production, GDP, and oil output currently falling or stable? Is the successful Kurdistan seceding or in fact still part of Iraq? Is the Shiite leadership now de facto a pawn of Iran, or still confident about its role in a democratic and autonomous Iraq? Do the communiqués and private correspondence of al Qaeda in Iraq reflect cocky triumphalism or worry over losing? Do Iraqi elected leaders praise us or damn us and ask us to leave? In a global war against Islamic jihadists, who have killed thousands of Americans here at home, should we lament that we are now fighting and killing them as they flock to distant Iraq?

As we head for the November elections, most politicians have renounced their paternity of the now-orphaned American effort in Iraq. And pundits of summer 2003 have not just had second thoughts about Iraq in the autumn of our discontent in 2006 — but very public third thoughts about whether they ever really had their enthusiastic first ones.

The odd thing is that, for all the gloom and furor, and real blunders, nevertheless, by the historical standards of most wars, we have done well enough to win in Iraq, and still have a good shot of doing the impossible in seeing this government survive. More importantly still, worldwide we are beating the Islamic fundamentalists and their autocratic supporters. Iranian-style theocracy has not spread. For all the talk of losing Afghanistan, the Taliban are still dispersed or in hiding — so is al Qaeda. Europe is galvanizing against Islamism in a way unimaginable just three years ago. The world is finally focusing on Iran. Hezbollah did not win the last war, but lost both prestige and billions of dollars in infrastructure, despite a lackluster effort by Israel. Elections have embarrassed a Hamas that, the global community sees, destroys most of what it touches and now must publicly confess that it will never recognize Israel. Countries like Libya are turning, and Syria is more isolated. If we keep the pressure up in Iraq and Afghanistan and work with our allies, Islamism and its facilitators will be proven bankrupt.

In contrast, if we should withdraw from Iraq right now, there will be an industry in the next decade of hindsight exposés — but they won’t be the gotcha ones like State of Denial or Fiasco. Instead we will revisit the 1974-5 Vietnam genre of hindsight — of why after such heartbreak and sacrifice the United States gave up when it was so close to succeeding.

Didn't happen.

Actually the reason North Viet-Nam won was the lack of support from America, mandated by the democrat congress. With American air support and more importantly ammo they may very well have repulsed the north.

"The ARVN was doing very well in the field until the Dems pulled the funding rug out from under them. Kinda hard to fight off the enemy when your rifle has an empty magazine."

Canard altert!!

The Paris Peace Accords were merely an attempt by the Nixon adminsitration to gain a decent interval between American withdrawal and the inevitable collapse of South Vietnam. $700 million in military aid was authorized for FY 1975 to South Vietnam (equal to about $2.8 billion in 2006 dollars). This was down from $2.3 billion (in 1973 dollars) for FY 1973, but was still substantial. Much of South Vietnam was communist occupied when the US pulled out in early 1973; the Ho Chi Minh trail had become a superhighway going from the North all the way to the Mekong delta. The only thing that would have stopped, or at least slowed, a North Vietnamese attack in 1975 would have been US air strikes, something the US electorate was DEAD SET against. Much like the dog that was sprayed by a skunk, the US was not about to go back for a second bite. Had the Saigon government been less corrupt and allowed most of the aid to actually go to its troops (doubtless one reason aid was cut back in the first place), ARVN might have been able to put up a stouter defense.

From my reading of Hanson I don't see him saying that US should emulate Roman empire. But anyway:

1. US is too young to be even compared to Roman Empire. If we live as long, than lets talk what will be after that.

2. Roman influence long outlived its physical life. Looking at the map now, there can be a reasonable claim that territories that once fell under Romans are still better off than their neighbors who did not.

If US influence and legacy will match Romans, I think its a good thing.

3. All empires had to hold territories. US has hegemony and dominance, but no territorial hold, at least for long. Not counting Iraq and Afghanistan now, local population can (and did) kick out Americans any time they want. With some consequences, maybe, but they can. No Empire ever allowed for that.

4. To be seduced by Empire, you should want it. There are people here who would not mind. But there is no such desire on the part of the whole country. I'd say that a bit more of such desire would make job in Iraq easier. But, alas, there is none.

SO, I respectively disagree with your analysis.

Empire doesn't work the way it used to; it's more pernicious now than the old way of planting your flag in some uncivilized territory and making it the same color on the map as your own country (e.g. everything British was pink). It involves getting bases agreements, backing up governments friendly to the US even though the "street" can't stand them, trading "privileges" etc. As for the Philippines, American Samoa, even Hawaii, annexing them after 1898 was a bad idea which came back to haunt us in 1941 when we were involved in war with Japan--a direct result of the US deciding it was, somehow, an "Asian" nation; this put this US straight in the path of Japanese expansion. McKinley and Teddy R. are no heroes of mine. Annexing Puerto Rico in 1898 made good sense as did eliminating Spanish rule in Cuba--this follows the Monroe doctrine to the letter. The framers would have cringed at annexation of the territories you mention, along with Guam and Wake Island.

