Posted on 07/27/2006 6:35:55 PM PDT by JewishRighter
The thing that most impressed Capt. Yisrael Friedler, commander of A Company in the Golani Brigade's Battalion 51, during the bloody battle in Bint Jbail on Wednesday, was the way the junior commanders conducted themselves after their officers had been hit by Hizbullah gunfire.
"The moment their officers went down," he told The Jerusalem Post Thursday, "the sergeants took their radios and began reporting in and managing the battle, while at the same time taking charge of evacuating the wounded. It was the height of professionalism," he said.
The firefight began early in the morning when two companies, A and C, began advancing down one of Bint Jbail's streets on parallel routes. Contrary to previous reports, Friedler said, the Hizbullah fighters were not lying in ambush. "Both sides were unaware of each other and it was actually one of our soldiers who saw them first and opened fire."
In the initial firing, 30 members of C Company, a third of its total strength, were hit, as was the battalion's deputy commander, Maj. Roi Klein.
Isn't Free Republic awesome? I have learned more in two years here, than I learned in four years of college. In fact, I've had to unlearn most of what I learned in college!
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Thank you, JewishRighter, for posting this thread and for your excellent questions.
(Hat tip to you)
Cool! When I see your car I'll honk!
FreeRepublic is an awesome place because of it's discussion facility, (the software and management ) and the people who spend so much time here....it is a huge resource!
The battle of Hue was a more recent case, but it was impossible to to avoid destroying the center city. I'm aware of a couple of squadrons who, almost single handedly, made rubble of the center city because the NVA was already entrenched in virtually every building that was more than one floor. Even with today's house-to-house methodology and doctrine, if the same situation arose, I think the result would be similar.
Paulus had an abundance of artillery ammo but was terribly short of rifle ammo. As the circle grew tighter around his riverside positions, the airlift that did get through didn't bring in more personnel, it delivered 88mm rounds and some minimal food and took out critical, party political and wounded personnel. His infanty force had been reduced by hunger and the weather to very limited rifle and mortar fire. Foraging for food and seeking to avoid death by freezing consumed more of their collective efforts than battlefield tactics and contact.
To Everyone:
Yoni the Blogger is up and running
Me, too! Shalom!
In Hue a Thermobaric ole BLU-118/B could be used and save all the room to room as well as save most of the structure...to bad it was not available!
'Course, no one's close to using nuclear weapons yet. But that's only because muslims don't have a lot of them so far.
True...
Nut the understimation of both enemy positions, and the combat ability of an exhuasted and weak Italian Corp, covering a HUGE area of the FEBA was the weak link in the chain...
Despite the weather, even a small mobile force reserve could have stemmed the tide long enough to allow the Italian and Romanians to regroup.Unsupportrd Cavalry alone cannot stand against T-34's..
The 20 hour loss of contact with the 2 Italian Divisions should have been the warning for Hoth's Armour, but alas, that is history...
what's "one-down position"?
The attacking force in any situation is at a natural disadvantage. The defenders are already in place and disposed to defend themselves, and to afford themselves advantages of cover and concealment.
The primary break in the southern component of the Paulus line was caused by the total breakdown of the Romanian divisions. Most of their officers defected to the Soviet forces across the river. They were retaliating against the German mid-level command for the horrible treatment to which they and their men had been subjected, the NCOs lost control of the conscripts because of the food and lack of ammo. The failure left a huge open salient in the southern sector that was quickly exploited by the Soviets leading to a critical segment of the encirclement that allowed Russian mobile AAA to finally stop the last remnants of the Luftwaffe ground support units from reaching and providing close air support to the trapped forces in the more northern segment of the German riverside lines.
Part of the strategic calculation of MOUT goes out the window when the urban point is, itself, the target. The doctrine of by-pass in MOUT becomes moot.
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