This Day In History | World War II June 19, 1944 Battle of the Philippine Sea

1944 United States scores major victory against Japanese in Battle of the Philippine Sea

On this day in 1944, in what would become known as the "Marianas Turkey Shoot," U.S. carrier-based fighters decimate the Japanese Fleet with only a minimum of losses in the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

The security of the Marianas Islands, in the western Pacific, were vital to Japan, which had air bases on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. U.S. troops were already battling the Japanese on Saipan, having landed there on the 15th. Any further intrusion would leave the Philippine Islands, and Japan itself, vulnerable to U.S. attack. The U.S. Fifth Fleet, commanded by Admiral Raymond Spruance, was on its way west from the Marshall Islands as backup for the invasion of Saipan and the rest of the Marianas. But Japanese Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo decided to challenge the American fleet, ordering 430 of his planes, launched from aircraft carriers, to attack. In what became the greatest carrier battle of the war, the United States, having already picked up the Japanese craft on radar, proceeded to shoot down more than 300 aircraft and sink two Japanese aircraft carriers, losing only 29 of their own planes in the process. It was a described in the aftermath as a "turkey shoot."

Admiral Ozawa, believing his missing planes had landed at their Guam air base, maintained his position in the Philippine Sea, allowing for a second attack of U.S. carrier-based fighter planes, this time commanded by Admiral Mitscher, to shoot down an additional 65 Japanese planes and sink another carrier. In total, the Japanese lost 480 aircraft, three-quarters of its total, not to mention most of its crews. American domination of the Marianas was now a foregone conclusion.

For all that, it still only took one nervous admiral to turn almost certain victory over the Americans to certain defeat at Leyte Gulf.

The four-day battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944 marked the eclipse of Imperial Japanese naval power, the last sortie in force of the Imperial Navy, and the largest naval battle ever fought on the face of the earth. It was separated in four parts, each carrying its own name: the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, when U.S. carrier planes struck the IJN’s Center Force and sank battleship Musashi; the Battle of Cape Engaño, where U.S. carriers destroyed the Japanese carrier force that had served as a deception; the Battle of Surigao Strait, where U.S. and Japanese battleships fought the last dreadnought engagement of all times; and lastly, the Battle off Samar, where the Japanese Center Force took to sinking the U.S. escort carriers defending the beachhead and were soundly defeated by miniscule forces. Some would add the Battle of Ormoc Bay that finally brought Leyte and the entire Gulf area under firm Allied control.

Mistakes were made on both sides. Halsey pursued Ozawa to the north and opened the doors to disaster for the U.S. fleet off Leyte. In his confused communications with Admiral Kinkaid of the 7th Fleet, he had left the impression of guarding San Bernardino Strait with Admiral Willis Lee’s fast battleships, six formidable battlewagons that Kurita would have found difficult to overcome. So unclear were his communiqués that Admiral Nimitz and his staff in Pearl Harbor had essentially come to the same conclusion.

In fact, however, Halsey had not left anything behind. Task Force 34, as the hypothetical battleship formation was called, had accompanied him north – even though Halsey knew of Kurita’s coming back toward San Bernardino, he had not left a single ship in the vicinity of the strait, or even bothered informing Kinkaid (who did not make night searches, of the kind that found Kurita, over the area) of the impending danger and absence of Task Force 34.

Leyte Gulf witnessed the first of perhaps the most harrowing type of attack delivered in World War II: Kamikaze.

Kurita’s sortie from Brunei had been Japan’s last bid for naval success. In its course, he had lost superbattleship Musashi; cruisers Atago, Maya, Chokai, Chikuma and Suzuya, with Kumano and Takao damaged severely. Several destroyers had suffered a similar fate. On the win side, he could note Gambier Bay, Hoel, Johnston, Samuel B. Roberts, and if one was kind to him, Darter. He had been repulsed from his main objective. He had played his role in the SHO plans with the necessary audacity and professional ability, and upon losing his last chance for a decision, made the courageous decision not to follow the way of Nishimura and add death to defeat, but retired his remaining forces successfully to Brunei. The Imperial Navy had engaged in the greatest battle of all times – and it was beaten bloodily. This was no Midway, no claim to bad luck could be made here: it was as fair a fight as war permits, and yet, the grave truth to Japan was that spirit had given way to technology.

