BP 'was warned' of corrosion

The Australian ^ | August 10, 2006 | Sheila McNulty, Houston

[PA Engineer]

BP's board and London-based executives were informed of widespread corrosion at the UK oil giant's Alaska field two years before the company was forced to shut it this week, citing "unexpectedly severe corrosion".

On May 22 2004, Chuck Hamel, an advocate for BP workers in Alaska, took the charges directly to Walter E. Massey, chairman of the environment committee of BP's non-executive board of directors.

In the letter, Mr Hamel told Dr Massey that in the previous four years BP employees and contract workers had brought to him concerns about safety, health and threats to the environment at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska.

"They seek to see the corrosion problem addressed and corrective action undertaken without further delay and before any of their colleagues at Prudhoe are harmed," he wrote in the letter, a copy of which was given to the Financial Times.

Mr Hamel warned Dr Massey that, as a board member, he owed it to shareholders to investigate. He said he would facilitate interviews with the BP engineers and corrosion experts if his committee provided assurances they would not suffer retaliation.

On July 27, 2004, Dr Massey wrote to Mr Hamel urging him to provide BP management "sufficient specificity" but without offering the requested protection.

The workers told Mr Hamel that Vinson Elkins, BP's Houston lawyer, went to Alaska with questions that seemed aimed more at identifying whistleblowers than uncovering corrosion.

Dr Massey referred questions by the FT at the time to BP, which gave assurances that corrosion was under control.

On Tuesday, BP spokesman Ronnie Chappell said: "I know there have been concerns raised about adequate corrosion inspection program raised by Hamel over time. We have looked into those."

[PA Engineer]

Here are a couple follow up articles. The important points are BP's refusal to take action years ago when the corrosion was first reported. This entire incident was preventable with a propper corrosion program. Here is another article from The Atlanta Journal-Constitution.

BP pays price for bad maintenance

"But experts say the simple answer is this: BP did a poor job of pipeline maintenance, used the least-thorough pipeline inspection procedures and had little government oversight.

BP also is accused of largely ignoring — or at least not properly addressing — warnings about its bad pipes from critics and even its own workers.

Two years ago, a retired oil man turned industry watchdog wrote a letter warning BP director Walter Massey — who also is president of Morehouse College in Atlanta — of serious corrosion problems in the very pipeline that was shut down."

[AMHN]

Yes, but then they could not be part of everybody raising the price of oil to offset cost...whereas now they can offset the costs by jacking prices (because of global market demands...of course)

[stylin19a]

BP's board and London-based executives were informed of widespread corrosion at the UK oil giant's Alaska field two years before the company was forced to shut it this week, citing "unexpectedly severe corrosion

wouldn't they have had to shut it down then ?

[E. Pluribus Unum]

I'm sure BP wanted their pipes to corrode and fail because they make more money if they don't have any oil to sell.

And I'm sure government oversight would have prevented the current problem, because the government knows so much about oil production as evidenced by the amount of oil the produce.

</sarcasm>

[PA Engineer]

There are remediation methods that could have been used with small section replacements during planned testing and maintanence periods. Depending on the internal pitting (that is a big deprending) the gathering lines may have been saved or at a minimum replaced with a minor impact on production.

[mewzilla]

To be fair to BP, if the corrosion was due to bacteria, isn't that a bit harder to predict and troubleshoot?

[Spirited]

I hope that the stockholders give the elitists at the head of the corporation a good shakeup.

[PA Engineer]

I'm sure BP wanted their pipes to corrode and fail because they make more money if they don't have any oil to sell.

And I'm sure government oversight would have prevented the current problem, because the government knows so much about oil production as evidenced by the amount of oil the produce.



It is more of an issue of quarterly profits. I don't know any corporate head who wants their lines to fail. I know many over two decades of my career who do not want to spend the money (on something they cannot see) to prevent those lines from failing. That is human nature. There is no sarcasm to turn off here.

[PA Engineer]

To be fair to BP, if the corrosion was due to bacteria, isn't that a bit harder to predict and troubleshoot?

The pitting and bacterial factors were already discovered. It is a little bit difficult to troubleshoot, however standard industry practices could have addressed the issue.

[E. Pluribus Unum]

I know many over two decades of my career who do not want to spend the money (on something they cannot see) to prevent those lines from failing.