--Roman influence long outlived its physical life. Looking at the map now, there can be a reasonable claim that territories that once fell under Romans are still better off than their neighbors who did not.--

Oh, so that's why Portugal is so much more prosperous than Japan! LMWAO!

Japan became prosperous when it persistently worked on adapting western legacy since the second half of 19th century and even more after US "correction" in 1945 - 1955. You can add all Asian "tigers" to this list,.

Eastern-Western Europe divide is very close to the Roman borders. Not exactly, too many years passed and its not exact science, but the rough approximation is there.

Germany prided itself on never being successfully conquered by Rome--the victory of Arminius (AKA Hermann) at the Teutoburg forest in 9 AD saw to that--and for centuries has been a cultural, and later, economic powerhouse of Europe. Romania (Roman Dacia) could scarcely say the same; Spain and Portugal had their moments of glory centuries ago, but are pretty poor now. Adapting western trappings does not guaranteee economic success, just ask any North Korean!

--let the Nips have their way?--

Wow, how profound is that?

--Pat, is that you?--

Yeah, better we should let our young men get killed in god forsaken trouble spots around the world. Makes sense to me. </sarc>

Example of militaristic Japan is a good one. They were hell-bent on dominating "their corner of the world", and that area was constantly increasing. Confrontation with them was inevitable. Sooner or later. It came sooner. I can say that later would have been even worse.

Because its Hanson's thread, let me remind one of his favorite points: most of the times the choices are not between good and bad options, but between bad and worse.

I think it would have been least worst to attack Hitler after he got Czechoslovakia. And least worst to fight Japan when it happen than later. And least worst to call Saddam's bluff about WMDs and be engaged in Iraq now.

There is a big question of who wields power in the world. There can be no power vacuum. If US did not patrol the world and be a reluctant policeman (bad option), we'd have many more hot spots and more dangerous world (worst option). We don't have an option available for the world to be guarded by Swiss or become suddenly law abiding low maintenance Scandinavians. BTW, I'd wish to live in that world.

Very insightful as usual. Mr Hansen is on the money. The sheiks of Al Anbar have been casting their lot with the GOI since early September. They are helping eliminate the Al Queda elements that are murdering and intimidating their peoples. We may have reached a tipping point already but no one wants to speculate because the will to kill is still strong among the fanatics. They are targeting the sheiks now to try to suppress their efforts. Pulling out now will be a tragedy but it is the horse the Democrats are trying to ride to political power. Please vote. We are at a historical watershed moment. Those of us here in Iraq believe we can see it but we can't seem to get that message out to the American people. The young soldiers and Marines and Sailors (SEABEES SEALS) understand it. They are re-enlisting and some are returning for their FOURTH tours. This article should be required reading for everyone going to vote so 5 years from now no one will be able to say they weren't told or just didn't understand. But I ramble... yet agin

"If US did not patrol the world and be a reluctant policeman (bad option), we'd have many more hot spots and more dangerous world (worst option). "

No, there is a third option. Some other poor schumck country would be the world's cop, spending all the money and losing all the lives, and we'd be Switzerland on steroids, separated by two vast oceans and armed to the teeth.

Not at all.

If I think now is more like 1942, you are right, no point to talk about 1938.

If I think that a better analogy is with 1936, I need to remember what happened in 1939.

But in 2006 you can't come back into 2003, and we need to build on what we already have. And what we have is not nothing, but a fair chance to succeed.

BTW, you can e-mail Hanson at author@victorhanson.com and please share his response.

Believe me, I am not disagreeing with your desires. I wish the same. But history happened another way, and in too many occasions without asking US for an opinion, only forcing to make choices (without perfect ones). Nazism, Japanese militarism and Communism had to be confronted. US is the one standing on the top. We are better off because of that, and anybody in the world with a head on the shoulders will think the same. So, US is de-facto a world sheriff without asking for a job. Now what, leave and let the bad guys have all the fun?

Let me ask you. What would have happended if, in 1898, the US was content to annex PR, kick spain out of Cuba, but left the Pacific alone? No Pearl Harbor attack, no US involvement in WW2 (and BTW their would have been no WW2 if the criminal Woodrow Wilson had not gotten the US involved in Europe's "Great War"); and 400,000 (maybe 500,000 assuming no WW1 involvement) Americans would not have died (not counting the other 100,000 who died in wars (Korea, Vietnam resulting from WW2). Sounds good to me.

Oh and as for the Nazi example the neo-cons like to throw around, I should remind all of you that Nazi Germany had no surface fleet to speak of, no long-range bombers, and was no threat to the integrity of the continental United States. Japan became a temporary threat to the Western US because we foolish put most of our warship "eggs" in the "basket" of Hawaii. If the battlewagons stayed in San Diego, no Pearl Harbor attack! Anyhow, Nazi Germany committed suicide on June 22, 1941, the day it invaded the Soviet Union. Soviet military might eventually would have exhausted, and eventually crushed "Hitlerite" Germany with or without US involvement.

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