If "ifs" and "buts" were candy and nuts, what a fine time we would have. Halsey made the mistake of falling for the Ozawa decoy. The brave US destroyer attack confused Kurita and bought time. The brave and audacious party was the US Navy.

Kurita had stumbled upon a much more modest force, Task Unit 77.4.3, or “Taffy Three”, six escort carriers and seven escorts, three destroyers and four destroyer-escorts. It was a pitiful force that Rear-Admiral Clifton A. Sprague was able of putting up against Kurita, especially since his composite squadrons were not equipped to deal with warships. Armor-piercing bombs and torpedos were not needed for their ground-support role, and everything else would have little effect on the oncoming behemoths.

As the Japanese closed the weak U.S. forces, however, confusion reigned. Under the impression of having encountered one of Halsey’s fast carrier forces, Admiral Kurita decided to rush his attack and not wait until his forces were placed in the most favorable way.

There was obvious reason for choosing such a course of action: the art of maneuvering one’s ships into position for battle, called “evolution”, took precious time and was supposed to be exercised before battle was joined. Now, however, speed became imperative – against the determined opposition a carrier force could put up, it was essential that sinkings were scored early and the enemy not be allowed to assemble and prepare his forces, or even worse, open up the range. As his destroyers and cruisers left behind the sluggish battleships, then, Kurita had sacrificed coherence in his force for the only prospect for victory he had.

Meantime, Rear-Admiral Sprague had turned his ships due east, and begun launching his planes to commission even so weak a defense as they provided.

As the Japanese closed the slow U.S. force, the first shells were dropped between the flattops. From the flagship Fanshaw Bay, Admiral Sprague signaled his escorts to start covering attacks against the superior Japanese. Peeling off the screen of the fleeing baby flattops, destroyers Hoel, Heerman and Johnston, as well as destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts, headed off and engaged the Imperial cruisers and battleships farther off.

All the while, the Japanese had continued with their uncontrolled, desperate hunt. Kurita’s only command to that point had been “Charge” – he was not inclined to specify exactly what or exactly how, even now.

On the easterly course that they were on, they chased and slowly closed the U.S. force, steadily straddling the fleeing flattops. By this time, there remained no planes on the U.S. carriers: they had all taken off, now picking at the battleships, destroyers and cruisers with machine-guns, depth charges and small bombs. They continued on to Leyte, where they were turned around and continued their pinpricks against the IJN fleet.

As the U.S. destroyers continued their loosing battle against the IJN fleet, they did more than their fair share of damage. Hunting the shell splashes enabled the U.S. ships to escape damage for an unduly long amount of time, and offered the opportunity to do real damage to the IJN. The first victim of the U.S. assault was heavy cruiser Kumano, flagship of the commander of the Seventh Cruiser division, loosing her bow to one of Johnston’s torpedoes. In return, the brave little destroyer was ripped into pieces by three 356mm shells from Kongo and left burning, though not sinking.

Then, the three other U.S. destroyers joined the fray, The miniscule artillery fire that the four ships offered could not hinder or delay the Imperial fleet, but their torpedoes were a different matter entirely. While the U.S. air attacks increased and the Japanese closed dangerously with cruisers, the powerful batteries of the battleships were kept out of the fight by the dedication of the U.S. attackers. Torpedoes forced Yamato to turn away and open up the range, causing her to loose value time. A charge by Johnston against Kongo forced that battlewagon to concentrate on her without success. Hoel attracted the fire of several battleships and cruisers that were thus unable to attack the U.S. carriers.