So would oversight by a government bureaucracy solve the problem?

[thackney]

then they could not be part of everybody raising the price of oil to offset cost...

The price of oil is down from the close before this event was announced.

[Tinian]

Read and learn:

BP: Learning from oil spill lessons

[norraad]

...standard industry practice could prevent.

To bad BP is the leader in not practicing this.

BP is a throwback to Capt. Bligh days;

"Mr. Cristian, the barnacles have eaten a hole in the bottom of the Bounty!"

"Ridiculous tomfolly, my feet are dry!"

[ASOC]

Mr Charles Hammel has a long history with the oil companies here in Alaska (lawsuits, lots of letters to board members, etc) and many residents consider him a gadfly. Others see him as anti-development, and thus a threat to local jobs. Some union concerns come into play depending on the company/issue.

Others see him as a crusader:

From counterpunch.org
Take the case of Charles Hammel. Back in the late 1980s, pipeline workers and inspectors began feeding Hammel information problems with the pipeline and with Alyeska's reckless cost-cutting and mismanagement. Hammel, an independent oil broker, took these concerns to congress and Alyeska was forced to spend millions of dollars to repair corrosion along the line.

The company, and the oil corporations behind it, didn't like this one bit, so they went after Hammel with a vengeance. In 1990, they hired the Wackenhut Corporation dig up dirt on Hammel. They rummaged through his trash, ran credit reports on him, set up a fake enviro group to trick him into giving them information and even hired a hooker to try to seduce him. Hammel sued the company for invasion of privacy and won a $5 million settlement.

From the oildrum.com
I caught CNBC early this morning. They had a guy on there named Charles Hammel. Hammel is an advocate for BP workers in Alaska. Hammel said he warned BP in 2004 that there were serious corrosion problems with the pipeline. He said BP workers reported this problem to him. He said there is about 1000 miles of "flow-line" in Alaska. He said the entire flow-line is like Swiss cheese. He said BP responded by trying to figure out who was talking to him

The truth, I suppose as is the case of events such as these, is somewhere in between.

SO pretty much take anything/everything said by the oil companies - and Mr Hammel et al, with a grain of salt. The real truth lies somewhere in between the extremes.

[PA Engineer]

I have actually heard rumblings for years within the oil support (corrosion) industry. System failures occur often, however this was a critical infrastructure failure that brought BPs dirty laundry to the forefront.

We have heard of water mains "wearing out", buildings exploding from gas line leaks, and concrete replacement in coastal and northern locations. These are typical local problems that do not receive national attention. Nevertheless these are "corrosion" related issues, but are not critical to national security. It happens regularly.

The BP issue is a national security problem. There are regulations on the books that should have been applied, however the DOT OPS is not known for enforecement prior to failure.

[ASOC]

The lines in question are not regulated, other than where they leak : )

Low pressure lines or feeder lines are not looked at by the state or FedGov. That, however, is likely to change.

The biggest casulaties are local polititions (the Gov) and folks who buy gas made from the oil.

If you know any welders, tell them to get up here and get tested/certified - there are bucs to made....for a while anyway.

[PA Engineer]

I did post this article earlier, but few seemed interested.

BP: Learning from oil spill lessons

[PA Engineer]

Actually a couple of years ago I ran into this very issue. You are correct. If they leak in "remote" locations then it is regulated. There was an actual tightening of this regulation a few years back, but I don't have this information at my fingertips (DOT OPS Pipeline Safety Regulations, Hazardous Liquids Part 195). Will look for pertinent sections and will post links to the OPS.

[kidd]

I'm in the nuclear industry

I've dealt with MIC in condenser tubing.

MIC can be readily detectable by eddy current testing (both bobbin coil and pancake probes)

What technique was used to look for pitting?
Were these pits located near welds?

[ASOC]

Exterior ultrasound and "smart" pigs using either ultrasound or in some cases, ionizing radiation.

The lines in question are sheathed, making conventional exterior based inspection difficult - or at least expensive.

Part of the problem is the real need to keep the oil warm so it will flow - it may start at 140F, but miles of -20F pipeline has a way of cooling the oil off fast.

While in Russia, I saw pipeline systems that burned some of the product to re-heat the oil for transport - and the system leaked like a sieve in many areas. Pretty nasty stuff. Of course it *was* a workers Paradise.