Support gradually became available to the U.S. As Sprague moved his forces east, then south, Taffy 1 under Rear-Admiral Felix B. Stump had became aware of the danger it was itself in and headed away from the danger, continuously launching planes to aid the sister force that was being hard-pressed by Kurita; together with Sprague’s own planes they created an impossible tactical situation: Kurita was desperately trying to get at the U.S. carriers, hampered by enemy air and destroyer attacks as much as by his own damaged cruisers.

As Kurita’s situation became more and more desperate, the air attacks that had been such a nuisance earlier became a real danger. Shortly after aiding Tone in the sinking of carrier Gambier Bay, which succumbed at 0907 the only carrier loss by surface engagement ever sustained by the U.S. Navy, Chikuma became the victim of concentrated air attacks, as did Chokai. Both vessels were crippled and sunk.

The sinking of Gambier Bay had peaked the Japanese assault. At 0911, Kurita had ordered retirement in fact of ever increasing danger from the air, correctly as it turned out. On his retirement, cruiser Suzuya, to which ComCruDiv7 had shifted his flag, was sunk by air attack.

Aiding his decision to retire was a clearly obvious development: he had made his bid when he launched his all-out attack on sighting the baby flattops; now, he was minutely paying a heavy price for no gain. Under the impression of heavy air attacks, Ozawa’s and Nishimura’s demise, and the likelihood that any delay now would only risk the return of Halsey before a successful retirement could be made, nothing could have been a wiser decision; and nothing could have made clearer the ultimate truth the Battle of Leyte Gulf showed: Japan’s Nihon Kaigun was finished.

Thank you, but I know the history of the Battle of Leyte Gulf quite well. I engaged in a bit of "What if..." for the purposes of torpedoing (no pun intended) your assertion that the US Pacific Fleet was an unstoppable force, given it's weapons, numbers and technology. Any force can be defeated on any given day, given the right conditions or series of decisions (see Coral Sea, Midway, for example).

Even with victory at the Phillipine Sea, Japan was not finished. It may not have had a naval air force anymore, but that didn't mean a hill of beans to the 2 million-plus Japanese troops who ultimately went uncontested by any Allied force of consequence between 1941-45.It did not mean that the remnants of the Japanese fleet would be incapable of mounting offensive operations, and if done right, been successful.

Japanese defeat in the Second World War had very little to do with their weapons, or even their numbers. It was a war fought blindfolded, and with one hand tied behind it's back. The blindfold was racism, the rope that tied the hand in place was Japanese culture itself. Give a Yammamoto, Nagumo or Kurita a system of intelligence only half as good as the Allied, and the course of the war could have taken a very different turn, although ultimate victory was still not obtainable.

Give the same men the ability to think like a westerner (i.e. without the cultural baggage of being a traditional Japanese) and the freedom to operate as they see fit (personal initiative) and a Phillipine Sea-type battle need never have been fought, or at least it would have been fought differently.

Put those men in positions of authority within a system that was much less restrictive and much more willing to experiment and question authority, and you have a completely different war on your hands.

The US Navy and the shipyards and aircraft factories of the United States did an outstanding job, it's true, and their sacrifices shouldn't go unrecognized. But, in the final analysis, the eventual defeat of Japan was all but a foregone conclusion 10 minutes after Pearl Harbor.

Personal opinion: The European Theatre.

Yes, the Japanese were fierce, bloddy-minded foes, but in the end, Japan was defeated under curious circumstances; the vast bulk of the Japanese army never saw an allied soldier. However, since the defense of Japan was a naval problem, and the Japanese were so badly prepared for it, defeat was all but assured in a prolonged war.

On the other hand, the Germans fielded perhaps the finest army history had ever seen up to that point. The German soldier who had been such a force on the offensive (Blitzkreig) was twice the soldier on the defensive (this had to do with German small-unit tactics being built around the machine gun as the offensive punch, rather than the manuevering rifle squad, as was common in the Allied armies). This is only a comparison of individual soldiers, not their machines (the PzKfw 3,4, Tiger and King Tiger were far superior to anything in the allied arsenal, except the T-34 and Stalin Tank).

On the European fronts, the Germans (on the defensive) registered a 15:1 kill ratio against the Russians and 7:1 against the Allies. Far in excess (I believe the number is .08 or something) for the Japanese on the defensive (this number is skewed by the very small numbers of Japanese troops actually engaged in combat). More Japanese and Allied troops in the Pacific died of malaria, other tropical diseases and malnutrition, than from actual combat.

These numbers also don't take into account the 60,000 Americans and 50,000 British killed in the strategic bombing campaigns (they went down with their planes).

Source for all of these numbers, incidentally, is "Dirty Little Secrets of World War II", by James Dunnigan (of Strategypage.com).

I agree with you. However, in this particular engagement involving Kurita, it was the Japanese Navy that had the superior force, not the US Navy. Kurita didn't marshall his forces properly and was unable to press the advantage. It is also a mistake to blame Kurita for a lack of audaciousness and not credit the almost suicidal attacks of the US destroyers, which were outgunned and out numbered. Strategically, there is no doubt that the US Navy was unmatched and unstoppable.

Even with victory at the Phillipine Sea, Japan was not finished.

No, but the Japanese Navy was finished. As an island nation with very few resources, the virtual elimination of the Japanese Navy was reallly the death knell for Japan"s mililtary and long term ability to wage war and win. You don't maintain an empire abroad without sea power. Mahan was right about its influence on history and the Japanese read his book.

Japanese defeat in the Second World War had very little to do with their weapons, or even their numbers. It was a war fought blindfolded, and with one hand tied behind it's back. The blindfold was racism, the rope that tied the hand in place was Japanese culture itself. Give a Yammamoto, Nagumo or Kurita a system of intelligence only half as good as the Allied, and the course of the war could have taken a very different turn, although ultimate victory was still not obtainable.

They were good enough to defeat the Russians and Chinese. They lost because they were the inferior power. Their objective was not to occupy America but to assert their power over the region, aka the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Put those men in positions of authority within a system that was much less restrictive and much more willing to experiment and question authority, and you have a completely different war on your hands.

But that wasn't the case, so we will never know. If they had a different culture and system, maybe they don't attack the US and there is no war.

The US Navy and the shipyards and aircraft factories of the United States did an outstanding job, it's true, and their sacrifices shouldn't go unrecognized. But, in the final analysis, the eventual defeat of Japan was all but a foregone conclusion 10 minutes after Pearl Harbor.

That's all 20-20 hindsight. A few days after Pearl Harbor was bombed, Hitler declared war on the US as part of the Axis. At the time, there was no guarantee of victory and the situation was far from rosy. We may have been the sleeping giant, but it took a tremendous national effort to pull it off. It was not a foregone conclusion at the time. We also had some luck at Midway and came within a whisker of defeat in other battles. If the Germans had developed the atomic bomb first, decided not to invade Russia, etc., the outcome could have been much different.

With regards to the first two parts of your reply, we are in agreement. I've only said three times that defeat of Japan's navy assured the defeat of Japan. I don't know how much clearer I can make that.

The point was, that with more audacity, better intelligence and a different system of command and thought, what was left of Japanese sea power (and it was considerable) could have wrecked havoc. It didn't, and that failure had more to do with the Japanese then it did the Americans.

I never underestimated the bravery of the men at Leyte Gulf or their sacrifice. I only pointed out that Kurita was on the cusp of victory when (go figure!) his intelligence failed him; he thought he had run into Halsey proper, not the Taffy's. This caused him to turn tail right at the moment when he had a decisive victory with his reach.

"They were good enough to defeat the Russians and Chinese. They lost because they were the inferior power. Their objective was not to occupy America but to assert their power over the region, aka the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. "

Wow, how difficult was that? The czar's demoralized, ill-prepared, ill-equipped forces, plagued by bad leadership and taken, initially, by surprise. The war wasn't over until the Baltic fleet got slauhtered at Tsu-shima, by a Japanese fleet that had waited for them for almost three months. After Tsu-shima, the Czar ordered his forces to lay down their arms. What was unknown, however, was just how close the Japanese had come to defeat. The Russo-Japanese war had almost broken Japan's military power. The Russians had beaten the Japanese, but the results didn't look like victory to the Czar.

Beat China? A divided, hardly-industrial nation that had been in decline for several hundred years was a deadly enemy? I doubt it. And in the end, China punched far below it's weight, Chiang engaging in a strategy of always pretending to be on the verge of defeat in order to get more aid from Roosevelt to use in keeping himself in power. Chiang's preoccupation was ALWAYS Chiang, not the Japanese. Had it not been, Chinese troops would have made more of a contribution (spare me the tales of Burma, I know them already). What "defeated" the Japanese in China was the need to keep substantial forces in China just to watch all those armed Chinese who hardly ever left their garrisons. That was China's contribution to victory; no battlefield victories of note, but simply remaining a threat. In the end, the Japanese conquered the coastal regions and parts of the North, but never conquered China outright. The Japanese did not "beat" China, China beat them (i.e. China Fatigue) without having to sacrifice it's own military forces.

"Their objective was not to occupy America but to assert their power over the region, aka the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

Their objective was to replace the western imperial system with one of their own. The Greater East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was public relations, entered into very late in the game (when defeat was staring them in the face). There was no "Co-Prosperity Sphere"; only a system where Japan would make the money and the rest of Asia would supply the grist for the mills (see "The Penguin History of the Second World War" - By Calvocoressi, Wint and Pritchard - which explores this in minute detail. The best book on the politics of WWII ever written).

No 20-20 hindsight involved. It was obviouos that Japan was doomed to defeat by anyone who cared to take notice. Yammamoto certainly did. So did many other high ranking officers and diplomats. The fact is, the constant stream of "one more humiliating defeat and the west will negotiate" that runs through Japanese policy and strategy in the Second World War bears this out. The Japanese had learned the wrong lesson from the Russo-Japanese War and 50 years of campaigning in China; they assumed that all they had to do was win a decisive victory and the other side would simply surrender, or at least beg to negotiate. Fat chace of the United States ever doing that.

Yammamoto knew that. But he still decided to do his duty anyway, like a good samurai.

There has been a delightful thread running on these very topics for the last few days:

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1645695/posts

To get back to what motivated Japanese strategy, it seems to me that Eastern Cultures, in general, and Japan in particular, engage in what anthropologists call "ritual warfare". In ritual warfare, display is the weapon of choice; an overwhelming show of force, a superior manuever, a show of prestige, etc, is supposed to defeat an enemy without actually trading shots with him. (John Keegan wrote extensively on this in "The History of Warfare. Superb book).

The inital stages of the Pacific War show all the trademarks of ritual warfare; the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese gains in it's direct aftermath, the speed and shock of the intial advance. It's almost as if they're saying "Look, see how powerful and clever we are? You should quit now and spare yourself the heartache. You can't deal with this."

Even the military culture was heavily impregnated in ritual. All that samurai stuff, for example. All that sake drinking, the banzai charges. Even in death the Japanese followed ritual. It was a pageant of romantic make-believe put on at a time when Japan needed realists.

The problem for all ritual warfare societies, however, is what do you do when the other side decides to fight back? Japan didn't have an answer (neither does Usama Bin Laden, by the way. 9/11 was a prime example of ritual warfare, if you ask me). The Japanese semi-solution was to embark on a series of more "embarassing" defeats of the west (Coral Sea, Midway, Aleutians), hoping that at some point, they could create enough embarassment to force a surrender.

Think about it; we'll take half the Pacific and South East Asia and Britain and America will surrender. Didn;t happen. We'll destroy the American fleet and then drive the Royal Navy from the Indian Ocean, and the Allies will surrender. Didn't happen. Okay, we'll cut off Australia and the Allies will surrender. Oops! They actually fought back. No problem, we'll lead them into a Jutland-like, epic naval battle at Midway and destroy their fleet, and they'll surrender. Aw, Sh*t! We lost!

The Japanese never planned for success in the first place. Consequently, they never planned, or even entertained thoughts of, defeat, either. The Japanese put so much effort on the offensive that when the defensive was called for, they could only fall back on attrition. When the best you can do is attrition, and can only lose while doing it, you know you're in trouble.

The point was, that with more audacity, better intelligence and a different system of command and thought, what was left of Japanese sea power (and it was considerable) could have wrecked havoc. It didn't, and that failure had more to do with the Japanese then it did the Americans.

Those are a lot of ifs, which I really don't see the point of enumerating. They were difficient in a number of areas, which any losing side can point to. If I were 8 feet tall, I could have made it in the NBA. The Japanese had their inherent weaknesses and strengths. If they had used the Kamikazees earlier in the war, that could have played even greater havoc with us. If we hadn't broken the Purple Code, we would have been at a disadvantage. The list goes on and on.

I never underestimated the bravery of the men at Leyte Gulf or their sacrifice. I only pointed out that Kurita was on the cusp of victory when (go figure!) his intelligence failed him; he thought he had run into Halsey proper, not the Taffy's. This caused him to turn tail right at the moment when he had a decisive victory with his reach.

That's how battles are won and lost. He was trying to conserve what was left of the Japanese fleet. I also think you underestimate the courageous attacks of our destroyers, which delayed Kurita's advance. The Japanese gunnery also didn't perform that well. This isn't the first time that an inferior force caused the enemy to retreat.

After Tsu-shima, the Czar ordered his forces to lay down their arms. What was unknown, however, was just how close the Japanese had come to defeat. The Russo-Japanese war had almost broken Japan's military power. The Russians had beaten the Japanese, but the results didn't look like victory to the Czar.

It was far from being a pyrrhic victory for the Japanese. Russia ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan. Russia signed over its 25-year leasehold rights to Port Arthur, including the excellent naval base, and the peninsula around it. Russia further agreed to evacuate Manchuria and recognize Korea as part of the Japanese sphere of influence.

The Japanese virtually destroyed the Eastern and Baltic fleets. The numerically inferior Japanese fleet under Admiral Togo soundly defeated the Russians in the Battle of Tsushima destroying all eight of their battleships.

"It was far from being a pyrrhic victory for the Japanese. Russia ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan. Russia signed over its 25-year leasehold rights to Port Arthur, including the excellent naval base, and the peninsula around it. Russia further agreed to evacuate Manchuria and recognize Korea as part of the Japanese sphere of influence.

The Japanese virtually destroyed the Eastern and Baltic fleets. The numerically inferior Japanese fleet under Admiral Togo soundly defeated the Russians in the Battle of Tsushima destroying all eight of their battleships."

You seriously have no idea of just how many Japanese died in the Russo-Japanese war (in the land battles, not sea battles), do you? In excess of 100,000 Japanese and Koreans, as a matter of fact. The Japanese Army was hampered by ammunition and food shortages, as well. Japan was on the brink of collapse, only the Russians were in even worse shape. When President (Teddy) Roosevelt offered to negotiate a settlement, BOTH sides ran to the table salivating. Japan escaped by the skin of it's teeth.

In this regard, Tsu-shima means nothing. The loss of territory meant nothing to Russia except as an embarrassment on the world stage. Victory and defeat cannot always be measured in territory.

The destruction of the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur (by sneak attack) and the Battle of the Tsu-shima straits, while impressive victories, do not change the fact that Japan was militarily exhausted by the Russo-Japanese War.

You can think of the Japanese "victory" of 1905 in the same terms as we think of Vietnam; American forces (like the Russians) were victorious in the field (depsite their bad leadership), but threw the victory away at the bargaining table, because what they achieved didn't LOOK like victory. Internal Russian politics did more to cause a Russian surrender than Tsu-shima (which was humiliating, but not a death knell for Russia. Japan may strip Russia of it's fleet, but Japan was never going to overrun the Russian Empire).

Besides, the Russians got even at Nomonhon 34 years later (the Japanese lost that one, too, although no one seems to know about it).

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.